

**Middle East Technical University and Revolution: Development Planning and
Architectural Education during the Cold War, 1950-1962**

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ABSTRACT

Middle East Technical University and Revolution: Development Planning and Architectural Education during the Cold War, 1950-1962

Burak Erdim

Through the analysis of the inception and development of the Middle East Technical University (METU), this dissertation examines the relationship between the diverging ideologies of development that became prevalent within the democratizing and decolonizing contexts of the postwar period. The study shows how the idea of training and education, and more specifically, the idea of a school of architecture and community planning emerged within this context as a new strategy of development and as a common ground among the diverging interests of multiple national and international agents and agencies. The study re-examines the roles played by these national and international agents and agencies, including the role of the expert, and proposes new methodologies for the interpretation of primary documents from this period. Furthermore, the study analyzes how the power dynamic among participating professional groups and state agencies contributed to and shaped the outcome of the project. It reveals how the emerging discipline of urban planning and architect-planners, operating in this context and sponsored by the United Nations Housing and Town and Country Planning (UN-HTCP) agency, played a central role in the configuration of this new strategy as well as in the organization of the administrative and spatial make-up of the resulting institution of higher learning. At the same time, it shows how this configuration was then contested and reconfigured as a result of multiple overlapping rivalries among numerous

professional and bureaucratic groups: Between Turkish and foreign architects; between the Turkish architectural community and the State; and, between the two existing schools of architecture. The study presents the rivalries among these national and international agents and agencies as the actual political context of the period revealing how professional groups participated in the Cold War much more directly than previously formulated. Through the course of two successive design competitions and taking advantage of the *coup* of May 27, the study traces how the graduates of the Istanbul Technical University joined hands with the Ministry of Public Works to take the control of the administration and the planning of METU from foreign consultants.

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To my parents and my daughter, Suna

Introduction: METU and Revolution

Through the analysis of the inception and development of the Middle East Technical University (METU; Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, ODTÜ), this dissertation examines the institutional and spatial conceptualization of the idea of training and education as a new strategy of development within the political context of the cold war in the Middle East from 1950 to 1962. It identifies METU as one of the first and most significant projects where the idea of training for development was fully realized. Through this analysis, the study examines how postwar modernism's approach to issues of housing and town and country planning was mediated and transformed within the political and professional settings it encountered as it traveled from the United States (US) to the postwar Middle East.

METU was established through an international collaboration among the United Nations (UN), the University of Pennsylvania School of Fine Arts, and the Turkish Republic, in Ankara, in November 1956. Through an analysis of the relationship among these participants, the study shows that the idea of training and education was not a product of a singular program or agency. Instead, it emerged as a result of rivalries and differences among these multiple agents and agencies that participated in the making of the School.

This proposition requires a redefinition or a reconceptualization of the term “political” as it pertains to the context of the cold war. Instead of defining the cold war as a standoff between two superpowers, this study shows that contentious relationships and

rivalries among multiple national and international groups made up the actual and the working political context of the postwar period.¹ As one shifts one's focus from the analysis of singular agencies, projects, or programs, to the international technical assistance machinery that produced them, it becomes all the more clear how the agency of multiple and diverging interests brought about these projects.²

One challenging question emerges within this proposed framework of diverging interests and contentious politics: How was it then possible to construct projects of international cooperation within a context of such rivalries? This study claims that it was the multiple but overlapping conceptions of revolution that provided the impetus and the common ground for the inception and development of METU.

Modernization, Revolution, and the Social Question

Within the political context of the Cold War, revolution was perceived as the primary threat to the political and economic stability of the world and the sovereignty of

¹ Recent works on the cold war support this definition. See, Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, eds. *Origins of the Cold War: An International History – Second Edition*, (New York; London: Routledge, 1994), 2. Also see, Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8-9.

² Many architectural histories of this period, however, examine built works or building and planning projects as products of a singular agency conceived within a cold war narrowly defined as a standoff between two superpowers. For example, see, Jane C. Loeffler, *The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America's Embassies*, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998); Sarah Goldhagen and R. Legault, eds., *Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000); and, Annabel Jane Wharton, *Building the Cold War: Hilton International Hotels and Modern Architecture* (The University of Chicago Press, 2001). Wharton, in her text, provides information on the negotiations that took place, for example, between the Turkish government, Hilton International, and the CIA to get Istanbul Hilton built; however, she still presents the making of the hotels within a narrow definition of the cold war. Also see, M. Ijlal Muzaffar, "The Periphery Within: Modern Architecture and the Making of the Third World," (Ph.D. diss., MIT, 2007). Among existing studies that examine the postwar period, Greg Castillo's analysis of a program to re-educate a group of German architects is the only one that begins to take into account the German architects' reactions and the context of their local professional cultures. Greg Castillo, "Design Pedagogy Enters the Cold War: The Reeducation of Eleven West German Architects," *JAE* 57 (May 2004): 10-18.

nations.³ It was this particular perception that Le Corbusier (1887-1965), the famous Swiss-French architect, had addressed in his influential formulation of the role of modern architecture, suggesting that its role was to prevent revolutions.⁴ In decolonizing nations, however, ideas of revolution and modernization became components of a singular ideology to overcome cultural and economic domination even in the face of conflicting models of reform and development. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), the leader of the national revolutionary war and the founding President of the Turkish Republic, was among the first national revolutionary leaders to propose modernization as the primary *raison d'état* of revolution.⁵ It was an ideological pairing to resist western hegemony and colonialism and to provide a self-motivated alternative to western models of development. Atatürk's pairing of modernization and revolution defined the primary goals of the Turkish national revolutionary ideology for his successors. During the postwar period and even during Turkey's transition to a multi-party system, the pairing of modernization and revolution was an ideology that could be claimed by either one of the primary parties despite the fact that they differed on certain issues in terms of what they wanted to achieve through this ideology.

³ Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1963), 8.

⁴ Le Corbusier wrote, "It is a question of building which is at the root of the social unrest of today: architecture or revolution." Le Corbusier, *Towards a New Architecture (Vers une Architecture, 1923; New York: Dover, 1986)*, 8.

⁵ Nils Gilman writes, "Although the *idea* of an all-encompassing world-historical progressive process had roots in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European thought, use of the word *modernization* to describe a political and economic program first popularized by the Turkish dictator Kemal Atatürk (1880 [sic]-1938) who made the "modernization of Turkey" one of his central political slogans." Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 30.

Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) recognized the significance and the multiple perceptions of the idea of revolution within the political context of the postwar period.⁶ She argued that, where nuclear proliferation and the armament race rendered any war equivalent to total destruction, becoming the primary deterrent against war itself, revolution took center stage in the physiognomy of the twentieth century as the primary cause as well as the threat to state legitimacy. She found that revolution was the central concept that may have tipped the ideological balance, which was initially in favor of the Soviet Union, toward the US and its allies during the postwar period. She wrote,

In the contest that divides the world today and in which so much is at stake, those will probably win who understand revolution, while those who still put their faith in power politics in the traditional sense of the term and, therefore, in war as the last resort of all foreign policy may well discover in a not too distant future that they have become masters in a rather useless and obsolete trade.⁷

Furthermore, in her analysis of revolutions, Arendt singled out the American revolution as the only successful revolution since it focused on the idea of liberty instead of social justice as its primary motivation. She argued that, for example, the French revolution had failed because the social question had ultimately replaced its primary aims.

Arendt, similar to Karl Marx, did not deny the important role the social question had played in modern revolutions. She defined the “social question,” as the question concerning the existence of poverty. She wrote,

... Since the eighteenth century, we have come to call the social question and what we may better and more simply call the existence of poverty. Poverty is more than deprivation, it is a state of constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; poverty is abject because it puts men

⁶ Arendt, 8.

⁷ Ibid.

under the absolute dictate of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictate of necessity as all men know it from their most intimate experience and outside all speculations.⁸

She recognized that, within the political context of the Cold War, the “social question” grew in scale from a question concerning the existence of poverty within nations to a question concerning the existence of poverty and under-development in the world.⁹

However, she differed from Marx and maintained that revolutions could not be reduced to or explained through the social question alone. She wrote,

The transformation of the Rights of Man into the rights of Sans-Culottes was the turning point not only of the French Revolution but of all revolutions that were to follow. This is due in no small measure to the fact that Karl Marx, the greatest theorist the revolutions ever had, was so much more interested in history than in politics and therefore neglected, almost entirely, the original intentions of the men of the revolutions, the foundation of freedom, and concentrated his attention, almost exclusively, on the seemingly objective course of revolutionary events. In other words, it took more than half a century before the transformation of the Rights of Man into the rights of Sans-Culottes, the abdication of freedom before the dictate of necessity, had found its theorist.¹⁰

Arendt identified that the social question had begun to play a revolutionary role only when, in the modern age and not before, men began to doubt that poverty is inherent in the human condition.¹¹ Arendt argued that America played a central role in making this shift happen, as it became the symbol of a society without poverty long before the modern age. In this way, Arendt pointed out that it was not the American Revolution

⁸ Hannah Arendt, “Chapter Two: The Social Question,” in *On Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1963), 50.

⁹ See Hannah Arendt’s, Chapter Two, entitled, “The Social Question,” in, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1963), 49-105.

¹⁰ Arendt, 51.

¹¹ Arendt, 12.

alone, but the existence of conditions in America that had been established and were well known in Europe long before the Declaration of Independence, that nourished the revolutionary *élan* in Europe and beyond.¹² To be clear, she pointed out that it was the absence of the social question in America, that inspired the revolutionary *élan* in Europe. In the aftermath of WWII, the emergence of the US as the primary political and economic power also promised an erasure of poverty and the social question altogether. However, an entirely different scene emerged during the years following the end of the Second World War. Instead of disappearing altogether, the social question became increasingly important in domestic as well as in international politics.¹³

Odd Arne Westad also identified the promise that America held within the postwar context.¹⁴ He wrote, “In urban popular culture, in Europe and in the Third World, America established itself as the epitome of modernity (over Fascism and Communism), conveying ideas that undermined existing concepts of status, class, ethnicity, and identity,” and therefore opening ground for nations and groups that had traditionally existed in the peripheries within the colonial world order. Within this context, he argued that the idea of liberty continued to be one of the two underlying forces in determining US identity and postwar foreign policy. He found that American ideals of liberty as a

¹² Arendt, . For a comparison between the American and Turkish revolutions, see Garrett Ward Sheldon, *Jefferson and Atatürk: Political Philosophies*, (New York: P. Lang, 2000).

¹³ Arendt, 12.

¹⁴ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8-9.

global influence were far more profound than just American models for production or management.¹⁵

At the same time, he found that there was yet a second force within US political traditions that ran counter to the idea of universal liberty and that was global economic interest. However, within the political context of the Cold War, US global economic interests could not be supported by the theory of imperialism.

Karl Marx (1818-1883) explained the theory of imperialism in his analysis of the capitalist means of production.¹⁶ He recognized that *raison d'Etat* was one of the primary ideologies through which the expansion of capitalist means of production based on surplus value and colonialism was justified in western political science and philosophy.¹⁷ Marx, in his analysis of the expansion of capitalism and the consequent definition of colonialism identified the mutual dependency of industrialized and underdeveloped nations. In his theory of imperialism, like many of his contemporaries, he castigated the misery and destruction, the arbitrariness and suffering imposed, for example, on India by the East India Company.¹⁸ He rationalized that the methods and the machinery that the

¹⁵ Ibid., 19. James Burnham, writing just before and during WWII, had argued that the American mastery of methods of production would provide the greatest advantage for American influence across the world. See, James Burnham, *The Struggle for the World*, (New York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1947); and, *The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening in the World* (1941), (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1972).

¹⁶ For Karl Marx's analysis of the theory of imperialism, I relied on, Jorge Larrain's, *Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism, and Dependency*, (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press and Basil Blackwell, 1989).

¹⁷ See especially Chapter Two entitled, "The Expansion of Capitalism: Colonialism and Imperialism," in Jorge Larrain, *Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism, and Dependency*, (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press and Basil Blackwell, 1989), 45-84.

¹⁸ Larrain, 46-49.

East India Company brought to India would eventually belong to India, facilitating its modernization. In this way, Marx refused to idealize the Indian autochthonous village life, which, according to his view, had been the basis of the poverty, cruelty, massacres and barbarism characterizing oriental despotism.¹⁹ At the same time, he denied any other possible means of modernization for India other than subjugation and colonization by the British Empire. He also refused to recognize that colonialism benefited the colonizers exponentially more than the colonized who were also perpetually denied a modern and sovereign identity.

Within the political dynamic that emerged after World War II, the theory of imperialism, which was based on an imperialist system of surplus production dependent on the inequality among nations, could no longer be openly supported. The processes of capitalism as the only model for development had also come under severe criticism. The appeal of the Russian socialist experience as well as the widespread poverty of decolonizing and newly developing nations threatened capitalism in both economic and ideological ways.²⁰ Within this context, while the theory of imperialism was being revised, development economics and the sociology of development were emerging as new disciplines. A vital political dynamic emerged among developed and developing nations replacing the theory of imperialism. Within this dynamic, developed nations found themselves in a position to gain the sympathy and ensure the legitimacy and success of the existing ruling elite in developing nations in order to continue the

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Larrain, 85.

advantageous trade agreements and economic sanctions they received previously under colonial systems.

Consequently, the theory of modernization emerged as an alternative to the theory of imperialism while maintaining its core postulates. In his rationalization of colonial practices, Marx foreshadowed the postulates of modernization theory, which operated on the invented existence of two ideal types: the traditional society (“rural,” “backward,” or “underdeveloped”) and the modern society (“urban,” “developed,” “industrial”). In this way, modernization theory maintained that all societies would follow the same pattern of change undergone earlier by the developed nations as they departed from one polar type towards the other. Modernization theorists did not question the ability of capitalist modes of production to bring about development and refused to accept the identity of interests between the two polar types.²¹ Furthermore, modernization theory largely undermined or neutralized the revolutionary content embedded in the ideology of modernization as formulated by Atatürk and understood by the Third World. Instead, it repositioned the social question as a way to ensure political and economic stability and to avoid revolutions in the developing world.

Within this dynamic, while world agencies and international aid organizations, such as the UN and its subsidiary agencies and the United States Agency for International Development (US-AID), began to shift their attention from economic development to building state legitimacy by refining administrative and welfare systems, the idea of

²¹ Larrain, 87.

national liberation and equality among nations remained more important for the decolonizing and the developing nations.

Consequently, the idea of world governance and planned development emerged somewhat contrary to both American and Third World ideals of liberty and economic freedom. It was a counter-revolutionary movement that focused on the social question and on preventing the breakdown of capitalist systems. As World War II was coming to an end, a generation of Washington officials, who had begun their careers during the economic troubles of the 1930s, had already realized that the long-term success of the US economy depended on the establishment of an international trade system. At the Bretton Woods Conference, held in July 1944, representatives of the Allied governments concluded agreements to set up an International Monetary Fund (to stabilize exchange rates and promote convertibility of currencies) and a World Bank (to help finance economic reconstruction). Both institutions began operations in 1946. One of the primary objectives of these institutions was to increase government intervention and cooperation in Europe and the developing nations to regulate both national and international economic systems in order to ensure economic and political stability around the world. Paralleling the suggestions of the Keynesian school of economics and following the experiences of the Great Depression, employment, stability, and growth had now become important subjects of public policy. Economists were predicting that “the absence of a high degree of economic collaboration among the leading nations will... inevitably result

in economic warfare that will be but the prelude and instigator of military warfare on an even vaster scale.”²²

This counter-revolutionary function that the world agencies had adopted aligned with the aims Le Corbusier had established for Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM).²³ One of CIAM’s central aims was to bring the social and formal concerns of modern architecture to the attention of state and industrial patronage worldwide. Many key members of CIAM had immigrated to the US during the course of WWII and through meetings held at the New School of Social Research in New York tried to formulate an agenda for CIAM within the context of postwar reconstruction. Ernest Weissmann, a prominent CIAM member representing Yugoslavia, was part of the international team of architects who were involved in the design of the UN building. He then became the director of the Housing and Town and Country Planning (UN-HTCP) division of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations. By 1950, he had set up the largest single organization that supported and coordinated numerous housing and planning projects, seminars, and workshops on issues regarding housing, construction, urbanization, and city and regional planning, therefore becoming the postwar face of CIAM. Weissmann and the UN-HTCP, through their focus on the social question of modernization, would be the central agent and the agency that would play a key role in the inception of METU.

²² Robert A. Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 8.

²³ CIAM was founded in La Sarraz, Switzerland, in June 1928 as the primary coalition of avant-garde groups from across Europe.

In this way, the political context of the postwar was made up of three primary positions regarding modernization. First was the position of the decolonizing world that replaced colonization with the ideology of revolution and modernization. Second was the American promise of liberty and economic freedom. Third was the position held by the agencies of world governance and was centered on the social question. While it could not be supported within the US, it was a position that was popularized abroad and focused on state legitimacy and economic stability in order to maintain a capitalist world order. The political context of the cold war emerged among these three primary although diverging positions.

In this way, the trope of revolution, through the multiple ways it was perceived and paired with the idea of development and modernization within the political context of the cold war, explains how the diverging interests of involved parties overlapped and differed in the establishment of METU. In this analysis, the notion of “misunderstandings” ubiquitous in accounts of colonial and postcolonial exchanges is replaced by the notion of overlaps and differences. As a result, the identities of each involved party emerge as equally relevant within a context of shifting political and professional rivalries.

Situating METU and Revolution in a Broader Context

Four years after the School’s establishment, Turkey experienced its first military *coup d’etat* (May 27, 1960) since its founding as a Republic in 1923. The popular Democrat Party (DP) government was overthrown by a rebellion organized primarily by a group of lower ranking military officials who expected to find the support of the

national revolutionary elite. Perhaps not surprisingly, METU experienced a period of phenomenal growth during this period following the *coup* of May 27, from 1961 to its temporary closing in 1969, due to repeated student protests. In 1961, Kemal Kurdaş, who had served as the Finance Minister of the National Unity Committee (1960-1961) after the *coup*, agreed to become the President of the University.²⁴ During Kurdaş's tenure (1961-69), the plans to build a Campus, which had been in the works since the establishment of the School in 1956, finally went into effect. Over a period of time, METU moved out of its provisional quarters located in the support buildings of the Grand National Assembly Complex in Ankara and into the buildings that were constructed on its new Campus located in the urbanizing outskirts of Ankara.

Even though my dissertation does not cover the School's development during the mid- to late-1960s, it is significant to note that the University and its Campus had become the epi-center of anti-American and anti-capitalist national revolutionary movements in Turkey by the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Interestingly, it was not just the administration, the faculty, and the students of METU who acquired this reputation and identity. Many METU buildings and sites around its Campus had also inscribed themselves into the Turkish national consciousness as iconic sites of resistance and revolution against right-wing conservatism, capitalism and imperialism.

For example, the word *devrim*, which means revolution in Turkish, that was painted in 1968 in very large letters by five students across the full length of the *beton-*

²⁴ Kurdaş was offered the job initially by the National Planning Agency, which was established during the reconstruction period, and by Orhan Mersinli, the Chairman of the Board of Visitors of the University. Kurdaş, 25-26.

brut, poured-in-place concrete bleachers of the athletic stadium gained a mythical significance (**figure 0.1**). Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing especially into the early 1970s, many stories were disseminated in daily newspapers and television broadcasts regarding the inexplicable permanence of the word *devrim* on the stadium bleachers, despite every attempt to erase the paint from the rough surface of the concrete. The paint was allegedly devised by a Chemical Engineering student and contained an acidic substance that etched the letters deep into the surface of the concrete. Images of the Campus and news regarding the magical re-appearance of the letters were usually coupled with news regarding the ongoing national trials of activist students.

The word *devrim* also appeared equally prominently in other parts of the Campus, such as the central *allée*, which had come to “belong” to the students (**figure 0.2**). This pedestrian *allée* was the central conduit that connected all the departments of the University. It also provided side spaces between departments where the students could gather, study, play, and enjoy a freedom they could not find in the spaces of the city (**figure 0.3**).

Interestingly, Altuğ and Behruz Çinici, the young Turkish wife and husband team who won the second and the final competition for the design of the METU Campus in 1961, claimed these very sites as the more outstanding innovations of their proposal (**figures 0.4 - 0.5 & 7.17**). Photographs depicting the School of Architecture Building, other buildings and spaces along the central pedestrian *allée*, and the main stadium, were featured in a number of international and Turkish architectural journals and

publications.²⁵ In several of these publications, Behruz Çinici drew particular attention to the positioning these sites as will be discussed in detail in the final chapter of this dissertation.

However, the way the Çinicis explained their work and the School's identity associated with the student movements of the 1960s, as powerful and compelling as they are in constructing an identity for METU within that particular historical context, have unfortunately obscured a more complex, significant, and transnational history of the School. For example, even though the Çinicis were well aware of the contributions and continuing influence of UN consultants in the development of the ideas that governed the criteria set out for the campus plan, they chose to explain their proposal through a narrative of their own rise to legitimacy as professionals. The broader context hidden beneath this narrative doesn't negate the meaning or the power of these narratives. In fact, it actually positions Çinicis' work within the international context that they always wanted to be a part of. After all, to bring Turkey's standards of higher education to international standards and to design a model University campus for Turkey that would draw international acclaim were at least two of the multiple aims of the idea to establish a UN-sponsored University in Turkey. However, neither the Çinicis nor the students were

²⁵ Even though the Çinicis were awarded the METU campus plan project in 1961, METU master plan did not appear in Turkish or International architectural publications until 1965. This rather unusual delay in the publication of the design will be discussed later in the dissertation. For initial publications of the METU campus and buildings, see, *Mimarlık* 1 (1965), 18-22, "Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi;" *Arkitekt* 3-4 (1965), 108-09, "Ankara'da Orta Doğu Üniversitesi;" *Arkitekt* 1 (1966), 5-9, "Orta Doğu Üniversitesi, Fen Lisesi Binası." For initial publications in international journals, see, *L'architettura* 114 n.12 (April 1965) : 804-811; Jürgen Joedicke, "Middle East Technical University," *Bauen und Wohnen* 19 (July 1965), 275-280; *Baumeister* 12 (December 1965): 1373-1375, "Middle East Technical University, Ankara;" *Progressive Architecture* (October 1966): 78, "The Designing Cinicis [*sic*]." See the bibliography for a more comprehensive list.

comfortable in claiming these international links within the modernities and nationalisms of the immediate post-*coup* years.

Furthermore, as this study will reveal, METU's revolutionary identity can actually be traced in multiple ways to its international roots. During the immediate postwar period, varying perceptions of national revolutionary ideals of sovereignty, modernization, and development were among the primary aims that had propelled projects of international cooperation and development forward. Consequently, understanding how ideologies of nationalism and internationalism overlapped and differed becomes central to understanding the dynamic among numerous agents and agencies, both governmental and professional, that were involved in the making of projects such as METU.

Chapter Outlines

Through the framework of revolution and within the political context of the relationships among national and international agents and agencies, the dissertation examines the inception and development of METU in seven chapters.

Chapter one provides the background to the political dynamic that formed among UN consultants and various Turkish political and professional groups as Turkey became a regional center and a model nation in the Middle East during a brief period in the aftermath of World War II. The chapter identifies the UN agents and agencies, as well as the Democrat (DP) and the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP) officials as the key groups and discusses their identities in relation to the Cold War and in terms of how each group perceived the idea of education and training in relation to their own understanding of

revolution. The chapter then shows where overlaps occurred among these varying perceptions and the ideals of modernization and development.

Chapter two provides the background to the workings and the breakdown of the so-called, “technical assistance machinery,” in Turkey during the postwar period. It shows how Turkey, despite its critical stance towards the UN, was one of the first countries to follow UN recommendations to implement indicative planning or country planning practices. Through the implementation of these programs, Turkey hoped to bring US funding to these projects. However, as US foreign aid to Turkey began to shrink during the mid- to late-1950s, the technical assistance machinery came to a halt followed by a political breakdown between the DP and the Eisenhower administrations. This chapter also analyzes in some detail the housing and planning initiatives that the UN was structuring for the developing world prior to the breakdown of the relations in Turkey. Here the chapter examines Charles Abrams’ involvement in a major international conference on housing and planning in New Delhi six months prior to his arrival in Turkey on his first overseas mission as a housing expert.

Chapter three examines Abrams’ encounter with the weary state of the technical assistance machinery in Turkey and how he reformulated his proposal to appeal to the diverging interests of involved parties and to reconnect the pieces of the technical assistance machinery. The chapter focuses on the letter that Abrams wrote to Ernest Weissmann, architect and the director of the United Nations Housing and Town and Country planning division (UN-HTCP) where he presented the idea as a new School of Architecture and Community Planning. The Turkish officials had supported the project as

a technical university and the US officials were interested only if the UN would spearhead the project. Knowing that the education of planners was a topic of common interest, Abrams chose to present it to the UN as a School of Architecture and Community Planning, making this an offer that the UN could not refuse within the prevailing contentious politics of the time. Abrams figured that the slight differences in the scope and content could be worked out later, once the project got off the ground.

Chapter four shows how Abrams' proposal constituted a shift in UN-HTCP's focus from policy development to training and education. The chapter analyzes the report Abrams filed following his mission to Turkey and how he formulated the idea of training and education as a new strategy of modernization in developing countries following his experience in Turkey. At the same time, the chapter also points out that Abrams left out the contentious politics he faced in Turkey from the content of the report. Instead, he made his argument for training along ideologies that were already accepted by the UN, eliminating the Turkish voice from the report. Through this analysis and building on the discussion of Abrams' letter to Weissmann in the previous chapter, chapter four raises questions about the reading and interpretation of primary documents from this period. It shows how these documents represent the discourse of their primary audience, the UN in this case, at the expense of all other parties who were involved in the making of the project. At the end, the chapter also traces how Weissmann and Abrams, working with other UN-HTCP consultants, tried to implement the idea of training and education in other locations around the world, including Ghana and South America.

Chapter five returns to Ankara with the University of Pennsylvania team of experts who accepted the job of establishing the School of Architecture and Planning in Turkey. This chapter examines the continuing debates regarding the scope and content of the project among UN, US, and Turkish agents and agencies. Once again, Holmes Perkins, the Dean of the School of Fine Arts at the University of Pennsylvania, structured the scope and content of the School based on the overlaps among the varying perceptions of the project. While the US funding emerges as one of the central issues determining the scope, the staffing, and the curriculum of the school, as the US pulls out of the project, the UN and Turkish negotiations begin to make up the dynamic that determines the development of the School. Chapter five then traces the innovative and interdisciplinary curriculum and staffing of the School, discussing its budget and how it contributed to the making of the emerging dynamic between Turkish teachers and professionals and foreign consultants.

Chapter six examines the spatial and administrative developments as the School began to grow from a School of Architecture into a University. The chapter first analyzes how the consultants, working with the School's Board of Trustees, differentiated the School's administrative structure from other existing Universities in Turkey. The chapter then examines the development of the University's campus plan through the successive proposals submitted by UN consultants who came to teach at the School. The chapter analyzes these proposals in relation to the projects that were being carried out with the students in the School. The chapter also shows how the campus planning project somewhat indirectly led to a divide between UN consultants who developed them and the

Turkish faculty who were not able to fully engage or have a voice in this project. In the end, the chapter shows how Holmes Perkins took full control of the project preparing a set of campus plans he called, “the consultants’ plans.”

The seventh and the final chapter examines how the Turkish architectural and bureaucratic community became aware of the alliance between Perkins and the School’s Board of Trustees and gradually took control of the project, over the course of two successive competitions, taking advantage of the developments that were taking place within the political context of the period. The chapter first analyzes the events that led to the organization of the first competition. Here the chapter shows how Perkins and the Board of Trustees, in order to involve the Turkish architectural community in the project, decided to open a competition to select one or more Turkish architects who could work with the Perkins team in the implementation of the campus plan. However, when Turgut Cansever, the Turkish architect who was awarded the first place in the competition, and the Turkish professional and bureaucratic community realized that Perkins would continue to oversee the project, they began to look for ways of taking control of this prestigious commission.

The second half of the chapter examines the program and the result of the second competition, which came about in the wake of the *coup* of May 27. The National Unity Committee that ran the government operations following the *coup* dismissed METU’s presiding Board of Trustees, therefore annulling any ties and agreements that existed between the Trustees and Perkins. They appointed a new Board, which was dominated by professors and practitioners who were graduates of Istanbul Technical University (ITU).

ITU was the school that had traditionally provided the technical bureaucrats for the State. This was a development that Perkins would deeply resent since the whole idea behind establishing METU was to bring a new system that would challenge and reform existing schools. Instead, what was happening was that ITU was taking over METU. Interestingly, however, ITU bureaucrats re-used many of the guidelines and recommendations that the Perkins team had developed for METU's site plan and for the first competition. They had no reservations about adapting what the consultants had developed. At the same time, they made sure that two young ITU graduates won the second competition. The Çinicis, in their explanations of the well-known site plan never acknowledged the links of the second competition program to the consultants' plans. Instead, they told the story of the competition without giving any credit to the collaboration with UN-sponsored US experts.

Existing Studies and Sources on METU

Despite its international origins, along with many other postwar projects of international cooperation, METU has remained outside of the mainstream studies that cover postwar developments in architecture and planning.²⁶ In recent years, there has been a growing interest in METU's beginnings and development, mainly at METU itself, both at the institutional and departmental levels.²⁷ Paralleling the multiplicity of agendas

²⁶ For a brief account of the establishment of METU as a UN project, see, Craig Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 87-90.

²⁷ Several reasons can be listed for this interest: The celebration of the School's 50th Anniversary in 2006, and, as will be discussed below, the appearance of the Howard Reed papers at METU are both contributors to this renewed interest.

in its beginnings, METU has been studied either as a model institution; or as a model community and campus; or as a school of architecture; but in distinct and separate ways, without recognizing that each one of these treatments makes certain assumptions about what METU is. To treat METU as a University or a campus, without recognizing its other identities, inevitably empowers or prioritizes only one of the voices or identities that were operative in its making.

The studies that examine the institutional make-up of METU have been carried out by scholars in history or public administration and focus on the administrative make up of the University. These studies usually examine METU as an administrative model for other state organizations, as well as towns and villages, and ultimately for the organization of the State. Among these, Howard Reed's analysis of Hacettepe and Middle East Technical universities is perhaps the most well-known and influential especially among historians and scholars of public administration.²⁸ Reed's 1975 essay re-introduces Hacettepe and METU as innovative and relevant models in response to new demands placed on Turkish institutions of higher learning within the domestic political context of the early 1970s.²⁹ After providing a brief overview of the evolution,

²⁸ Howard A. Reed, "Hacettepe and Middle East Technical University: New Universities in Turkey." *Minerva* XIII, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 200-235. Howard Reed, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Connecticut, is one of the pioneers of Turkish studies in the US. See, Howard A. Reed, "An American Family's Lasting Links with Izmir (Smyrna) and Turkey since 1830: Trade, Education, and Philanthropy Bridging Three Centuries," *Proceedings of the Fourteenth CIEPO Symposium Held in Çeşme 18-22 September 2000*, ed. Prof. Dr. Tuncer Baykara (Ankara, Turkey: Turkish Historical Society, 2004), 631-638; and, "Perspectives on the Evolution of Turkish Studies in North America since 1946," *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 1 (winter 1997): 15-31.

²⁹ Reed, 200. Similar to the way that METU was established as a school of architecture and community planning, Hacettepe was established as a model children's hospital through a US-Turkish collaboration during the 1950s to reduce infant deaths and child diseases in the capital city. Both

development, and the present make-up of Turkish institutions of higher learning, Reed discusses the inception, development, and the administrative structure of Hacettepe and METU as a divergent pattern that, “shows the possibilities of new and distinctive procedures and modes of organization, even within a highly centralized state.”³⁰ He then goes on to point out the innovative features of each institution which set them apart within the Turkish context and gave them the ability to produce competent professionals who could function competitively on the world stage. He describes the key features of METU in the following manner:

Late in 1958 UNESCO obtained the services of Mr. Harold Stassen as a consultant to METU, primarily to advise on a draft statute... Mr. Stassen made two trips to Ankara in November 1958 and March 1959, in between which he drafted an unusual charter for METU, which was revised by an advisory committee to the Turkish Government during his second visit and adopted without major changes.

This law is unique in Turkish university legislation and marks a sharp break with other institutional charters and tradition. The vesting of authority in a board of trustees, rather than in faculty boards and a senate, provision for a permanent president as chief executive officer with wide powers, instruction in English and special financial and auditing provisions are among many features which distinguish this law from all other Turkish university statutes.³¹

institutions grew rapidly to become full-fledged universities. On Hacettepe, Reed wrote, “By 1 March, 1954, Dr. İhsan Dođramacı persuaded 171 members of the parliament to support a bill introduced in the final days of the annual budget debates, to provide T.L. 850,000—roughly \$3000,000 at the prevailing rate of T.L. 2.80 to \$1.00—to begin building the new center with the aid of the architect Adnan Onaran... In the autumn of 1955, Dr. Dođramacı was awarded a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship to visit child health and maternity centres in the United States and Mexico. In February 1956 the Rockefeller Foundation granted \$100,000 ‘for equipment and supplies, and for visiting teachers and specialists...’ for a four year period.” See Reed, 214-215. On a personal note, my mother, Esim Erdim, at the time, a young American studies scholar at the Ankara University, gave birth to me in 1969, at the Hacettepe University Hospital. She has always spoken of her doctor and the hospital with great confidence and as one of the most forward-thinking places in Turkey.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Reed, 224-25.

In the rest of the essay, Reed provides further details on the responsibilities of the president, board of the trustees, and the function of the instruction in English.

In his analysis, Reed makes use of both archival resources and interviews with key figures who took part in the establishment of the University. Among the archival resources that Reed relies on were the annual reports submitted by UN and UNESCO consultants working either as administrators or as teaching and research faculty at the University.³² Reed also makes use of interviews with key politicians, university administrators, and faculty, which he recorded on tapes. Reed donated all of this material to METU as he was retiring from his post at the University of Connecticut in the early 1990s.

Arif Payaslıoğlu's history of METU is the most detailed existing record of the University's years of inception and development from 1954 to 1964.³³ It makes use of the material that was provided by Reed, as well as new documents obtained from the UN archives in New York, from the University Archives of the University of Pennsylvania,

³² The most comprehensive collection of these reports is available in the United Nations archives in New York. See the Bibliography for a list of all reports, located by this study, on METU. For his assessment of METU, Reed also relied on two previous studies both of which were funded partially again by UNESCO: Metin Heper, *Decision-making in the Middle East Technical University: Responsiveness of the University to the Socio-Economic Development Efforts in Turkey*, assisted by Orhan Yılmaz Silier, sponsored by International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 1973); and, Clement Henry Dodd, ed. *Studies in University Government and Administration* (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 1962). In the latter source, see especially the last essay by Dodd, "The Middle East Technical University," 63-76. While doing work on universities, Dodd was also writing on Turkish politics and government. See, C.H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969). There are two other sources that should be noted here: Frederick W. Frey, *Education and Political Development in Turkey* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1963); and again by Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965).

³³ Arif Payaslıoğlu, *Barakadan Kampusa 1954-1964 [From Barracks to Campus 1954-1964]* (Ankara: METU Publications, 1996).

and other materials that were made available for Payaslıoğlu's use from the President's office during Prof. Dr. Süha Sevük's tenure as President of the University.³⁴ Payaslıoğlu, a former Professor in the School of Public Administration first in Ankara University and then at METU, was a good choice for the task as he himself was a product of postwar US-Turkish educational exchanges and technical assistance.³⁵ Payaslıoğlu, in his account of METU, argues two primary points. First, METU was just as much a product of the efforts of Turkish bureaucrats and technocrats as it was a product of UN and US programs. In this way, he sets out to correct the point of view developed through numerous UN reports and foreign historians regarding the origins of the University.

Payaslıoğlu's second thesis is that METU was extraordinary within the Turkish context in the way that it was founded and developed by technocrats and bureaucrats

³⁴ Payaslıoğlu, in his Introduction, explains how Prof. Dr. Namık Kemal Aras, from the Department of Physics at METU, met somewhat accidentally with Reed in the US during a Fulbright Research trip to the US. Reed asked Aras if he would take the materials to METU if he were to give them to him and Aras kindly agreed. Aras shipped approximately four boxes of materials comprised of documents, notes, and tapes of interviews to METU as he was returning to Turkey at the end of his Fulbright. It is conceivable to think that the arrival of this material at METU was what ignited the effort to begin to write a history. A committee was formed under the directorship of the Süha Sevük and it was decided that Payaslıoğlu, who was then retired, should direct the research and writing. Payaslıoğlu notes that the Reed documents were organized and archived in the President's office for future use by scholars. See, Payaslıoğlu, xx-xxi. Also see, Howard Reed, phone interview by author, 11 October 2007, digital recording, author's archive; and, Namık Kemal Aras, phone interview by author, 30 January 2008, digital recording, author's archive. However, the METU President's office was not aware of the location of these materials upon my request in 2007-08. One or two boxes of materials were found, however the University, under the guidance of Ayşen Savaş, Associate Professor in the School of Architecture and Advisor to the President on Cultural Affairs, reluctantly made only a portion of these materials available for my review only after repeated requests on my part and phone calls from Ersin Onulduran's office, the Fulbright Director in Ankara. I am indebted to Ersin Onulduran and Seçil Yazıcıoğlu at the Fulbright Office for their help on this matter.

³⁵ Along with a number of his colleagues (Necat Erder, Orhan Türkay, and Cevat Geray) at the Department of Political Science at the Ankara University, Payaslıoğlu was in one of the first groups of scholars who were sent to the New York University as a part of an exchange program between the two universities.

instead of by traditional academicians.³⁶ The book points out that METU established a new academic tradition in Turkey. This is the reason why the title of the book, “Baraka’dan Kampus’a...” picks up on the nickname that the academicians in other universities in Turkey had used for METU, “Baraka Üniversitesi,” or “University of Barracks.”³⁷ Consequently, Payaslıoğlu’s book struck a cord and was influential within the audience that it was intended for. It is unfortunate that the book is published only in Turkish and Payaslıoğlu’s tone addresses a limited audience of Turkish academicians, educators, bureaucrats, and technocrats who would have been “in-the-know” and familiar with the trials and the tribulations that the Turkish bureaucrats and technocrats faced in the making of METU in one way or another.³⁸ Later depictions of the school’s early years in documentary films and magazine articles tended to emphasize this rather reclusive and national revolutionary aspects of the making of the University instead of its mission to become a regional and international University during the time of its inception within the political context of the Cold War.³⁹

³⁶ Both of these points are recognized and pointed out in President Süha Sevük’s, “Preface.” See Payaslıoğlu, v.

³⁷ It is true that a number of barracks, supplied by US-AID, were used as classrooms during the initial years of the school, therefore earning this nickname for the University.

³⁸ The decision to publish Payaslıoğlu’s book only in Turkish also point to a significant turn of events at METU. Keeping in mind that the provision to make English the primary language of instruction was one of the fundamental articles of the METU Charter, the University’s chose to publish the book only in Turkish points to an intentional narrowing of METU’s mission by the late 1990s.

³⁹ Especially in Part I of the two part documentary of METU that was prepared by GISAM, METU’s public relations and media center, METU is depicted in the way that Payaslıoğlu reconstructs it in his book. Even though the movie uses Ersoy’s title (see the next footnote), it is based largely on Payaslıoğlu’s thesis. Önder M. Özdem and Berrin Balay Tuncer, *Bozkırı Yeşertenler: ODTÜ Tarihi – Bölüm I (1956 – 1963) [Cultivators of the Steppe: History of METU – Part I (1956 – 1963)]* (GISAM, 2006). See also, again by GISAM, *Zor Yıllar: ODTÜ Tarihi – Bölüm II (1964 – 1980) [Difficult Years: History of METU – Part II (1964 – 1980)]* (GISAM, 2008).

Aside from Payaslıoğlu's book, there are also a number of published and unpublished memoirs that provide further information on the early years of METU. Among these, Uğur Ersoy's account of the years around his tenure as an Assistant to President W.R. Woolrich is a reliable additional source that provides accurate information on the effects of the distinct laws and procedures that set METU apart from other universities in Turkey.⁴⁰ Ersoy's account gives equal credit to UN and Turkish administrators in the establishment of METU. Kemal Kurdaş's account of the events during his Presidency is an excellent source on METU's development and maturation as a University and campus during the years following the Coup d'Etat of May 27, 1960.⁴¹ Furthermore, Nurettin Çalışkan's journalistic account of the history of the University provides valuable information especially on the student movements of the late 1960s.⁴² For this study, regarding the institutional history of METU and the events surrounding its establishment and development, I have been able to interview both Kemal Kurdaş and Uğur Ersoy to confirm and clarify the details of some of the events they describe in their memoirs.⁴³

⁴⁰ Uğur Ersoy, *Bozkırı Yeşertenler: ODTÜ Kuruluş Yılları Anıları, 1959-1963* [*Cultivators of the Steppe: Memoirs of METU's Founding Years, 1959-1963*] (Kadıköy, İstanbul: Evrim Yayınevi, 2002). Also see, Kani Mutlugün Gökpınar, *ODTÜ Barkalar Devri, 1959-1964* [*METU during the Period of the Barracks*] (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1999).

⁴¹ Kemal Kurdaş, *ODTÜ Yıllarım: Bir Hizmetin Hikayesi* [My METU Years: The Story of a Service]. Ankara: METU Press, 1998. Also see, Ayşe Taylan, *ODTÜ'yu ODTÜ Yapan Rektör: Kemal Kurdaş: Anılar, Görüşler* [*The Rector Who Made METU into METU: Kemal Kurdaş: Memoirs, Thoughts*] (İstanbul: EKV, 2006).

⁴² Nurettin Çalışkan, *ODTÜ Tarihçe, 1956-1980* [METU History, 1956-1980] (Çankaya, Ankara: Arayış Yayınları, 2002).

⁴³ Kemal Kurdaş, interview by author, 16 November 2007, digital recording, author's archive. Uğur Ersoy, interview by author, 13 December 2007, digital recording, author's archive. Here one should

There have been a number of studies in the form of Master's theses and Ph.D. dissertations on the program and curriculum of METU's School of Architecture and Regional Planning.⁴⁴ Recently, paralleling the University's interest in its beginnings and inspired by the events celebrating the school's first fifty years, the School of Architecture began to document its early years through exhibitions and oral histories.⁴⁵ In 2006, Sevgi Aktüre, Professor of Urban and Regional Planning, organized an exhibition providing a comprehensive list of all publications produced by the School of Architecture faculty and press from the school's beginnings to 2006.⁴⁶

The development of METU's campus plan has been analyzed and documented, although anecdotally, in a number of short essays and studies. Interestingly, during the five year master planning process that METU went through where each successive plan and competition was discussed and reviewed publicly, none of the proposals were

also note Ekmel Derya's unfinished manuscripts documenting and discussing the initial years of the school, Ekmel Derya, "Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Kuruluş Yılları," in .doc format, made available by Baykan Gunay, Professor of Urban Planning, Department of Regional Planning, METU.

⁴⁴ Aktan Acar, "The Construction and Execution of Beginning Design Education at the Middle East Technical University Department of Architecture between 1956-2000" (Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2003); Yüksel Yeşim Uysal, "A Survey on the System of Education at the Middle East Technical University Department of Architecture, 1956-1980" (Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2003); Özce Turgay, "Hands-on Building Practices in Architectural Education: METU Summer Construction Practices" (Master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2005); Tonguç Akış, "Teaching/Forming/Framing a Scientifically Oriented Architecture in Turkey between 1956 – 1982" (Ph.D. diss., Middle East Technical University, 2008); Derya Yorgancıoğlu, "Re-constructing the Political and Educational Contexts of the METU Project" (Ph.D. diss., Middle East Technical University, 2010).

⁴⁵ Sevgi Aktüre, Sevin Osmay, and Aysen Savaş, eds., *1956'dan 2006'ya ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi'nin 50 Yılı: Anılar: Bir Sözlü Tarih Çalışması [Fifty Years of the School of Architecture at METU from 1956 to 2006: Memoirs: A Study in Oral History]* (Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 2007).

⁴⁶ See bibliography for a full list of the School's publications during the years of this study between 1956 and 1969. Aptullah Kuran's, *İlk Devir Osmanlı Mimarisinde Cami [The Mosque in Early Ottoman Architecture]* (Ankara: ODTÜ/METU, Mimarlık Fakültesi/Faculty of Architecture, Pub. No. 1, 1964) was the School of Architecture's first publication.

published and discussed in neither of the two Turkish architectural journals of the period. Both *Mimarlık* and *Arkitekt* almost always published the advertisements as well as a comprehensive coverage of many other competition results, printing drawings and photographs of models of the projects that had received recognition in the competition along with jury comments. In METU's case, neither the advertisements, nor the results of the two competitions were ever published. Considering the scale and importance of the project, this omission could not have been accidental. The absence of this documentation is significant in that it would add another layer to Reed's and Payaslıoğlu's theses which argued that METU was a departure from existing academic traditions in Turkey. This finding shows that METU, perhaps both intentionally and unintentionally, was also a departure from existing professional traditions as well.⁴⁷

The first set of publications on METU's master plan and on the design of its individual buildings came from its architects' personal efforts. Altuğ and Behruz Çinici published the METU site plan and their drawings for the School of Architecture building in 1964, three years after the competition.⁴⁸ This publication was soon followed by an exhibition in Ankara and Istanbul in 1965. Again in 1965, both *Arkitekt* and *Mimarlık*, finally, published METU's site plan and covered its architecture building.⁴⁹ By this time,

⁴⁷ The relationship of METU's School of Architecture to the professional and academic community in Turkey will be further discussed in Chapter Three. Even though METU raised considerable curiosity within the existing professional culture in Turkey, it was also rejected and scorned by that community as a foreign implant. Alumni of, for example, Istanbul Technical University continue to express that same sentiment even today.

⁴⁸ Altuğ Çinici and Behruz Çinici. *Altuğ-Behruz Çinici: Mimar-Architect: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi/Ankara/Mayıs 1964-Middle East Technical University/Ankara/May 1964*.

⁴⁹ *Arkitekt* 3-4 (1965), 108-09, "Ankara'da Orta Doğu Üniversitesi." *Mimarlık* 1 (1965), 18-22, "Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi."

METU was also being recognized in foreign periodicals.⁵⁰ These early publications provided only a descriptive documentary of the project and did not provide any critical analysis of the project. Only Uğur Tanyeli's later analysis of Çinici's life and work provides a more extensive analysis of METU within Çinici's career.⁵¹ However, there has not been any documentation of the earlier site plans for METU that were developed by Turgut Cansever and the UN consultants who were teaching in the school during the late 1950s.⁵²

In addition to these sources, this study makes use of a number of new sources and materials available in various public and personal archives in order to provide analyses of previously unpublished work. The UN archives in New York, the Architectural Archives as well as the University Archives of the University of Pennsylvania, and the project records of the Çinici office now located in Salacak, Istanbul have been used to gather the necessary documents on the making of METU.⁵³ In addition, new materials which were

⁵⁰ See, for example, Jürgen Joedicke, "Middle East Technical University." *Bauen und Wohnen* 19 (July 1965), 275-280; and, *Baumeister* 12 (December 1965): 1373-1375, "Middle East Technical University, Ankara."

⁵¹ Uğur Tanyeli, ed., *Improvisation: Mimarlıkta Doğaçlama ve Behruz Çinici* (Istanbul: Boyut, 1999). Also see the film documenting a conversation between Kemal Kurdaş and Behruz Çinici on the development and construction of the METU campus master plan and buildings, Andreas Treske, Haluk Pamir, Hasan Barutçu, and Suha Özkan, *Kemal Kurdaş ve Behruz Çinici Görüşmesi: ODTÜ Yerleşkesi ve Yapıları Nasıl Var Edildi? [A Conversation between Kemal Kurdaş ve Behruz Çinici: How did the METU Campus and Buildings Come to Be?]* (ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 2001).

⁵² For an extensive coverage of Turgut Cansever's life and work, see, Uğur Tanyeli and Atilla Yücel, *Turgut Cansever: Düşünce Adamı ve Mimar [Turgut Cansever: Theorist and Architect]* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi ve Garanti Galeri, 2007). For a discussion of the METU competition, see pages 76-84.

⁵³ Behruz Çinici passed away in 2011 three years after my interviews with him in April 2008. His office continues to be in operation. Can Çinici, his son, and Şebnem Yalınay, his daughter-in-law, both of them architects and METU graduates, continue their practice in the same building in Salacak, Istanbul.

previously stored in the basement of the School of Architecture building at METU were made available for the first time to be documented in this study. Upon closer inspection, I have been able to determine that the drawings found in the basement of the School were some of the drawings submitted to the two competitions for the master plan of the METU campus.

To compliment these published and unpublished documents, I have also conducted a series of interviews with the initial students, staff, and faculty of the school as well as other professionals and officials who were closely related to the establishment and development of the school and its administrative and spatial organization.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Please see the bibliography for a list of these interviews. These will also come up as they become relevant in the footnotes throughout the text.

Chapter One:

A School of Architecture in the Cold War “Middle East,” 1950 – 1954

The “Middle East,” a term originally coined by late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century western military historians and strategists, had come to refer to a new geo-political dynamic that was forming in the eastern Mediterranean basin towards the end of the Second World War.⁵⁵ The term first gained currency in the British Parliament when British cultural and economic interests in the larger region were threatened by an agreement between the Ottoman and German empires, signed at the turn of the twentieth century, to commission the construction of the Berlin to Baghdad railway (**figures 1.1 & 1.2**).⁵⁶ Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire along with the Central forces at the end of World War I, Allied forces took control of much of the remaining Ottoman territories in Anatolia and the Middle East (**figures 1.3 & 1.4**). The Turkish Republic emerged as a result of a national revolutionary resistance to regain a portion of the

⁵⁵ Peter Beaumont writes, “The term ‘Middle East’ was coined in 1902 by the American naval historian, A.T. Mahan, in a discussion of British naval strategy in relation to Russian activity in Iran and a German project for a Berlin to Baghdad railway. He was referring to a region centered on the Persian Gulf, for which the current terms ‘Near East’ and ‘Far East’ seemed inadequate. The new term was taken up by *the Times* correspondent in Tehran, V. Chirol, for a series of articles on the lands forming the western and northern approaches to India, the defense of which had been a sensitive issue for more than a century and became more and more crucial as the strategic centre of the British Empire, no less than British trade, became centered upon the subcontinent. ‘Middle East’ was given respectability when it was used in the House of Lords on 22 March, 1911 by Lord Curzon when opening a discussion of ‘the state of affairs in Persia, the Persian Gulf, and Turkey in Asia, in relation... to the construction of railways...” See Peter Beaumont, Gerald Henry Blake, and J. Malcolm Wagstaff, *The Middle East: A Geographical Study* (London; New York: Wiley, 1976), 16; and, R.H. Davidson, “Where is the Middle East?”, *Foreign Affairs*, 38, (1960) 665-675; C.R. Koppes, “Captain Mahan, General Gordon and the Origin of the Term ‘Middle East’,” *Middle East Studies* 12 (1976): 95-98. The United Nations uses the more neutral term, “Western Asia,” to refer to the same geographical region. For the history of the Modern Middle East, see William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004).

⁵⁶ Initially, this railway was to be constructed through a collaboration of several companies from both England and Germany.

territories of the former Ottoman Empire within Anatolia and Thrace.⁵⁷ However, England and France remained in control of much of the Middle East until about 1945. At the end of the Second World War, when the weakened European empires found it difficult to maintain their influence in the region, the Soviet Union saw a window of opportunity to expand into the Middle East after gaining a satisfactory share of Europe during the Potsdam Conference (July-August, 1945). As Mümtaz Soysal (1929 -), a prominent Turkish political scientist and author, pointed out, within the political context of the postwar period, the term “Middle East” referred to a decolonizing middle zone emerging out of a Eurasian vacuum of power between first and second world interests and ideologies.⁵⁸

Turkey held a critical geo-political position in this “middle” zone and made an important ally despite the fact that it did not have the rich oil reserves of some of the other former provinces of the dissolved Ottoman Empire. From the very beginning of the Cold War, Turkey was, according to a NATO official, regarded as, “one of the most valuable pieces of real estate in the world,” mainly because of its control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (the Straits) positioned strategically between Europe and Asia; and

⁵⁷ For information on the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic I have relied mainly on the following sources: Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vols. I & II* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London; New York: Routledge, 1993). Please see the bibliography for additional sources on this topic.

⁵⁸ Mümtaz Soysal, interview by author, 09 January 2008, Ankara, digital recording, author’s archive.

between the Soviet Union and the Eastern Mediterranean basin.⁵⁹ Consequently, Turkey became one of the first two nations, along with Greece, to receive postwar aid from the United States through the provisions of the Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947) and the Marshall Plan (June 5, 1947).⁶⁰ While the influx of US aid and expertise promised to build Turkey as a symbol of US policy against Soviet expansion and as a model nation-state in the region, social, political, and economic transformations that were taking place during the postwar period threatened Turkey's stability from within. In addition, postwar military, financial, and technical aid provided by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as well as the ideological divide publicized by the Truman Doctrine between communism and capitalism brought further economic and political challenges to Turkey's relatively stable, but single-party parliamentary system established in 1923.⁶¹ The Middle East Technical University (METU) emerged during these rapid political and economic postwar transformations that Turkey was experiencing. The University was named, perhaps very appropriately, the "Middle East" Technical University, not because it ever truly functioned as a regional or transnational institution, but because it was a

⁵⁹ For the NATO official's opinion, see Malcolm D. Rivkin, *Area Development for National Growth: The Turkish Precedent* (New York; Washington; London: Praeger, 1965), 97.

⁶⁰ Eduard Mark, "The Turkish War Scare of 1946," in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History – Second Edition*, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York; London: Routledge, 1994), 112-133.

⁶¹ For Turkey's postwar transformation, see in addition to previously mentioned histories of Turkey, Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959); Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977); *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye, 1945-80* (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 1994); and, Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Part III: Devrimciliğin Sonu: Tanzimat Batıcılığına Dönüş: Sınıflar Açısından Çok Partili Düzen," in *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın, cilt I & II [Structure of Turkey: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, volumes I & II]* (Ankara: Bilgi, 1968. Reprint, İstanbul: Tekin, 2003), 515-532.

product of the very same conflicts that had originally created the idea of the “Middle East.”

This chapter and the next work in tandem to provide the background to the identities and the ideologies of the various parties that were involved in the making of the School. The chapter first recounts the story of the encounter between Charles Abrams and Vecdi Diker when the idea of a School of Architecture and Community Planning was first conceived. The chapter then traces the backgrounds to the ideologies of the two primary parties in Turkey; namely, the Republican Peoples’ Party (RPP) and Democrat Party (DP), to show how and why they both found the idea agreeable within a context of otherwise contentious relationships not only between the two parties, but also amongst the UN, the US, and Turkish agencies in general. Here the chapter examines how each of the political parties perceived the idea of the School and how this idea conformed to their perceptions of revolution and development within the Cold War dynamic. Abrams’ perception of the idea as a UN consultant is analyzed in chapter two which, in a detailed manner, differentiates the similarities and differences in Abrams’ and the UN’s respective positions.

1.1 Diker meets Abrams

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, official envoys of the United States or the United Nations were exposed to quite an unusual scene as part of their daily encounters and interactions with Turkish officials and professionals. This scene would come to life in the restaurants of a handful of grand hotels of the capital city where foreign diplomats, consultants and Turkish officials came to see and to be seen, outside of the strict protocol that Ottoman-Turkish state traditions otherwise continued to follow. These hotels hosted the most daring cabaret shows one could imagine, put together by traveling French and Italian troops, for this select crowd, perhaps as a way to compete with other capitals in the region and to showcase what a modern metropolis Ankara sought to be.⁶² Dining

⁶² Many visitors and residents of the capital mention these hotels and the burlesque shows that took place in them as a memorable part of their experience in Ankara. These shows appear to be an inevitable part of any formal dinner especially for foreign visitors in a time and culture where dining out was not a part of the everyday for the middle class and was intended for the Turkish elite and the foreigners. For example, both Thomas Godfrey, the initial UN appointed director of METU (1956-59), and Charles Weitz, the UN resident representative in Turkey (1954-59), both recalled these shows as an intrinsic component of the peculiar diplomatic culture of Ankara. A show that was presented by an actress with the stage name “Veronique” at the then famous Ankara Palas (now serving as a Government Guest House) was especially popular. Guests recall that Veronique brought a new twist to the Ankara burlesque by performing her striptease on a grey horse. The shows at the hotels mesmerized the Ankara public as their guests, performers, and the contents of the shows were discussed in the popular weeklies of the period, such as *Akis*. Such reviews did raise the curiosity of the public to the point that some of the more well-to-do, the young, and the adventurous did wonder in to check out the scene for themselves. Thomas Godfrey, interview by the author, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, April 5, 2006, digital recording, author’s archive; Charles Weitz, interview by author, Madison, Wisconsin, March 27, 2007, digital recording, author’s archive. At the same time, these hotels were beginning to be visited by some of the more adventurous. Regarding Ankara’s grand hotels and the entertainment they provided see, Önder Şenyapılı, “Gençlik Yıllarımın (ve Öncesinin) Ankara’sında Eğlenme-Dinlenme Mekanları [Places of Entertainment and Leisure of Ankara of my Younger Years (and before)],” in *Cumhuriyet’in Ankara’sı [Ankara of the Republic]*, ed. Tansı Şenyapılı, with a foreword by İlhan Tekeli, (Ankara: ODTÜ, 2006), 310-356. One should also point out the construction of the Istanbul Hilton by SOM and Sedat Hakkı Eldem was nearing completion, putting Istanbul back on the map as a dually important strategic and cultural location, and bringing competition and an alternative to the paradigm of the grand hotels. For an analysis of the Istanbul Hilton within the context of the Cold War, see especially Chapter One, “Gaze to the East: Istanbul,” in Annabel Jane Wharton’s, *Building the Cold War: Hilton International Hotels and Modern Architecture* (The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 13-38.

among the celebrated protagonists of this scene, one could find, for example, Rodney Stuart Young, a distinguished scholar of Greek Art from the University of Pennsylvania, who was working on an archeological excavation in Gordion near Ankara.⁶³ One could also find Daniel Lerner, a well-known scholar of modernization theory, who was continuing his well-known case-study of the social and economic transformation of Balgat, a small disappearing village near Ankara, which was being engulfed by the expanding capital.⁶⁴

It was in one of these hotel restaurants where Charles Abrams (1902-1970) first met Vecdi Diker (1910-1997) in October, 1954. Abrams was a New York labor lawyer and a housing expert who was on his first United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UN-TAA) mission advising the government of Turkey as a consultant on housing, planning, and land-use practices. Diker was an American-trained Turkish civil engineer, industrialist, and the former director of the Turkish National Highway Department during that department's reconfiguration under the Marshall Plan. Celal Uzer, a staff architect and planner at the Turkish Ministry of Public Works, who had been assigned to Abrams as his guide and interpreter during Abrams' two-month visit,

⁶³ Rodney S. Young, a distinguished scholar of Greek Art from the University of Pennsylvania, extended his research into Anatolia during the 1950s and worked in and around Gordion for the next 30 years. The excavations still continue today. For a publication from the period see, Rodney S. Young, *Gordion: A Guide to the Excavations and Museum*, (Ankara: The Ankara Society for the Promotion of Tourism, Antiquities, and Museums, 1968); or *The Gordion Excavations: final reports*, (Philadelphia: University Museum, University of Pennsylvania, 1981).

⁶⁴ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

allegedly introduced the two men.⁶⁵ Out of this encounter would come the idea to establish a UN-sponsored School of Architecture and Community Planning in the Turkish capital.⁶⁶

Based on available accounts of this meeting, it is not possible to determine, beyond speculation, who among these three agents may have first suggested the idea for a school. However, what is clear is that, from the very beginning of these conversations, there were differences among the ways the three agents perceived the scope and purpose of the school. Abrams, based on his observations and the nature of his mission during his

⁶⁵ There are conflicting reports regarding how the meeting was arranged and in exactly which restaurant or hotel restaurant the meeting was held in. İlhan Tekeli claims that the meeting took place at Restaurant Bekir. He writes that Abrams and Diker met when Diker, allegedly dining at a table next to Abrams' overheard his conversation regarding his mission and visit. Tekeli does not reference this information. See, İlhan Tekeli, "Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Mimarlık Fakültesi," in *Türkiye'de Kentbilim Eğitimi [Urban Planning Education in Turkey]*, ed. Ruşen Keleş (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları (No. 561), 1987), 67-68. Diker mentions that the meeting was arranged by Celal Uzer, but does not mention the name of the place during the interview. See, Vecdi Diker, "Röportaj: Vecdi Diker," interview by Fevzi Gümrah and Mahmut Parlaktuna, *Odtü'lü Dergisi* no. 2 (1993): 4. Uzer set up a number of other meetings between Abrams and the prominent members of the professional community. Another one of these meetings was held between Abrams and Ekmel Derya at the Barıkan Hotel. Derya later became the first Turkish architect to teach at METU when the School opened in 1956. See, Ekmel Derya, "İlk Türk Öğretim Üyemiz: Ekmel Derya," interview by Mehtap Saatçioğlu, Fikret Görün, and Fevzi Gümrah, *Odtü'lü Dergisi* no. 8 (1995): 6-9. Arif Payaslıoğlu mentions another set of rumors claiming that the meeting was held at Bulvar Palas Hotel. Payaslıoğlu, *Barakadan...*, 7.

⁶⁶ Both Abrams and Diker independently confirm that the idea to take the necessary steps to solicit government support toward the establishment of a UN-sponsored school was first conceived during this meeting. At the same time, each take credit for proposing the idea. Abrams later wrote, "It was not until I met an American-trained Turkish engineer named Vecdi Diker that I found a sympathetic response to the idea of a new university." See, Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1964), 203. Diker recalls, "O günlerde Karayolları'ndan Celal diye bir arkadaşım Bayındırlık Bakanlığı BM uzmanı olarak gelen Charles Abrahams [sic] adında MIT mezunu [sic] birisi ile görüşmemi istedi. Görüşmeye gittim... İstersen burada bir üniversite kuralım dedim." See, Diker, "Röportaj: Vecdi Diker," 4. For the purpose of this study, it is not crucial to determine whether it was Abrams or Diker who first proposed the idea. In fact, an earlier report prepared by Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill points out the need for education and training in construction and related fields. See, Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, Architects and Engineers, *Construction, Town Planning, and Housing in Turkey*, (SOM Archives, 1951), 37. Abrams became familiar with the report during his work in Turkey. He makes a reference to the SOM report in his, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1964), 202. By the same token, Diker would have been familiar with previous attempts to establish a technical university in Ankara. Payaslıoğlu, *Barakadan...*, 8-9.

visit to Turkey, may have pointed out the need to establish an Institute of Architecture and Community Planning in Ankara. Diker supported the idea of training and education. In fact, he may have been the one to suggest it first as a UN-sponsored technical university.⁶⁷ Uzer, on the other hand, as an architect and planner working in the Ministry of Public Works under the the Democrat Party administration, would have been a bit ambivalent toward the idea altogether.⁶⁸

To briefly explain Uzer's ambivalence, it must be pointed out that this conversation between Abrams and Diker was taking place at a time of considerable contention between the architectural community and the Ministry of Public Works. In 1954, the year that Abrams arrived, the Law of the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects allowed Turkish architects and engineers to organize under a union.⁶⁹ The law also protected Turkish architects from competition against the practice of foreign professionals.

During the debates leading up to the resolution between the professionals and the Ministry, the professionals had criticized the Ministry's long-standing practice of hiring

⁶⁷ Abrams had helped to establish a similar Institute of Urban Studies at the New School in New York prior to his mission to Turkey. Abrams, writing in retrospect, shares the same view as Diker, admitting, "The need for architects and planners was the wedge, but engineering and training in other disciplines were also essential to build the country." Abrams, *Struggle for Shelter*, 202-203. Aside from being familiar with previous government attempts to establish a technical university in Ankara, Diker mentions that he had begun to think about the need to establish an up-to-date technical university in Ankara in 1950. See, Diker, "Röportaj: Vecdi Diker," 4.

⁶⁸ Aydın Germen, a prominent Turkish planner and a contemporary of Uzer, pointed out the anxiety and the curiosity the Turkish professional community felt in response to the possibility of the opening of new school of architecture and planning by the UN. See Aydın Germen's response to İlhan Tekeli's essay in memory of Esat Turak in, "Letter to the Editor," *Journal of the Faculty of Architecture-METU*, no. 2 (2005): xiii. For İlhan Tekeli's original essay, see, "Bir Kurucu Kişilik Olarak Esat Turak," no. 1 (2005): v-xii.

⁶⁹ See, Gülsüm Baydar (Nalbantoğlu), "The Professionalization of the Ottoman-Turkish Architect" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1989), 3 & 45-48.

foreign professionals for significant government projects. In response, the Ministry argued that there was a shortage of high-level engineers and architects in the country and they could not fill the positions they had in the Ministry with local professionals. Zeki Sayar, the editor of *Arkitekt*, the only architectural and planning journal of the time, wrote an editorial declaring once and for all that there was no shortage of architects in Turkey and summarized the heart of the disagreement.⁷⁰ He pointed out that the Ministry was paying the Turkish staff an average of 35 Turkish Liras (TL) per month, which was not a living wage by even conservative standards. The Ministry paid their foreign consultants in the vicinity of 1500-2000 TL per month. He explained that the Turkish architects did not want to live in Ankara for 35 TL per month especially when their foreign counterparts were making much higher salaries. Within the context of these debates and at a time when the Turkish professional community had won the right not to have to compete against their foreign counterparts, Uzer must have felt that the idea of a new UN-sponsored school of architecture could be perceived in a number of ways, depending on how it was organized and who was put in control of its administration.

Despite these differences and overlaps among the varying perceptions of the idea for the school, Diker and Abrams met again the very next day to bring the idea to two key individuals in two separate meetings to be held first with, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Turkish Secretary of the State and the Acting Prime Minister (during the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes's visit to France); and second, with Avra Warren, the US Ambassador to

⁷⁰ This issue of the foreign architects will be discussed in more detail in chapter three. Zeki Sayar, "Yabancı Teknik Eleman Meselesi [The Issue of Foreign Technical Experts]" *Arkitekt* no.7-8 (1953), 119-120.

Turkey. Diker's well-established connections with the Turkish bureaucratic elite and the cabinet members of the DP government were instrumental in setting up these meetings. The idea found unprecedented support from both officials.⁷¹ Despite the varying positions on the proposed school's scope and mission, the idea of the school gained sufficient support. Before examining the initial and the shifting scope and content of the project as Abrams and Diker presented it to different key officials, it is helpful to survey the ideological backgrounds of the participants in order to understand how they perceived this idea and on what grounds they believed that the idea corresponded with their respective aims and identities.

⁷¹ The US would later temporarily withdraw its support especially during the establishment phase of the school. This issue will be discussed further in chapters two and three.

1.2 Vecdi Diker and the Ottoman-Turkish National Revolutionary Ideology

Diker explained the reasons for his support of the establishment of the University in an interview with Fevzi Gümrah and Mahmut Parlaktuna for *The METU Journal (Odtü'lü Dergisi)* in 1993.⁷² During this interview, Diker emphasized the necessity of an up-to-date University in order to ensure the continuation of the national revolutionary ideology founded on modernization and nationalism as established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the charismatic founder of the Turkish Republic. Diker explained,

Western enlightenment philosophy is based in two fundamental principles. First is to get down to the facts (ve-ri-tas); second is idealism. The West has stuck with these principles and has become the West of today. At METU, the goal was to educate both educators and students who would identify with these principles. The key to the West is to know both its language and its principles. Atatürk has brought us the idea of reform and has inoculated in us these principles. [When I was attending college in the United States], we were only three Turkish students in New York and as we were living there with the spirit that Atatürk had instilled in us, we sent a telegraph to Atatürk letting him know that we were celebrating the Republic's Tenth Anniversary with him. I returned to Turkey in 1936. Atatürk passed away soon afterwards. The ideology of reform lost some pace. All that was begun was being lost. I worked in the Highway Department [of the Ministry of Public Works] until 1951. During those days, we used to bring experts and consultants from the United States in order to maintain and continue the reform efforts and to train the local staff to ensure the continuation of the reform ideology. We also began a number of short term training programs to do this...

During my training abroad, I observed how a highway system could unite a nation and how a university could play a central role in uniting a nation through the education of a high-level workforce. I also realized that we desperately needed to provide our youth a place where they could receive that same type of education that was available at the best research institutions across the world. This place had

⁷² Diker, "Röportaj: Vecdi Diker," 4-6. This interview is one of few existing and reliable sources on Diker's involvement in the establishment of METU. Both of Diker's interviewers, Fevzi Gümrah and Mahmut Parlaktuna, were professors at METU. Also see, Arif Payaslıoğlu, *Barakadan Kampusa 1954-1964 [From Barracks to Campus 1954-1964]*, (Ankara: METU Publications, 1996), 6; and the documentary film on METU's beginnings by, Önder M. Özdem and Berrin Balay Tuncer, *Bozkırı Yeşertenler: ODTÜ Tarihi – Bölüm I (1956 – 1963) [Cultivators of the Steppe: History of METU – Part I (1956 – 1963)]*. ODTÜ: GISAM, 2006).

to be a university, in order to ensure the maintenance and the continuity of the idea of reform.⁷³

As can be understood from his explanation, Diker was a strong proponent of the Turkish national revolutionary elite that had founded the Republic and his interest in supporting the idea of a UN-sponsored university was rooted in the continuation of that ideology. After graduating with an engineering degree from Istanbul Robert College, Diker received his Master's degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Missouri in 1936. As he mentions in the interview, he returned to Turkey to work in the Bridge and Highways Department of the Ministry of Public Works. He later became the founding director of the Highway Commission during a time of significant transformation and expansion in Turkey's highway network due to US financial and technical aid during the postwar period. However, in 1951, shortly after Turkey's transition to a multi-party system and the victory of the Democrat Party over the twenty-seven year incumbent Republican People's Party (RPP; Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), he left public office. During the same interview, Diker explained, "As I did not want to bring politics into the Highway Commission, I could not get along with the [DP] Minister and, as I was not going to be able to implement the highway program I had planned, I resolved to leave the Commission."⁷⁴

⁷³ Unless otherwise noted all translations are by the author. Diker, "Röportaj: Vecdi Diker," 4.

⁷⁴ Diker, "Röportaj: Vecdi Diker," 4.

Diker was no doubt one of the central figures who pushed the idea of establishing a UN-sponsored University past its many detractors within Turkey.⁷⁵ Within the dynamic that formed among the various international agents and agencies during the inception and establishment of the School, Diker emerges as the voice of the national revolutionary elite which was one of the central forces in the development of the Turkish national revolutionary ideology.

In order to better understand Diker's position within the Turkish historical and political context as well as his commitment to higher education, it is important to consider the development of the Ottoman-Turkish national revolutionary ideology in relation to the West during the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries. The emergence of modern Turkey out of the center of the declining Ottoman Empire has traditionally been analyzed in a comparative context with the transformation of three other former empires: Soviet Russia, China, and Mexico.⁷⁶ As mentioned in the "Introduction," Turkey was also seen as the first nation to use the ideology of modernization as a political and economic program to resist Western domination.⁷⁷ Among world empires, the Ottoman Empire, like the other great non-European empire still in existence in 1900, the Chinese Empire, had

⁷⁵ In the interview with Gümrah and Parlaktuna, Diker listed the various forms of opposition to the idea. He pointed out for example how both the Parliament and the Ministry of Education were adamantly opposed to the idea of designating English as the language of instruction. He mentions that both the Parliament and the Minister maintained, "We want to close both Galatasaray and Robert College. You are trying to establish yet another University that teaches in English. Unbelievable!" See, "Röportaj: Vecdi Diker," 5.

⁷⁶ See, for example, John Dewey, *Impressions of Soviet Russia and the Revolutionary World: Mexico, China, Turkey, 1929* (Introduction and notes by William W. Brickman. Columbia University: Teachers College, 1964). Also see, John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

⁷⁷ See also, Gilman, 30-31.

suffered severely from the combined military and economic expansiveness of the European powers.⁷⁸ Much more intimately involved with European civilization, it had suffered in a more direct and alarming fashion in part due to its geographical proximity.⁷⁹ Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was in constant danger of dismemberment by western powers and many of its outlying provinces were already detached from it in one way or another.⁸⁰ But the main reason was not simply one of geographical location, though this certainly entered into it.⁸¹ The relationship between Islam and Christianity also played a major historical role in this encounter.⁸² This relationship has been defined by military confrontation between Christianity and Islam, through crusades and counter-crusades, by wars defined by both parties as holy wars.⁸³

Within this dynamic, despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire was made up of a multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups, the Christian empires of Europe perceived it as the largest and most powerful Islamic empire in history. By the same token, as the Christian empires of Europe began to supersede the Ottomans in military technology, the geographical and historical source of modernity became intrinsically complex for the Ottomans.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ Dunn, 173.

⁷⁹ Dunn, 173.

⁸⁰ Dunn, 175.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Dunn, 176.

As a part of this discussion, it is important to point out that the very emergence of the geo-political idea of the Middle East coincides with the period when the Ottoman Empire began a series of reform movements in order to modernize its military and other administrative systems in order to maintain its territorial integrity against growing western interests in the region. It is also within this dynamic that the defining lines of Ottoman nationalism and Turkish revolution can be compared to and differentiated from other nationalisms and revolutions in the region.

The western perception of the Ottoman Empire as a buffer state between the Tzarist Russia and the Middle East was extensively discussed under the topic, “the Eastern Question,” within especially the British Parliament during the second half of the nineteenth century. The consensus in the British Parliament was that the Ottoman State should be maintained as a buffer state. However this presented a paradox for the British politicians as the Ottoman State ruled over Christian subjects and many in the Parliament supported the independence and nationalization of the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman State. The perceptible British interest in the empowerment of primarily the non-Muslim populations was one of the significant forces that pushed the Ottoman State to begin to collaborate with the growing German Empire especially during the second half of the nineteenth century. Aside from the technological advances and the military prowess that the German Empire displayed in confrontations within and beyond Europe, they also showed a seemingly more genuine interest in the continuation and cultivation of Ottoman culture and State. British anxiety regarding the Ottoman-German alliance came

to a peak when the British component of the Berlin to Baghdad railway was turned over to German companies. The term, “Middle East” began to be used in the British parliament in particular response to this alarming development. Prussian expansion toward the East threatened British interests not only in the Middle East, but also in India and eastern Asia. The German-Ottoman alliance can be seen as the event that tipped the consensus within the British Parliament toward a strategy to break up the Ottoman Empire.

Keeping the historical dynamic between Christianity and Islam in mind, modernization in the Ottoman Empire began and remained for some time overwhelmingly military in purpose as the reformist Ottoman administrators faced considerable cultural resistance and anxiety against western methods and technologies. However, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, changes in military technology no longer allowed wholesale transformation of military technologies from one state to another. Modern armies required the modernization of wider segments of society, ranging from the establishment of elite educational institutions to the promotion of industrialization in order to manufacture weapons as well as finding ways to enlarge tax revenue for the purchase of expensive weapons.⁸⁵ Therefore, it became clear to reformist Ottoman sultans and administrators that to catch up with the West meant, in addition to modernizing military institutions and equipment, a reformation of educational institutions across the Empire.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Dunn, 177.

⁸⁶ For a history of Ottoman-Turkish educational reforms see, Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (The University of Chicago Press, 1966).

During the nineteenth century, despite repeated Ottoman programs to realize comprehensive reforms in education, western missionary schools established primarily to benefit the non-Muslim populations, remained to be the elite educational institutions throughout the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century.⁸⁷ Robert College is an outstanding early example of the Protestant missionary schools that were established throughout the key territories of the empire. Robert College was established in Istanbul on July 4, 1869 and was located in Bebek, near the fortification of Rumeli Hisar built by Mehmet II, the conqueror of Constantinople, as the first American missionary school established outside the US.⁸⁸ The primary goal of these missionary schools was to educate and to develop cultural and national identity among the non-Muslim populations even though the Muslim elite also attended these schools.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ For example, during the Hamidian Era, two new types of schools, namely *Rüşdiye* and *İdadis*, were created as a part of the effort to modernize Ottoman secondary education. Kazamias, 83. An American observer writing in 1908 estimated that throughout the Ottoman Empire Protestant missions operated 527 schools with 23,572 pupils, and 45 colleges with 3,004 pupils. Roman Catholic missions, particularly the Jesuits, had fewer institutions. See, Kazamias, 95. For the nature and impact of foreign missionary schools in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic see, John Dewey, "Foreign Schools in Turkey" (*New Republic* 41, no. 522 (1924)): 40-42; Frank Andrew Stone, *Academies for Anatolia: A Study of the Rationale, Program, and Impact of the Educational Institutions Sponsored by the American Board in Turkey, 1830-1980* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984).

⁸⁸ Kazamias, 95. For a comprehensive recent history of Robert College, see John Freely, *A History of Robert College, vols. I & II* (Istanbul: YKY, 2000). Maureen Freely, *Enlightenment* (Woodstock and New York: The Overlook Press, 2008). Mehmet the Conqueror's castle was built in preparation to the last siege of Constantinople. In one of the many orations delivered in English, French, Turkish, Greek, Armenian, and Bulgarian, the following analogy was drawn between the school and Rumeli Hisar: "It [the school] stands on higher ground than those towers. It dominates them. Its forces are spiritual and eternal. It shall see them pass away." See, Kazamias, 95. Kazamias argues that the primary mission of these schools was to provide, "a better spiritual hearth, especially for the Turkish non-believer," while Stone shows that the missionary zeal was rooted in millennialism and zionism and in empowering "the people of the book," in the Ottoman empire.

⁸⁹ For example, Hans-Lukas Kieser points out the impact American millennialism and missionary schools had on the development of the events that led to the Armenian massacre. He argues that the availability of premium education only to the non-Muslims during a time when western education was

Christopher R. Robert, an American philanthropist, and Rev. Cyrus Hamlin, head of the missionary schools in Anatolia, defined the aims of the American schools in 1856 in the following manner,

... a large element in Eastern society that rightly apprehends and esteems freedom of conscience, without being infidels. A Christian college, that shall offer the best intellectual training, and as broad a culture as our best New England colleges, will meet the wants of this class, of whatever race or faith.⁹⁰

The missionary schools weakened Ottoman solidarity from within and reversed traditional ethnic hierarchies among Muslim and non-Muslim groups. However, they also provided some of the best education available in the empire. Consequently, they were received with pronounced ambivalence by the Muslim Ottoman elite (as well as the peasantry), who sought to educate their children in these schools.

The Christian missionary schools played a central role, both directly and indirectly, in the development of Turkish nationalism and revolution. Along with the development of nationalism among non-Muslim minorities, ideas of nationalism, reform, and revolution from within the Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire also came from the educated elite who were graduates of these schools. The impact of foreign missionary schools in shaping the Ottoman-Turkish national revolutionary ideology continued into the Republican years. Children of the Muslim elite who attended these schools usually continued on to selective institutions of higher learning abroad and

perceived to be vital was a factor that created divisions among populations. See, *Iskalanmış Barış: Doğu Vilayetlerinde Misyonerlik, Etnik Kimlik, ve Devlet, 1839-1938* [*Missed Peace: Missionaries, Ethnic Identity, and State in the Eastern Provinces, 1839-1938*] (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005).

⁹⁰ As quoted in Stone, 62. Also see, Rufus Anderson, *History of the Mission of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission to the Oriental Churches*, (Boston: Congregational Publishing Society, 1872), 127.

returned to become some of the most sophisticated cultivators of Turkish identity, nationalism, and culture. Along with many other notable Turks such as Orhan Pamuk (Nobel Laureate in Literature, 2005) and Halide Edip Adivar (prominent writer), Vecdi Diker was, as mentioned above, also a graduate of Robert College.

During the early twentieth century, the education of the Ottoman-Turkish elite was of particular significance to key revolutionaries, especially to Ziya Gökalp.⁹¹ While the motivations of the Christian schools remained suspect, the creation of a western style educational system for the Muslim populations was one of the central concerns of the national revolutionaries. Top priority was given to the schools that trained the elites with the belief that in this way, modern Turkish society would be established on firmer ground.⁹²

Aside from supporting the development of sentiments of nationalism among non-Muslim groups, missionary schools also led to the development of a Muslim elite and the formation of a bourgeois class from within the empire.⁹³ However, by the end of the nineteenth century, foreign trade and much of the internal trade of the empire was in the hands of hundreds of thousands of resident foreigners and the Ottoman government had

⁹¹ Kazamias, 111-112. Atatürk's brand of nationalism was rooted in the ideological identity that was articulated by Gökalp's, *Türkçülük*, the concept of Turkism. Gökalp was exiled to Malta by the Allied forces during the Allied occupation of Istanbul and other parts of Anatolia at the end of World War I.

⁹² This view was justified on what was known as the *Tuba Ağacı nazariyesi* (the theory of the tree of Heaven). In Turkish folklore the *Tuba Ağacı* was a tree which had its roots in heaven and cast its delightful shade and fruit on the earth. Kazamias, 112.

⁹³ Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

no control over trade flows into or out of the empire.⁹⁴ The financial services of foreign banks threatened the political autonomy of the imperial administration itself. The Young Turks of the Committee of Union and Progress who had master-minded the revolution of 1907, were the first national political leaders to attempt a measure of industrial development to restore balance among the ethnic groups of the empire.⁹⁵

The seeds of the Republic were sown at the very same Straits that would once again prove to be crucial during the aftermath of World War II.⁹⁶ Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk, 1881-1938), the Ottoman General who made his reputation by stalling the formidable British Navy and overcoming the Anzac invasion of Gallipoli, would be the one to unite a Turkish national revolutionary campaign against the Allied occupation of Ottoman territories in the aftermath of World War I.⁹⁷ The Turkish Republic emerged in this context when Allied attempts to position the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire in control of key territories around Thrace and Asia Minor were countered by an unexpectedly well-organized nationalist coalition brought together by Mustafa Kemal.

⁹⁴ Dunn, 190.

⁹⁵ Dunn, 190-191.

⁹⁶ Historically, the control of the Straits had been central to the political and economic stability of the Roman, Byzantine, and the Ottoman empires that had previously ruled over this region. During the nineteenth century, the Straits had played a major role in the outcome of the Crimean War (1835-56) as well as in the making of other important geo-political disputes and alliances. More recently, the failure of the British Navy to penetrate the Dardanelles during World War I to bring help to the Russian Empire had been instrumental in the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the rise of the world's first communist state.

⁹⁷ Mustafa Kemal did not receive the surname, Atatürk (father of Turks), until 1934 when the Turkish National Parliament honored him with this surname when the surname law was passed. Shaw, 386. For Mustafa Kemal's biography, see, Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (Woodstock, N.Y.: The Overlook Press, 2000). Kemal was also a given name. Mango, 36-37. During the Independence struggle, Mustafa Kemal received significant military and economic assistance from the Bolshevik government. Dunn, 193.

The Ottoman Empire, against popular support of the Entente forces, had entered World War I in support of the Central Powers in a secret agreement signed between Germany and the Ottoman administrators on August 2, 1914. Interestingly, to seek protection against Russia was the main drive behind the reason to join forces with Germany. At that point, France and England did not agree to provide the same protection as Germany since they were allies with Russia. Facing battle against the Entente forces on all fronts, the Ottoman Empire was left to its devices as the German support diminished toward the end of the war. On October 31, 1918, the Armistice of Mondros was signed between the Entente and the Ottoman state requiring a total and unconditional surrender of all Ottoman forces.⁹⁸ The Entente forces joined hands with the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire to take over much of the key remaining territories of the Ottoman state.

As the British Navy moved into Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal, the victorious General of the well-known Battle of Gallipoli at the Dardanelles, was sent to Samsun, a port town on the Black Sea coast, to purportedly oversee the disarmament of the forces in that region at the end of World War I on May 5, 1919. From Samsun, he began a successful campaign to encourage and bring together the resistance forces that were already beginning to form across Anatolia.⁹⁹ Following a series of wars against the Greek

⁹⁸ The Armistice of Mondros was followed by the Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10, 1920, which incorporated the will of the Allies as to how the Turks should be treated. The Arab provinces were detached from the empire, as decided already at San Remo. Greece, in addition to western Thrace (which it had just acquired from Bulgaria), received eastern Thrace, including Edirne, right up to the Çatalca line, only 40 kilometers from the Ottoman capital. The city of Izmir and its environs were put under Greek administration for a period of five years, after which what was left of the population would be allowed to request permanent incorporation into the Greek state if it wished... For further details on how the Ottoman territories and resources were divided among Allied interests, see, Shaw, 356.

⁹⁹ Shaw, 341-350.

occupation on the Western front, Turkish forces re-captured Izmir on September 9, 1919. On September 11, Kemal's forces had also arrived in the Dardanelles reclaiming the territory he had successfully defended during World War I from British, French, Italian, and Greek forces. On January 20, 1921, the Grand National Assembly that was formed in Ankara passed the Law of Fundamental Organization (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*) as the first Turkish Constitution and organized the laws and administrative units of the Turkish Republic. On July 24, 1923, Treaty of Lausanne was signed recognizing the territorial integrity of the Turkish nation.¹⁰⁰

The Turkish Republic was officially proclaimed on October 29, 1923, as a secular and modernizing state. It was an unlikely victory against the West. When Mustafa Kemal set out to Samsun to purportedly oversee the disarmament of the forces in that region, the success of the resistance hinged upon his ability to unite two diverging groups within the Ottoman population: First, the modernizing bureaucratic and military elite; second, a strongly traditional rural society. As was mentioned before, Diker was a proponent of the former kind and a complete believer in Mustafa Kemal's nationalizing and modernizing ideology. John Dunn (1940 -), the well-known political theorist who has written on the nature of modern revolutions, refers to Mustafa Kemal's genius in his ability to bring together these diverging groups under a common goal: To escape the domination of the non-Muslim minorities that the western empires had supported and manipulated in order

¹⁰⁰ During the Mudanya conference, British forces in Istanbul expected a Turkish advance to the city. Instead, Kemal's forces made further advances in Thrace while İnönü negotiated in Mudanya. Kemal's strategy was brilliant as it isolated British command and reduced their bargaining power. During the Mudanya Conference, İnönü gained a lasting reputation as an uncompromising negotiator against his Western counterparts. Shaw, 364-369.

to colonize the former Ottoman territories.¹⁰¹ At the same time, Dunn argues that the success of the Revolution depended on how the rivalry that had emerged in Anatolia between the Muslim and the non-Muslim populations would play out. In order to defeat the occupation, the Anatolian peasantry agreed to join forces with the modernizing elite towards the restoration of a viable national unity.

Beginning soon after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal implemented a series of modernizing reforms based on the six fundamental ideologies he articulated throughout his Presidency.¹⁰² In addition, he adopted a non-expansionist policy of peaceful neutrality, which became the model for the Third World during the postwar period. As he had done during the Revolutionary War of Independence, he also maintained a collaborative relationship with the Soviet Union from which he received extensive technical assistance on how to promote economic development and industrialization by means of state action.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Dunn, 197.

¹⁰² Mustafa Kemal's basic ideas and policies, developed in hundreds of speeches, programs, and laws from the early days of the War of Independence to his death in 1938, have come to be known as Kemalism. Developed originally out of the struggles and debates among the Easternists and Westernists during the early days of the Grand National Assembly and partly included in the new Constitution enacted in 1924 to replace the one promulgated during the war, they later were made part of the political programs of the Republican People's Party (RPP, or *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP*), which he created as his principal instrument to secure them. The six ideologies were republicanism (*Cumhuriyetçilik*), nationalism (*Milliyetçilik*), populism (*halkçılık*), revolutionism (*inkılapçılık*), secularism (*laiklik*), and statism (*etatism*). In February 1937, they were brought together in six ideologies written into article 2 of the Constitution. The first four principles reflected the ideological basis of the new political structuring, and the last two expressed the policies that were to provide a philosophical framework for reforms. Shaw, 375.

¹⁰³ In the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, Mustafa Kemal was able to establish a good working relationship with the Soviets (as he had done during the war), finding the Soviet model of industrialization and modernization, if not the ideology, applicable to Turkey. Soviets provided considerable technical and monetary aid to Turkish industrialization during the planning and implementation of the first five-year plan in 1931. Britain was also deeply involved in the development of the second five-year plan. Dunn, 193; Avcioğlu, 533-34; and Shaw, 392.

Diker, a member of the Turkish modernizing elite and ardent supporter of Kemalist reforms, perceived the idea of training and education in the form of a technical university to be established in the new capital. As a US-trained engineer who had worked closely with US experts during the modernization of the Turkish highway network, he felt that this new university needed to be established based on the top research institutions in the US as a new model that would educate a new generation of technical and administrative staff and faculty who would reform both the state agencies and the existing universities in Turkey. Subsequently, this new institution would curb Turkey's reliance on foreign experts and would provide the necessary staff for its industrialization and modernization. In this way, for Diker, the idea of a new technical university in Ankara embodied one of the key projects of the revolution that had not yet been realized.

1.3 The Democrat Party and Turkey's Postwar Transformation

During World War II, Turkey maintained its policy of peaceful neutrality despite its geo-political importance in order to avoid the fate the Ottoman Empire had suffered as a result of the overwhelming western interest in its territories during World War I. By making a series of trade and non-aggression agreements with both the Allied and the Axis forces, Turkey was not drawn into the war until almost the very end. On February 23, 1945, when Allied victory in Europe seemed imminent, Turkey allowed Allied help to the Soviet Union to pass through the Straits and declared war on Germany, just in time to become a charter member of the United Nations.¹⁰⁴

However, disputes over the Straits continued. Once the defeat of the German forces in Europe became certain, the Soviet Union turned its attention to the Straits and the Middle East. As early as March 21, 1945, even before the V-E day (Victory in Europe Day, May 8, 1945), Soviets sent an ultimatum to Ankara to take control of the Turkish Straits and to bring an end to an Achilles' heel that had repeatedly troubled them in every major confrontation. They demanded the revision of the Montreux Convention to assure them of access to the Straits in war as well as peace and also to allow them to establish military bases along both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.¹⁰⁵ Repeated Soviet demands

¹⁰⁴ Even before the declaration of war on Germany, Turkey had opened the Straits for Allied supplies to the Soviet Union (January 12, 1945). However the Soviets would later hold the fact that Turkey had kept the Straits closed during the majority of the war against Turkey and began a smear campaign against Turkey by publishing selected documents to demonstrate Turkish sympathy for the Nazis. Shaw, 399-400.

¹⁰⁵ In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne had demilitarized the Dardanelles and had opened the Straits to unrestricted civilian and military traffic under the supervision of the International Straits Division of the League of Nations. However, with the rise of Fascist Italian threat in the Aegean, Turkey requested to remilitarize the Dardanelles and to have more exclusive control of the Straits. During a meeting held in Montreux with the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey was granted most of its requests (the

to control the Straits, parts of Thrace, as well as Kars and Ardahan in eastern Anatolia drove Turkey to solicit binding protection from the United States against an imminent Soviet advance. British intelligence confirmed the mounting Soviet threat in the region. Consequently, the conflict over the Straits quickly escalated into the first outstanding confrontation of the Cold War between the Anglo-American and the Soviet components of the Allied forces.¹⁰⁶ The event, along with George F. Kennan's, famous *Long Telegram*, compelled US politicians to define their position in relation to Soviet ideological and territorial expansion.¹⁰⁷

Montreux Convention, 20 July 1936). England largely supported Turkey fearing that any resistance would force Turkey to sign agreements with Fascist Italy and Germany. The US declined to send anyone to this meeting which focused on one of the most important locations in the Mediterranean. Shaw, 399-400.

¹⁰⁶ Turkey would later play a central role in the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis as well. During the Cuban Crisis, as a final attempt at a resolution, Kennedy told Khrushchev that US would dismantle the Jupiter missiles located in Turkey if USSR would dismantle the ones in Cuba. However if Khrushchev made this bargain public, the whole deal would be off. Khrushchev agreed and the crisis came to an end, but this deal was never publicized until the declassification of the recordings in the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ernest R. May, and Phillip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997).

¹⁰⁷ George F. Kennan (1904-2005), the Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States to the USSR, also known as the "father of containment," sent what was later called the *Long Telegram* to Washington on February 22, 1946, outlining the Soviet psychology, in response to the question from the US Treasury Washington's question, "Why are the Soviets not supporting the newly created World Bank and the International Monetary Fund?" Through a five point analysis of Soviet actions, Kennan sought to critique the comfortable myths of wartime collaboration. He explained the gulf between capitalist America and the communist Soviet Union and pointed out that the latter believed that the contradictions within capitalism would produce wars, but these wars would be directed against the Soviet Union. Because of this belief, Kennan then argued that the Soviet Union would direct its policies towards building up the country's military and industrial strength, pursue self-sufficiency for the areas it controlled rather than international economic cooperation, and only use the United Nations for its own ends rather than as a mechanism for mutual interest. Kennan went on to warn that the Soviet Union was "committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no *modus Vivendi*", and it would work to destroy, "our traditional way of life." At the same time, he pointed out that Soviet foreign policy was well-calculated and not adventurist unlike Hitler's Germany, "it can easily withdraw-and usually does-when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so." Kennan summarized that the Soviets have, "an internally driven hostility toward the outside world," and identified that the only policy toward the Soviets should be, "patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." T.G. Fraser and Donette Murray, *America and the World since 1945* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 20-21.

At the same time, as Leffler argues, it is important to recognize that the US was not an innocent bystander pulled into the Cold War by a “relentlessly expansionist and ideologically motivated” Soviet Union.¹⁰⁸ Instead, the US was just as, if not more expansionist and ideologically driven, than the Soviet Union based on “deeply embedded economic and ideological imperatives,” and “fears about socioeconomic dislocation, revolutionary nationalism, British weakness, and Eurasian vacuums of power.”¹⁰⁹ The fact that US military planners had devised and begun to implement elaborate and extensive plans for a global air defense and base system as early as 1943-44 is usually discussed as concrete evidence that shows the US anticipation of the Cold War. However, aside from military strategies that sought to ensure US control of strategic locations in the case of another World War, the question regarding the construction and maintenance of a sustainable economic order was perhaps the underlying challenge and source of anxiety for US politicians, strategists, political scientists, economists, and other professionals that became intricately and intentionally involved in the Cold War.

Studies into the origins of the Cold War reveal that the debates regarding the establishment of this economic order first focused on the reconstruction of Europe. However as the interests of the former European empires began to become a factor in the maintenance of their economies, the scope and complexity of the Cold War grew exponentially to include other territories, nations, and societies such as Turkey and the

¹⁰⁸ Leffler, 2.

¹⁰⁹ Leffler, 2, 3, 15-41.

Middle East. It was in this context that the conflict over the Straits gained central importance.

The US had begun to make plans to rebuild Europe, even before the Secretary of State, George Catlett Marshall, speaking at Harvard in June 1947, pledged US financial assistance to a comprehensive European recovery program.¹¹⁰ Energy was one of the central issues concerning European recovery. While US energy needs were met almost entirely from western hemisphere production, Secretary of State George Marshall claimed, in September 1948, “the oil of the Middle East is an important factor in the success of the European Recovery Program and in the continued prosperity of Europe.”

¹¹¹ Following World War II, neither of the European empires was in any condition to maintain their control of these regions despite the fact that they needed access to Middle Eastern oil in order to promote Europe’s reconstruction.

Harry S. Truman, then President of the US, began to work on a comprehensive foreign policy that would not only address the situation in and around Turkey, but would provide a consistent strategy that would establish a clear position and ensure the security of US interests against Soviet ideological and territorial expansion. In July, he asked his Special Counsel, Clark Clifford to compile a report with George Elsey, regarding the state of relations with Moscow.¹¹² Their analysis of the situation did not differ from that of Kennan’s Long Telegram, but went further in several significant respects to anticipate

¹¹⁰ Stivers, 2. Although Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan,

¹¹¹ Stivers, 2-3.

¹¹² Fraser, 23.

future policies. First, the Clifford-Elsey Report suggested that a vigorous information programme be implemented to counter Soviet propaganda. Second, it advised that the US should offer economic support to countries which felt threatened by the Soviet Union. Finally, the report advised that if the Soviet cooperation could not be secured, then the United States should combine with Britain and other western countries as a distinct entity.¹¹³

Within the US however, the Democrats had lost control of both houses in the elections of November 1946, and any implementation of a far-reaching foreign policy would have to reach out to the Republicans, especially the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who would in fact prove to be a crucial ally in the months to come, ensuring bipartisan support even when Britain's postwar economic plight put further pressure on Washington. On February 21, 1947, Britain informed Washington that it would have to cease British aid to Greece and Turkey in six weeks and asked the US to take the burden.¹¹⁴ Because of its financial crisis, Britain had granted independence to India and handed the decision over Palestine to the United Nations. On February 27, President Truman, George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson, the Undersecretary, met and concluded that the Soviet success in either Turkey or Greece, as had been found during the crisis over the Straits, would threaten not only the eastern Mediterranean but also other parts of Europe and the Middle East.¹¹⁵ Truman

¹¹³ Fraser, 23. Other implications of the report was so far-reaching that Truman ordered all the report's copies to be locked up in the White House.

¹¹⁴ Fraser, 24.

¹¹⁵ Fraser, 24.

then began to draft a program that would form the first implemented component of the Clifford-Elsey Report.

In response to the crisis over the Straits and Kennan's report, Harry S. Truman delivered what has become known as the Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947) to a joint session of Congress in order to draw bipartisan support to send \$400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey.¹¹⁶ Following Kennan's position, he drew a clear distinction between the western and communist systems, the former "distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom of political expression", the latter relying "upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms."¹¹⁷ He added that since the choice between the two systems was not always a free one, he proclaimed "that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." He reassured his listeners that such an aid should be mainly economic and financial.¹¹⁸ Initially a political success, the Truman doctrine drew some criticism for its "dangerously universalist language."¹¹⁹ However, the Truman Doctrine was followed

¹¹⁶ Fraser, 24.

¹¹⁷ Fraser, 24.

¹¹⁸ Fraser, 24.

¹¹⁹ Even though Truman's plea found overwhelming congressional support, his first attempt at preparing public opinion for the new foreign policy of the United States was criticized by those who had worked on the policy's details with the President. For example, Marshall found the President's tone to be too anti-communist, while Kennan was concerned that his language was cloaked in dangerously universalist language raising questions about whether the US would be obligated to get involved anywhere there was a perceived communist threat. Another problem was that Truman's words insulted the national

by the Marshall Plan (June 5, 1947), which was geographically more focused; even though ideologically less determined.

In this way, the Clifford-Elsey Report, which was prepared in response to the crisis over Turkey, gave way to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and set the tone for US policy in Europe and the Middle East for the next two decades to come. The early conflict over the Straits clarified several questions for the remainder of the Cold War period. First, it became clear that in order to rebuild Europe, the US had to expand its sphere of influence to areas formerly controlled by the shrinking European Empires. Therefore, the US confirmed that the balance of power that was established in these regions in the aftermath of World War I would be maintained. Out of this conflict, Turkey emerged as a symbol of US policy of Soviet containment and as a permanent Western ally in the region. At the same time, the US commitment to protect Turkey against Soviet expansion confirmed that the US would have to get involved in the development and modernization of nation-states beyond Europe in order to succeed in its quest to contain Soviet ideological and territorial expansion.

From the Turkish perspective, Turkey's inclusion as a major benefactor of both of these programs marked a significant shift in western policy. Unlike the way the declining Ottoman Empire had been perceived during the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries, Turkey was no longer treated as a provisional buffer zone between the Soviets and the Middle East. Instead, within the political context of the postwar period, Turkey was seen, not unlike West Berlin, as what one UN official from that period called, "a

revolutionary elites in the very countries that the Doctrine was extending aid as, for example, Turkey's single-party parliamentary system could be interpreted as a totalitarian system based on Truman's clear-cut definitions. See Fraser, 24-25.

lynchpin state” within the region, key to the success of Truman’s policy of Soviet containment and the reconstruction of Europe.¹²⁰

As an extension of the geo-political dynamic of the Cold War, Turkey was going through a number of political, economic, and social transformations from within.¹²¹ The series of austerity measures and taxes implemented to fortify the Turkish military during World War II had weakened the singular authority and popularity of Turkey’s founding party, Republican People’s Party (RPP; Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and its leaders. RPP’s identity and history were one and the same with the revolutionary beginnings and the founding principles of the secular and modernizing Turkish State.¹²² Even though there had been successive attempts, usually encouraged by RPP leaders including Mustafa Kemal, at building an opposition party in Turkey since the beginning of the Republic, opposition parties were closed usually soon after their establishment in the interest of maintaining unity and political stability toward modernization and

¹²⁰ The western perception of the Ottoman Empire as a buffer state between the Tzarist Russia and the Middle East was extensively discussed under the topic, “the Eastern Question,” within especially the British Parliament during the second half of the nineteenth century. The consensus in the British Parliament was that the Ottoman State should be maintained as a buffer state, however this presented a paradox for the British politicians as the Ottoman State ruled over Christian subjects and many in the Parliament supported the independence and nationalization of Ottoman so-called minorities. This had a significant impact in the development of Ottoman Nationalism and nationalism within the Ottoman Empire. For “the lynchpin state,” see, Charles Weitz, interview by author, March 27, 2007, digital recording, author’s archive. See also Rivkin, ...

¹²¹ Scholars disagree on whether internal or external forces were primarily responsible for Turkey’s social and economic transformation during the immediate postwar period. At the same time, the internal versus external distinction is problematic as a framework in itself as the two developments also became increasingly interrelated during this period. For an example of the internal vs. external debate, see, Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Part III: Devrimciliğin Sonu: Tanzimat Batıcılığına Dönüş: Sınıflar Açısından Çok Partili Düzen,” in *Türkiye’nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın, cilt I & II [Structure of Turkey: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, volumes I & II]* (Ankara: Bilgi, 1968. Reprint, İstanbul: Tekin, 2003), 515-532.

¹²² Shaw, 398.

development within the Republic. However, due to the growing unpopularity of RPP toward the end of WWII and the ideological tone of the Truman Doctrine, it became once again necessary for RPP leaders to consider the establishment of a second party.

Consequently, the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP), was established in January 1946 from within RPP.¹²³ In order to better comprehend DP's position within this dynamic, it is important to examine the emergence of DP as a new political and economic force within Turkey during the postwar period. Following the end of World War II, DP was established as a result of both external and internal forces. DP built a political platform to take full advantage of the postwar dynamic that was forming both within and around Turkey. DP won a land-slide victory over the twenty-seven year incumbent Republican People's Party (RPP; Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) in 1950 opening an era of a multi-party democracy as a response to meet not only the demands of multiple social and economic forces, but also the political implications of the Truman Doctrine.

Encouraged by the provisions of the Marshall Plan to build Turkey as a bread-basket for the reconstruction of Europe, DP, under the leadership of Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, built a populist platform, drawing support from large land-owners, businessmen, professionals, and peasants, as opposed to RPP's leadership composed

¹²³ For the emergence of the Democrat Party in Turkey, see, Feroz Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye, 1945-80* (Baskı. Hil, 2007); *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977). Hüseyin Bağcı, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1990); and, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar [Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1950s]*, (Ankara: METU Press, 2001). Mehmet Ali Birand, et. al. *Demirkırat: Bir Demokrasinin Doğuşu [Demirkırat: the Birth of a Democracy]*, (Istanbul: Doğan, 1991); Mustafa Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti (1946-60) [Democrat Party in Turkish Political History]*, (Ankara: Phoenix, 2004).

largely of the heirs of an elite Ottoman-Turkish military/bureaucratic class.¹²⁴ This divide roughly resembled the two factions that Mustafa Kemal had managed to unite in order to organize a national revolutionary war against the occupying forces at the end of WWI. Promising to follow liberal economic practices, to support both agricultural and industrial growth, to encourage competition, to privatize state enterprises, to weaken the strict secularization laws, to take utmost advantage of Turkey's geo-political position to build Turkey as a regional leader in the Middle East, and to "make Turkey a 'little America' within a generation, with a millionaire in every district," DP won a land-slide victory, in their second try, against the 27-year incumbent RPP in 1950.¹²⁵ In order to succeed, DP was to rely heavily on foreign support and investment. As the funds earmarked for the Marshall Plan began to run out and inflation rose in Turkey, DP's repeated requests of financial support from primarily the US began to wear down the relationship that had been hastily built between the US and DP politicians.

Thus, Turkey became a full and binding partner of the western military alliance.

Despite the fact that Truman had expressed that this aid should be economic and financial, American military experts came to Ankara for discussions that led to the

¹²⁴ Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1965),

¹²⁵ Ahmad Feroz, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 103. *Demokrat* and *demokratik* are essentially western terms that made their way into the Turkish language. It is curious why a party running on a populist platform would pick a term of high culture for its name—perhaps the leaders wanted the name to be recognizable in international circles and transactions. Interestingly, many rural supporters of the party began to refer to the party as, "Demir kır at," or as "Iron gray horse," associating the party with both industrial and agrarian imagery consistent with DP's dual aims. The party emblem therefore became a gray horse on a Turkish red background. Many critics found DP dual aim to succeed in both industrial and agrarian development to be too ambitious, however DP characteristically would not listen to this type of criticism finding it to be a form of latent Western orientalism against countries such as Turkey. DP made considerable progress in both areas and ran aground as foreign aid was pulled out from under them around the second half of the 1950s.

Turkish-American agreement on military aid and cooperation, ratified in Ankara on September 1, 1947.¹²⁶ Beginning in 1948, Turkey began to receive military equipment and help in building up its transportation systems. Through both financial and military aid, Turkey was able to increase its military force from around 80,000 to around 400,000.¹²⁷ Exchange programs were set up to train high-level Turkish military and administrative staff in the United States.

Following the Marshall Plan, Turkey was admitted as a charter member into the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later, Organization for European Cooperation and Development, OECD) on April 16, 1948, which led to a direct economic agreement between the two nations on July 8, 1948. In June 1950, Turkey agreed to contribute 5,000 troops to the UN effort in Korea and subsequently was admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in February 18, 1952, despite initial objections from Britain and France. As a full member of the NATO, Turkey had finally secured binding support against a Soviet attack, but economic and military cooperation with the West remained the basis of Turkey's foreign policy, establishing Turkey as an essential pillar of Western defenses in the region ever since.

One of the reasons that England gave in to the Turkish bid to become a member of NATO was that England felt that Turkey could be instrumental in consolidating the Middle Eastern coalition against the Soviets by making the Baghdad Pact a reality--a "Catch-22" for Turkey: In order to move closer to the West, Turkey was being asked to

¹²⁶ Shaw, 400.

¹²⁷ Rivkin, 97.

move closer to the East. DP's enthusiastic acceptance of the offer to act as the leader of the Middle East was based on the hopes that their willingness to "play" would be rewarded even though this was a significant political and strategic risk for DP and for Turkey as a state that emerged out of the center of the Ottoman Empire. Many decolonizing Middle Eastern nations, which were now beginning to free themselves from the Western protectors who had liberated them from the Ottomans, did not take too well to the proposition to accept the leadership of one of their former colonizers.

At the same time, while the majority of the Turkish population was Muslim, Turkey was now a secular state based again on one of the pillars of the Kemalist Revolution. Any suggestion to join an Islamic coalition or to engage too closely with Islamic nations was seen as a step back to Ottoman traditions and was considered a "betrayal" of Kemalist doctrines. However, encouraged by its popularity and the demographics of its followers, DP went on to soften secularist laws, which were closely guarded by the military and the bureaucratic elite, allowing, for example, the call to prayer to be in Arabic, and courses on Islam to be reintroduced into the secondary school curricula. These changes were done in the name of democratization, increasing personal liberties, and decreasing the authority of the State, while they also anticipated political and economic gains and relationships as Turkey had now turned also toward the East.¹²⁸

The RPP was not able to come close to regaining the popular vote or to exert any influence in the Parliament during the 1950s despite rising concerns regarding the long-

¹²⁸ The establishment of Israel and Turkey's recognition of Israel ultimately weakened Turkey's position as a leader of the Islamic coalition... The leadership position was then taken up by Egypt... This shift of attention to Egypt would inevitably cause some anxiety in the Turkish administration in terms of the continuation of foreign aid

term success of DP's policies. As a result, effectively, Turkey had gone back to a single-party rule, except this time to sanction what had been marginalized by the revolutionary elite. DP's success was a revolution in itself as it threatened to overturn some of the founding doctrines of the Turkish State rooted in nationalism and modernization.

Consequently, the military elite, which had deep connections to the bureaucratic elite in control of the RPP, remained the only threat to DP, similar to the way the military had embodied the only formidable power against the Ottoman Sultan's modernizing reforms during the nineteenth century. However, the military did not have any direct political power. At the same time, the military had benefited from DP's foreign policies to join NATO and to build Turkey as a regional center and a stronghold in the Middle East. For the time being, as long as DP held overwhelming popular power and was in favor of the US, there was not much the military generals could do about DP's traditionalist policies. However, the tables would turn as US financial and political support for DP declined during the mid-1950s.

Another social and spatial transformation occurred, when, in order to increase Turkey's military efficiency, the US military mission recommended that Turkey abandon its emphasis on railroad construction and undertake a major road-building program with American assistance.¹²⁹ The single-track rail system that Turkey had been building with foreign assistance could not meet the maneuverability needs of a military under potential pressure from multiple sides. In addition, the US experts felt that the highway network could serve a double-duty and tie the rural farms and villages to urban markets and ports,

¹²⁹ Rivkin, 105.

effectively providing better connections between Turkey and Europe as well, allowing Turkey to meet its potential as an important grain exporter to the West.¹³⁰ To realize this major geographical transformation, a US Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) team came to Turkey under the direction of Deputy Commissioner H.E. Hilts in 1947.¹³¹ The Hilts Report became a blueprint for the subsequent program and recommended that national roads be increased by 5,000 kilometers and provincial routes (the farm-to-market connectors) by 30,000 kilometers. The report also suggested the establishment of a Turkish highway department, using local contractors and engineers. Work began in 1948 within the Turkish Ministry of Public Works, to which a BPR technical assistance mission was attached. In 1950, just a short time before the change from RPP to DP administration, a semi-autonomous National Highway Department (Devlet Karayolları), was created within the Ministry. A large professional staff was recruited, many of whom were sent to the US for advanced training in civil and road engineering. Vecdi Diker served as the founding director of this department, but, as discussed earlier in this chapter, he resigned shortly after the beginning of the DP administration.¹³²

¹³⁰ Rivkin, 105. The provisions of the Marshall Plan designated Turkey as the bread-basket for Europe and therefore earmarked much of the aid for Agricultural use and not for industrial development.

¹³¹ For the Hilts Report and the establishment of Turkey's Highway Administration, also see, Hüseyin Yayman, *Türkiye'nin İdari Reform Tarihi [History of Administration Reform in Turkey]* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2008), 173-198.

¹³² Rivkin, 106. Also see, Lehman, Robert S., "Building Roads and a Highway Administration in Turkey," in *Hands across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation*, eds., Howard M. Teaf, Jr. and Peter G. Franck (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955). Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü. *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Karayollarımız [Our Highways on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Republic]*. Ankara: Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü Matbaası, 1973. İlhan Tekeli points out that the Hilts report was a proponent of a highway network, but the Turkish side lobbied for an emphasis on the importance of the secondary road network. Interview by the Author, March 17, 2008; Digital Recording, author's archive. Also see the extensive exploration of the history of the development of the Ottoman-Turkish transportation systems in Vol. 3 of, İlhan Tekeli and Selim Ilkin. *Cumhuriyet'in Harcı: Modernitenin Alt Yapısı*

DP, under the leadership of Adnan Menderes, used postwar aid to modernize and mechanize Turkish agriculture while also building up the capital as well as Istanbul and Izmir as the main Turkish harbors and as show places for foreign trade and business. Tractors and other mechanized farm equipment were imported in large numbers through the provisions of the Marshall Plan, irrigation systems were improved, credit possibilities via the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası) were expanded.¹³³ However, despite an initial increase in agricultural production during the early 1950s, mechanization displaced farmers and led to a loss of top soil and erosion caused by deep-furrowed cultivation. This led to further loss of farmland and a fall in production due to drought in 1954 and 1955.¹³⁴

Availability of inexpensive foreign imports also stalled the efforts of many industrial entrepreneurs. Many lost large investments as new start-ups manufacturing spare parts or other light manufacturing industries. They could not compete with foreign imports that had now become available for Turkish consumers. Vecdi Diker was one of the few who successfully established a tractor manufacturing plant in Turkey to curb Turkey's reliance on foreign imports and to compete with foreign imports. Others, like

Oluşurken [The Mortar of the Republic: The Making of Modernity's Infrastructure]. Volumes I-III. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2004. Oya Köymen, et. al., eds., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere [From Villages to Cities in 75 Years]*, (Beşiktaş, İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999).

¹³³ In an address to the American-Turkish Society in New York in October 1950, George C. McGhee, assistant secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs, commented, "As of June 30, 1950, Turkey had received approximately 185 million dollars from Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) [under the provisions of the Marshall Plan] to be used to purchase tractors, plows, combines, and other types of agricultural equipment so that great areas of land can be brought under cultivation. This money was also used to modernize and expand the principal coal mines.... They are used for roadbuilding.... They are used to increase the country's power facilities. As quoted in Wharton, 33. Also see, Rivkin, 101.

¹³⁴ Rivkin, 102.

Vehbi Koç, made their fortunes on selling foreign imports to Turkish consumers. However, a political divide opened between those who struggled to compete against foreign goods and DP efforts to keep them coming.

Furthermore, due to the effects of the National Highway network and the agricultural revolution, Turkey suffered a population explosion and demographic transformation. Many peasants left the countryside in search of work and opportunities in urban areas where industrial growth did not keep up with the increase in the numbers of displaced farmers due to mechanization in agriculture.¹³⁵ Uncontrolled speculative development ran rampant in cities and remained the primary means of capital development due to slow industrial growth. However, such development did not meet the housing needs of newcomers and the poor. *Gecekondu* or slums began to fill the public lands of many cities. To make matters worse, while municipal governments and public officials struggled to enforce outdated zoning and construction codes, large scale development projects, oftentimes sponsored by the DP administration, threatened and destroyed the historic fabric of cities. Furthermore, legalization of slum developments became a political tool through which populist governments such as DP gained political strength.

¹³⁵ Rivkin, 94-95; Shaw, 400-401. Michael N. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, *The Politics of Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, (New York; London: Holmes and Meier, 1984); Ruşen Keleş, *Kentleşme Politikası [Politics of Urbanization]*. 10th Edition. (İstanbul: İmge, 2008); Karpaz, Kemal H., *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization*, (Cambridge, London, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1976). Tansı Şenyapılı, *Ankara Kentinde Gecekondu Gelişimi (1923-1960)*, (Ankara: Batıkent Konut Üretim Yapı Kooperatifleri Birliği, 1985). Yıldız Sey, ed., *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık [Seventy-five Years of Change in the City and Architecture]*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998). Oya Köymen, et. al., eds., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere [From Villages to Cities in 75 Years]*, (Beşiktaş, İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999). Üçüncü Türkiye Şehircilik Kongresi. *Türkiye'de Şehirciliğin Gelişiminde son 30 Yılın Değerlendirilmesi* (İzmir Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, 1991).

DP, under the leadership of Adnan Menderes, now a charismatic and popular leader, and the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works, undertook a number of large scale urban renewal and expansion projects in order to make port cities, such as Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana, into major trade centers that were more accessible to foreign investors and travelers.¹³⁶ The Istanbul Hilton near Taksim Square, the new Palace of Justice building near the Roman Hippodrome and the Blue Mosque in the historical peninsula, and the reorganization of the Beyazıt (Mosque) Square are some of the outstanding examples of these projects. The Menderes administration was especially pleased with the way the Hilton project was realized through a collaboration among a US corporation, and the US and Turkish governments.¹³⁷ Indeed, the Hilton proved that such a collaboration could be beneficial for all involved as it was both a political and an economic triumph. As Annabel Wharton reveals in her book on the Hilton International Hotels, the establishment of the hotel was largely, if not entirely, a political affair.¹³⁸ The design and

¹³⁶ The projects for Istanbul that were developed and carried out under Menderes's watch have been likened to the Haussmanization of Paris. Many of the major public works that are currently present in Istanbul such as the Bosphorus Bridge were projected during the postwar period; first, during Vecdi Diker's tenure at the Ministry; and later, under the Menderes administration. For an in-depth analysis of these projects within the larger context of urban planning in Turkey, see, İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Kent Planlamasının Tarihsel Kökleri," in *Türkiye'de İmar Planlaması [(Re)Construction Planning in Turkey]*, edited by Tamer Gök (Ankara: ODTÜ Şehir ve Bölge Planlama Bölümü [METU Department of City and Regional Planning, 1980), 8-112. For a discussion of the projects for Beyazıt Square, see, Uğur Tanyeli and Atilla Yücel, *Turgut Cansever: Düşünce Adamı ve Mimar [Turgut Cansever: Theorist and Architect]* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi ve Garanti Galeri, 2007). Also see, Zeynep Çelik, *Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). *Arkitekt*, the only architectural journal that was active in Turkey during the 1950s published many of the projects that were being carried out by the Menderes government.

¹³⁷ During the early 1950s, the Pan-American company had begun to look into building a luxury hotel in Istanbul to provide a stop there for the Pan-American World Tour that the company was advertising during those years.

¹³⁸ Annabel Jane Wharton, *Building the Cold War: Hilton International Hotels and Modern Architecture* (The University of Chicago Press, 2001).

construction of the hotel was not realized through corporate investment. The project was funded jointly by the Turkish and the US governments. The Turkish government, in the guise of the Turkish Pension Fund, provided the land, the building, and the maintenance costs of the hotel. However, this money was underwritten by the US. According to the New York Times, the Federal Operations Administration (FOA) guaranteed the Bank of America loan to the Turkish Pension Fund for the hotel.¹³⁹ Situated on the hills of the Bosphorus, the Istanbul Hilton faced the Soviet tankers that navigated through the Bosphorus and delivered a clear message that the Straits were now under the protection of the US.

The well-known American architecture, engineering, and planning firm, Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill (SOM) was awarded the project following their commission with the Turkish Ministry to provide an extensive report titled, “Construction, Town Planning, and Housing in Turkey.”¹⁴⁰ Gordon Bunschaft led the SOM team and as a part of the agreement, SOM partnered in the design and execution of the project with the well-known Turkish architect, Sedad Hakkı Eldem, who was also involved with a number of other Menderes projects in Istanbul.¹⁴¹ Hilton provided

¹³⁹ Wharton, 33.

¹⁴⁰ Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, Architects and Engineers, “Construction, Town Planning, and Housing in Turkey,” SOM Archives, 1951. The contents of this report will be discussed under the next subchapter, “Abrams and the UN.”

¹⁴¹ For the most recent study of Sedad Hakkı’s involvement with SOM in the Hilton project and the emergence of the large architectural office in Istanbul as a result of these encounters, see, Ela Ayşem Kaçel, “Intellectualism and Consumerism: Ideologies, Practices, and Criticism of Common Sense Modernism in Postwar Turkey” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 2009). Also see, Sibel Bozdoğan, Suha Özkan, and Engin Yenil, *Sedad Eldem: Architect in Turkey*, foreword by Hans Hollein (Singapore: Concept Media; New York: Aperture, 1987).

administrative expertise and staff training and was entitled to third of the profits. It turned out to be a highly profitable venture for all involved due to the fact that the hotel could pay much lower wages to highly competent, well-educated, and motivated staff.¹⁴² The Turkish Government saw the enterprise as a training ground, almost as a school for the construction, establishment and management of other large scale luxury ventures to get the tourism industry started in Turkey.¹⁴³ While building the Hilton in Istanbul, the Turkish Government started the Izmir Grand Efes Hotel, a second luxury hotel in Izmir, the second largest port in Turkey, funded and operated this time through again the Turkish Pension Fund.¹⁴⁴

The Menderes government was pleased with the cooperation model that they had devised with the US in the Hilton project. Conrad Hilton's promise, "Each of our hotels... is a 'little America,'" perfectly matched DP's desire to build Turkey as a "little America."¹⁴⁵ However, as early as 1954, the US was finding it hard to finance economic

¹⁴² Wharton points out how, for example in the case of the Cairo Hilton, the sons and daughters of governmental ministers and bureaucratic elite lined up to apply for the jobs that became available with the opening of the hotel. Differences in the way these hotels were perceived by US and the audiences in the places that they were built is a very interesting topic. Similar to the way the Cairo Hilton was perceived, the Istanbul Hilton immediately became not only the single most prestigious hotel, but also the most prestigious business and the building to be involved with in Turkey. They would not have enjoyed the same prominence and distinction in the United States.

¹⁴³ Wharton notes, "The Hilton International management contract became a popular model for management leases. In 1990, for example, it served as a template for the agreement form promoted by the United Nations in negotiations between 'third world' countries and 'first world' hoteliers. Wharton, 33.

¹⁴⁴ In addition to the luxury hotels, the DP government undertook a wide range of construction projects at a variety of scales. Many of these projects were awarded through competitions organized by the Ministry of Public Works. For a range of these projects, see, TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, *Yarışmalar Dizini 1930-2004* (Ankara: TMMOB Odası, 2004).

¹⁴⁵ Conrad Hilton, as quoted in Annabel Jane Wharton's, *Building the Cold War: Hilton International Hotels and Modern Architecture*, (The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1. President Celal Bayar said, "We in our country are working to follow the example of American development. We hope that thirty years from now when our blessed country will have a population of 50 million, it will be a little

development abroad. Menderes was frustrated with US and UN consultants who advised his government to adopt a mixed economy whereas Menderes' motto had been, "The budget is a plan."¹⁴⁶ Menderes felt that this was an excuse by the US to slow down development in "third world" countries.

Furthermore, by 1954, the relationship between the DP government and the US Embassy, as well as the relationship between the US and the UN, had worsened considerably at least within the Turkish context. During the early 1950s, Kemal Kurdaş, who was then the Assistant to the General Director of the Ministry of Finance, points out that the relationship between the DP cabinet and the US diplomats had increasingly worsened between 1950 and 1955.¹⁴⁷ The central point of contention between the two parties had to do with finance regulation and planning. US-AID representatives felt that the Turkish economy was heading toward a crisis and wanted the DP administration to take a series of precautions before allowing Turkey to borrow more foreign aid.

Kurdaş recalls one meeting in particular that was held in March 1955. At this meeting, Fatin R. Zorlu, as the Deputy Prime Minister had gathered the outstanding officials from the Ministry of Finance (including Kurdaş) as well as the foremost

America." See, "Cumhuriyet," October 21, 1957, as quoted in Richard D. Robinson, *Developments Respecting Turkey: A Summary of Events and Statistics with Biographical Notes*, (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1954), 216. Also see, Malcolm D. Rivkin, *Area Development for National Growth: The Turkish Precedent*, (New York; Washington; London: Praeger, 1965), 96. Based on Bayar's statement, the well-known historian Ahmad Feroz later wrote, "The Democrats promised to make Turkey a 'little America' within a generation, with a millionaire in every district." See, Ahmad Feroz, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 103.

¹⁴⁶ The Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, in a press conference, as quoted in, Robinson, *Developments Respecting Turkey...*, 26.

¹⁴⁷ Kurdaş, 15-17.

representatives of the US agencies in Turkey.¹⁴⁸ Avra Warren, the US Ambassador, the Resident Representative of USAID in Turkey, and Gardner Patterson, visiting consultant to the USAID were all present. Kurdaş recalls that Avra Warren opened the meeting suggesting that the Turkish economy was heading for a serious decline and it needed to take the precautions that the US agencies have been suggesting in order to stay afloat. Cutting the Ambassador's introduction off, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu went on a formidable tirade, arguing,

We have been hearing these suggestions for years. None of it comprises a visionary worldview; all of it are precautions that little bureaucrats, narrow-minded accountants, and fruitless economists copy from each other. We aren't hearing these from you only. Our own bureaucrats are the same [pointing to Kurdaş]... We *listen* to these bureaucrats. And we are saddened. However, this is not our central problem. Your higher officials seem to have the same view as your bureaucrats. Why is this the case? Because even the high level representatives you send us are not properly trained in nation-building; they do not have proper statesman qualities; or have proper nation-building experience. You send us the merchant class [pointing to Dayton and Warren] who have no higher vision than making small change. Please let your supervisors know that we request better qualified agents experienced in nation-building.¹⁴⁹

Following these remarks, Kurdaş recalls that Avra Warren adjourned the meeting by making the remark that he would be sure to bring these wishes to Washington's attention. Kurdaş points out, after this meeting, the talks regarding foreign aid between the Finance Ministry and the US agencies came to a complete stop. He mentions that the trip to Washington, DC that had been planned by the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes and

¹⁴⁸ In his memoir, Kurdaş points out that Zorlu had told him that he was going to attack the US representatives once and for all for dragging their feet in terms of aid for Turkey. Zorlu also asked Kurdaş to be at the meeting, but to keep his mouth shut, since Zorlu knew quite well that Kurdaş tended to agree with the precautionary views of the US agencies. Kurdaş, 15.

¹⁴⁹ Author's translation. Kurdaş, 16.

Fatin R. Zorlu to ask for US-Aid produced embarrassing results.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, Warren and Dayton resigned from their positions soon after this meeting.¹⁵¹

A radical breakdown within the DP cabinet soon followed Zorlu's confrontation of the US agents during the March 1954 meeting. Due to an internal uprising in 1955, Zorlu (1910-1961), along with the Minister of Labor and Finance, Hasan Polatkan (1915-1961) and many other members of the DP cabinet were forced to step down.¹⁵²

Around the same time, UN-Turkish relations were breaking down as well for several reasons. First, the DP Administration did not find UN methods of development compatible with their aim to build an American-style economy in Turkey. However, they were willing to implement UN programs as long as these programs made Turkey more attractive for investment for US agencies.¹⁵³ DP's agreement to establish the United Nations Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East (Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Entitüsü, TODAIE) in Ankara on March 24, 1953 was a primary example of their willingness to incorporate UN methods of development into DP's administrative structure.¹⁵⁴ However, DP would have preferred the type of

¹⁵⁰ Menderes and Zorlu asked for \$350,000,000.00, but only got surplus wheat worth \$33,000,000.00. Kurdaş, 16.

¹⁵¹ The UN-TAB resident representative was also changed. Ole Sturren was replaced with Charles Weitz in 18 October 1954, toward the end of Abrams' visit to Turkey.

¹⁵² Although Zorlu was reappointed as the Minister of State (1955-1957) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1957-1961). Following the coup d'état of 1960, Menderes, Zorlu, and Polatkan were executed by hanging following contrived trials set up by the National Unity Committee (1960-1961).

¹⁵³ US agents and agencies had initially recommended that Turkey should make use of the UN. The SOM report, for example, recommended that Turkey make use of UN experts to develop a national housing agency and construction materials and methods research institutes.

¹⁵⁴ TODAIE establishment will be discussed in more detail in chapter two.

development and collaboration that they were able to achieve with US agencies during the construction of the Hilton Hotels. DP did not view TODAIE as a useful suggestion and the development practices that the UN agents provided were too cautious for the social and economic transformation that the DP government wanted to achieve in a short period of time in Turkey.¹⁵⁵

Second, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) repeatedly expressed criticism of the large-scale development projects that the DP government had begun in Istanbul's historic districts such as the Beyazit Square and the construction of the Palace of Justice. DP felt that UNESCO was being partial to the protection of Roman and Byzantine remains and identity of the city and declared all UNESCO agents as *persona non grata* in all diplomatic affairs.¹⁵⁶

Third, When Abrams arrived, the Turkish officials were waiting for the UN to deliver on a larger and earlier promise, and Abrams' work in housing and zoning problems, although important, did not interest the Turkish side within the context of the larger agreements with the UN. In the Introduction of Abrams' report, Abrams begins by stating, "Pursuant to the Basic Agreement of 5 September 1951 concluded between the

¹⁵⁵ For Turkish perceptions the UN and the Turkish membership, see Mehmet Gönlübol, *Turkish Participation in the United Nations, 1945-1954*, (Ankara: Faculty of Political Science and the Institute of International Relations, University of Ankara: 1965).

¹⁵⁶ Later, DP officials continued to be reluctant allow the UN to shift the project from UN-TAB to UNESCO, since, from the UN's standpoint, UNESCO would be the organization that should have dealt with educational matters. Charles Weitz, Resident Representative of UN-TAB in Ankara (1954-59), also pointed out that UNESCO had a bad reputation in Turkey. In this letter, Weitz also points out that, ironically, "the UNESCO team which help put together the grey book which was the basis for the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme." Charles Weitz, Madison, WI, to Craig Murphy, Cambridge, Mass., February 11, 2005, email letter transcript in the hand of Craig Murphy. In this letter, Weitz also points out that, ironically, "the UNESCO team which help put together the grey book which was the basis for the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme." Also see, Craig Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 88.

United Nations and the Government of Turkey, the Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) of the United Nations provided the services of Mr. Charles Abrams (USA) to advise the Government on a number of aspects of housing and planning.¹⁵⁷ However, a survey of the agreements between Turkey and the UN between 1950 and 1953 does not yield an agreement regarding housing and planning.¹⁵⁸ The majority of the agreements had to do with a project that was of particular importance for Turkey. On April 14, 1951, Turkey and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UN-FAO), the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund had signed an agreement of cooperation for the establishment of a Research Institute in Turkey in Agriculture and Related Fields of Development to benefit Turkey and the larger Mediterranean Region.¹⁵⁹ Under this agreement, the Turkish Government agreed to provide the necessary resources, such as the facilities and the monetary funds, needed to establish a training and research center to assess and develop the economic opportunities in agriculture and related industries in the Mediterranean region.¹⁶⁰ The Marshall Plan had designated Turkey as the breadbasket for the reconstruction of Europe, and the DP government had taken on that mission as a political platform. Consequently, this agreement was one of the

¹⁵⁷ Charles Abrams, *United Nations Report on a University in Turkey; the Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning*, prepared for the Government of Turkey by Charles Abrams (Appointed by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration), File No: TAA 173/57/018, Report No: TAA/TUR/13, (New York: United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, 1955), 1.

¹⁵⁸ Ahmet Yavuz, ed., *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Akdettiği Milletlerarası Andlaşmalar, 20 Nisan 1920 – 1 Temmuz 1976 [International Agreements of the Turkish Republic, April 20, 1920 – July 1, 1976]*, (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1976), 399-407.

¹⁵⁹ Yavuz, 400. Also see, *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Bulletin of the Turkish Republic]* July 4, 1951, no. 7851, 1561-1562.

¹⁶⁰ See the detailed descriptions of the responsibilities of each participating agency in *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Bulletin of the Turkish Republic]* July 4, 1951, no. 7851, 1562.

major accomplishments of the DP government as part of the larger project to establish Turkey as a leader in the region.

Fourth, as mentioned in relation to Uzer's position during Abrams' encounter with Diker, the staff and administrators in the Turkish ministries had begun to view foreign experts with some ambivalence. To a certain extent, the presence of a renowned foreign expert in a Turkish ministry or school, especially during the Republican era, was business as usual. Due to the influx of many German and Austrian professionals into Turkey following the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany in 1933, Turkey had no significant shortage of highly qualified professionals aiding Turkish development and modernization across most disciplines.¹⁶¹ Many of these German-Austrian professionals held dual positions teaching at the universities in Istanbul, while also serving as consultants at the Ankara ministries. Because of this, the professional community, most of whom had been, at one time or another, their pupils, viewed them both as master teachers as well as unfair competitors for government commissions. All in all, the German and Austrian masters were accepted and contributed their knowledge for many years while living in Turkey.

Regarding the Turkish perception of foreign experts during the postwar period, İlhan Tekeli, a prolific author of Turkey's modernization, Professor Emeritus in the Department of City and Regional Planning at METU and an initial student of that

¹⁶¹ Arnold Reisman, *Turkey's Modernization: Refugees from Nazism and Atatürk's Vision* (Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 2006). Also see, Mustafa Gencer, *Jöntürk Modernizmi ve 'Alman Ruhü: ' 1908-1918 Dönemi Türk-Alman İlişkileri ve Eğitim [Youngturk Modernism and 'the German Soul: 1908-1918 Period Turkish-German Relations and Education]*. Istanbul: İletişim, 2003. One should also note the involvement of Soviet experts in the construction of Turkish agriculture and industry. For this see, İlhan Tekeli, ...

department, makes an interesting observation.¹⁶² He points out that the UN and the US consultants, unlike their German predecessors, stayed for only a couple of months, wrote a report, and left. Because of this, Turkish professionals working in the ministries usually felt that the UN and the US agents' understanding of the conditions in Turkey was very limited and did not warrant much attention. The time was too short to develop a closer working relationship with these consultants.

However, there was more to the tension that was building up between the ministries and their practice of hiring foreign experts for important government jobs and the Turkish professionals' rise to legitimacy within the growing building and construction market of the 1950s. This rivalry between Turkish professionals, state practices, and foreign experts would play a major part in the formation of the political dynamic that contributed to the establishment and development of the idea of a new school of architecture. However, as suggested by Tekeli's observations, the area of training and education was one area where Turkish architects felt their foreign counterparts could continue to be involved.¹⁶³

¹⁶² İlhan Tekeli, interview by author, 17 March 2008, digital recording, author's archive. Tekeli also met Abrams personally and was able to briefly discuss the establishment and the aims of the school with Abrams during his graduate work in planning at MIT during the early 1960s.

¹⁶³ The issue of foreign architects will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.

Conclusion

Despite the breakdown in the postwar aid machinery, Diker and Abrams had been able to get Zorlu's interest and approval for the project. The DP perceived the scope and content of the project as a technical university like the RPP, but in a slightly different way. For the DP, in addition to representing the modernizing aims of the Turkish revolutionary ideology, it also represented the social, economic, and revolutionary transformations that the DP had introduced, replacing the incumbent RPP. More specifically, the DP perceived the idea of the university as a regional research institution that would strengthen Turkey's bid to position itself as a model western ally as well as a cultural and economic leader in the Middle East. Furthermore, the university needed to be based on US models in order to bring US strategies of development to Turkey. The proposed institutions' potential link to US governmental and private agencies was also an important aspect of the project. DP's western-centric, economically liberal, and expansionist vision ran counter to RPP's nationalist and statist economic strategies. However, the two parties' agendas overlapped on the idea of establishing a UN-sponsored technical university based on US models. The next chapter examines how Abrams perceived the project and how he began to formulate the idea based on his perceptions and in a way to convince the UN of the validity of his proposal.

Chapter Two:
Charles Abrams, Postwar Reconstruction, and the Turkish
Technical Assistance Machinery, 1950 - 1954

This chapter steps back from the moment of the breakdown of the Technical Assistance Machinery in Turkey and retells the story from the point of view that reflects the developments within the United Nations and its agencies. It traces Charles Abrams' background and work as a labor lawyer, housing policy intellectual and lecturer at the New School of Social Research in New York. It shows how his work on land economics and his advocacy for a "middle road", which he articulated in his well-received book, *Revolution in Land*, attracted the attention of both foreign and domestic architects and planners who were working on postwar projects of reconstruction. Within this context, the chapter shows how Abrams began to work as a consultant for the United Nations Housing and Town and Country (UN-HTCP) division and how he adapted his work on land economics to work as a guide for housing and development issues in the decolonizing and developing worlds.

The chapter then examines how the UN-HTCP, under the directorship of Ernest Weissmann, became a significant supporter of many professionals related to the planning field during the mid-1950s. Through the examination of a major seminar that Weissmann organized in collaboration with the Indian Government in New Delhi, the chapter identifies the general configuration of UN-HTCP's operational framework and Abrams' involvement and contributions to it about six months before his arrival in Turkey.

Lastly, the chapter examines how Abrams had to adjust both his own and the UN's approach to housing and development as he arrived in Turkey on his first UN mission as a housing consultant. As Abrams encountered the technical assistance machinery in Turkey, the chapter traces what opportunities and roadblocks he found in terms of his approach to state administration and land reform. It then shows how he reformulated the scope and content of his mission in order to be able to implement a new version of his land revolution while also appealing to the interests of all parties involved.

2.1 Charles Abrams and the United Nations

Before Charles Abrams began to work as a consultant for the UN, he had already established himself as a labor lawyer and a well-known housing and planning expert and policy intellectual in New York. By the early 1950s, he had also lectured and taught courses on a variety of topics related to housing, land economics, and planning practice and law at a number of colleges and universities such as the New School of Social Research, College of the City of New York, Columbia University, and the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Perhaps because Abrams was a lawyer and not an architect or a planner by training or profession, his name and publications are curiously no longer among the most cited works in housing and planning publications.¹⁶⁴ However, Abrams was one of the most accomplished members of the loose-knit group of New York public and policy intellectuals that Alexander Bloom later referred to as the “prodigal sons.”¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Abrams wrote and published extensively. Please see the bibliography for a more extensive list. *Revolution in Land* (New York; London: Harper and brothers, 1939); *The Future of Housing* (New York and London: Harper and brothers, 1946); *Race Bias in Housing* (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1947); *Forbidden Neighbors: A Study of Prejudice in Housing* (New York: Harper, 1955); *The City is the Frontier* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965) can be counted among his books on housing and cities. He documented his work as a consultant for the UN in, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1964). Also see, A. Scott Henderson, *Housing and the Democratic Ideal: The Life and Thought of Charles Abrams*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); O. H. Koenigsberger, S. Groak, and B. Bernstein, eds., *The Work of Charles Abrams: Housing and Urban Renewal in the USA and the Third World: A Collection of Papers*, (New York: Bergamon, 1980); Bernard Taper, “A Lover of Cities, I,” *The New Yorker*, 4 February 1967, 39-42, 44, 47-48, 50, 55-56, 58, 61-62, 64, 69-70, 72, 75-76, 78, 83-84, 86, 89-91; and Bernard Taper, “A Lover of Cities, II,” *The New Yorker*, 11 February, 1967, 45-50, 53-54, 56, 59-60, 62, 67-68, 70, 73, 76, 78, 80, 85-86, 88, 90, 92, 95, 97-98, 103-104, 106, 109-110, 112, 115. His papers and manuscripts of his many publications and lectures are located in the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections in the Cornell University Library.

¹⁶⁵ Alexander Bloom, in his book entitled, *Prodigal Sons*, uses the phrase, “New York intellectuals,” to describe a distinct social group that emerged in New York beginning in the 1930s. He writes, “They had assembled on the edge of American society. Coming from the immigrant ghettos in which their parents had settled upon arrival in America, they moved toward the center of American intellectual life by a circuitous route through left politics and the avant-garde cultural life of the 1930s. They exchanged the peripheral world of the immigrants for the marginal world of radical intellectuals. But even here, among those who all considered themselves cosmopolitan and universalist, they felt different.

Between the 1930s and the 1960s, along with other public intellectuals such as Irving Howe, Alfred Kazin, and Lewis Mumford, he was able to explain complex subjects to lay audiences throughout the world through his writings in a variety of publications such as *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, *Commentary*, *Survey Graphic*, *The New Leader*, *The New York Times*, *Ekistics*, as well as other national and international journals and newspapers.¹⁶⁶

The son of Jewish Lithuanian parents, Abrams was born in the crowded slums of Vilna, then in Tsarist-controlled Poland.¹⁶⁷ As a result of residential restrictions that were placed on Jews during the latter half of the 1890s the socio-economic conditions for Jews especially in Vilna had worsened drastically. Abrams' parents immigrated to the U.S. in 1904 and had to squeeze into a three-room apartment in a six-story tenement in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn.¹⁶⁸ Growing up in the dilapidated apartments and communities of Williamsburg and Brooklyn which were largely occupied by immigrants and the poor, Abrams got to know first-hand what it meant to be a dispossessed newcomer in a bustling city. He began to work at an early age doing various jobs to help support the family, taking up part-time jobs in Manhattan, which served as his introduction to a city during its phase of immense growth and urbanization.

They were young, Jewish, urban intellectuals whose radical politics became bound up with an assimilationist momentum begun when their parents left Europe. Alexander Bloom, *Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals and their World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 4.

¹⁶⁶ Henderson, 1-2.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

The Abrams' parents, like many other Jewish immigrant parents noted in Bloom's book, encouraged and supported intellectual ambitions even though economic difficulties ruled out traditional higher education for Abrams.¹⁶⁹ He managed to send himself to night law school while clerking in a lawyer's office.¹⁷⁰ This dual path to a legal career, the mixture of theory and practice, which was becoming increasingly uncommon after World War I, gave Abrams the professional edge that he was to be known for later in his career.¹⁷¹ He began to teach at the New School for Social Research towards the late 1930s, not because he was an academic, but because he wanted to convey to others his experience-derived insights and expertise in housing and land use planning.¹⁷² In addition, early involvement in Greenwich Village real estate gave him not only experience in property transactions and finance, but also lifetime financial security, which allowed him to steer his practice to represent underprivileged urban populations in labor and housing disputes and to write extensively in order to educate and mobilize others who cared about similar issues. Regarding Abrams' work as the New York City Housing Authority's (NYCHA) first general counsel for four years, Scott Henderson writes, "Initiating housing reform in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had been complex and uncertain. Implementing public housing in the 1930s would be similarly challenging... By the end of his (Abrams') tenure, NYCHA had emerged as the

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 24.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid., 83. Henderson adds, "Not all institutions supported the kind of applied scholarship Abrams found stimulating. The New School for Social Research was one of the few that did. Unique among universities, the New School was both a pedagogical and an academic experiment. It was an ideal place for Abrams to combine his skills as an instructor with his experiences outside academia.

preeminent housing authority in the country, with three projects in various stages of completion (one being the largest such development in the United States). Thousands of families had been rehoused, and some of the city's worst tenements had been demolished.¹⁷³

It was Abrams' work in *Revolution in Land* (1939) that led to his engagement with UN-HTCP.¹⁷⁴ The book grew out of Abrams' fascination with the American democratic and state-building traditions, which he traced to their roots in land utilization practices peculiar to the US. Because of its legal and practical perspective, it made a unique contribution to studies that were being done at the New School of Social Research, which focused on the American experience and identity, positioning Abrams among an influential group of intellectuals in New York and the US.

Abrams' work dealt with the structure and role of the State in relation to the social question within capitalist economic systems. Therefore, his work was compatible with the UN's mission to maintain social and economic order and to avoid political and economic instability and revolutions in the postwar world order. In his study of the history of US social and economic development, Abrams became aware that, even in the absence of monopolies, which he found to be rare in the aftermath of the industrial revolution, competition alone in capitalist systems did not provide for the needs of the lower income groups. Consequently, he argued that the role of the State was to maintain a better balance between classes by regulating industrial and economic speculation and

¹⁷³ Ibid., 60.

¹⁷⁴ Charles Abrams, *Revolution in Land*, (New York; London: Harper and brothers, 1939).

wealth, prices, wages, and social services. What he found in the US became relevant for the world as, during the postwar period, the US systems of finance and development began to be adopted by many developing nations. The UN, as a world governing body, became interested in Abrams' ideas regarding the role of the welfare state. Arguments that dealt with class conflict within capitalist systems became relevant in resolving or, at least, in negotiating conflicts among developed and developing nations as well.

In *Revolution in Land*, Abrams sought to show that the housing problem had grown out of the changes that had occurred in land utilization practices during the industrial revolution. His title made reference to Jacob L. Crane's (1892-1980) earlier essay, "Revolution in Housing;" however, Abrams sought to take the issue one step further to point out that the housing problem cannot be solved unless the distribution of land and land values are dealt with first.¹⁷⁵ Abrams argued that land values and land utilization practices are one of the primary factors that render affordable housing an impracticable issue for the poor in the United States. It was this foresight to look beyond the cost of materials and construction of building as well as Abrams' unmatched legal knowledge in and understanding of land economics and land utilization practices that brought much acclaim to his work. Lewis Mumford, who knew Abrams well from Abrams' involvement in the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) and his appointment at the New School, became interested in Abrams' penetrating explanations and provided him with feedback during the writing stages of *Revolution in Land*.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Jacob, L. Crane, "Revolution in Housing," *Current History*, (Mar. 1922): 903-910.

¹⁷⁶ Abrams' involvement in both of these institutions will be explained below.

Furthermore, he hailed it with enthusiastic reviews, calling it the most insightful investigation of land economics since Henry George.¹⁷⁷

In *Revolution in Land*, Abrams focused on the neglected topic of land utilization and its relation to the development of democratic ideals and practices in the United States. Broadly speaking, he was interested in how property ownership and exchange practices, laws, and regulations affected the national economy and the political system.¹⁷⁸ Pointing to the differences between England and the United States, he posited that in the United States, widespread availability of land had resulted in a correspondingly high rate of property ownership. This in turn led to a “dynamic and fluid system” which replaced “the stubborn rigidity of the British way of life.” He argued that in the United States where large numbers of people possessed modest amounts of property, the ability to use land as a lever to exert class advantage was minimal.¹⁷⁹

However, Abrams pointed out that with the changes that were brought about by the industrial revolution, industry gradually superseded land as the motor of social organization in America. Coordination of production policies to monitor supply and demand pushed prices up, for example in the building materials trade, creating one of the principal causes of the shelter problem, by forcing the rents in newly constructed houses

¹⁷⁷ A. Scott Henderson, *Housing and the Democratic Ideal: The Life and Thought of Charles Abrams*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 89. Also see, Abrams, *Revolution*, xiii; Abrams to Robert L. Crawford, April 15, 1943, reel 1, AP. See also Taper, “A Lover of Cities,” II, 90. Also see the sub-chapters entitled, “The ‘Eternal Dichotomy;’” and, “Land and Industry,” 89-97 for topics covered here.

¹⁷⁸ On the importance of property ownership in the organization of national economies, see also, Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley; Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2002), 11.

¹⁷⁹ Henderson, 89-90.

to go up and thus be far out of line with the wages that industry paid to its workers.

Consequently, Abrams felt that even when the legislative tools were largely in place, the results of this shift from land to industry widened the gap between the upper and the working classes.

In addition, Abrams showed, “Industrialization created urbanization. It dictated most phases of land use. It placed land in and about the cities in a position where business rather than sentiment would inevitably dominate its development.”¹⁸⁰ At the urban scale, this meant that the city grew not based on social concerns, but on business practices of turning a profit. At the housing scale, Catherine Bauer (1905-1964), another outstanding housing activist of the period, repeatedly pointed out that affordable housing was not a “normal product” of capitalism.¹⁸¹

Bauer and her supporters felt that the situation could be reversed if and only if “there is an active demand on the part of workers and consumers which is strong enough to over-balance the weight of real estate and allied interests on the other side.”¹⁸² Abrams felt that Bauer was overestimating the power of workers and consumers and continually stressed the political disadvantages handicapping these groups.¹⁸³ Instead, what Abrams proposed as a *revolution* in land, was public intervention of a more integrated and radical

¹⁸⁰ As quoted in Henderson, 90. Also see, Abrams, *Revolution*, 78, 6, 25, and 80.

¹⁸¹ Henderson, 90 and 94. Catherine Bauer was the author of one of the most influential works in modern housing in the US, Catherine (Wurster) Bauer, *Modern Housing* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934). She also co-authored the Housing Act of 1937. Bauer, Mumford, and Abrams were part of the same group of intellectuals who supported each other and shared ideas regarding housing and other urban issues in the United States.

¹⁸² Henderson, 94-95.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

nature than what was able to be accomplished during the New Deal programs.

Consequently, for Abrams, change had to come from inventive and well-designed government policies to re-organize the relationship between land and industry.

Abrams defined this proposition as the “middle road,” and the “middle road” was the revolution that he was proposing.¹⁸⁴ It was not an overnight overthrow of the existing system. He sought to bring public control over the fluctuations of the business practices,

We have seen, thus far, enough to make us realize something of the complexity of modern land problems, enough to make us very humble in the face of these tremendous realities... The most we can dare to expect is the slow evolution of a new world, the gradual, almost imperceptible progress of a reason, an understanding, a logical and legal and social structure valid for the new conditions of modern life. One of the fundamental postulates of the new day is bound to be the obligation of the public authority to intervene, regardless of formal considerations and vested rights, to rectify injustice, to restrain oppression, legal or not, traditional or not, and to secure to all that measure of opportunity which the productive mechanism makes possible and which the present economic confusion necessarily frustrates.

No matter what the future shape of the world may be, it is already becoming abundantly clear that the use of land must be subjected to an increasing measure of social control. The chaotic conditions of today cannot be permitted to continue if collapse is to be avoided. Blind chance cannot remain the arbiter of destiny in a world with all the technical skill of ours.¹⁸⁵

Abrams’ “middle road” consisted of additional public housing, stronger enforcement of antitrust laws, federal taxation of intangible property, and credit liberalization for housing construction. Although most of these had been a part of the New Deal programs at one time or another, Abrams proposed that in order to succeed properly, these programs needed to be a part of a more comprehensive long-term government plan. He criticized

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 96.

¹⁸⁵ Abrams, *Revolution*, 228.

the New Deal plans by defining them as the product of a “business welfare state.” According to his calculations, business with their eyes on the bottom-line could not provide housing for the very poor.¹⁸⁶

In this way, through the social controls of the “middle road,” which had by the end of the book begun to appear more attractive, even to conservative ears, Abrams proposed that a more drastic revolution could be and needed to be avoided. Abrams maintained that through these propositions, he was suggesting nothing more than a return to what the American democratic tradition had originally achieved before the onslaught of the industrial revolution. His “middle road” was in fact a return to the doctrines of the American Revolution and it was a revolution in this sense. In addition, Abrams perceived urbanization as, “the most dynamic revolution in man’s history,” and as one of the most urgent issues of the postwar world.¹⁸⁷

Abrams’ *Revolution in Land* had grown out of two lecture courses he had begun to teach during the 1930s at the New School for Social Research based on a suggestion by Clara W. Mayer, Associate Director of the School.¹⁸⁸ At that time, not many institutions supported the kind of applied scholarship Abrams found stimulating. Unique among universities, the New School was both a pedagogical and an academic experiment. It was an ideal place for Abrams where he could combine his knowledge and experience gained working in New York as a labor lawyer and as the Director of the New York

¹⁸⁶ Henderson, 99.

¹⁸⁷ Charles Abrams, *Man’s Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1964), v.

¹⁸⁸ Abrams, *Revolution*, xiii.

housing authority with his interest in the history of zoning and real estate laws.¹⁸⁹ While teaching as a part-time lecturer at the New School, Abrams was still New York City Housing Authority's (NYCHA) general counsel. He also ran his law practice and continued his real estate ventures in Greenwich Village. He saw himself as an urban-practitioner moving back and forth along a spectrum of teaching, scholarship, and experience. He was appointed as a regular lecturer in 1935 and began to develop two main courses, "Modern Problems in Real Estate," and "Contemporary Housing and Rehousing."¹⁹⁰

In the second course, "Contemporary Housing and Rehousing," among the topics Abrams discussed were "Land and Industry," "Taxation," "The Mortgage Structure," "Land and the City," "Land in Theory and in Fact," "Urban and Rural Tenancy," and "The Government and Real Estate." In addition, he brought in a variety of impressive guest speakers: Catherine Bauer who described urban developments in Europe; Warren J. Vinton of US Housing Authority who spoke on public housing, as did Colonel Horatio B. Hackett, former Director of the Public Works Administration's (PWA) Housing Division; Miles Colean of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) who lectured on the relationship between housing and private enterprise; and veteran reformers Langdon Post and Edith Elmer Wood who analyzed the "social aspects of housing."¹⁹¹ Building on

¹⁸⁹ A. Scott Henderson, *Housing and the Democratic Ideal: The Life and Thought of Charles Abrams*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 83-84.

¹⁹⁰ See both Henderson, 84-85; and Abrams, *Revolution...*, xiii. Henderson points out that, aside from Henry George, a possible inspiration for Abrams' courses was the re-emerging discipline of land economics, a field that was largely a product of the scholarship and teaching of Richard T. Ely. Land economics, as Ely defined it, was concerned not only with the use of land, but also with the social relations its acquisition and management created. Henderson, 85.

these initial courses, Abrams helped launch the New School's Institute of Urban Studies in 1939, which, with its interdisciplinary nature, was one of the first urban studies programs in the US. By 1943, Abrams himself believed that the Institute was offering "the most successful courses of their kind in the country."¹⁹²

Charles Abrams, Ernest Weissmann, and the UN-HTCP

Ernest Weissmann (1903-1985), architect, a member of CIAM (Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne) and the Chief of the Housing and Town and Country Planning Section of the United Nations (UN-HTCP), thanks to Mumford's raving reviews, became aware of Abrams' book, *Revolution in Land*. Weissmann was impressed with the way Abrams had approached the problem of land utilization and housing. Abrams' articulation of the idea of the "middle road" substantiated Le Corbusier's and CIAM's positions on land reform in urban areas and matched their formulation of architecture and urbanism as an alternative to class conflict and revolution.

Weissmann and Abrams were also active in some of the same circles that were involved in formulating ideas regarding architects' role in projects of postwar reconstruction. There were several key locations and institutions, including the New School, where architecture and planning professionals converged to conceptualize the shape of postwar strategies for reconstruction. In each of these venues, European

¹⁹¹ Henderson, 86.

¹⁹² As quoted in Henderson, 87.

modernist concepts in housing and planning were combined with developments in the US in housing reform in the conception of postwar approaches to issues of housing, urban and regional reconstruction, renewal, and development. While Ernest Weissmann, Josep Lluís Sert, Sigfried Giedion, and Walter Gropius could be counted among those who represented the European camp, Lewis Mumford, Henry Wright, Jacob Crane, Catherine Bauer, and Charles Abrams were among those who formulated the American position on these matters.

Weissmann, Sert, and Gropius had immigrated to the US during the mid- to late-1930s for various political and professional reasons. All of them were active members of Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM). Between 1927 and 1930, Weissmann (1903-1985) had worked with Le Corbusier, the well-known modernist architect and one of the founding leaders of CIAM. During this time, Weissmann took part in the design of a number of influential projects such as Centrosoyuz in Moscow, Villa Savoye in Poissy, Villa Church in Ville d'Avray, and Cité de Refuge in Paris and adopted the basic principles of Le Corbusier's architecture and urbanism. While working on these projects, he also sought to promote modern architecture in Yugoslavia through his own projects and became involved in CIAM as a member representing Zagreb, Yugoslavia.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ During the summer of 1928, he took part in a competition for primary schools Grad and Lucac in Split. In these projects, he, for the first time, implemented Le Corbusier's five points in Croatian architecture. Weissmann's next project in Croatia was a Sanatorium for bone and joint tuberculosis in Kraljevica made in collaboration with Doctor Miroslav Delic. In this project, Weissmann used prefabricated components in order to explore and promote the collaboration between architecture and the building industry. Tamara Bjazic Klarin, *STKZ - Sanatorij Tuberkuloze Kosti i Zglobova or Sanatorium for Bone and Joint Tuberculosis in Kraljevica*. Forthcoming. Also see, Ernest Weissmann, "A Tuberculosis Sanatorium" (*Architectural Record*, v. 76, (July, 1934)): 25-26.

CIAM was founded in La Sarraz, Switzerland, in June 1928 as the primary coalition of avant-garde groups from across Europe. One of its central aims was to bring the social and formal concerns of modern architecture to the attention of state and industrial patronage worldwide.¹⁹⁴ Weissmann's involvement with CIAM as a member representing Zagreb, Yugoslavia, began with the meeting of the executive body of CIAM or *Comité international pour la résolution des problèmes de l'architecture contemporaine* (CIRPAC) in Barcelona in 1932.

The agenda of the Barcelona CIRPAC was the preparations for the anticipated Moscow congress. Even though the Moscow congress was later indefinitely postponed (due to political shifts in the Soviet Union), the anticipated congress, CIAM 4, was, in the end, held aboard a cruise ship, the *SS Patris II* from Neptos lines, chartered specially for CIAM to sail from Marseilles to Piraeus in July-August, 1933.

Weissmann's involvement in CIAM at this particular moment of CIAM's evolution is significant. Since CIAM's second major meeting in Frankfurt-am-Main, in October 1929, titled, "Die Wohnung für das Existenzminimum" (The Minimum Dwelling), CIAM had undertaken a definitive shift, under the leadership of Le Corbusier, toward the consideration of the dwelling within its socio-economic and spatial environment. In the CIRPAC meeting, held on May 17, 1930, Le Corbusier called for a

¹⁹⁴ For an in-depth analysis of CIAM's establishment and development, see Eric Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: The MIT Press, 2000). For CIAM's influence in the development of the field of urban design during the postwar period, see Eric Mumford, *Defining Urban Design: CIAM Architects and the Formation of a Discipline, 1937-69* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). For CIAM's influence on architectural and planning education in the US, see also, Jill E. Pearlman, *Inventing American Modernism: Inventing American Modernism: Joseph Hudnut, Walter Gropius, and the Bauhaus Legacy at Harvard* (Charlottesville; London: University of Virginia Press, 2007); and, Anthony Alofsin, *The Struggle for Modernism: Architecture, Landscape Architecture, and City Planning at Harvard* (New York; London: W.W. Norton, 2002).

“doctrine of urbanism,” saying that CIAM must attempt to link “architecture and town planning with social evolution.”¹⁹⁵ Consequently, CIAM 4 was entitled, “the Functional City,” and treated the dwelling as one of the four functions of the functional city: dwelling, work, leisure, and circulation. Many of the ideas articulated during the CIAM 4 meeting was published in Le Corbusier’s book, *La Ville Radieuse*, in 1935.¹⁹⁶ The tenets of CIAM 4 will be published until later, as, *the Athens Charter*, in 1943.¹⁹⁷

However, much of the momentum that was gained during the CIAM 4 congress was lost by the mid- to late-1930s, at least in Europe, since many of its core members, especially in Germany, were driven to exile by 1937. For example, Berlin CIAM members, Walter Gropius, Marcel Breuer, and László Moholy-Nagy, all first moved to London and then to teaching positions in the United States.¹⁹⁸ Similarly, Weissmann also immigrated to the United States in 1939 and he continued to be active in promoting

¹⁹⁵ It is also worth noting that, at this particular point in time, Le Corbusier felt that the Soviet Union was the place that would be most receptive to such an attempt. Mumford adds, “Although his own politics would soon lean toward the right, Le Corbusier, like other CIAM members, was at this time fascinated by the Soviet experiments in urbanism and was completing his ‘Commentaries Relative to Moscow and the Green City.’ This document, commissioned by Soviet officials, outlined a plan to redesign Moscow by combining elements of his ‘Contemporary City for Three Million’ with the proposals for new outlying ‘leisure cities’ for workers that had been suggested by the ‘Green City’ competition of March 1930.” See, E. Mumford, *Defining Urban Design...*, 4.

¹⁹⁶ Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City* (*La Ville Radieuse*, 1935) (New York: Orion, 1967).

¹⁹⁷ Le Corbusier. *The Athens Charter* (1943). Introduction by Jean Giraudoux. Translated by Anthony Eardley. Foreword by Josep Lluís Sert. New York: Grossman, 1973. The resolutions of the Athens Charter were first published in the US in Josep Lluís Sert’s, *Can Our Cities Survive?* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942). For details of the CIAM 4 and its influence, see, E. Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse...*, 73-104.

¹⁹⁸ Ludwig Mies van der Rohe moved to the United States after working in Nazi controlled Germany for some time. For the immigration of German members of CIAM to the US, see, E. Mumford, *Defining Urban Design...*, 17. Also see, Kathleen James-Chakraborty, ed., *Bauhaus Culture from Weimar to the Cold War* (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).

CIAM principles working with other CIAM members operating in the US.¹⁹⁹ He formed a partnership with another CIAM émigré, Josep Lluís Sert (1902-1983), and they began work designing an Upper East Side apartment house to be called “River Crescent.”²⁰⁰ Sert, who had become influential in CIAM also beginning with the CIRPAC meeting in Barcelona, had left Spain in 1939 where he had been forbidden to practice by the new government after the fall of the Second Republic. Sert would become one of the most outspoken CIAM members in the US. In an effort to establish himself as a prominent architect in the US and to bring recognition to CIAM members as urbanistic experts, one of Sert’s primary ambitions became to publish the CIAM principles in the United States under the title, *Should Our Cities Survive?*²⁰¹ With the assistance of the Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design (GSD), Joseph Hudnut, the book was finally published, allowing Sert to begin a long teaching career at GSD in tandem with other CIAM members already positioned there such as Walter Gropius and Martin Wagner.²⁰² Sert’s book and CIAM’s Functional City found constructive criticism from well-respected American critics such as Lewis Mumford whom Sert had approached for an introduction to the book. Lewis Mumford told Sert, “The four functions of the city do not

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ E. Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse...*, 128.

²⁰¹ Sert’s publisher would later change the title to, *Can Our Cities Survive?* Even though it was finally published with Joseph Hudnut’s support, bringing the recognition that Sert was seeking, the book was initially turned down. E. Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse...*, 132-133. Also see, Josep Lluís Sert, *Can Our Cities Survive?* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942).

²⁰² Jill E. Pearlman, *Inventing American Modernism: Joseph Hudnut, Walter Gropius, and the Bauhaus Legacy at Harvard* (Charlottesville; London: University of Virginia Press, 2007); Anthony Alofsin, *The Struggle for Modernism: Architecture, Landscape Architecture, and City Planning at Harvard* (New York; London: W.W. Norton, 2002); and, Eric Mumford, *Defining Urban Design: CIAM Architects and the Formation of a Discipline, 1937-69* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

seem to me to adequately to cover the ground of city planning: dwelling, work, recreation, and transportation are all important. But what of the political, educational, and cultural functions of the city: what of the part played by the disposition and plan of the buildings concerned with these functions in the whole evolution of the city design.”²⁰³

Mumford’s point made a significant impression on Sert and CIAM. The idea of the civic center would later form the basis of future debates in both CIAM and American planning circles.²⁰⁴

Gropius and Wagner had already begun to exert their influence in the configuration of the curriculum at GSD under Hudnut’s and the modernizing President, James Bryant Conant’s visionary influence. Even before bringing Gropius into GSD, Hudnut had dismantled the Beaux-Arts system, establishing a Town Planning Studio in 1935-36 with two design faculty members, Werner Hegemann, the German-American planner and Henry Wright, the former partner of Clarence Stein and one of the key figures of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA).²⁰⁵ Wright was the link to Mumford (through RPAA), the New York-based Housing Study Guild, and many other “housers” including Catherine Bauer and Charles Abrams. GSD became one of the places where CIAM and American planning ideas began to converge.

²⁰³ As quoted in E. Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse...*, 133.

²⁰⁴ See for example, Giedion’s notion of New Monumentality in Sigfried Giedion, *Architecture You and Me: The Diary of a Development* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958). Also, CIAM’s postwar meeting would focus on this issue. Also see, E. Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse...*, 150-151.

²⁰⁵ E. Mumford, *Defining...*, 29.

There were also at least two other places where European and American ideas on urban design converged. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was one of them and the other was the New School of Social Research in New York where the New York CIAM Chapter for Relief and Postwar Planning held its meetings. Weissmann was one of the key operators in both of these. UNRRA was established in 1943 and Weissmann became its deputy director in 1944.²⁰⁶ UNRRA was UN-TAA's predecessor and was one of the first postwar rehabilitation agencies that was put together to work alongside US agencies of postwar aid and rehabilitation.²⁰⁷ In 1951, the Housing and Town and Country Planning section of the United Nations was established under the Bureau of Social Affairs and Weissmann became its director. The office was initially given a staff of six professionals and three clerical people to handle the housing and planning problems of the world. Consequently, it relied on outside technical consultants.

Jacob L. Crane (1892-1980) can be counted among these consultants. At the same time, he was instrumental in the formulating the UNRRA from its very beginnings. He had played key roles in the construction of US housing agencies and policies, and therefore was influential in the making of UN agencies as well. Crane had begun working

²⁰⁶ See the Bibliography for articles by and about Weissmann regarding his contributions to the formation of UN-HTCP. Weissmann would also become involved in the design and construction of the UN building in New York, once again joining hands with Le Corbusier and others. See, Aaron Betsky, *The U.N. Building*. Foreword by Kofi A. Annan. Essay by Aaron Betsky. Photographs by Ben Murphy (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2005), 13. Also see, Ernest Weissmann, "United Nations Headquarters, New York, N.Y." *Architectural Record*, (July, 1952): 103-122.

²⁰⁷ Sert, Weissmann, and many other CIAM members now living in the United States were also active in the New York CIAM Chapter for Relief and Postwar Planning. See, E. Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse...*, 142-152.

in the United States Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) in 1947. His work as a housing reformist and a bureaucrat came to fruition during the New Deal and toward the end of the 1930s when he became the director of project planning in US Housing Administration in 1938, shortly after the US Housing Act of 1937.²⁰⁸ In 1945, Crane became the head of the National Housing Agency's International Office and was influential in the construction of UN-HTCP. He worked as a consultant in the United States and 25 other countries under both US and UN agencies, preparing 60 zoning plans and ordinances, and acting as an expert witness in zoning cases. He served as a consultant to many government agencies, including the Tennessee Valley Authority, National Resources Planning Board, Federal Housing Administration, United States Housing Authority, Defense Housing, Housing and Home Finance Agency, and the Division of Urban Development of the National Housing Agency. He was also a consultant to the Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama in 1944, to Greece between 1950-56, and perhaps his most extensive involvement in self-help housing, a term he coined, in Puerto Rico from 1952-1962.²⁰⁹

Crane's writings, not only set the stage for the work of UN experts, but also created a link between US national and international planning practices and the UN's

²⁰⁸ Crane received a degree in civil engineering from the University of Michigan and a planning degree from Harvard in 1921, where he studied under John Nolen.

²⁰⁹ For this brief biographical information on Jacob L. Crane see, "Guide to the Jacob Leslie Crane Papers, 1927-1980, 1946-1965 (bulk) at the Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, finding aid and biographical information available online at, <http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/EAD/htmldocs/RMM02646.html>.

international missions, at least in the beginning.²¹⁰ Crane held various appointments as a housing consultant for the Housing and Town and Country planning section of the ECOSOC. Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) granted him leave for this work. He was the chairman of the first UN mission to Southeast Asia on tropical housing between November 13, 1950 and January 26, 1951.²¹¹ For this mission, he prepared the draft report titled, “Preparing Programs of National Governments for Housing and Community Development,” in 1951. In 1954, he chaired a multi-day session in a major conference on housing and planning in New Delhi and presented a paper entitled, “Experience of National Governments in Preparing Programmes for Housing and Community Development.”²¹² In 1955, he did a study on demographic information needed for planning housing program in Economic Commission for Asia and Far East

²¹⁰ Crane’s writings on housing and planning include, “Progress in City Planning in the United States,” *Engineering News-Record* 87 (September 1921): 526-528; “The Revolution in Housing,” *Current History* (March 1922): 903-910; “Reflections of a City Planner on his Profession,” *Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics* 6 (1 February 1930): 43-50; “Power Planning as the Basis of National Planning,” *Civil Engineering* 3:10 (October 1933): 581-582; “Planning for Planning: Principles for the Organization of State and Regional Planning on a National Scale,” *Civil Engineering* 3:9 (September 1933): 525-526; “Building Houses and Building Cities,” *American Planning and Civic Association* (1935): 311-313; “Post-war City Planning and Rebuilding,” *Architect and Engineer* 153:2 (May 1943): 25-27; “Huts and Houses in the Tropics,” *Unasylya* 3:3 (May-June 1949): 100-105; (with Edward T. Paxton), “The World-wide Housing Problem,” with Edward T. Paxton, *Town Planning Review* 22:1 (April 1951): 16-43; “The Experience of National Governments in Preparing Housing and Community Improvement Programmes,” *Housing, Building and Planning* no. 9 (September 1955): 47-51; and “The Role of the U.S. Government,” with Ellery Foster, *Housing and Economic Development; The Report of a Conference sponsored at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by the Albert Farwell Bemis Foundation*, (January 1955): 133-145.

²¹¹ *Report of the Mission of Experts on Tropical Housing, South and South-East Asia*, December 1950 and January 1951. UN Document No. E/CN.5/251, UN Archives, NY. Hereafter cited as *Tropical Housing Mission Report*, 1951. This was the mission that would lead to the seminar in New Delhi—see below.

²¹² This conference will be discussed in detail in this chapter. United Nations, *Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement in Asia and the Far East, New Delhi, India, 21 January – 17 February 1954* (New York: UN Technical Assistance Programme. UN document no. TAA/NS/AFE/1), 1.

region to be used at the Rio De Janeiro Seminar. This was under the joint auspices of UN Technical Assistance Division and International Social Science Council.²¹³

Crane believed that the house was a key component of American-style economy and development.²¹⁴ He was also one of the outspoken US officials who advocated that housing would be an important issue within the context of the cold war and Third World development.²¹⁵ At the same time, he believed that worldwide postwar housing and planning issues were not limited to the developing world. In fact, because of his extensive work in the United States, he was well aware that the US itself would, “enter the peace with the greatest urban housing shortage in history.”²¹⁶ Crane felt that the housing problem needed to be dealt with similarly to the way other production problems had been resolved during the war. He wrote again in 1943, “Today housing is an implement of war. Like

²¹³ During these seminars, Crane became acquainted with Constantine Doxiadis, and following his retirement, he opened a planning office in Washington, DC and became a senior consultant for Doxiadis Associates, an international planning firm, in 1955.²¹³ Crane and Doxiadis worked on two projects, one in Greece and another in Ponca City, Oklahoma. Doxiadis was the editor of the well-known publication on human settlements, *Ekistics*. He also got involved in major planning projects in Iraq, working with Walter Gropius and the Architects Collaborative on the design and construction of the Baghdad University for the next two decades.

²¹⁴ The following two articles by Richard Harris uncover the significance of Crane’s work during this period. Richard Harris, “‘A Burp in Church’ Jacob L. Crane’s Vision of Aided Self-Help Housing.” *Planning History Studies* 11, no. 1 (1997): 3-16; and, “The Silence of the Experts: ‘Aided Self-help Housing’, 1939-1954.” *Habitat Intl.* 22, no. 2 (1998): 165-189.

²¹⁵ See also Greg Castillo’s study on how housing and ideas of American-style domesticity were utilized as propaganda both in the US and abroad during the Cold War. Greg Castillo, *Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design* (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). Interestingly, Castillo does not mention Crane’s work in his study.

²¹⁶ Jacob L. Crane, “Post-war City Planning and Rebuilding.” *Architect and Engineer* vol. 153:2 (May 1943): 25. Crane wrote this in 1943 when he was the Director of Urban Studies at the National Housing Agency, Washington, D.C.

other such implements it is expendable, and its production is guided not by the needs of the future but by the necessities of the present.”²¹⁷

The New School of Social Research in New York became the third place of exchange between members of CIAM and the proponents of housing reform in America.²¹⁸ The New York CIAM Chapter for Relief and Postwar Planning held its meetings there between 1943 and 1945 in an effort to reconstitute CIAM’s efforts in the US and to find commissions for its members. Many influential professionals and intellectuals of this period, including Hannah Arendt, Lewis Mumford, and Charles Abrams, also lectured at the New School. The New School was established in 1919 by mostly professors from Columbia University who would not take the loyalty oath required by the US Government at the end of the First World War. Charles Beard (History), John Dewey (Philosophy), Alvin Johnson (Literature), and James Harvey Robinson (Economy) established the school to create a purposeful intellectual environment where visionary practitioners, not necessarily academics, could provide lectures, take courses, and develop their work.²¹⁹ For example, Lewis Mumford took classes under the economist Thorstein Veblen, then returned in 1924 to give a series of lectures, which were the basis for one of his first books. Mumford’s mentor, the British planner Patrick Geddes, also gave weekly talks at the New School during the summer of 1923.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ There were some, for example, Richard Neutra and Knud Lonberg-Holm, who associated with both groups.

²¹⁹ Henderson, 84.

Abrams' Initial Report for the United Nations

In the meanwhile, CIAM's New York chapter was in the process of reconfiguring itself along the same lines as the American Society of Architects and Planners (ASAP, later ASPA), in a series of meetings it held at the New School.²²⁰ The group decided that the new CIAM chapter in the US would be "a temporary CIAM formed in view of the actual emergency... (to) deal mainly with the problems of devastated areas outside this country."²²¹ Based on this agreement three standing committees were formed.

Weissmann served in the first committee on "Technical Housing Research." The second committee focused on "Programming and Planning," and the third was the "Professional Groups Committee."²²²

Having become aware of Abrams' groundbreaking work in *Revolution in Land*, Weissmann, as the director of the UN-HTCP, asked Abrams to conduct an examination of international land problems in 1952.²²³ Abrams welcomed the challenge and completed a report entitled, "Urban Land Problems and Policies," the following year.²²⁴

²²⁰ ASAP was being formed at about the same time.

²²¹ E. Mumford, 147.

²²² Knud Lonberg-Holm chaired the first committee and Henry Wright (not Clarence Stein's partner, who had died in 1936) and Robert Davison served on that committee with Weissmann. Sert (chairman) and Pierre Chareau served on the second committee. Giedion (chairman), Hudnut, Norman Rice, and Harwell Hamilton Harris served on the third committee. For committees, see, E. Mumford, 148. At the seminar, the Programming and Planning topic had made up the second and the third sections. The education of planners, which was a component of the third section at the seminar can be seen as an offshoot of the third committee of CIAM in New York.

²²³ Henderson, 175.

²²⁴ Charles Abrams, "Urban Land Problems and Policies." *Bulletin on Housing and Town and Country Planning*, no. 7 (New York: United Nations, 1953), 3-58.

Abrams' adaptation of *Revolution in Land* into, "Urban Land Problems and Policies," marked the beginning of Abrams' influence beyond the US.²²⁵ Regarding this report, Abrams, at the beginning of his later book, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (1964) where he documented his extensive work as a UN agent, wrote,

The study sparked my interest in the evolving problems of the less developed nations and widened a focus that until then had been concentrated mainly on the American scene. During the ten years that followed, I was sent to India as a U.N. consultant and subsequently served on U.N. missions to Ghana, Turkey, the Philippines, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Singapore, and Bolivia. Thereafter my interest and information broadened with additional assignments for the governments of Venezuela, Barbados, and Puerto Rico, an assignment to Jamaica for the International Cooperation Administration, another to Colombia for the Pan-American Union, and attendance at numerous seminars and conferences of world experts convened by the United Nations. The findings and recommendations of these missions are embraced in fourteen different reports.²²⁶

In his report, as in *Revolution in Land*, Abrams began with an analysis of land tenure and land acquisition patterns in developed countries, and then focused on related policies in developing countries. In this way, as Abrams began to apply his ideas to the international scene, one finds that he adopted the binary structure of the developed and the developing world that had been put forward by modernization theorists. His articulation of the similarities and differences between these two worlds became central

²²⁵ Following, "Urban Land Problems and Policies," Abrams began his career as an international expert in addition to continuing his practice as a labor lawyer in New York. He went to the Seminar in New Delhi and then to Turkey, which was Abrams' first international UN mission. Beginning with his trip to Turkey in 1954, as he notes above, he traveled to twenty-one countries in total during his lifetime as a world expert in housing and land utilization laws and legislation. Based on the request of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University in 1961, he compiled this work in a book entitled, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World*, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1964). Also see Henderson, Ch. 9, for his work as a UN expert during the Cold War; and, O. H. Koenigsberger, S. Groak, and B. Bernstein, eds. *The Work of Charles Abrams: Housing and Urban Renewal in the USA and the Third World: A Collection of Papers* (New York: Bergamon, 1980).

²²⁶ Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1964), v.

to Abrams' work during this period. Like many modernization theorists of his day, even though Abrams felt that both the developed and the developing countries would go through the phases of development, he argued that the situation in the developing countries was ultimately different since they were going through the processes of transformation at a much more rapid rate than the developed countries.

He argued that in the developed countries, developments in four basic areas have affected land tenure practices over the last two centuries:

- (1) The maturing of the individual's rights against the state, the grant of privacy in his property and security against search, seizure or expropriation without due process.
- (2) The deconcentration of land ownership and the break-up of holdings (in a number of countries, laws which perpetuated or concentrated holdings have been abolished or more widespread distribution of holdings have been encouraged).
- (3) The decline of land as the dominant form of wealth, giving rise to new forms of intangible property, and the simultaneous development of new uses for land.
- (4) The rise of a welfare concept in which the desire to advance housing and urban living standards, rationalize the disordered urban land structure and improve city patterns, all played a part.²²⁷

It is important to point out that Abrams, following his mission to Turkey, would describe these transformations as four revolutions providing the basis for the formulation of his idea of the "middle road" or the revolution in land that would ameliorate the effects of

²²⁷ Following his mission to Turkey, Abrams would describe these as four revolutions. Abrams' article and the four transformations he lists here will be discussed in more detail in chapter two during the analysis of his report on his mission to Turkey. Charles Abrams, "Urban Land Problems and Policies," *Housing and Town and Country Planning Bulletin* 7 (New York: United Nations, 1953), 6.

these four revolutions.²²⁸ He showed that while developed nations experienced these social and economic changes over a long period of time, developing nations were experiencing these changes much more rapidly and, “almost simultaneously,” putting all the more pressure on the legal and administrative structure of the State. Since Abrams believed that shelter problems were caused by a lack of well-conceived policy initiatives, and not by a shortage of land or finances, the organization of sound State policies were all the more important in developing countries.²²⁹ Abrams was aware that the western European countries had received the lion’s share of postwar reconstruction funds and that the developing world was not receiving enough aid to finance their development. He felt that the developed world was largely blind to the mounting housing problem in the developing world.²³⁰ He felt that this point made his argument all the stronger since it was all the more important to do more with existing resources in developing countries. Consequently, he put state construction ahead of economic aid and development. In his analysis of land tenure practice in developed countries, Abrams also referenced some of

²²⁸ The four revolutions will be discussed in more detail in chapter four. However, it is important to point out how Abrams reformulated the idea of four transformations following his mission to Turkey. He defined the four revolutions as, “a political revolution; a land revolution; an industrial revolution; and a welfare revolution.” See, United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, *The Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning*, ((prepared for the Government of Turkey by Charles Abrams), 23 August 1955, File No. TAA 173/57/018; Report No: TAA/TUR/13), 3. Abrams also talked about these four transformations as revolutions in his, Charles Abrams, *Man’s Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1964), ?.

²²⁹ As quoted in Henderson, 175.

²³⁰ Abrams wrote, “While the more developed areas were elevating housing and urban development to social and economic necessities at home, they gave little thought to the crucial housing problems of the less developed nations. Even when the contest between democracy and communism was revived and the support of the underdeveloped world became prized, urbanization and housing problems were still given the lowest priority in official aid programs by the more developed countries as well as by the international aid agencies and the United Nations.” Abrams, *Man’s Struggle...*, 90.

the early housing and planning studies US and UN agencies had carried out in Europe and the East.²³¹

Beyond this point however, Abrams found that modernization theories were not applicable to the developing world while the issues surrounding land and housing were potentially all the more volatile in developing political and economic systems.²³²

Regarding modernization theories, he later wrote,

Defining the terms is easier than spelling them out in practice. The two dominant theories among economic writers seem to have become (1) quantitative economic theories identifying capital saving and investment as the vortex around which development moves and (2) qualitative theories accenting the procreative or productive aspects of economic operations. A third theory (currently viewed as lowborn) is that no one factor can fully account for the intricacies of the development process—it is a social process with a measurable economic aspect. In developing areas, however, the “non-economic factors do not express themselves in the kind of economic behavior which conforms to the conventional assumptions of Western economic theory.” Thus housing is not only shelter but a device in Kingston, Jamaica, for breaking up social trouble spots in squatter areas that threaten major political eruptions...

The tendency to develop categories in the urbanization process leads to a kind of Sisyphean embarrassment. Housing has a capital and a savings aspect, a

²³¹ Among his references, the following can be listed: *Housing Policy in Europe*. International Labour Office (United Kingdom, London: P.S. King and Son, Ltd., 1930); *The European Housing Problem*. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (Switzerland, Geneva: the Commission). 1 October 1949, document E/ECE/HOU/110); Housing Problems in the War-Devastated Areas of Asia and the Far East.” C.M. Lorenzo. *Housing and Town and Country Planning*, United Nations, November 1948 (Bulletin 1); *Final Report. Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment* (United Kingdom, London: H.M. Stationery Office). 1942, 19-20; *Implementation of Planning Measures*. Papers for XX International Congress for Housing and Town Planning, Amsterdam 1950 (Netherlands, Amsterdam: International Federation for Housing and Town Planning); *National Housing*. National Planning Commission (India: Bombay: Vora & Co.). February 1948; “The Development of Housing in the USSR.” E.M. Chossudovsky. *Housing and Town and Country Planning*. United Nations. 1951 (Bulletin 5), 81-94; *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation*. United Nations Department of Social Affairs (United States, New York: United Nations). 1952, document E/CN.5/267/Rev. 1, p. 180; and, *The Housing Situation, 1950*. Housing and Home Finance Agency (United States, Washington, D.C.: the Agency). February 1951, 5, 7.

²³² For development theory and Abrams, see, *Man's Struggle*, 215. Abrams' cautionary skepticism was in line with development theorists who also had their doubts about how development theory would hold up in developing countries and societies. For example, see, Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

generative aspect, and a social or attitudinal aspect that should normally endow it with political and social as well as economic respectability. When it is ignored by the economic planner, it will move into focus through the politician.²³³

This last point would be key to Abrams' later formulation of the idea for the necessity to develop local knowledge. Following his work in Turkey, Abrams would tie the idea of local knowledge with the idea of training and education.²³⁴

In addition, Abrams found, "Neither in Europe nor in North America have there been many revolutionary advances in housing production or in city planning from which developing countries might benefit materially."²³⁵ Besides, he cautioned, "few urban land policies were applicable universally. The differences of national patterns and in social, economic, and political backgrounds," had to be "considered in applying the policies of another country."²³⁶ Consequently, he felt that each country's issues and solutions had to be considered on a case-by-case basis. This position marked Abrams as an avid supporter of area studies, a growing field during the postwar period, to supplement overarching theories of modernization and development. It also set Abrams up as an excellent candidate for overseas missions.

At the same time, as Weissmann had recognized, Abrams' interest in creating a social balance through an administrative revolution and the fortification of state power and apparatus was consistent with the goals of the United Nations Economic and Social

²³³ Abrams, *Man's Struggle*, 216.

²³⁴ See, chapter four.

²³⁵ Abrams, *Man's Struggle...*, vi.

²³⁶ As quoted in Henderson, 175.

Council.²³⁷ The UN along with its subsidiary monetary, welfare, cultural and educational agencies, as briefly discussed in the Introduction, had been established in order to ameliorate the anxieties felt by world leaders regarding the future of the world social and economic order.

²³⁷ Henderson writes, “Abrams’ philosophical outlook intersected with the political trajectory of other intellectuals during this period. The post-World War II era has been characterized as one in which an older generation of radical critics shifted from “revolutionary anti-Stalinism” [or Trotskyism] to “liberal anti-communism.” In moving ever rightward, they momentarily joined Abrams at a point left of American political center.” Henderson, 174.

2.3 The Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement in New Delhi

Following his report for the UN-HTCP, Abrams was asked to chair a major session on urban land policies and problems in an international seminar organized, at the invitation of the Government of India, by the Technical Assistance Administration of the United Nations. The organization of the seminar was assisted by the Housing and Town and Country Planning Section of the United Nations Department of Social Affairs and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).²³⁸ It began on 21 January 1954 and lasted until 17 February 1954. The relationship between urbanization, housing, and economic development and national planning were designated as the central topics of the seminar.²³⁹ The event was made to coincide with the Indian Government's International Exhibition on Low Cost Housing and the meetings were held on the exhibition site in the specially built Seminar Hall.²⁴⁰ It is worth describing the events of this seminar, which took place approximately six months before Abrams' arrival to Turkey, in some detail because it evidences how the UN-HTCP, under Weissmann's leadership, acted as a continuing arm of the CIAM and as an organization that shaped and supported the activities of the emerging field of urban design during the postwar.

²³⁸ United Nations, *Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement in Asia and the Far East, New Delhi, India, 21 January – 17 February 1954* (New York: UN Technical Assistance Programme. UN document no. TAA/NS/AFE/1), 1.

²³⁹ United Nations, *Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement in Asia and the Far East, New Delhi, India, 21 January – 17 February 1954* (New York: UN Technical Assistance Programme. UN document no. TAA/NS/AFE/1).

²⁴⁰ The program of the seminar describes, "The nucleus of the Exhibition was a Village Centre constructed by the Community Projects Administration of the Government of India and the Technical Assistance Administration. This centre, which will be described in detail, was intended to illustrate the thesis. Later synthesized and endorsed by the Seminar, that the first steps towards improved housing in the villages were an improved water supply, sanitation and community facilities, and that these should be integrated with the village life." *Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement...*, 1.

The seminar represented the culmination of a series of activities undertaken by ECOSOC since the beginning of the 1950s regarding issues of housing and community planning. The report of the seminar provided a brief list of these prior activities which focused on the development and exchange of knowledge on issues concerning housing, housing construction and building industry, construction materials, and community planning.

As the Chief of the United Nations Housing and Town and Country Planning Agency, Ernest Weissmann (1903-1985), a Yugoslavian architect and a member of *Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (CIAM), presided over the organization and proceedings of the seminar as the UN Secretariat. Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, Professor of Town Planning at the University of Toronto, served as the director of the seminar.²⁴¹ Tyrwhitt conducted the organization of the seminar from the UN-TAA Resident Representative's office in the Council for Industrial and Scientific Research building, in New Delhi, India. Aside from the nine international experts (see below) appointed by the UN to run the main components the seminar, the attendees included official delegates from a number of developing countries, representatives of international and governmental organizations, delegates from Indian organizations, businesses, schools of planning, and ministries.²⁴²

²⁴¹ For a recent essay on Jacqueline Tyrwhitt's substantial contributions to the transnational discourse on modern urban planning, see Ellen Shoshkes, "Jaqueline Tyrwhitt and Transnational Discourse on Modern Urban Planning and Design, 1941-1951," *Urban History* 36, no. 2 (2009): 262-283. Also see multiple excerpts by Tyrwhitt on working with Abrams in O. H. Koenigsberger, S. Groak, and B. Bernstein, eds. "Charles Abrams: A Bibliography." In *The Work of Charles Abrams: Housing and Urban Renewal in the USA and the Third World: A Collection of Papers* (New York: Bergamon, 1980).

²⁴² Delegates from the following countries attended the seminar: Burma, Ceylon, Fiji Islands, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Laos, Pakistan, Puerto Rico, Singapore, Thailand, and

Among the presenters, aside from Weissmann and Abrams, there were such well-known names as Constantine Doxiadis, who was working for the Ford Foundation missions in Calcutta and Karachi at the time; Michel Ecochard, CIAM member and the former director of the French Protectorate in Morocco, then serving as TAA advisor to the Government of Pakistan on Town Planning; Maxwell Fry, Jane Drew, and Pierre Jeannerette, in India at the time with Le Corbusier undertaking the design of Chandigarh; Jacob Crane, Assistant to the Director of US Housing and Home Finance Agency; Rafael Pico, the Chairman of the Puerto Rico Planning Board; Luis Rivera Santos, the Director of Puerto Rico's Social Program; and Frederick J. Adams, Town Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Director of the Joint Center at Harvard and MIT.²⁴³

The seminar was organized around three primary sections of paper presentations and discussions each focusing on a particular topic designated by the organizers. A number of papers were presented in each section.²⁴⁴ Section one (January 21-27) focused

Vietnam. In addition, delegates from the following International Organizations were also present: CIAM, Ford Foundation, Technical Cooperation Mission (USA), International Federation for Housing and Town Planning, World Health Organization, UNESCO, Food and Agriculture Organization, ECAFE, International Labour Organization. The seminar also included delegates appointed by the UN as well as delegates from a variety of Indian organizations. See, United Nations, *Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement in Asia and the Far East, New Delhi, India, 21 January – 17 February 1954* (New York: UN Technical Assistance Programme. UN document no. TAA/NS/AFE/1), 48-55.

²⁴³ M. Ijlal Muzaffar, "The Periphery Within: Modern Architecture and the Making of the Third World" (Ph.D. diss., MIT, 2007), 38-39.

²⁴⁴ For example, thirty-eight separate papers were presented in section 1 (eleven others were submitted but not circulated). A total of seventy-seven papers (not including those papers which were not circulated) were presented at the seminar. For a full list of papers, see, *Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement*, 63-70.

on the topic of local building techniques and materials.²⁴⁵ Section two (January 28-February 9) focused on housing and community improvement programs.²⁴⁶

Section three (February 10-16) dealt with the issue of physical planning in three parts. Abrams was appointed as the chair of this section and the two discussants were Professor William Holford (UK) and Professor Frederick J. Adams (USA). Professor Holford was later replaced with Arie Sharon, architect and planner from Israel. Part one, led by Abrams, focused on urban land policies.²⁴⁷ This section was organized under the following topics: Land Acquisition; Financing; Zoning; and, Taxation. Part two, led by

²⁴⁵ The seminar program defined the focus of this section as, “The major emphasis of discussions on building techniques will rest on methods of increasing the effective use and production of building materials. They will therefore dwell more particularly on the local factors influencing house building. At the same time the Seminar will deal with the design of buildings from the point of view of the most appropriate types of structures, construction methods and building materials for a particular location. It will at the same time consider the possibility of applying self-help and other methods of group work on the community level for housing and village improvement. In connection with the other supporting topic, siting of buildings, the seminar will try to evolve the most advantageous type of community layout from the climatic point of view and the most desirable location of community facilities and services in relation to housing. The cost as well as the technical aspects of establishing, maintaining and managing such communities are of course corollary [*sic*] to these considerations.” Section 1 and section 2 were switched once the seminar began due to the late arrival of some of the US delegates held up by background checks by the State Department. I am presenting the sections here as they were positioned in the final seminar. “United Nations Asian Seminar on Low Cost Housing and Community Improvement to be held in New Delhi in January and February 1954: Brief for United Nations Experts,” 4.

²⁴⁶ The seminar program defined the focus of the second section as, “Emphasis will be laid on the methods governments apply in formulating and executing their housing and community improvement programmes. National policies, legislation, and administrative organization will be considered within the framework of current plans for economic and social development. Parallel discussions will however deal with types and densities of housing accommodations which correspond to the economic potential of the countries in the ECAFE region and which are socially desirable. The Seminar should in this connection evolve recommendations on housing and community standards. The topic essential community services and facilities will consider such services basic to the maintenance of safety, health and physical and cultural well-being that should be provided together and as integral components of residential neighbourhoods. Economic and Social Aspects as well as the relative importance and priority among community facilities and between these and shelter will be included here and should be considered in the light of available investment resources.” “United Nations Asian Seminar on Low Cost Housing and Community Improvement to be held in New Delhi in January and February 1954: Brief for United Nations Experts,” 3.

²⁴⁷ *Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement*, 57-62.

Sharon, focused on regional land use and planning. The titles of this section were: Rural Regions and Regional Towns; Metropolitan Regions; and Resource Development Areas.

Part three of section three was led by Frederick Adams and was made up of an evening symposium on the education of planners and architects. Here the topics were:

Professional Education for Planners; Awareness to Planning Needs; and, Implementation.

The discussion on the education of planners was led by Frederick J. Adams and focused on raising the awareness of architects in issues of town, city, and regional planning.²⁴⁸

The proposed seminar programs summarized the contents of section three as follows,

Major discussion will centre around current land policies and problems requiring governmental action on the national and local levels. The problem of urban land will be related to the need for regional land use planning as part of a balanced process of resource development. The task of organizing the physical relationships of various functions of a specific development programme in terms of land use planning (area for agriculture, industry or residential communities) and in terms of transport, communications and utility networks will be considered. The process of projecting the different components of a development plan in space and time is of course part of this topic. The problems of the education of planners appropriate in the light of the physical planner's role in the process of economic and social development is the other related subject. The physical planning phase provides a unique opportunity to confront and to reconcile the contradictory requirements of economic and social development and to integrate the different factors determining the direction and the pace of development. The complexity of this process requires teamwork of the specialists involved. The seminar will provide an opportunity to analyze the particular needs of the developing countries and the corresponding type of training of practitioners required for housing and community improvement in the broadest sense.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁸ This symposium focused on the education of architects as planners as well as the lack of awareness of architects.

²⁴⁹ "United Nations Asian Seminar on Low Cost Housing and Community Improvement to be held in New Delhi in January and February 1954: Brief for United Nations Experts," 5.

During this section, each country was asked to furnish, for the benefit of the participants at the Seminar, a brief statement on the various aspects of housing, planning and building from their national point of view. This section included a comparative discussion of how the constitutions of each participating nation dealt with issues of private property and land tenure.²⁵⁰ During this discussion, Abrams also asked each country representative to check from the following list, “the problems relating to the land problem which in your area are currently pressing”:

1. Land speculation.
2. Concentration of land ownership.
3. High land costs.
4. Difficulty of acquiring land for housing by compulsory purchase.
5. Land shortage.
6. Difficulty of financing development of land.
7. (Add any other aspect)²⁵¹

Section three also included three film sessions: a film session on urban reconstruction (with commentary by Charles Abrams) and two film sessions on town and regional planning (with commentary by Arie Sharon).²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Countries included in the discussion were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Ceylon, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, The Phillipines, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia, and India. The list here is more extensive than the one provided on the list of countries represented in the seminar. I am not sure if this means more countries actually participated in this particular session.

²⁵¹ Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 30.

²⁵² Films on urban reconstruction included: *Neighborhood* (British Council); *New Horizons in Housing* (United States Information Services); *A Plan to Work on* (British Council). Films on town planning included: *Tale of New Cities* (United States Information Services); *Eye Witness No. 10* (Canadian Film Board); *Planned Town* (British Council); *New Town* (British Information Services); and, *TVA Town* (United States Information Services). The films on regional planning included: *Triumph in the Wilderness* (United States Information Services); *Waters of Life, Ceylon* (British Information Services); *Training of Men, Etawah* (United States Information Services); *Beaver Valley* (Walt Disney, R.K.O.); *Yellow Knife*

Presentation of reports by three section chairs (Atkinson, Patel, and Abrams) concluded the seminar in a plenary session.²⁵³ Ernest Weissmann adjourned the seminar with a closing speech as the UN-secretariat to the seminar and the chief of HTCP.²⁵⁴ The event was a major triumph not only for Weissmann personally, but also for architecture and planning professionals worldwide. It was one of the largest and most productive gathering of a multi-disciplinary group of professionals, administrators, and representatives of the building industry during the postwar years. The fact that such a meeting was held based on the invitation of the Indian Government was telling of where the patronage of reformist ideas in architecture, planning, and development was located during this period.

While many developing nations had shown great interest and had provided support for the seminar, the US Government had almost successfully stalled the whole event by not granting security clearances to UN-appointed experts of US origin. Charles Abrams, Frederick J. Adams, Rafael Pico, and Jacob Crane, all of whom were central to the seminar, were able to depart for the seminar only with great difficulty and after repeated correspondence with the UN and the US State Department.²⁵⁵ In fact, the

(Canadian Film Board); *Land of Cyprus* (British Information Services); and, *Jamaica Problem* (British Information Services).

²⁵³ Jacob Crane must not have been able to stay long enough to present his report from Section II. Instead G.B. Patel (participant in Section I), a housing advisor from the Indian Government, read the concluding report of Section II.

²⁵⁴ Include something here from Weissmann's speech found in Abrams' papers from this seminar.

²⁵⁵ Abrams kept all of his correspondence with the UN as well as the US officials on this matter. See, Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 30. As Shirley Hazzard notes, according to a secret agreement between Byron Price, the Administrative Chief of the United Nations and the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, beginning roughly around the second half of 1949, "United States

agreement to send them to the conference was at first canceled. On January 8, 1954, Eleanor M. Hinder, Chief of the Office for Asia and the Far East of UN-TAA, wrote to Abrams,

Dear Mr. Abrams,

I very much regret to have to inform you that the Technical Assistance Administration has to date not yet received the necessary information from the U. S. Government before the UN can offer you a contract as Adviser on the TAA Seminar on Housing and Community Improvement to be held in New Delhi from 21 January to 17 February 1954.

We have therefore had to make other arrangements to substitute for the functions you would have performed at the Seminar. It is indeed unfortunate that the participants in the Seminar who will be primarily technical officials nominated by Governments of the region will not have the benefit of your wide experience and knowledge of the housing and planning field.²⁵⁶

In his reply, after expressing his regrets regarding the situation, Abrams noted,

I have been informed that within the last year, because of similar bureaucratic difficulties, the United Nations has not hired American experts. Since this means that the vast pool of information available in the United States for the benefit of underdeveloped countries is no longer available to the United Nations, some of the most important fields in which U.N. can serve will be sterilized, and nations needing the benefits of American experience will be deprived of it.²⁵⁷

citizens who were candidates for, or incumbents in, Secretariat positions were screened, without their knowledge, by official American security agents as a check on their opinions, political sentiments, and private lives...., in direct violation of the United Nations Charter, which bound the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, under oath, to a scrupulous independence from national pressures.” Hazzard also notes, around 1953, “United States citizens—together with a number of Secretariat employees who had applied for resident status in the United States—the comprised approximately two-thirds of the United Nations Headquarters staff.” This meant that the US State Department had control over the majority of UN staff and operations. See, Shirley Hazzard, *Defeat of an Ideal: A Study of the Self-destruction of the United Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 14-15.

²⁵⁶ Eleanor M. Hinder, New York, to Charles Abrams, New York, 8 January 1954, Cornell University Library, Reel 30.

²⁵⁷ Charles Abrams, New York, to Eleanor M. Hinder, New York, 8 January 1954, Cornell University Library, Reel 30.

On the same day, Abrams sent a note expressing a similar sentiment to Albert Bender, US Mission to the United States. Abrams arranged for his office to send copies of his correspondence with the UN to Lillian Bellison at the New York Times. Fortunately, on January 18, 1954, Abrams' assistant left him a note in his office letting him know that the US team of experts had been given permission to attend the seminar,

Just checked through with Washington [*sic*] and was advised that the Board has just issued a favorable opinion in your case. Clearance on its way to State Department; will [*sic*] then be sent to Bender's office which will send it on to Secretary General's Office. Bender will advise UN Secretariat that clearance is on its way.²⁵⁸

Abrams finally received his contract on January 21, on the day of the beginning of the seminar. The US team's late arrival at the seminar drew much attention and criticism of the US position toward this and other similar international events.²⁵⁹ Upon his return to the US, Abrams replied to an apologetic letter he had received from David McKey, Assistant Secretary, Department of State,

I read your letter today upon my return from India and I am happy to see that attention is being given to ways and means of expediting loyalty determinations. Evidently the stories of the delayed departure (of the US team) had appeared several times in the Indian press and was the subject of much discussion among the other delegates from the twenty nations.

Most important, however, is the fact that in these areas I found the United Nations held in high esteem and American experts chosen by the United Nations do more

²⁵⁸ Note to Abrams, "1:25 PM MESSAGE FROM BENDER:" Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 30.

²⁵⁹ A curious type-written note found among Abrams' papers from the seminar reads, "Why is America fighting communism? Why do Americans want to dominate an international organization like U.N. and what is the meaning of administrative purges and scrutiny of U.N. officials?" The note is not signed, but only has, "India 1954," noted on the top right. It may have been a note handed to Abrams during the seminar. It does not look like one of his own notes, which were usually hand-written.

good for the United States from a prestige standpoint than if they came directly as experts from the United States.²⁶⁰

Abrams noted later,

American experts were especially hard to enlist [to UN missions] partly because of the small fees (a maximum of \$50 a day for a thirty- to ninety-day mission) and partly because every candidate was subjected to a rigorous search by the Federal Bureau of Investigation into his personal life, loyalty, and security. Since the 1950's were hardly marked by calm impartiality, and since Anglo-Saxon rules of evidence have never won a place in the investigatory encounter, loyal Americans often shunned U.N. service when they learned that investigators would visit their former landladies, employers, and disgruntled employees, scour their pasts, and compile all the hearsay into a file—all for a two- or three-month visit entailing a fee of \$50 a day or less.²⁶¹

The difficulties that US professionals faced in participating in UN commissions notwithstanding, the UN-HTCP, thanks to Weissmann's calculated efforts, had become an important supporter of many professionals related to the planning field during the mid-1950s.²⁶² The three sections of the seminar; namely, building techniques and materials; housing and community improvement; and, physical planning, reflected, not just Weissmann's influence in the configuration of HTCP's operational framework, but also the make-up of the emerging field of urban design at it was conceived in the US during the postwar period.²⁶³

²⁶⁰ Charles Abrams, New York, to David McKey, Washington, DC, February 10, 1954. Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 30.

²⁶¹ In the footnotes, Abrams noted his own experiences during his appointment to the UN seminar in New Delhi. See, *Struggle for Shelter*, 93.

²⁶² This was evidenced by how Weissmann picked the key players of the seminar in New Delhi from among US professionals.

²⁶³ Eric Mumford accurately explains the emergence of the discipline of urban design in the United States in this manner. See, E. Mumford, *Defining Urban Design: CIAM Architects and the Formation of a Discipline, 1937-69* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 29.

2.4 Abrams' Arrival and the Turkish Technical Assistance Machinery

When Abrams arrived in Turkey in September 1954, he found that the negative US attitudes towards the UN projects were taking their toll within the Turkish context as well. But other factors were also operating that had caused a temporary breakdown of the technical assistance machinery in Turkey during the mid-1950s. UNESCO's criticism of Democrat Party's urban renewal projects in Istanbul as well as UN's reluctance in doing its part in the establishment of a Research Institute in Agriculture and Related Fields for Turkey and the larger Mediterranean Region certainly did not help to nurture the cooperation that had begun between Turkey and the UN. However, the temporary breakdown of US-DP relations was certainly the primary factor, if not the only one, that affected the implementation of UN projects and reports in Turkey.

Until the early- to mid-1950s, the major portion of the funding for the implementation of UN projects had come from the US, its various aid organizations, including the Ford Foundation, as well as the funds made available through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Consequently, by trying to obtain both UN and US support for important projects, Turkey had developed a bi-lateral strategy to pursue its development goals and to supplement the programs that had been implemented by the US agencies alone. The US, the UN, and the Turkish agencies formed the three essential components of the postwar aid machinery. The UN usually only provided funds to cover the salaries and the *per diem* expenses of the technical assistance staff, at times providing scholarships for the training of necessary local staff for the completion of projects begun

by foreign experts. To DP's frustration, as the funds provided by the US diminished during this period, UN reports and recommendations became ultimately useless. However, there was at least one other reason for DP's reluctance to cooperate with the UN during this time and that had to do with developing US lack of support and skepticism towards the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) projects in general around the beginning of 1954.

Abrams recognized this grid-lock and how the lack of actual funds provided by US and other international agencies affected the work of UN experts when he noted his observations of the situation in Turkey later in 1964,

Certainly the odds were against the success of any mission, for an expert carrying no funds in his portfolio was just another expert. In 1954, he would rarely get to see anyone with the rank of a cabinet minister and was more often assigned to a minor functionary who would spend an occasional hour with him lamenting the predicaments of officialdom. A U.N. economics mission with three prominent experts, after struggling to make an impact on the government, had packed its belongings and left in despair.²⁶⁴

In the same text, Abrams also commented on the contentious relationship that existed among US and UN agents and agencies. Considering that many UN agencies including the Economic and Social Council of the UN as well as its Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance were established through the initiatives of the US, it was hard to understand why the US scrutinized the efforts of many UN agencies. The US attitude toward the UN certainly effected Turkish perceptions as well. Abrams wrote,

Official experts from the United States had considerable influence in Turkey thanks to the millions of dollars behind their advice, but UN missions got no cooperation from them either in money or in sympathetic interest. There was in

²⁶⁴ Abrams, *Man's Struggle...*, 202. See the projects listed in the Dimock report below for this particular project.

fact a hostility among ICA officials to the idea of a UN-sponsored project that either emanated from or was carried over in the State Department in Washington.²⁶⁵

Abrams had become involved in the activities of the United Nations Housing and Town and Country Planning (UN-HTCP) division just at the time when the US was especially skeptical of the operations of ECOSOC and the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (UN-EPTA), originally established by the US. US attitudes toward these programmes would change again in the next few years; however, for the time being, the UN did not see much support from the US. In other words, the kind of cooperation among US and UN agencies and companies that was evidenced during the time of SOM's involvement in Turkey was not in full operation in 1954.

At the same time, despite this slow-down in the implementation of UN reports in Turkey during the mid-1950s, Abrams found upon his arrival that the UN operations in Turkey were extraordinarily well established and coordinated with the economic development projects of the DP Administration. In fact, he had arrived in the middle of a series of major administrative reforms implemented to ensure better coordination of the projects undertaken through cooperation between the DP Administration and the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UN-TAA). This new structure that was

²⁶⁵ Abrams, *Man's Struggle...*, 203. Abrams also noted, "In any event, a competitive feeling was manifest and persisted for years after the university had begun to function. The fact that the proponent was American, the teaching was to be in English, and an American university was to be later involved as advisor never altered the American attitude." This contentious relationship between the UN and the US will again emerge as an important factor in the discussion on the role of the expert in the next chapter.

being implemented in Turkey would open up a whole new world of possibilities for Abrams and his counterparts at UN-HTCP.

When Abrams arrived in Turkey on September 5, 1954, he was greeted by Olle Sturen (? – 2003) at the UN-TAA office in Ankara. Sturen, who was himself a UN-expert working on Industrial Standardization in Turkey, was the interim acting resident representative of UN-TAA.²⁶⁶ Marshall E. Dimock (1903-1991), the former acting resident representative, had just left in August and the newly appointed resident representative, Charles Weitz, was to arrive in November, as the first full time UN-TAA resident representative in Turkey.²⁶⁷ Coincidentally, Abrams' two-month mission in Turkey corresponded directly with Sturen's two-month tenure and Abrams missed both Dimock and Weitz during his time there. However, Dimock's final report that he had filed with the UN just before his departure was one of the first important papers Abrams encountered upon his arrival. Dimock's report would open up a whole new set of

²⁶⁶ Olle Sturen was to later become an influential figure in Industrial Standardization first in Sweden and then in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Although the perfect overlap of his tenure as a res. Rep. with Abrams' visit was purely coincidental, his influence on Abrams in formulating the idea of a University cannot be underestimated. Abrams was fully aware that Diker and the DP government were interested in the establishment of a technical university, which included multiple departments in engineering. It is possible to suggest that Sturen may have supported that idea during discussions with Abrams. This will be discussed further in the upcoming pages, however, for now, it may be important to point out that Abrams were to later write, "The need for architects and planners was the wedge, but engineering and training in other disciplines were also essential to build the country." Abrams, *Struggle for Shelter*, 202-203. I owe a special thanks to Professor Craig Murphy, M. Margaret Ball Professor of International Relations at Wellesley College, for pointing out Sturen's importance in the equation.

²⁶⁷ Marshall E. Dimock, who was already a well-recognized figure by the time of his tenure in Turkey, was to become even more influential and controversial in public administration in the United States soon after his work in Turkey. Dimock was also the Co-Director of the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East (see the significance of this in the upcoming paragraphs).

possibilities for Abrams.²⁶⁸ The content of the report also shed some light on why the US agencies had become hostile toward the implementation of UN projects at least in Turkey during this period.

In his report, Dimock expressed his approval of the UN's decision to appoint a full-time resident representative to Turkey. He explained how the role of the resident representative had become all the more important as Turkey, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), had gone through a lengthy process to adopt what he referred to in his report as the "French plan." Also known as "country ownership," "country programming," or as "indicative planning," the "French plan," was a radical shift from the existing system of "agency shares" toward a more comprehensive program of economic development recommended by ECOSOC.²⁶⁹ Under agency shares, each UN agency operating in a given country was allocated a percentage of the total budget that a country was entitled in technical

²⁶⁸ Report of Mr. Marshall E. Dimock, Acting Resident Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board to David Owen, Executive Chairman of the U.N. Technical Assistance Board, for the period 1 June -31 August 1954, "United Nations Technical Assistance Activities in Turkey," 31 August 1954 (Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 51). It is important to emphasize the fact that the Dimock report was among the papers Abrams saved from his mission to Turkey.

²⁶⁹ The "French plan" refers to one of the better-known and early examples of country planning during the immediate postwar years. As Charles P. Kindleberger describes it, "The origins of French planning lie in the wartime preparation of French emergency needs for overseas assistance after liberation. With liberation achieved, the program was extended, and a special department set up in the Ministry of National Economy. But the requirement of the French mission in Washington for a more systematic statement of governmental intentions and requirements resulted in the consolidation of scattered agencies into a central General Planning Commissariat, in January 1946, under the direction of the chief Washington negotiator, Jean Monnet. The first publication of the commissariat was written in English as well as in French, with the Congress in mind: *Statistical Review of the Economic and Financial Situation of France at the Beginning of 1946*. A year later, the first four-year plan, covering 1947-50, was adopted. With the change in United States aid from piecemeal to systematic, under the European Recovery Program, the First Plan was extended to 1952 to coincide with the coverage of the Marshall Plan." See, Charles P. Kindleberger, "French Planning," in *National Economic Planning*, ed. Max F. Millikan, (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research; distributed by Columbia University Press, 1967), 279-303.

assistance in order to carry out their projects. Each agency coveted their budgets and projects and did not take into consideration the over-all development plan for the country, if there was such a thing.

Dimock explained that Turkey had recently taken the initiative to consolidate the coordination of all technical assistance programs including those of the United States as well as the UN-TAA under the Division of International Economic Cooperation in the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs (Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Mehmet Fuad Köprülü (1950-55)). He found it necessary to describe the process through which this was done,

The first step in the 1955 programming was to inform the interested Ministries and independent establishments via the Foreign Office of the tentative ceilings and agency allocations as formulated by the Technical Assistance Board. The tentative over-all ceiling for 1955 is \$550,000. The specialized agencies through their local regional and headquarters staffs then conferred with the appropriate Ministries concerning their part of the 1955 program.

The second step in this unfolding procedure occurred in June, when all of the interested Ministries and agencies were invited to a meeting in the Foreign Office where the 1955 program was explained, where a deadline was set for the receipt of new projects, and where there was a full discussion of problems arising in the administration of the UN Technical assistance program. This meeting was presided over jointly by a representative of the Foreign Office and the UN Resident Representative. It was explained that old projects that had not been instrumented were to be resubmitted if they were still desired... As a result of this meeting the Foreign Office received something in excess of 60 project submissions.

The third phase consisted in taking the proposals of the specialized agencies and the projects which had been submitted without solicitation and to consider both kinds in relation to an over-all program.²⁷⁰

Dimock then noted that the findings they obtained as a result of this process allowed them to discover the underlying principles of country planning. He wrote,

²⁷⁰ Dimock report, 3.

One of the most interesting developments was neither the established jurisdictions of the Ministries nor of the UN specialized agencies entirely correspond with the over-all needs of the country in terms of a balanced program of economic development. This discovery reinforces one of the main principles of underlying the so-called French plan, namely, that country needs can be assessed accurately only when all of the projects are brought together in one place and at one time and carefully examined in terms of an over-all strategy of economic development.²⁷¹

He continued,

A second principle that clearly emerges is that requirements differ at various stages in the process of economic development. If, for example, much has been done to secure the mechanization of agriculture, then the next step may be to provide better methods of distributing the increased output... The point is that each step must be built upon the preceding one, and each new step is to be decided on the basis of what is logically required as of that given time. Otherwise there is nothing that deserves to be called a method, but instead, the picking of projects is a hit-or-miss affair, and the total economic impact from such a random procedure is bound to be wasteful and inefficient...

A third principle concerns the securing of a balance between the various segments of the economy. As has been stated, in Turkey we think in terms of five basic segments, namely, agriculture, industry, public utilities, and transportation, basic institutions and processes (sometimes called the institutional framework), and social welfare. In considering priorities, one must also think consistently about keeping the various parts of the economy in balance.²⁷²

Based on his experience in Turkey, Dimock summarized the French plan as, "In terms of country programming, therefore, two basic elements must constantly be kept in mind:

First, priorities must be based on organic growth, and second, balance must be maintained between the various segments of the program.²⁷³ The cooperation that was required between UN agencies and donor governments in order to implement such a

²⁷¹ Dimock report, 4.

²⁷² Dimock report, 4-5.

²⁷³ Dimock report, 5.

program however was highly unusual. In other words, what was taking place between Turkey and the UN-TAA was progressive and extraordinary for that time.

ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly had recommended a shift from “agency shares” to country programming in 1954. The idea was not new and, as can be seen in the making of the “French plan,” formed the basis of postwar reconstruction. During the early postwar period, W. Arthur Lewis’s book, *The Principles of Economic Planning* (1949), provided one of the clearest statements where the idea was articulated.²⁷⁴ In his opening chapter entitled, “Why Plan?”, Lewis argued,

The dispute between planning and *laissez-faire* is not a dispute between order and anarchy in economic life. All serious political thinkers, and not least the *laissez-faire* philosophers, start with the proposition that production and distribution must be controlled to the service of social ends. The point at issue is simply how much of this control may be invisible, and how much must be visible. The invisible control, extolled by the *laissez-faire* protagonists, is that which the market exercises; the visible control, favoured [*sic*] by the planners, is that which is organized by the state.²⁷⁵

During postwar reconstruction in Europe, when market forces were up-ended by the war, planning had become a necessary way to regulate and ensure economic development until a manageable balance was achieved. Lewis held a similar position for developing countries and regions and argued that, in developing countries, an even bigger share of the responsibility to regulate economic order and development fell on the state and its administrative structure and apparatus. It may be helpful to include a rather lengthy

²⁷⁴ W. Arthur Lewis, *Principles in Economic Planning: A Study Prepared for the Fabian Society* (London: Unwin University Books, 1949). See especially Appendix 2, “On Planning in Backward Countries.”

²⁷⁵ Lewis, 7. Also see, Craig Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 79.

quotation here from the portion of Lewis's book on the developing world to frame how and why the idea of country programming was implemented in Turkey within the political context of the Cold War:

Planning is at the same time much more necessary and much more difficult to execute in backward than in advanced countries.

In the first place, planning requires a strong, competent and incorrupt administration. It must be strong enough to be able to enforce its measures, such as to collect taxes from the peasantry, or to enforce a rationing system without black markets, measures which even so ancient a government as that of France has not found itself fully able to enforce. It must have a competent administrative service, with trained personnel, able to understand the large issues that are at stake, and to act reasonably and rapidly. And it must be free of all charge of corruption, since, whereas men will bear many restrictions from a government which they believe to be acting fairly and solely in the public interest (however mistakenly) without respect of persons, they will sooner or later resist violently measures which are corruptly administered, however acceptable the measures themselves may be.

Now a strong, competent and incorrupt administration is just what no backward country possesses, and in the absence of such an administration it is often much better that governments should be *laissez-faire* than that they should pretend to plan. This was indeed the essence of the case for *laissez-faire* made by eighteenth century writers, who saw the mess that was made by weak, incompetent and corrupt governments, and sought therefore to confine the activities of governments within the narrowest practicable limits, so as to minimise [*sic*] the damage that they might do. The alternative approach was that of Lenin, who fully realized the impossibility of using a backward administrative service for planning, and who sought therefore to create, in his Communist Party, a highly trained and disciplined priestly order, on which he could rely to carry out his instructions. *At least we may say this: the first objective of planners must be to create an administrative machine that can do the work of planning; to train young men academically and in the tasks of administration, and to weed out mercilessly the incompetent and the corrupt.* And, secondly, in the meantime no administration should be loaded with tasks more numerous or more delicate than it can handle; the quantity and forms of planning should be limited strictly within the capacity of the machine.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁶ Italics are my emphasis. Lewis, 121-122.

At the UN, Hans W. Singer (1915-1991) was the person who championed the idea of country programming from the very beginnings of the establishment of the UN-EPTA.²⁷⁷ Singer was Keynes's student, and friends with Lewis and Owen.²⁷⁸ When the UN Expanded Program of Development was in its infancy, Singer continuously held that governments needed broad assessments of resources to help shape sensible requests for technical assistance. He later sent Owen a paper linking 'pre-investment', the concept Singer had invented to distinguish the role of the nascent organization, with the new theory of development articulated in a series of Cambridge lectures (1958) by W.W. Rostow, an advisor to Senator Kennedy, to support and further articulate his position.²⁷⁹

However, the idea of country programming was not implemented in many countries for two primary reasons. First, the individual agencies were not willing to let go of their control of the budgets and projects that they had negotiated with donor countries. Second, while US agencies and embassies would have supported the activities of ECOSOC during the early 1950s, by 1954 they did not support country planning on the grounds that it sounded communist, even though the idea was hardly coming from the far

²⁷⁷ Murphy, 63-64.

²⁷⁸ Murphy writes that Singer and Owen had worked together in the 1930s and Singer was the first person Owen asked to join him at the UN. Singer's primary accomplishment in the 1950s is often considered to be his design of the World Food Programme (WFP), whose political engineers were the later US presidential candidates George McGovern and, to a lesser extent, Hubert Humphrey. However, Singer was also involved with the Secretariat's side of the SUNFED (Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development) debate from the beginning, and he helped Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, when he lobbied the World Bank to expand its development facilities.

²⁷⁹ Murphy, 64. Walt Whitman Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

left.²⁸⁰ It took until 1971 for the idea to be mandated and it was only with the World Bank's acceptance and requirement of indicative planning through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP's) in 1999 that the elements of a potentially workable system were in place.²⁸¹

The link between public administration and economic development that Lewis had articulated early on was also influential in Turkey. In fact, the establishment of the United Nations Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East (Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, or TODAIE as known in Turkey) in Ankara on March 24, 1953, just prior to these developments, was perhaps one of the most likely influences on the implementation of country planning in Turkey.²⁸² It was established through a collaboration between the United Nations and the Turkish Government as a component of the Department of Political Science at Ankara University. The Institute was jointly financed by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UN-TAA) and the Turkish Government but US agencies did not provide any financial support for the project at least during its initial years. Its aim was to install

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ E-mail correspondence with Professor Craig Murphy, July 15, 2011. PRSP's describe a country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs. PRSPs are prepared by governments through a participatory process involving civil society and development partners, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For more information on PRSP's, see, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPRS/0,,menuPK:384207~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:384201,00.html>.

²⁸² Craig Murphy agrees with this proposition. Craig Murphy, phone conversation with author, 18 July 2011, digital recording, author's archive, Charlottesville, VA. Also, one of the first UN sponsored professors at the institute was H.H. Hanson who was to later write extensively on the relationship between public administration and economic development using Turkey as one of his case studies. See, Albert Henry Hanson, *Public Enterprise and Economic Development* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1960).

more equitable administrative practices, to strengthen the Turkish state apparatus and to address the rising social and economic consequences of development.²⁸³ The institute sought also to increase governmental efficiency, reduce corruption, and to curb Turkey's reliance on foreign assistance.²⁸⁴ The planning for the institution was begun during a visit by an advisory committee sent from the World Bank and under the leadership of James M. Barker in 1949. Following the Barker report, five Turkish trainees from a variety of academic ranks were sent to the School of Public Administration at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles on a Mutual Security Agency (MSA) scholarship for eighteen months. Upon their return further steps were taken to establish the institute in Ankara, and Gunnar Edvard Heckscher (1909-1987), influential Swedish political scientist, along with several other UN-funded foreign professors, as well as the returning trainees, began to lecture at the Institute.

Based on his reading of the Dimock report, Abrams realized that the decision to bring him to Turkey was partially a result of the country programming work that was being done by TODAIE on the one hand and between UN-TAA and the DP administration on the other. As briefly noted earlier, Abrams described his mission in Turkey as a two-month UN-TAA assignment (Sep. 1 to Oct. 31) to, "advise the Turkish Government on a variety of subjects including zoning problems, finance, and a number of

²⁸³ In the case of the UN School of Public Administration, I will use the Turkish acronym, TODAIE from this point on, since its English acronym was never used widely. The establishment and make-up of TODAIE is significant and will be discussed in more detail shortly. It can be seen as the predecessor to METU.

²⁸⁴ Cemal Mıhçıoğlu, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Kamu Yönetimi Öğretiminin Başlangıç Yılları [Beginnings of Modern Public Administration Education in Turkey]*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları (No. 568), 1988); Hüseyin Yayman, *Türkiye'nin İdari Reform Tarihi [History of Administration Reform in Turkey]*, (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2008).

other aspects of housing and planning.”²⁸⁵ His contract with the UN stated his duties in more detail,

To advise the Turkish Ministry of Public Works and to prepare a report on:

(1) the manner in which zoning ordinances should be drafted for a number of Turkish cities which have grown rapidly in the past few years.

(2) the drafting of general city planning laws for presentation to the Turkish Parliament.

(3) general city planning matters; in particular, to make recommendations on (a) laws, regulations, building codes and sanitation; (b) financing of public services and residential projects.

(4) a preliminary housing and city planning programme for implementation in the future.²⁸⁶

At the very beginning of his report, Abrams noted that the nature of his assignment was pursuant of the agreement signed between UN-TAA and the Turkish Government on September 5, 1951.²⁸⁷ However, as Abrams also noted, this was essentially a “basic”

²⁸⁵ Abrams described his mission as such in his later report and in the memorandum he prepared for METU in 1959. For the report see, United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, “The Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning” (Prepared for the Government of Turkey by Charles Abrams, 23 August 1955. Appointed by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. File No. TAA 173/57/018; Report No: TAA/TUR/13), 2.

²⁸⁶ United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, “Revised Job Description, TUR-27 (VIII-4) of 8 May 1952,” 12 August 1954. Abrams’ Letter of Appointment designated his official title as, “Housing Legislation Expert,” and he was to receive, “an approximate net salary of \$10,000 per annum plus any allowances to which he may be entitled.” See, Betty K. Whitelaw, for the Director of Personnel, to Charles Abrams, New York, “Letter of Appointment, (UN/P/131/1/Rev.2, 8 April 1953),” 5 August 1954, 1.

²⁸⁷ Pursuant of the Basic Agreement of 5 September 1951 concluded between the United Nations and the Government of Turkey, the Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) of the United Nations provided the services of Mr. Charles Abrams (USA) to advise the Government on a number of aspects of housing and planning. See, United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, “The Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning.” Prepared for the Government of Turkey by Charles Abrams, 23 August 1955. Appointed by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. File No. TAA 173/57/018; Report No: TAA/TUR/13, 1.

agreement of technical assistance between the Turkish Government and a number of UN agencies namely, the United Nations, UN; United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, UN-FAO; United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization, UN-ICAO; United Nations International Labor Organization, UN-ILO; and, United Nations World Health Organization, UN-WHO. The agreement defined the fundamental goals and principles of cooperation in technical assistance between Turkey and the UN. It also established the process through which projects would be identified and prioritized, setting the groundwork for the country programming as early as 1951.²⁸⁸ Based on this agreement, a number of projects in a wide variety of fields were begun in Turkey. Dimock, in his report, provided a full list of the technical assistance projects under three headings, that corresponded to the five essential components of the national economy, namely, the agricultural economy, basic institutions and processes, industrial development, transportation and communications, and health and social welfare. It is helpful to provide the full list of the projects here in order to offer an idea of how extensive and comprehensive the UN-TAA involvement in Turkey was at the time.²⁸⁹ Also, one should note that Dimock includes Abrams' assignment towards the end of the list, under the heading, "New Projects." Just above Abrams' project, he notes that this project deserves special notice as he notes that the draft of the legislation on housing and

²⁸⁸ The agreement was signed on September 5, 1951, between Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, at that time the General Secretary to the Turkish branch of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OECD), and Milton Winn, the Resident Representative of the UN-TAA in Turkey. The signed agreement was then approved in the Turkish Parliament on July 3, 1953. See, *T.C. Resmi Gazete [Official Bulletin of the Turkish Republic]* 10 Temmuz 1953, sayı 8454, kanun no. 6114, sahife 6656-6659.

²⁸⁹ I have abbreviated the description of the completed projects, but left Dimock's full explanation on most of the current and new projects.

planning that Abrams will help prepare will be introduced to the Turkish Grand

Assembly:

A. Completed Projects:

The Civil Aviation project (ICAO 19-53) at one time employed three experts...; the Rural Electrification project (TAA 437-53) employing three experts, ... of the Economic Commission for Europe, and will result in a report dealing with various aspects of a comprehensive plan...; Cotton Textiles (TAA 327-53, Regular Programme) concerns one of the most important industries of Turkey...; the Nurses' Training program (WHO 106-53) has been a very successful one...

B. Current Projects:

The regional Fodder and Range Resources Conference (FAO 302-54) has been completed...; with the arrival of our Forestry expert from Switzerland (FAO 644-53), a new pioneering venture with possible far-reaching implications has been got under way...; Dr. Albert Black, agricultural economist (FAO 302-54) ... has been studying the field of agricultural economics for the Ministry of Agriculture, and has cooperated with the Economic Research Team; the Fisheries' project (FAO 17-53) is continuing; vacancies are being filled; and the Turkish Government has asked for a continuation of the program in 1955; our paper expert (TAA 380-53, Regular Programme) is concentrating on supplementary sources of cellulose and on rationalization of paper manufacture, ...; the project relating to Conservation of Sub-bituminous Coal (TAA 334-53), through better methods of washing and recovering coal dust...; promising developments have occurred in the Mining field (TAA 145-53) in Turkey, and in consequence the Government has requested assistance during all of 1954 and again in 1955; our expert on Management Training (TAA 144-53) in the manufacturing enterprises of the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies has had his contract extended. This is a follow-up activity of the now famous Wegenstein – Kaeser report; since my last report the ILO has increased the number of Turkish recruits in its Foreman Training program (ILO 242-54) from 30-60. These Turkish foremen are sent to European industries for eight weeks of intensive training as participant – observers; the Economic Research Team (TAA 148-53) of four members has completed a report dealing with the organization of economic intelligence. In addition, it has been carrying on a seminar for Turkish trainees in this area as a necessary step toward organizing and staffing such an activity in the Government...; the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East (TAA 236-53) has completed its first full year of operation. Professor Lynton K. Caldwell of Syracuse University, the new Co-Director, has arrived in Ankara; the Hydrology project (UNESCO 77-53) affords a good example of effective cooperation. The first forty students to be trained at the Technical University of

Istanbul have been doing fieldwork during the summer under the supervision of a FOA expert whose specialty is the practical application of hydrogeology. This combining of the theoretical and the practical through the close cooperation of two technical assistance programs points the way to other similar cooperative activities; Our expert in Seismology (UNESCO 76-53) has had his contract renewed for a second year. This program of training in the Technical University of Istanbul is proceeding nicely; the Turkish Association of Commerce and Industry is now sponsoring the establishment of an industrial standardization unit, and is providing the funds and office space. This project (TAA 146-53), which is a central one in Turkey's economic development, is now moving ahead rapidly.

A regional training program for highway administrators in the Middle East (TAA) got under way on 25 August. The Turkish Highway Department is to be complimented on the skill with which the teaching curriculum and the field program were worked out. It is hoped that such a training conference will become an annual event.

Our Petroleum Geologist (TAA 145-53) will soon complete his assignment in Turkey and is being transferred to Yugoslavia. This project has helped to lay the legal and administrative foundation of the petroleum industry in Turkey. The Turkish Government has asked for additional assistance in this area in the 1955 program.

Our Statistical team of three (TAA 143-53, ILO 92-53 and WHO 252-53) has devoted increasing attention to organizational and training problems during the latter part of their stay. This activity is due to lapse in 1955, at the completion of the present experts' assignments.

C. New Projects

The Maternal and Child Health program (WHO 105-53), one of the most necessary and ambitious of any to be undertaken in the public health field, will get under way early in September. This program will be headed by Dr. Humann who is currently serving in the Near East.

Among the new projects that will soon be starting, the following deserve special notice:

A Housing and City Planning expert (TAA) will advise the Turkish Government on zoning ordinances for cities undergoing industrialization, will advise on the drafting of legislation to be introduced to the Grand National Assembly, and will deal with a preliminary housing and city planning program for implementation in the future.

An Insurance expert (TAA 427-53) will soon be available to assist the appropriate Ministry to develop plans for the supervisory and administrative aspects of government control of insurance organizations in Turkey.

Another expert will serve in the area of Food Processing and Canning (TAA), this being one of the most important export possibilities in Turkey. In a related field a second expert has been requested in the area of Merchandizing and Packaging (TAA), especially for fresh fruits and vegetables that constitute another export possibility for Turkey.

At the recent meeting of the Technical Assistance Board in Geneva, a project was approved authorizing the establishment of a Labor Administration Institute in Turkey (ILO 243-54). According to plans, this program is to commence in October 1954 to provide training on a regular basis for the staffs of government labor departments and related agencies in Turkey and the Near and Middle East. In this training and fellowship program a wide area will be covered, but with particular reference to labor inspectors, conditions of work, industrial safety and health, and industrial law and labor relations. It is anticipated that sixteen officials will be trained in the initial six months' term.²⁹⁰

Dimock does not provide any explanations as to how Abrams' assignment to, "advise the Turkish Government on zoning ordinances for cities undergoing industrialization," was prioritized through the process of country planning described above.²⁹¹ There are two possible explanations and both of them may have contributed to the incorporation of the idea among the projects to be implemented within the 1954-55 budget. First was UNESCO's concern regarding the extensive urban renewal projects that the DP Administration had begun in historic districts of Istanbul. As mentioned earlier in the previous chapter, UNESCO was especially concerned about the way DP allegedly

²⁹⁰ Dimock report, 7-11. The variety of the projects listed here also help to show how the UN-TAA was linked to all the various developments that were taking place in Turkey during the postwar period.

²⁹¹ Craig Murphy suggested that there would normally be an amendment to the original agreement made between the two agencies that would have spelled out Abrams' assignment. However a survey of amendments to this report did not produce an agreement made specifically for cooperation in the field of housing and planning.

disregarded the Roman and Byzantine heritage of the city. UNESCO's concern may have contributed to the prioritization of a project that dealt with zoning and planning practices in industrializing cities, the most prominent of which was Istanbul.

The more likely foundation of the scope and content of Abrams' assignment, however, was the report prepared and submitted by the SOM team of architects and planners in December 21, 1951, about three months after the signing of the agreement between the Turkish Government and the UN. The SOM report had identified the fields of housing and construction as potential areas of significant economic development for Turkey. However, the team strongly recommended that the development of such industries should be coordinated through a central governmental agency, such as a national planning agency. Consequently, the team limited the purpose of their report to that of a survey and recommended that Turkey should take advantage of the promises of Truman's Point Four aid program and the subsequently established United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance in order to solicit further research toward developing laws and industries in these fields.²⁹² Following these recommendations, the Ministry of Public Works may have filed a request for technical assistance to the Division of International Economic Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Dimock had described in his report.

Conclusion

²⁹² SOM report, 10.

Abrams was perhaps the best possible candidate to continue the work that was begun by the SOM team. Despite the challenges that the temporary breakdown of the technical assistance machinery presented, Abrams found a receptive setting within the country programming initiatives that Turkey had begun following UN recommendations. Even though DP had initiated these efforts in order to solicit US funding, the idea of centralized planning was compatible with the state capitalism that Abrams had advocated in his book, *Revolution in Land*. Through a centralized agency of indicative planning, the idea of a land revolution could be carried out within a capitalist system and in the Turkish context.

The idea of training and education that he and Diker had discussed was perfectly compatible with this scheme. Abrams could advise the establishment of a school of architecture and planning in Turkey similar to the way he had helped to launch the Institute of Urban Studies at the New School of Social Research in New York in 1939. The program in Turkey could be more comprehensive and grow into a full technical university as Diker had advocated and Zorlu had approved. The program could then grow incorporating the School of Public Administration that the UN had already opened. Departments in engineering could also be added to develop the workforce needed to carry out Turkey's goals in indicative planning.

Within the international context of diminishing foreign aid, the idea of training and education as a new strategy of development made perfect sense. Abrams saw that it was certainly supported in Turkey, perhaps because of the fact that it brought value to local knowledge and professionals and restored the revolutionary content back into the

idea of modernization and development. The idea of training and education could provide the common ground upon which to form a new consensus among the participants of the technical assistance machinery. Abrams was convinced that he needed to make the shift in the scope and content of his mission from policy to training. He now needed to convince Weissmann and the UN of the validity of what he was about to propose.

Chapter Three: Role of Experts, 1954-55

Charles Abrams had arrived in Ankara, Turkey in September 1954, as an expert from the Housing and Town and Country Planning division of the United Nations (UN-HTCP), to, “advise the Turkish Government on a variety of subjects including zoning problems, finance, and a number of other aspects of housing and planning.”²⁹³ However, soon after his arrival and especially after a series of meetings and discussions with Vecdi Diker, a Turkish civil engineer, industrial entrepreneur, and the former head of the National Highway Department, and Olle Sturen, a UN-expert on Industrial Standardization and the acting interim Resident Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UN-TAA) in Turkey, it became clear that the Turkish Government would be much more likely to implement a recommendation to establish a UN-sponsored technical university in Ankara than work with Abrams on housing and planning policies. Even though the proposition of a university was much different from Abrams’ original mission and would have been considerably beyond its original scope and content, Abrams, Sturen, and Diker resolved that training instead of policy development might indeed be the best way to support Turkey’s efforts in country programming.²⁹⁴ Because of Abrams’ immediate affiliation with UN-HTCP, they devised that a school of architecture and community planning might be the way to initiate the

²⁹³ Abrams described his mission as such in his later report and in the memorandum he prepared for METU in 1959. For a more detailed discussion of Abrams’ assignment, see chapter two.

²⁹⁴ For country programming, see chapter two.

project at a smaller scale with the intention of enlarging it to a full-scale university. Such an idea could appeal to UN-HTCP's and UN-TAA's current interests in planning and country programming, while also maintaining Turkish interests as the initial department of a larger technical university. In this way, the idea of a school of architecture could bridge the gap between Turkish and UN interests in development. It could even re-introduce US support into the technical assistance machinery through the school's potential to invigorate the construction market through new methods and materials and to create new avenues of economic development in Turkey and the Middle East.²⁹⁵ At the same time, however, the proposition required a significant shift in the scope and content of Abrams' mission. He had to reorient his attention from policy development to training and to training in housing and planning in particular, at least initially.

Abrams, although was initially disappointed by the Turkish reception of what he had come to offer, found the idea agreeable as well. After all, a number of his initial experiences and findings in Turkey had pointed to the need for training especially in the Ministerial offices in order to bridge the methodological and communicative gaps between UN experts and their Turkish counterparts. This idea to reinforce the Turkish administrative structure and state apparatus through training (instead of policy development) was compatible with Abrams' ideas of implementing reform and revolution of state practices in order to avoid more disruptive revolutions that developing regions could face as a result of rapid social and economic transformation. Abrams would later

²⁹⁵ Economic development was one of the central features of a report prepared by a group of architects and planners from the well-known firm Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill in 1951. Abrams reviewed this report. The content of this report is discussed in chapter one.

argue that training was just as if not more appropriate and effective than policy development brought on by foreign experts.²⁹⁶ The idea was revolutionary in that it did not impose an existing development strategy on Turkey. Instead, it sought to reform the ways in which Turkish civil servants were educated. It was a radically different way of building state power to develop and to implement appropriate strategies of development in various regions of Turkey and the Middle East. Reform through training differed from the recommendations of broader theories of development in that it allowed policies to develop in response to specific local conditions through the training of the local personnel. At the same time, it was compatible with applications of development theory in developing regions in that it targeted state development and organization first instead of free enterprise.

Thanks to Diker's bureaucratic know-how and experience and to the surprise of many UN-experts operating in Turkey, the idea drew the interest and support of Turkish officials. Even Avra Warren, the US Ambassador to Turkey, gave the project his initial approval and support. Despite the contentious relationship between Turkey and the US, US approval held considerable currency in maintaining Turkish support for the project.

It was now Abrams' and Sturen's job to present the idea to the UN-TAA Headquarters in New York and to other US agencies in such a way as to win their technical and financial support for the project. After all, the idea to establish a school of architecture and planning was a very different proposition than what Abrams had originally come to do in Turkey. Consequently, the idea needed to be presented in a

²⁹⁶ See, "Chapter 7: Aid—Experts and 'Inperts'," in *Men's Struggle...*, 89-113. Also see, The Abrams Report.

particular manner in order to ensure UN and US support for the project. Abrams and Sturen needed to explain why such a shift in the scope and content of Abrams' mission had become necessary and what sorts of factors had necessitated such a shift. In convincing the UN, the initial approvals that Abrams, Diker, and Sturen had obtained from Turkish and US officials would prove to be their most powerful leverage. At the same time, the scope and content of the project had to be adjusted carefully in order to render the idea of a school of architecture and community planning as both a feasible and a significant project that would substantially contribute to social and economic development and political stability in Turkey. Consequently, in order to solicit the interest of all necessary parties for the successful implementation of the project, Abrams and Sturen had to temporarily shift their focus from Turkey to UN and US agencies: Instead of having to persuade and advise Turkey, a client government, their task had now become to convince the UN, their own agency, of the validity and the feasibility of their proposal.

This chapter analyzes the correspondence that took place between Abrams and Sturen on the one hand, and the UN and US agents on the other, following Abrams' and Sturen's meetings with Vecdi Diker, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Avra Warren, in order to bring UN and US support to the project. Through this analysis, the chapter raises questions about the role UN experts played and the way they operated between client governments and their agencies. Unlike the way experts from this period have been usually portrayed as agents of a singular program, discourse, or ideology, this chapter

finds that Abrams and Sturen acted less as experts and more as mediators or negotiators toward the construction of a project that appealed to the interests of all involved parties.

Similarly, Abrams' and Sturen's letters raise questions about the interpretation of primary documents from this period as well. The analysis finds that the reasons and explanations provided by Abrams and Sturen in these letters cannot be taken to represent the actual reasons for the establishment of the school. The specific purpose and the audience of the letters have to be taken into consideration in order to better understand the content of these letters. When the letters are contextualized in this way, their meaning changes entirely. One finds that these are carefully crafted texts that represent only the interests of their intended audiences. Consequently, the letters don't tell us about METU as a whole, but they are only useful to the extent that they tell us how Abrams and Sturen perceived the aims of the agencies that they were writing to and about how they perceived their role as UN-agents in relation to these agencies. How Abrams and Sturen chose to present the project to these agents and agencies comprise at least one of METU's identities. However, one has to keep in mind that, for example, Diker or the DP Administration had their own perceptions of what the idea of the school ought to be.

The chapter focuses first on Abrams' letter to Ernest Weissmann. The letter to Weissmann is important since it comprises the first and most extensive letter Abrams wrote in order to bring UN support to the project. The letter is also important because the reasons that Abrams presented in this letter, along with the reasons he listed in his later report, have been taken to be the reasons for the establishment of the school. However, when one reads the letter with an understanding of the larger context within which

Abrams operated in Turkey, one realizes that the reasons presented in the letter were carefully picked in order to appeal to Weissmann's interests as a planner architect, chair of the UN-HTCP, and a CIAM member. Therefore, this portion of the chapter examines what Abrams found in Turkey and how he chose to convey it to Weissmann in order to draw support for the project. Through this analysis, the letter reveals how Abrams perceived Weissmann and the UN-HTCP as an agency as well as how he understood his role in the construction of a project to be implemented through the support of both national and international agencies and officials of client governments.

The chapter then analyzes the other letters that Abrams and Sturen sent to a number of UN, US, and Turkish agencies in order to mold the Turkish interest and to use it to leverage the UN and US interests. These letters reveal how the interest of each party was not only necessary for the successful implementation of the project, but also for maintaining the integrity of the technical assistance machinery. In other words, if the US didn't support the project, the Turkish interest could potentially wane. Similarly, if UN didn't support the project, despite the contentious relationship between the United Nations Economic and Social Council and US agencies, the US could lose interest in the project. Consequently, through an analysis of these letters, one finds that Abrams and Sturen worked to portray the project in a way to appeal to each party's interests while at the same time ensuring each party of the validity of the project and the support of the two others in order to leverage their commitment.

3.1 Letter to Weissmann

The letter Charles Abrams wrote to Ernest Weissmann on October 2, 1954 was his first and most significant attempt in soliciting UN support to establish a technical university in Turkey.²⁹⁷ Through discussions with Vecdi Diker and Olle Sturen, Abrams decided to present the idea to Weissmann as a School of Architecture and Community Planning.²⁹⁸ Abrams was aware that the Turkish officials were interested in the establishment of a technical university. Abrams also felt that a university was what was

²⁹⁷ Charles Abrams, Ankara, Turkey, to Ernest Weissmann, New York, 2 October 1954. The most readily available copy of Charles Abrams' letter to Ernest Weissmann is located in the Avery Library at Columbia University as Appendix B in a thin and bounded volume containing a number of primary materials related to Abrams' mission to Turkey including his report. It is likely that Abrams compiled the volume for the UN and perhaps later provided copies for Columbia and perhaps METU. The title of the volume is misleading, "U.N. Report on a University in Turkey: The Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning," since the volume is not the report and contains materials in addition to those that were included in the original report. The volume consists of: "Memorandum of Charles Abrams on the Origin of the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey submitted upon the request of the Middle East Technical University" (July 25, 1959); The original report prepared by Charles Abrams for UN-TAA, "The Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning," (Appendix A); Abrams' letter to Weissmann (October 2, 1954), (Appendix B); "Memorandum on the Establishment of a School of Architecture and Community Planning in Ankara, Turkey" (October 1, 1954), (Appendix D); "Draft Budget of the Proposed School of Architecture and Community Planning in Ankara," (Appendix E); Letter from Olle Sturen, Resident Representative of UN-TAA in Ankara, to Celal Yardımcı, Minister of Education, (October 6, 1954), (Appendix F); Letter from Olle Sturen to Taghi Nasr, Chief of the Office for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East at UN-TAA, (October 6, 1954), (Appendix G). It is the most complete compilation of materials related to Abrams' mission to Turkey, although appendix C is curiously missing from the volume. There is no indication of what may have been contained in this missing appendix. The UN may not have given clearance for its inclusion in the volume. It is very likely that the omitted appendix was the letter Abrams wrote to Fatin Zorlu immediately following their meeting. This letter can be found in Abrams papers at the Cornell University Library. These materials will be discussed later in this chapter. Most of the materials included in the above-mentioned volume can also be found individually in two other places: At the Cornell University Library where the Charles Abrams papers are located and at the United Nations archives in Queens, New York City, New York. The reference for the actual report is, United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, *The Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning*, (prepared for the Government of Turkey by Charles Abrams), 23 August 1955, File No. TAA 173/57/018; Report No: TAA/TUR/13. Excerpts from Abrams' correspondence and report can be found in, Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1964), 195-212.

²⁹⁸ Abrams first documented the minutes and the agreements that were reached during his meeting with Fatin Rüştü Zorlu in a Memorandum he prepared for Zorlu, on October 1, 1954, the day immediately following their meeting. However his letter to Weissmann comprises his first letter to the UN-TAA.

actually needed. Ten years after his mission to Turkey, he wrote, “Architects and planners was the wedge, but engineering and training in other disciplines were also essential to build the country.”²⁹⁹ At the same time, the idea to establish a university could be perceived as an unreasonable shift in the scope and content of Abrams’ original mission in Turkey, at least from the UN’s point of view. However, based on the work Abrams and Weissmann had done together on housing and planning issues in the developing world, Abrams felt that he could propose the idea of a school of architecture and community planning to Weissmann, perhaps as the initial department of a larger University. Following Weissmann’s and *Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne’s* (CIAM) shared interests, this idea would position architects and planners at the head of a multi-disciplinary team of experts and would create an extraordinary opportunity to realize one of CIAM’s primary aims: to influence, advise and control country planning decisions. Consequently, in the letter Abrams discussed Turkish architecture, architectural and planning education, as well as the administrative and the professional contexts within which they existed in order to demonstrate, “the need for training and education for housing and planning.” The letter’s primary aim was to solicit Weissmann’s help in paving the way for Abrams’ subsequent correspondence with other UN officials with the aim of obtaining support for the school.

The following analysis of the letter juxtaposes Abrams’ depiction of the situation in Turkey with other accounts of his experience as well as of the current state of architecture and planning in Turkey in order to understand two issues. First, whether

²⁹⁹ Abrams, *Men’s Struggle for Shelter...*, 202-203.

there was a specific need for architects and planners in Turkey and what factors actually led to the shift in the scope and content of Abrams mission; secondly, how Abrams chose to argue that there was a lack of architects and planners in order to solicit Weissmann's interest for the project.

What was included and excluded from the letter and the order in which Abrams chose to present his argument was key to the aims of the letter. For example, Abrams did not mention Diker in the letter. Diker, as we know, was key to the development of the project, however, perhaps because he was not a government official at that particular point in time, Abrams chose to keep his name and contributions out of the discussion. In addition, even though Abrams had already obtained support for the project from top level Turkish and US officials, he chose not to mention this at the beginning of the letter. Instead, Abrams began the letter as if he were asking Weissmann's opinion regarding the situation in Turkey. Once he had presented the situation in a way to attract Weissmann's attention, only then he used the support he had obtained from Turkish and US officials in order to further leverage Weissmann's consent and support.³⁰⁰ Abrams wrote,

Dear Ernest,

³⁰⁰ The fact that Abrams chose to write to Weissmann is significant for two reasons. First, his contract with the UN gave him the power to act autonomously. The letter accompanying his contract from the UN stated, "5. During your assignment, you will naturally discuss technical matters covered by your specific duties with appropriate government officials and give freely such advice and information as you believe most helpful to them. The United Nations selected you for this post because of your qualifications, and you are free, when you believe is appropriate, to make oral recommendations or submit to the Government as your own expert opinion written communications pertaining to your assignment without prior clearance from Headquarters concerning any phase of your work or to consult us before communicating with the Government, when you believe that consultation with us would be appropriate or helpful." See, Arthur Goldschmidt, Director Programme Division, Technical Assistance Administration, New York, to Charles Abrams, New York, 11 August 1954, (TAA 173/57/018), 1. Second, the same letter informed him that if he needed to consult, he was to write to... Abrams wrote to Weissmann ...

I swallowed a canary a few days ago and I should like your expert advice on how to digest it from the UN's standpoint. After five weeks in Turkey, it became apparent to me that any technical recommendations I might make would make no more dent than a mosquito's bill on the hull of a battleship. The Turks, however willing, simply have not the administrative or the technical equipment with which to implement any technical recommendations I might make. Any laws I might prepare would not be enforced and a detailed report with elaborate recommendations would be relegated to the dust-bin.³⁰¹

In this way, Abrams put forward the notion of a lack of administrative and technical personnel as the reason for the shift in the scope and content of his mission. Abrams suggested that it was for this reason that an advisory report could not be implemented and would be, "relegated to the dust-bin." It was true that the Turkish government had not properly utilized a number of UN missions and reports from this period. As Bernard Taper, reporter and Abrams' long-time associate and collaborator, noted,

At that particular time, the UN Technical Assistance Administration, to which Abrams was attached, happened to be, for various obscure political reasons, very much out of favour with the Turks. For months, UN technical experts had found it all but impossible even to get an appointment to talk with Turkish officials about

³⁰¹ Charles Abrams, Ankara, Turkey, to Ernest Weissmann, New York, 2 October 1954, 1. Abrams' use of the metaphor, "mosquito's bill on the hull of a battleship," is certainly interesting and needs further examination. The mosquito and the mortal diseases it hosted such as malaria and yellow fever, among others, comprised one of the most pervasive battles during and after World War II. Populations in Egypt, especially along the Nile Valley, and due to operations in and around the Aswan Dam, and parts of South America, especially in Panama, during the construction of the Panama Canal, were devastated by unusually lethal strains of the malaria. The epidemics were brought under control only after military-style methods used by American experts. Timothy Mitchell traces how such a lethal form of the disease which killed more than 90% of populations in certain regions was a product of complex circumstances produced by overlapping mechanisms of economics, war, technical assistance, and development. American experts felt that they had brought the solution to the disease with their overarching methods while overlooking the fact that they were part of the same machinery that produced the disease in the first place. See, Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), ?. Abrams must have been aware of US and UN experts' battle with malaria across the world stage including Turkey and his metaphor is fitting since early experts arrived on battleships to fight malaria. Abrams use of such a metaphor certainly needs further exploration for which I unfortunately don't have the space for in the body of this study.

their projects. By the time Abrams arrived at the Technical Assistance Administration's headquarters in Ankara, the outfit was thoroughly stymied.³⁰²

Diker had also told Abrams during their first meeting, "And the UN will send the report to Turkey and Turkey will put it somewhere on dusty shelves."³⁰³ In addition, Abrams, writing ten years later about his experience in Turkey, mentioned the SOM Report as an example of one of these reports that had not been utilized effectively.³⁰⁴

However, the lack of administrative and technical personnel, as Abrams had suggested in his letter, was not the primary reason for the reluctance of Turkish officials to implement UN reports and recommendations. As discussed in chapter two, it was the breakdown in US-Turkish relations, which led to a significant decrease in US foreign aid to Turkey and crippled the Turkish technical assistance machinery.³⁰⁵

³⁰² Bernard Taper, "Charles Abrams in Turkey," In *The Work of Charles Abrams: Housing and Urban Renewal in the USA and the Third World: A Collection of Papers*, eds. O. H. Koenigsberger, S. Groak, and B. Bernstein (New York: Bergamon, 1980), 47. Per his contract, Abrams had originally planned to spend eight weeks in Turkey, however, as the scope and content of his mission and subsequent report changed to the establishment of a school, he left from Ankara to his second mission in Ghana after six weeks in Turkey.

³⁰³ As Diker later recalled, Abrams had seemed utterly frustrated at the beginning of their first meeting when the idea of the school emerged. According to Diker, Abrams was disappointed in the reception of his ideas at the Ministry of Public Works in Turkey—the location of his first mission as a UN consultant abroad. Abrams confided in Diker and said, "I am at a loss for what to do (or "I can't find a way out")," regarding the scope and content of his report.³⁰³ Abrams added, "I also learned that they (the Ministry) asked for three more UN experts even before they reviewed my findings and recommendations." Diker, "Röportaj: Vecdi Diker," *Odtü'lü Dergisi [The METU Journal]* (1993): 4.

³⁰⁴ Abrams wrote, "...visiting experts usually stayed a month or a year and left. Their reports were filed away, often because there were no people to implement or even interpret them." In his footnotes, Abrams continued, "This was the fate of a report on housing made by the architectural firm of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, which, though printed and bound, lay inviolate under a stack of forgotten papers in a petty official's file." See, Abrams, *Men's Struggle...*, 202.

³⁰⁵ One of the main topics of discussion at the UN-TAA offices at the time of Abrams arrival was the failed mission of a group well-respected experts on economics from England. Within the political context of the time, Turkey perceived planned economic development schemes as a shift in US attitude toward Turkey.

In addition, housing and urbanization had not yet gained the social and political importance that they had in other developing countries during this period. Several reports that Abrams had reviewed at the Ministry and at TODAIE confirmed this point, and consequently, the Turkish officials that Abrams encountered at the Ministry of Public Works approached the matter with reluctance and without the urgency that Abrams would have preferred.

Turkish officials perceived the scope of Abrams' assignment to be exploratory, and they were not interested in detailed recommendations that required immediate action.³⁰⁶ Abrams found out about the Turkish perceptions of his assignment a few days after his arrival through a two-month work pass that was issued to him by the Ministry of Public Works on September 14, 1954. The document stated, "This pass has been issued to Charles Abrams, the American expert shown in the picture below, to remain in Our Country for two months, to prepare a report on building construction and urbanism and to work under the auspices of Our Ministry."³⁰⁷ The document also described Abrams'

³⁰⁶ A report by Arnold Ernst Egli, who was teaching urban planning courses at the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East, states, "The Housing Problem in Turkey is for 75% a problem of the peasant and village house, and concerns only for 25% urban lodging. Intermediate forms, appearing with the settling of labourers near industrial centres in country regions, play only a minor part, but are of some importance in view of the progressing industrialization of Turkey." Egli, "Interim Report on the Housing Problem in Turkey," Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East, 26 February 1954. Also see, Michael N. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş. *The Politics of Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey* (New York; London: Holmes and Meier, 1984); and, Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge; London; New York; and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

³⁰⁷ "Yukarıda fotoğrafı bulunan Amerikalı eksper Charles Abrams'ın Birleşmiş Milletler Teknik Yardım İdaresi tarafından 1955 yılı zarfında Yurdumuza gönderilecek şehircilik mütehassısı için Memleketimizde iki ay kadar kalarak yapı işleri ve şehircilik mevzuunda bir rapor hazırlamak üzere İdaremiz emrinde çalışmalarına başladığını gösterir işbu vesika kendisine Reisliğimizce verilmiştir." T.C. Bayındırlık Vekaleti, Yapı ve İmar İşleri Reisliği [Turkish Ministry of Public Works, Office of Building

assignment considerably differently than the UN had. It described Abrams' role as an expert who would do the preliminary work for another team of experts that would be provided by UN-TAA in 1955.³⁰⁸ Abrams expressed his discontent about the situation during his meeting with Diker.

Given the secondary importance of the matter for Turkish officials, it could actually be argued that the SOM Report was in fact being implemented in due course. After all, it was the recommendations in this report that had led to Abrams' assignment. Within the progressive framework of the newly adopted "French Plan," it could be said that Turkey was addressing its development needs by prioritizing projects based on the urgency of specific social and political issues of the period. However, one finds that Abrams did not present the progressive aspects of the Turkish development program. Instead he chose to present the problem as a lack of administrative and technical staff. His reasons for this were two-fold. First, this would open the door for him to make a case for the training of architects and planners. Abrams utilized some of his own observations in order to show how and why training and education was essential for the success of the Turkish program of economic development.³⁰⁹ Second, both Diker and Sturen and later Zorlu supported the idea of training and education as essential and as a viable area of involvement by future UN and/or US experts. In addition, Abrams had a few reasons of

and Construction], to Charles Abrams, 14 September 1954. Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25.

³⁰⁸ This change in the scope and purpose of Abrams' assignment explains why Abrams was not very positive during his first meeting with Diker. During that meeting, according to Diker, Abrams had criticized, among other things, how the Ministry was already asking for more experts even before reviewing his report. For a discussion of this meeting, see chapter one.

³⁰⁹ He articulated these further in his later report, "The Need for Training and Education in Housing and Planning" This will be discussed further in the next chapter.

his own to shift his attention from policy creation to training and many of these reasons were formed during the very first days of his mission. support the idea of training and education.. utilized some of his own observations from the first few weeks of his arrival in Ankara in order to demonstrate how training and education would benefit Turkish programs of economic development.

Taper notes that, beginning with the very first days of his visit in Ankara, Abrams became aware of a considerable cultural and professional divide between him and his counterparts in Ankara. The fact that many of the Ministerial staff did not know English and were not able to translate key documents for Abrams' review made it almost impossible for Abrams to accomplish what he had come to do. Taper wrote,

All unconscious of this stalemate [between the UN and the Turkish Government], Abrams came breezing into Ankara. To the sceptical [sic] eyes of the UN people stationed there, the first impression he made was, in the words of one of them, 'one of misguided enthusiasm and intense misplaced activity.' On Abrams' first day in Ankara, he discovered that the building code he was supposed to revise was available only in a Turkish text and that, within the mere six [sic] weeks allotted to him, he was not going to be able to find anyone in Turkey to put it into English for him...., Abrams fired a copy of the building code off to Harvard for a translation by a Turkish architectural student he had heard of who was enrolled there...³¹⁰

Here Taper provides a detailed picture of Abrams' initial experiences. From the beginning of Abrams' arrival in Turkey, language and communication with his counterparts became a central issue. The language barrier was not only a pragmatic challenge that kept him from communicating freely with his Turkish colleagues in the ministries, but it also translated into differences in ideology, methodology, and approach

³¹⁰ Bernard Taper, "Charles Abrams in Turkey," In *The Work of Charles Abrams: Housing and Urban Renewal in the USA and the Third World: A Collection of Papers*, eds. O. H. Koenigsberger, S. Groak, and B. Bernstein (New York: Bergamon, 1980), 47.

between him and his colleagues in Turkey on issues of architecture and planning. As a result, Abrams became aware of a significant divide between Turkey and the western world order, which had to be realigned if Turkey were to move forward with its plan for development and to operate as a part of the First World order.

During the early to mid-1950s, the ministerial staff in Turkey was generally used to communicating with German and Austrian experts and was not as used to working with English-speaking experts, who, aside from speaking a different language, also brought different methodologies, approaches, and sensibilities with them. Celal Uzer, who became Abrams' guide and translator during his mission, was an exception to the rule. Uzer had completed his planning degree in England and was one of the only architects working in the Ministry with a degree in planning and a full command of English.³¹¹ As Taper suggests, many of the documents that Abrams needed in order to do his work were either in Turkish or in German. In a memorandum Abrams submitted to the Ministry of Public Works on October 20, 1954, he noted,

Since my arrival in Turkey on September 6th, 1954, I sought to obtain an English translation of the Turkish Building Laws and Codes and Housing Acts so that I could be of service to you in advising you on the needed revisions. Unfortunately the translations consumed so much time that only a few days were left for my drawing a memorandum and conferring with representatives of your Ministry... Since my arrival, I have been able to effect the translations of the following:

1. Public Law 2290 approved June 10, 1933.
2. The Typical Statute for the Pension Fund Cooperative Housing.

³¹¹ Ekmel Derya, "Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Kuruluş Yılları," p. 4, incomplete manuscript on his memoirs of the establishment of METU, digital word document, personal archive of Baykan Günay, Professor in the Department of Regional and Urban Planning, METU. Derya was to become one of the first Turkish professors to teach in the School of Architecture at METU.

3. The Ottoman Building Code, some sections of which still survive here in effect. This was translated by a student at Harvard University without charge to the Turkish Government.
4. I have also obtained digests of Laws No. 1580, 5218, 5228, 5431, 5656 and 3/6739.³¹²

In this portion of the memorandum, Abrams also acknowledges, “the continued cooperation of Mr. Salahattin [sic] Onat, Mr. Orhan Alsaç, and of Mr. Celal Uzer. At the Ministry, Uzer must have facilitated the communication among Abrams, Onat, and Alsaç, since Onat or Alsaç, although could speak German, did not speak English at the time of Abrams’ visit.”³¹³

Orhan Alsaç, who held a number of important positions at the Ministry (1952-1959) and who later served as the Chief of Buildings and Construction at METU (1961-69), also recalled that when the decision was made to award scholarships to Turkish staff in order to train them to teach in the Department of Regional Planning at METU, the first set of recruits were gathered from among the Ministry staff.³¹⁴ This will be further discussed in chapter five, however it is interesting to point out how Abrams’ initial observations at the Ministry had an effect in the making of the school later. Rauf Beyru and Dündar Elbruz, who were both working as architects at the Ministry, were awarded two of the first six scholarships provided by the UN to allow them to study Urban

³¹² This memorandum was not included in Abrams’ report. From Charles Abrams to the Minister of Public Works, “Memorandum Re-revision of the Turkish Building Code (October 20, 1954)” (Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25), 1.

³¹³ Alsaç later learned to speak English and he was to become second in command to President Kurdaş, especially in building operations, beginning in 1961, at METU.

³¹⁴ See, Üstün Alsaç, *Bir Türk Mimarının Anıları Yaşamı ve Etkinlikleri: Orhan Alsaç* (İstanbul: Yapı Yayın, 2003), 37, 254.

Planning in the School of Fine Arts at the University of Pennsylvania. They were expected to return to METU and to teach with the UN staff there, while also contributing to the work at the Ministry.

Ekmel Derya, who knew Uzer and was later introduced to Abrams through Uzer, noted that, in addition to Vecdi Diker, Uzer made an effort to introduce Abrams to as many other English-speaking bureaucrats and professionals as possible. Similar to Uzer and Diker, Derya had studied in an English-speaking country and had earned his Bachelor of Architecture degree from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1952, and his Master of Architecture degree from Oklahoma A. and M. Institute of Technology, in 1953. Following his graduation, he had worked on a number of projects in architectural offices in the US. Derya recalls that in those days, he was working in the NATO commission of the PTT (Posta, Telefon, Telgraf, or the Turkish Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph Company):

Uzer contacted me and asked if I would like to meet Abrams. We met at the now demolished Barikan Hotel and discussed how many expert reports amounted to nothing but to fill the shelves of the Ministry. Abrams told us about his thoughts to open a school and to train local staff. He asked me if I would be interested in getting involved in the making of the school.³¹⁵

Because of his familiarity with US schools of architecture and his fluency in English, Derya was an obvious choice to serve as the first Turkish professor when the school finally opened in November, 1956. I point this out here in order to demonstrate how the

³¹⁵ From an interview with Ekmel Derya published in the METU magazine. See, "İlk Türk Öğretim Üyemiz: Ekmel Derya," *ODTÜ'lü Dergisi*, no. 8, 1995, 6-9. There is no indication whether this conversation took place before or after Abrams spoke with Diker. However, judging from the fact that Abrams sounds rather decided about the idea of a School, it is possible to suggest that Abrams' conversation with Derya occurred after his meeting with Diker.

staff at the Ministry was oriented to work mainly with European and German-speaking experts. While Turkey's and the DP Administration's relationship with the US and the UN had developed during the postwar years, the staff at the ministries continued to prefer to work with German and Austrian experts. This was a situation that Abrams became aware of during the very first days of his assignment at the Ministry of Public Works. He would convey this issue to Weissmann in his letter as he began to discuss the existing condition of Turkish architectural and planning education. However, before discussing that portion of the letter, it is helpful to further understand what else Abrams found as he arrived in Turkey.

Abrams' Sources

While Abrams waited for the translations of the documents he needed for his work, the report prepared in 1951 by the architecture and planning firm Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill (SOM), which was available in English, was a valuable source. In addition, the recently established Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East (TODAIE) became a useful resource both in terms of its faculty and staff and in terms of its library. Other UN experts who came to teach at TODAIE had already produced reports and documents on Turkey and on the Turkish state and administrative apparatus in English.³¹⁶

³¹⁶ There were strong connections between the UN-TAA office in Ankara and TODAIE. For example, Marshall Dimock, who was the acting resident representative of UN-TAA just prior to Abrams' arrival, was also the co-director of TODAIE. Many other UN experts who came to Turkey through UN-TAA operations also taught at TODAIE. For Dimock and UN-TAA, see chapter two.

In a later letter, Abrams wrote to Weissmann, he noted several members of the TODAIE staff could potentially be helpful in the establishment of the new school.³¹⁷ He identified Ms. McKetterick as, “the detail dynamo of the UN School of Administration..., who knows the educational ropes in the Turkish scene.”³¹⁸ He also mentioned Professor Egli or Arnold Ernst Egli (1893-1974), an Austro-Swiss architect and planner, who taught city planning courses at TODAIE (1954-55). Egli was working on the same type of housing and settlement issues that Abrams had come to observe. In addition, Egli had taught at the Academy between 1927 and 1936, had designed a number of significant buildings in Ankara, and had published a book and other essays on Turkish architecture.³¹⁹ Abrams felt, “His Turkish experience, his knowledge of the language, and his training are definite assets. He should be consulted, interviewed, and considered as a possibility for a professorship.”³²⁰

³¹⁷ From Charles Abrams, to Ernest Weissmann, 31 October 1954. Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, reel 25.

³¹⁸ Ibid., 2.

³¹⁹ Court of Financial Appeals (1928-30) and İsmet Paşa Institute for Girls (1930), both constructed in Ankara can be counted among his significant works in Turkey. He also compiled his research on the renowned Ottoman architect Sinan in, Ernst Egli, *Sinan: Der Baumeister Osmanischer Glanzzeit* (Stuttgart: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1976). This was one of the first modern assessments of Sinan’s work; Egli also wrote extensively on city planning during the second half of his career.

³²⁰ For reasons that will be discussed shortly in this chapter, Abrams may have had some reservations about hiring someone who had previously worked in Turkey and taught at one of the existing schools. In a separate letter, Abrams mentioned Egli to Holmes Perkins as well, but again he would not provide a full endorsement and could only recommend Egli with reservations. To Perkins, he wrote, “There is a Professor Egli here connected with the UN, an architectural teacher, a Swiss who talks both languages and taught at the Beaux Arts in İstanbul before it blew up. I have made no commitment pending your determination as to his qualifications. His reputation as a teacher seems good.” Charles Abrams, Ankara, Turkey, to Holmes Perkins, University of Pennsylvania, October 6, 1954. Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25. Despite these concerns, Egli may have very well been hired when the push came to shove as the time approached for the opening of the school if he hadn’t left Turkey in 1955 before the school’s opening in November 1956.

In addition, aside from the SOM Report, Egli and his work at TODAIE must have contributed to Abrams' understanding of the Turkish scene.³²¹ Abrams kept several reports by Egli in his files. The first of them, "Interim Report on the Housing Problem in Turkey," clarified the condition of the housing issue in Turkey for Abrams.³²² The report stated,

The Housing Problem in Turkey is for 75% a problem of the peasant and village house, and concerns only for 25% urban lodging. Intermediate forms, appearing with the settling of labourers near industrial centres in country regions, play only a minor part, but are of some importance in view of the progressing industrialization of Turkey.³²³

In this way, Egli's report repositioned Abrams' focus from urban centers to the periphery while also pointing out that housing and urbanization issue were not yet major political and social issues in urban centers in Turkey. The latter point also clarified to Abrams why Turkish officials might seem reluctant to implement any recommendations on housing.

Following the findings of the first report, Egli's second report, "Research Trip to the South-Western Provinces of Anatolia," surveyed an area made up largely of smaller towns and villages on the periphery but with particular potential for development through

³²¹ Egli's reports may have been the first place where Abrams was introduced to the idea of partial loan schemes, such as the roof loan scheme he had proposed in Ghana, following his visit to Turkey. Ernst Egli's reports praised the resourcefulness of the Turkish rural population in constructing their homes and suggested that roof loans or window and door loans may be all the people would need in order to construct better homes. Cevat Geray also discusses Egli's reports in, "The Application of the Aided Self-help Housing Method in Turkey," in the Proceedings of the RCD Symposium on Rural Housing in Ankara (7-10 July 1973). RCD stands for Regional Cooperation for Development (est. 1964) and RCD countries included Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.

³²² E. Egli, "Interim Report on the Housing Problem in Turkey," Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East, 26 February 1954, (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, reel 51).

³²³ *Ibid.*, 1.

tourism.³²⁴ Egli noted, “the aim of the research trip was to collect some material for use in the courses given by the undersigned, on town and village planning at the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East.” His questionnaire dealt with, “1. General data on building surplus and activity in the Vilayet (city center) and its Kazas (peripheries), as well as data on the status of town planning; 2. Relations with neighboring vilayets; 3. Possibilities for tourist traffic; 4. Data on the village.”³²⁵

The documents at the TODAIE library allowed Abrams to examine the structure of the Turkish administrative and legal system and structure.³²⁶ Abrams kept copies of a good number of these documents and brought them back to the US. His notes on these documents indicate that he was impressed with these studies, and found them to be good

³²⁴ E. Egli, “Research Trip to the South-Western Provinces of Anatolia,” Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East, 28 July 1954, (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, reel 51).

³²⁵ For this report, Egli examined Burdur, Antalya, Aydın, Muğla, Söke, and İzmir. *Ibid.*, 1.

³²⁶ These materials are available with Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, reel number 51. Aside from Egli’s reports, the following can be counted among the materials that Abrams examined and kept for his records. Most of these were a series of analytical and descriptive reports compiled by Albert Henry Hanson (1913-1971) during the few months prior to Abrams’ arrival. Abrams kept copies of the following documents for his records: “Government and Administration in Turkey,” (by A.H. Hanson, Restricted, 16 November 1953); “Materials for the Study of Local Government in the Turkish Republic” (Ankara, March 1954); “Materials for the Study of Local Government in the Turkish Republic, No. 2, Provincial Administration and Local Self-Government Institutions in Turkey” (A memorandum, compiled by Tahir Aktan, with an analysis of the Relevant Laws by Fatma Mansur, two charts, and an introduction by A.H. Hanson; Ankara, May 1954); “Employee Training in the Turkish Public Service” (by Professor Joseph Kingbury, 9 September 1954); “Municipal Government: İstanbul, İzmir, Kayseri” (by A.H. Hanson, September 24, 1954); “On Local Self-Government in Turkey” (by A.H. Hanson, September 1954); and, “The Structure and Control of State Enterprises in Turkey: A Preliminary Survey (by A.H. Hanson with the assistance of Mümtaz Soysal, (no date given)). On this last one, Abrams hand-wrote, “keep,” and “very good indeed,” on the title page of Hanson’s, “Materials for the Study of Local Government in the Turkish Republic.” Hanson published, *Public Enterprise and Economic Development* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1959). His title to his Introduction, “The Struggle for Development,” may have inspired Abrams’ title, *Man’s Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* in 1964.

resources for his flourishing work at the international scale and wanted to study them further upon his return to the US.

Aside from serving as an invaluable resource for Abrams during his first days of arrival in Turkey, TODAIE, as an institute served as a precedent for Abrams as well, especially when the scope and content of his mission began to shift toward the establishment of an educational institute. During his work there Abrams was able to observe the strengths and weaknesses of this institution. Through conversations with colleagues who taught there, Abrams realized that certain key mistakes had been made in its conception, which limited the school's capacity to reform the Turkish administrative structure and organization. First, TODAIE was established as a component of the pre-existing Faculty of Administrative Sciences at the Ankara University which confined TODAIE to the academic traditions and structure of the previous school. Consequently, it could not function as a reformative model institution for other Turkish universities and governmental agencies and organizations. Second, students and trainees at TODAIE were not required to learn English as a pre-requisite to their studies. This meant that UN-experts lectured in English and their presentations were translated to students. This set-up prolonged a rather idiosyncratic method of communication between foreign professors and Turkish students and trainees that had been in practice in İstanbul schools. An interpreter would provide simultaneous translations while the professor delivered the lecture.³²⁷ This method limited the Turkish students' access to resources beyond those

³²⁷ German and Austrian design professors who taught in the two existing schools of architecture in İstanbul would provide desk crits in this way as well. They would go from desk to desk with their interpreter. The position of foreign professors in design schools will be discussed further below. Orhan Alsaç provides some accounts of the interaction between Turkish architecture students and their foreign

available in Turkish as well as their ability to do research. It also curbed the school's intended international impact and status. Furthermore, if the professors prepared any advisory reports, as many of them did, regarding Turkey's administrative structure, their reports, which were initially published in English, could not be read by many of the officials for whom the reports were intended. Consequently, the school had only limited impact in bridging the communication and knowledge gap between the Turkish bureaucratic staff and the foreign professors and experts. Abrams would keep both of these shortcomings in mind when he began to work on structuring the idea of a new UN-sponsored school.

In the final analysis, Abrams must have felt that TODAIE, as it operated at the time of Abrams' observation, could not meet the demands of the country programming strategies that Turkey was ambitiously putting into effect. This was the sentiment of the opening paragraph of his letter to Weissmann when he wrote, "Turks, however willing, simply have not the administrative or the technical equipment...". He had also come to the understanding, most likely through discussions with Sturen and Diker, that the school of public administration, besides already needing reform, also needed a twin establishment that would provide technical training so that projects of administrative reform could be embodied in the physical construction of the country as well through the construction of infrastructure, towns, buildings, public spaces, and institutions.

In a letter Abrams wrote to Holmes Perkins few days after writing to Weissmann, Abrams took the time to explain how Turkey was suffering from a break-down of center-

professors in his memoirs at the İstanbul Technical University. See, Üstün Alsaç, *Bir Türk Mimarının Anıları Yaşamı ve Etkinlikleri: Orhan Alsaç* (İstanbul: Yapı Yayın, 2003).

periphery relations: Decisions made in the capital could not be interpreted or implemented properly in the municipalities across the nation due to a lack of trained personnel to be positioned in the municipal offices.³²⁸ The ministries in Ankara were themselves having trouble recruiting graduates of İstanbul universities to come to work in Ankara.³²⁹ Consequently the situation in the municipalities was much worse. However, Abrams did not articulate the problem in its full extent to Weissmann. Instead, as he moved into the second paragraph of the letter, he left the larger scope of the “administrative and technical equipment,” behind and focused strictly on architecture and planning in order to appeal directly to Weissmann’s interests as an architect with a special interest in planning as evidenced through his activities as a member of CIAM.

Architecture and Planning Education and Practice

Specific knowledge of architecture and planning disciplines were outside of Abrams’ area of expertise, however he was familiar with the state of the field through

³²⁸ Charles Abrams, Ankara, Turkey, to G. Holmes Perkins, Dean of the School of Fine Arts at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 6 October 1954, microfilm, Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25.

³²⁹ For İstanbulites, Ankara never lost its provincial connotation. Rauf Beyru recalled that, from time to time, the Ministry of Public Works in Ankara would have to resort to requiring compulsory service for a period of two years from graduates of İstanbul universities in order to have enough staff to do the work. Even though there was not enough work for Turkish engineers and architects in private practice, this was still the case. During the contentious battle between professional agencies and the Ministry regarding the Ministry’s practice of hiring foreign experts, the Ministry used the notion that Turkish architects and engineers were sometimes too good to come work for the Ministry. This will be discussed further below. Rauf Beyru, interview with author, Dec. 2007, Izmir, Turkey, digital recording, author’s archive.

discussions with his colleagues in New York, including Weissmann.³³⁰ The topic of architectural and planning education was also discussed extensively at the New Delhi Seminar.³³¹ Based on this past experience and through conversations he had with Turkish and foreign bureaucrats and professionals, Abrams gathered an extensive picture of the educational and professional contexts in Turkey. Celal Uzer, Orhan Alsaç, Ernst Egli, who was now teaching at TODAIE and had previously taught at the Academy and had worked as a foreign consultant architect designing significant buildings for the Ministry of Public Works, must have all contributed to Abrams understanding of the situation.³³²

At the same time, the points he made in the letter were carefully crafted to appeal to Weissmann's interests as a CIAM member operating in the First World. His point regarding the continuing prevalence of the divide and definition of the field along the now obsolete French model and through the Beaux Arts and the Polytechnique traditions as well as his point regarding monumentality were both issues at the forefront of the discussion in architectural and planning circles in the US during the postwar period.

Abrams wrote:

³³⁰ Taper also points out that Abrams was excellent when he was talking about housing policy or land economics, however he sometimes ventured a bit too far from his comfort zone as he went out on a limb discussing architecture and architectural education.

³³¹ See chapter two.

³³² Ekmel Derya, Emin Onat, and many others, who worked in and outside of the Ministry of Public Works, can be counted among those who met and discussed these matters with Abrams during his mission. In his memoirs, Orhan Alsaç provides brief accounts of his encounters with Abrams and his later involvement with METU during the construction of its campus. See, Üstün Alsaç, *Bir Türk Mimarının Anıları Yaşamı ve Etkinlikleri: Orhan Alsaç* (İstanbul: Yapı Yayın, 2003). Also from the way Abrams referred to Egli's departure from the Academy in his letter to Perkins, "taught at the Beaux Arts in İstanbul before it blew up," alluding that Egli left when his relationship with his other colleagues there went sour, it seems that Egli and Abrams talked about the Academy and the profession to some extent. Charles Abrams, Ankara, Turkey, to Holmes Perkins, University of Pennsylvania, October 6, 1954. Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25.

Architectural talent is scarce and such as exists has been burdened with an engineering emphasis... a Beaux Arts School in Istanbul that emphasized art and is on the way out, and an Engineering School which treated architecture as a subordinate unit, with the result that most architects here are part engineers and part architects, but neither of either, while those the Beaux Arts School turned out were artists with little knowledge of structure. The Art School has now been almost thoroughly subdued by the Engineering School's competition and the engineers' overwhelming influence in the financial and political sphere. There is no architectural teaching as a self-contained discipline and none in sight. Buildings are borrowing the very worst monumentality from Germany, and city planning is no more than an emotion, albeit a strong one. When emotion gets translated into asphalt, brick and mortar, it takes the form of narrow streets, obsolescence upon creation and general over-all chaos.³³³

Abrams' mention of the continuing prevalence of the Beaux Arts and the Polytechnique systems in Turkish schools would have attracted Weissmann's attention in more ways than one in terms of both aesthetic and ideological reasons. As a UN employee, Weissmann would have found the continuation of Beaux Arts teaching methods as well as classical formalism problematic as it was the preferred style in both former fascist regimes and now ironically, in areas under Soviet control. As a CIAM member, he would have found the persistence of the aesthetic concerns of the city beautiful movement to be out of date at best as opposed to approaches discussed in CIAM. Based on Abrams' assessment, Turkey appeared as a place where CIAM and US planning traditions somehow had minimal impact and influence. Ultimately, in order to convey the professional divide he perceived between US and Turkish bureaucrats and professionals, Abrams sought to create a contrast between where the field was or wanted to be and where it was in Turkey.³³⁴ Abrams even brought forward the issue of monumentality

³³³ Letter to Weissmann, 1.

³³⁴ A similar divide existed among traditionalists and modernists within the US. Abrams must have felt that the modernist camp was not as well represented within the Turkish professional and bureaucratic culture.

which was a central topic of discussion between American housing activists and CIAM members operating in the US during the 1940s.³³⁵ Whether these contrasts really existed or not, or whether they existed exactly as Abrams characterized them is the focus of the following discussion.

CIAM had emerged to create a voice for modern architects as urbanistic experts and as leaders of a multi-disciplinary team made up of planners, economists, engineers, politicians, industrialists, as well as social scientists. Consequently, in principle, its members opposed a synthetic divide of the profession along aesthetic and technical lines as was the case in the French system of design education where two separate schools focused on one aspect of the field. While the curriculum at the Ecole des Beaux Arts focused on the formal and aesthetic concerns, the Ecole Polytechnique focused on the technical aspects. Furthermore, within the political context of the post-WWII period, the classical language and the formal organizing principles which continued to be taught in schools that followed the Beaux Arts traditions had fallen out of favor as they were associated with the fascist regimes of the pre-WWII era and now the totalitarian regimes in Soviet controlled areas.

The two İstanbul schools that Abrams described in his letter were organized roughly along the same lines as the two French schools (with some late 19th- and early 20th-Century German reforms), one focusing on the aesthetic and the other on the technical aspects of the field. Both schools were established during the early 1880s when the existing system of educating architects in the Military Engineering School (Royal

³³⁵ See discussion in chapter two.

School of Military Engineering, or Mühendishane-i Berri-i Hümayûn, est. 1795) was found to be inadequate.³³⁶ The Royal School of Fine Arts or the Academy of Fine Arts, as it was later called [Sanayi-i Nefise Mektebi; later, Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi; and currently under, Mimar Sinan Üniversitesi], was the Beaux Arts School that Abrams was referring to, and it was established in 1883.³³⁷ The school with the engineering emphasis was established in 1884 as the Civil Service School of Engineering [Hedese-i Mülkiye] and continued the engineering tradition within a non-military school.³³⁸ As Abrams suggests above, the second school maintained the technical orientation and the direct link of the former Military School to the State. Its aim was to produce the bureaucratic staff for employment in the Ministry of Public Works. The Academy, on the other hand, focused on the artistic concerns of the architectural profession.

In 1928, the Ministry recognized the possibilities of specialization within the engineering field. Three autonomous departments of road construction, civil engineering and waterworks, and planning were established within the Civil Service School (Yüksek

³³⁶ The Royal School of Military Engineering was established in a reform effort to impose formal education on royal architects. However it was modeled after the *École Royale Militaire* in Paris which was not structured to provide an education in architecture. Since the 15th Century and before the establishment of the Military School, all building activities were controlled by the Office of Royal Architects whose members came from among the Ottoman *Devşirme* system of recruits and training for military and government personale and high offices. For the Royal School of Military Engineering, textbooks were imported from the *École Royale Militaire* and teachers were promoted as a reward for translating them. See, Gülsüm Baydar (Nalbantoğlu), “The Professionalization of the Ottoman-Turkish Architect” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1989), 3 & 45-48. Also see, Haluk Pamir, “Architectural Education in Turkey in its Social Context: Underlying Concepts and Changes.” In *Architecture Education in the Islamic World: Proceedings of Seminar Ten in the Series: Architectural Transformations in the Islamic World Held in Granada, Spain 21-25 April 1986*, ed. Ahmet Evin (Singapore: Eurasia Press for the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 1986), 131-151.

³³⁷ For information and analysis of both schools, see chapter two in Baydar, 42-108.

³³⁸ Baydar, 53.

Mühendis Okulu).³³⁹ Nine years later architecture and civil engineering were separated into independent departments. In 1944, the architecture component underwent another structural change and was recast as the Department of Architecture within the İstanbul Technical University (ITU). From this point on, even though the two schools' curricula were not so different from each other and both were based on the French Beaux Arts traditions, ITU graduates continued to think of themselves as technically more proficient than their counterparts at the Academy, while the graduates of the Academy tended to feel more in tune with the artistic concerns of the profession.

Even though, since its establishment in 1883, the Academy had the reputation of being the leading school of architectural education, graduates of the Engineering school maintained control of the Ministry. As engineers and architects, they not only outnumbered the graduates of the Academy, but they were also the school which maintained the traditional link between the profession and the state. The Ministry was the primary patron of major commissions throughout the country and this meant that ITU graduates held a considerable advantage over their counterparts at the Academy in terms of winning competitions and commissions that were organized by the State. The unfair advantage that ITU alumni held within Turkish engineering and architectural culture was one of the causes of friction between these two schools, but also, and more importantly, between the architectural profession and the State.

Up to this point, the observations that Abrams put forward in his second paragraph were fairly accurate and they must have made a strong impression on

³³⁹ Baydar, 101.

Weissmann. However, there was yet another major point of contention between the profession and the State, or the Ministry of Public Works, to be more precise, around which the alumni of both schools came together against the practices of the State. The issue was the Ministry's consistent preference for hiring foreign experts for the design and execution of some of the most prominent government commissions.

It is curious why Abrams did not articulate this situation to Weissmann, since the contentious relationship between Turkish architects, engineers, and planners and their foreign counterparts ran deep in the history of the development of the profession during the 19th and 20th Centuries and, by the postwar period, had reached a point where it would have affected the implementation of certain projects devised by foreign experts in the Ministry. Consequently, it was a topic of central concern regarding the implementation of UN-projects in Turkey. The fact that Turkish professionals despised foreign experts in practice but were willing to tolerate them in education and training would have also made an excellent point in support of Abrams' proposal. However, he did not voice this point to Weissmann despite its prominence.

The origins of the antagonism between Turkish professionals and their foreign counterparts can be traced back to the social and economic transformations that were taking place both within and outside the Ottoman Empire beginning in the first half of the 19th Century.³⁴⁰ During this time, non-Muslim groups within the Empire played a key role in the economic and cultural colonization as well as in architectural

³⁴⁰ Explain Tanzimat in ch. 1-part 1, then mention it again here.

transformations.³⁴¹ Empowered by a series of edicts and laws provided by the Empire after 1839, non-Muslim groups were given a number of judicial advantages that allowed them to operate as entrepreneurial petty bourgeoisie of traders, moneylenders, brokers, and commissioners, linking the large European importers, exporters, and banks with the indigenous farmers, craftsmen, petty traders, and other producers and consumers. Acting as middlemen between European and the Ottoman Muslims, the non-Muslim groups held an economically and socially advantageous position throughout the nineteenth century. Educated in European schools, many were directly exposed to western culture, which was the equivalent of high-civilization in the eyes of the contemporary Ottoman rulers. When it came to matters of taste and technical expertise in the construction of new buildings and institutions within the Empire, both state and private patronage favored the practice of foreign and non-Muslim architects.

After the Young Turk and the Republican revolutions, even though these movements were largely realized in order to restore the financial institutions of the Empire back into the hands of a Muslim majority, the Turkish State continued to rely on foreign experts for its modernization. Beginning during the late 19th Century, the French influence on Ottoman administrative and institutional reforms was slowly replaced with German methodologies within the context of shifting alliances among British, French, German and Ottoman empires. During this time, and especially during the 1930s, the impact of German and Austrian professionals, some of whom were exiled from Nazi Germany, on Turkish modernization and the creation of its national identity has been

³⁴¹ Baydar, 4.

well-documented.³⁴² Among these, German and Austrian architects and planners played a significant role in Ankara's construction as the new capital.³⁴³ For example, Herman Jansen, a professor of urban design at the University of Berlin and a well-known planner in Berlin, won a competition in 1928 to design the master plan for the city.³⁴⁴ Martin Wagner (1885-1957), who had established the GEHAG building society in Berlin in 1924 and was responsible for 70% of Berlin's housing construction between 1924 and 32, designed a number of residential neighborhoods in Ankara.³⁴⁵ Ernst Egli (Austrian, 1893-

³⁴² Between around 1870 and 1923, the German-Turkish collaboration had been fueled by a developing shared interest in creating a joint Eastern Empire that could compete with the British and French empires. After Germany's defeat in WWI, it continued both as a result of established cultural and economic ties and the diaspora of many German and Austrian professionals due to their treatment as cultural and political degenerates by the Nazi regime. Arnold Reisman, *Turkey's Modernization: Refugees from Nazism and Atatürk's Vision* (Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 2006); Fritz Neumark, *Boğaziçine Sığınanlar [Refugees in Bosphorus]* (İstanbul: Ercivan, 1982); and, Hirsch, Ernst E. *Anıların [Memoirs]* (1982) (Ankara: Tubitak, 2000).

³⁴³ The literature on Ankara's development as the capital of the Turkish Republic is extensive. Among these, see especially, Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle and London, 2001); Zeynep Kezer, "The Making of a National Capital: Socio-Spatial Practices in Early Republican Ankara," *Built Environment* 22.2 (1996): 124-137; Tansı Şenyapılı, ed., *Cumhuriyet'in Ankara'sı [Ankara of the Republic]* (Ankara: ODTÜ, 2006); Yavuz, Fehmi. *Ankara'nın İmarı ve Şehirciliğimiz [The Construction of Ankara and our Urbanism]*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi (No: 123?), 1952. Tankut, Gönül. *Bir Başkent'in İmarı: Ankara: 1929-1939 [The Construction of a Capital: Ankara: 1929-1939]*. Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1990. Also, see the bibliography for more sources on Ankara's development as a new capital.

³⁴⁴ Jansen's master plan came after the initial plan for Ankara. The exact origin of the original master plan (the one prior to Jansen's) is still open to debate, but it is certain that yet another Berlin planner, Dr. Carl Christoph Lörcher, as well as an engineering and insurance company named Heussler were involved in its development. See, Ali Cengizkan, *Modernin Saati [The Time of the Modern]* (Ankara: Mimarlar Derneği and Boyut Yayın Grubu, 2002), 44-45. The Jansen plan was implemented between 1932-57. Jansen designed the master plan for Adana as well, a significant port town on Turkey's Mediterranean coast.

³⁴⁵ In 1938, Wagner immigrated to the US in 1938 to teach at GSD's City Planning Department. For his housing schemes in Turkey, see, Esra Akcan, "Modernity in Translation: Early Twentieth Century German-Turkish Exchanges in Land Settlement and Residential Culture" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2005); and, *Çeviride Modern Olan: Şehir ve Konutta Türk-Alman İlişkileri [Modern in Translation: Turkish-German Exchanges in Urbanism and Housing]* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009). Wagner also contributed to the plans developed for İstanbul. This will be discussed in the upcoming pages. For his involvement in İstanbul, see, Murat Gül, *The Emergence of Modern İstanbul: Transformation and Modernisation of a City* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 95-96.

1974) and Bruno Taut (1880-1938) designed many of the capital's early administrative and educational institutions while they also taught successively at the Academy of Fine Arts in İstanbul.³⁴⁶ On the other hand, Clemenz Holzmeister (Austrian, 1886-1983), who won a competition to design the capitol complex in 1938, taught at the Department of Architecture at the İstanbul Technical University.

Largely because of their dual appointments as teachers and practicing architects, Turkish professionals had an ambivalent relationship with and conception of their German/Austrian counterparts.³⁴⁷ On the one hand, Turkish architects first encountered these professionals during their education, and consequently, perceived them as benevolent and knowledgeable teachers. On the other hand, they perceived them as their

³⁴⁶ Ernst Egli worked in Turkey between 1927-40 (as a professor at the Academy and as an architect at the Ministry of Public Works) and between 1953-1955 (as a professor and consultant at the Ankara University). He initiated one of the first modern studies on the Ottoman Royal Architect Sinan. See, *Sinan: Der Baumeister Osmanischer Glanzzeit*, (Stuttgart: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1976). Taut designed a number of educational buildings of various sizes. Among these his Faculty of Languages, History, and Geography building at Ankara University is his most celebrated commission. For further discussion of both Egli's and Taut's work in Turkey, see, Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle and London, 2001) and Bernd Nicolai, *Moderne und Exil: Deutschsprachige Architekten in der Türkei, 1925-1955* (Berlin: Verlag Fur Bauwesen, 1998). For a detailed analysis of Taut's educational buildings in Turkey, see, Burak Erdim, "Lost in Translation: The Encounter between Bruno Taut and the Early Turkish Republic from 1936 to 1938," (Master's thesis, University of Virginia, 2004).

³⁴⁷ Several sources addressed the relationship between Turkish architects and their foreign counterparts as a significant topic in the formation of Turkish architectural culture. See especially the section, "B. The Problem of Foreign Architects," under the sub-chapter, "2. The Struggle for Recognition," in chapter three of Baydar, "The Professionalization..." 130-137. Also see, Gürhan Tümer, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Yabancı Mimarlar Sorunu [The Problem of Foreign Architects during the Republican Period]* (Izmir: Izmir Chamber of Architects, 1998); İnci Aslanoğlu, "1923-1950 Döneminde Yabancı Mimarların Geleneksel Türk Mimarlığı Üzerine Düşünce ve Uygulamaları [The Practice and Theory of Foreign Architects on Traditional Turkish Architecture between 1923-50]," in *Bir Başkent'in Oluşumu: Ankara, 1923-1950 [The Making of a Capital: Ankara]* (Ankara: TMMOB, 1993), 41-45; İnci Aslanoğlu, *Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Mimarlığı, 1923-1938 [Architecture of the Early Republic]* (1980. Ankara: Ö.D.T.Ü. Mimarlık Fakültesi, 2001), 55-63.

competitors with an unfair advantage, since, like the Ottoman administration before it, the Turkish state continued to prefer foreign experts for major building commissions.

Interestingly, many of the buildings that were, in Abrams' words, "borrowing the worst monumentality from Germany," were designed by these German architects and planners.³⁴⁸ With their stripped-down classicism and imposing set-back facades of local stone, these buildings reminded Abrams of the structures that represented German or Italian fascism. Among these one can count the National Assembly Complex by Clemens Holzmeister; Faculty of Languages, History, and Geography building at Ankara University by Bruno Taut. Ironically, many of the foreign architects who had designed these buildings were exiles from Nazi fascism in Turkey and Abrams characterized their architecture as being fascist.

In many instances, Turkish architects, when awarded projects of equal significance, produced buildings with a similar monumentality to prove that they were equally competent in designing State buildings as their foreign counterparts. In response, Sedad Hakkı Eldem, developed the National Architecture Seminar at the Academy, a course in which, with his students, he documented outstanding examples of houses and other buildings in İstanbul and its environs in order to develop a catalog of "Turkish" architecture.

³⁴⁸ There are a number of sources that survey the architecture of the early Republic. See, Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle and London, 2001); İnci Aslanoğlu, *Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Mimarlığı, 1923-1938 [Architecture of the Early Republic]*. 1980 (Ankara: Ö.D.T.Ü. Mimarlık Fakültesi, 2001); Renata Holod and Ahmet Evin, eds. *Modern Turkish Architecture* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984).

Consequently, some of these buildings that Abrams was referring to were products of debates involving nationalism, regionalism, and modernity not unlike the debates Abrams found within the architectural culture upon his arrival. Furthermore, some of these buildings could have also been said to resemble some of the state and institutional buildings built roughly around the same time in Washington D.C. or elsewhere in the United States.³⁴⁹ However, even though Abrams' assessment of these buildings was not exacting by any means, his point regarding German monumentality would have resonated with Weissmann and others in the US within the political and architectural contexts of the 1950s.³⁵⁰

İlhan Tekeli, a prolific author and scholar on Turkey's modernization, provides yet another explanation of why tensions existed between Turkish architects and foreign experts.³⁵¹ He argues that the type of expert that Turkish professionals were used to no longer existed.³⁵² He points out that the UN and US consultants, unlike their German predecessors, stayed for only a couple of months, wrote a report, and left. Because of this, Turkish professionals working in the ministries usually felt that the UN and the US agents' understanding of the conditions in Turkey was very limited and did not warrant

³⁴⁹ For example, the US Embassy building in Ankara by Eggers and Higgins (1948-53) provides good resemblance to Washington landmarks.

³⁵⁰ Weissmann, as a CIAM member and an apprentice to Le Corbusier was a modernist, but also, as a refugee from Yugoslavia and an émigré architect in the US, he would have been doubly sensitive to monumental architecture that recalled fascist Europe or Stalinist Russia.

³⁵¹ İlhan Tekeli is a Professor Emeritus in the Department of City and Regional Planning at METU and an initial student of that department.

³⁵² İlhan Tekeli, interview by author, 17 March 2008, digital recording, author's archive. Tekeli also met Abrams personally and was able to discuss the establishment and the aims of the school repeatedly with Abrams during his graduate work in planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology following his undergraduate work at METU during the early 1960s.

much attention or respect. In such a short time, they were not able to develop a closer working relationship with the consultants.

In 1953, thirty German architects and engineers were working in the Ministry of Public Works alone.³⁵³ Under scrutiny from the professionals, the Ministry defended its position by stating that the Ministry was over-burdened by projects and could not keep up with demand. It also pointed out that long-term projects were being prepared in collaboration with the Ministry of Education to increase the number of trained architects and engineers of Turkish origin. At the same time, the Ministry reproached the professionals for the current situation stating that the ministry had open positions for Turkish architects and engineers and no one would take them.³⁵⁴

In 1954, the year that Abrams arrived, the Law of the Union of the Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects allowed Turkish architects and engineers to organize under a union. Aside from defining the goals and activities of the union, the law also protected Turkish architects from competition against the practice of non-professionals including not only building material suppliers and contractors, but also foreign

³⁵³ Baydar. İnci Aslanoğlu writes that the situation at universities was no different. In 1938, at the İstanbul University, there were 44 Turkish professors, 42 German professors, 102 Associate (Docent) Professors, and 38 foreign specialists. During those years, many of the foreign experts who came to Turkey were all well-recognized names in their fields. Aslanoğlu, 59.

³⁵⁴ Rauf Beyru, who was among the first group of bureaucrats to receive UN fellowships to study at the University of Pennsylvania to then come back and teach at the School of Architecture at METU, recalled that, during the 1950s, new graduates from architecture and engineering programs (in İstanbul) had to serve a compulsory term in the ministerial offices in Ankara and İstanbul. Rauf Beyru, interview by author, 31 January 2008, Izmir, digital recording, author's archive, Charlottesville, VA. Zeki Sayar addressed this issue in a number of editorials in his journal, *Arkitekt*. He argued that the reason why the graduates were not taking the Ministry jobs was because, first, the Ministry had instigated the compulsory service law (Barem Kanunu); and second, the Ministry was paying the new graduates only 35 Turkish Liras a month while they paid the foreign consultants 1500-2000 Liras. See, Sayar's, "Yabancı Teknik Elemanlar Meselesi [Issue of Foreign Technical Staff], *Arkitekt* no. 261-262 (1953): 119-120.

professionals. Article thirty-three stated, “the members of the engineering and architectural professions in Turkey have to be registered with the appropriate chamber and keep up their membership in order to practice their profession and engage in professional education.”³⁵⁵

The law of 1954 had come at the end of a long and arduous battle of the professionals with the Ministry. Both the architects and the engineers wanted their voices to be heard by the State, however, they also could not alienate themselves from the State, which was the primary patron of most commissions in Turkey even during the postwar period. The architects’ desire to claim ownership of architectural practice was motivated by social and economic concerns on the one hand, and on the other by concerns about the creation of a national architectural language. For example, when the International Style architecture of the İstanbul Hilton became popular in Turkey and was emulated in other government commissions such as the İstanbul Municipal Palace, the movement received united criticism from the architectural community and was dubbed as, “hiltonculuk”.³⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the architectural community did not deny their dependence on their foreign

³⁵⁵ As translated in Baydar, 129.

³⁵⁶ The term, “Hiltonculuk,” can be translated as, “those-who-do-Hiltons.” Turkish word referred to the uncritical strain of architectural practice with a self-appointed mission to design and construct Hilton-like buildings without any attention to the Turkish urban and cultural landscape roughly during the period immediately following the construction of the İstanbul Hilton Hotel building in 1951-1954. For a study that focuses on the postwar period and the rise of criticism against, for example, “Hiltonculuk,” see, Ela Ayşem Kaçel, “Intellectualism and Consumerism: Ideologies, Practices, and Criticism of Common Sense Modernism in Postwar Turkey” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 2009). For an analysis of the formation of architectural criticism against foreign professionals, see Baydar, “Chapter Three: The Rise of Professionalism,” 108-150; and especially the sub-chapter, “B. The Problem of Foreign Architects,” 130-137.

counterparts, especially in the field of education. An editorial in *Mimarlık* expressed this sentiment,

We have never said that we should not benefit from foreign civilizations and the knowledge of foreign experts. We do not have such a claim. It is necessary to make use of foreigners whom we invite to our institutions as experts or to our schools as instructors. Yet it is no virtue to glorify them instantly by offering commissions of every scale from police stations to the National Assembly building.³⁵⁷

A consensus had emerged among the professionals that architectural schools or professional organizations rather than government departments should have the authority to select the experts to be invited. Furthermore, and as the Law of 1954 stated, foreign experts should be employed only as technical advisors and instructors, and they should not engage in professional practice.

Consequently, just around the time of Abrams' visit, the Law of 1954 had largely limited the ways a foreign architect or a planner could operate in Turkey outside of schools of architecture, essentially echoing the parameters of Abrams' proposal. If Abrams was to make an impact on the Turkish architectural and planning culture through foreign intervention, the establishment of a new school of architecture was the only acceptable way this could be done without facing debilitating criticism from the profession. In this way, all other points aside, the antagonism of Turkish professionals toward foreign experts could by itself account for the majority of the difficulties that Abrams and other UN-experts faced in Turkey: First, they did not stay long enough to understand the local conditions which increased their foreignness; second, they were

³⁵⁷ As translated in Baydar, 134. For the original editorial see, *Mimarlık* 4, n. 5-6, 1947, 17.

trying to operate at a time when the Turkish professional community had finally been able to organize themselves against State practices to hire foreign professionals.

The other point that needs to be made here is that even though Abrams was in Turkey during a time of very lively and productive discussion amongst professionals and the State, Abrams did not express this to Weissmann similar to the way he had left Diker's contributions out of his letter. Instead, he rendered the field as antiquated and in desperate need of reform. In addition, Abrams curiously left out the extensive urban renewal projects that Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister of the DP Administration, had begun in a number of major cities, but especially in those that served as international transportation hubs, such as İstanbul, Izmir, and Adana.³⁵⁸ In order to meet the demands of these wide-ranging urban renewal projects, the Ministry of Education had also taken some steps to increase enrollment and to update the curricula in schools of architecture and engineering in order to better prepare the students for the demands of these new types of projects that involved issues of urban and regional development as well as housing and architecture.

During the DP Administration's efforts to position Turkey as a regional economic center, the planning of İstanbul as a commercial and cultural center gained primary importance. The Hilton project was one among many other large-scale urban and regional planning schemes that DP sought to realize during this period. The debates surrounding the nature and effect of these projects escalated the divide between local and international

³⁵⁸ For Democrat Party's projects especially in İstanbul, see Murat Gül, *The Emergence of Modern İstanbul: Transformation and Modernisation of a City* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009).

agencies, as well as between the two schools. They also fueled and shaped the establishment of urban and regional planning studies at both the Academy and the İstanbul Technical University.³⁵⁹ It is worth noting that many of the schemes that gained momentum during the DP period were in fact begun prior to the 1950s and around the time of the planning of Ankara, with a competition that was held in 1933.³⁶⁰ Three European urban planners were invited to enter the competition, namely: Donald Alfred Agache, Hermann Ehlgötz, and Henri Prost.³⁶¹ Prost, who was then the chief of the Planning Bureau of Paris, did not participate in the competition. Consequently, another French planner, Jacques-Henri Lambert, was invited on the recommendation of the French Embassy in Ankara. In the end, none of the proposals were found to be acceptable

³⁵⁹ Generally speaking, the Academy was the more preservation minded school and provided strong and at times constructive criticism of DP plans. See for example, Turgut Cansever's (a graduate of the Academy) accounts in, Uğur Tanyeli and Atilla Yücel, *Turgut Cansever: Düşünce Adamı ve Mimar [Turgut Cansever: Theorist and Architect]* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi ve Garanti Galeri, 2007), 62-82. Here, Cansever provides an account of how he and a few of his colleagues collaborated with Professor Wolfgang Müller-Wiener (1923-1991) in the protection of both Byzantine and Ottoman heritage of the city. At the same time, Sedat Hakkı Eldem, one of Cansever's most influential professors at the Academy was responsible for the design and construction of the Palace of Justice near the Hippodrome and on top of a number of Byzantine ruins during the 1950s.

³⁶⁰ For the formation of the discipline of planning in Turkey, see, Tamer Gök, ed., *Türkiye'de İmar Planlaması [(Re)Construction Planning in Turkey]* (Ankara: ODTÜ Şehir ve Bölge Planlama Bölümü [METU Department of City and Regional Planning], 1980). Here, see especially the essay by İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Kent Planlamasının Tarihsel Kökleri [The Roots of Urban Planning in Turkey]," 8-112, and charts and images (this portion unpaginated). Also see, Ruşen Keleş, ed., *Türkiye'de Kentbilim Eğitimi [Education of Urbanism in Turkey]* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, No: 561, 1987).

³⁶¹ Le Corbusier also submitted a proposal in 1933 in which he proposed that the İstanbul Peninsula should be preserved as is and that new development areas should be created outside of the Theodosian Walls. For the modernization of İstanbul, see, Murat Gül, *The Emergence of Modern İstanbul: Transformation and Modernisation of a City* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009); Zeynep Çelik, *Remaking of İstanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and also see, İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Kent Planlamasının Tarihsel Kökleri [The Roots of Urban Planning in Turkey]," in *Türkiye'de İmar Planlaması [(Re)Construction Planning in Turkey]*, Tamer Gök, ed. (Ankara: ODTÜ Şehir ve Bölge Planlama Bölümü [METU Department of City and Regional Planning], 1980), 8-112.

by the Turkish Government on the basis that the proposals were contrary to Kemalist political ideology, which demanded a more radical transformation of the former Ottoman capital. As a result, Martin Wagner, who was, as mentioned above, working in Ankara at the time, was invited by the Municipality of İstanbul in 1935 to be a consultant to the newly established Directorate of Development. Later, he was appointed as an advisor for the Department of Public Works in 1937. However, Wagner's in-depth study of the city's transportation, financial resources, and the relationship of its center to its hinterland, requiring a regional plan, did not satisfy what the government was looking for.³⁶² This time, the Turkish government, invited Prost exclusively to develop a master plan for İstanbul. Prost agreed and arrived in İstanbul on May 15, 1936.³⁶³ Prost's proposal was similar to CIAM's proposal in that it organized the city around industrial, commercial, residential, and recreational zones with the establishment of an effective transportation system. His plan required the creation of new urban pattern, which was in accordance with the demands of the Turkish government. When the DP Administration came to power, it sought to increase the speed with which the Prost plan was put into effect. At the same time, it criticized how little of the plan had been realized during Prost's fourteen-year stint as chief planner. DP and the Municipal Assembly created a

³⁶² Wagner's proposals were contained in a report to the Municipality of İstanbul and published in a series of articles in the architectural journal, *Arkitekt*. See, *Arkitekt* between 1936-37.

³⁶³ Prost would continue to work on the plan until his decommission in 1950. Le Corbusier later wrote, "If I had not made the most strategic mistake of my life in the letter I wrote to Atatürk, I would be planning the most beautiful city of İstanbul, instead of my biggest competitor, Henri Prost. In this notorious letter, I foolishly suggested to the greatest revolutionary hero of a new nation to leave İstanbul as it was in the dirt and dust of centuries." See, Şemsa Demirel, 'Le Corbusier ile mülakat', *Arkitekt* 19/11-12 (1949), 230-1. For Corbusier's involvement, also see, Enis Kortan, *Le Corbusier Gözüyle Türk Mimarlık ve Şehirciliği* (Ankara, 1983), 93-96.

commission to review Prost's master plan and the feasibility of its implementation. In the process, the assembly also criticized the fact that Prost had not educated any young professionals to participate in the redevelopment of İstanbul. Part of the reason why Prost became a target at this time was that DP sought to publicize how the RPP government had neglected İstanbul. In response to DP's and the Municipal Assembly's criticism, Prost pointed to, "lack of essential technical staff and legislation," in terms similar to those later used by Abrams.³⁶⁴

In response to mounting accusations against Prost and the eagerness of the Turkish professionals to seize control of İstanbul's planning and reconstruction, the Municipal Assembly overwhelmingly voted to discontinue Prost's contract.³⁶⁵ The Municipality immediately set up an interim commission called the Revision Commission (*Revizyon Komisyonu*). Its members included representatives from official institutions and universities: Kemal Ahmet Arû from İstanbul University; Cevat Erbel and Mithat Yenen from the Bank of Provinces (*İller Bankası*); Mukbil Gökdoğan from the Turkish Union of Engineers (*Türk Yüksek Mühendisleri Birliği*); Muhittin Güven from the Turkish Union of Architects (*Türk Mimarlar Birliği*); Mehmet Ali Handan from the Academy of Fine Arts; Behçet Ünsal from the Technical School. The Municipality of

³⁶⁴ See Gül, 135. Prost, in his defense, also chose to blame the previous governments, "Instead of retirees, I requested new personnel. They have sent 15 or 20 architects from Ankara who are active but do not know the streets of İstanbul yet... There has been talk about the reshaping of a city such as İstanbul. But there is a lack of essential legislation on this matter..." As quoted in Gül, 135-136.

³⁶⁵ The assembly disclosed and publicized that Prost had shown preferential treatment to a piece of land owned by İsmet İnönü, the leader of the previous RPP regime. Ironically, in a similar way DP had used İstanbul as a political tool, following the Coup of May 27, 1960, the pro-RPP reconstruction administration would come back to build a case to incriminate DP members based largely on DP's reconstruction of İstanbul.

İstanbul was also represented in the commission by architects Ertuğrul Menteşe and Faruk Akçer. Seyfi Arkan participated in the commission as an observer.³⁶⁶ The formation of this commission represented a radical shift in the way the Turkish government dealt with major projects. For the first time, they had put together a multi-disciplinary committee of Turkish professionals to approach a design issue instead of simply hiring a foreign expert.

The commission's report found that Prost's master plan was not based on analytical studies and recommended that new research and statistical studies of population growth, zoning, transportation, housing, public health, education and industrial sites as well as geological and meteorological data needed to be gathered in order to develop a new plan. The commission also found that Prost's plan had greatly ignored the city's topography and that revisions needed to be proposed based on a better understanding of both the challenges and the opportunities presented by the city's topography.³⁶⁷ At the same time, however, the commission recommended the continuation of ongoing work following Prost's proposals until a more adequate master plan could be prepared. Based on the recommendations of this report, a Permanent

³⁶⁶ Gül, 137. Most of these professionals were well-known and respected members of the Turkish professional community.

³⁶⁷ In a separate study conducted later, Aydın Germen also found that master plans from this period did not take into consideration specific data regarding topographic and geological information. See, Aydın Murat Germen, "Şehirciler ve Planlar" Üçüncü İskan ve Şehircilik Haftası Konferansları, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, Ankara, 1958, 22; as quoted in Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Kent Planlamasının...", 9.

Commission for İstanbul's Master Plan (*İstanbul Şehir İmar Planı Daimi Komisyonu*) was formed in 1952 by members of the former interim commission.³⁶⁸

The discourse and education of architects and planners were largely affected by the well-publicized debates surrounding İstanbul's postwar development.³⁶⁹ Courses in civil engineering and site planning had naturally been a part of the architecture curricula in the two schools of Architecture in İstanbul. According to available records, the first course in urban planning was provided at the Academy by Celal Esat Arseven beginning roughly around 1924.³⁷⁰ Arseven's lectures were based on his translations of Camillo Sitte's book.³⁷¹ By 1937, three schools in İstanbul; namely, the Academy, the Engineering School, and the Technical School (Yıldız) offered 2-3 hour courses in urbanism along with studios where students were able to apply concepts to studio projects. In addition, Ernst Reuter, Professor in the Department of Political Science at Ankara University, had begun to teach courses in urban planning.

From this point on, Ernst Egli, Bruno Taut, Wilhelm Schutte, Gustav Oelsner (who taught at both schools), Martin Wagner, Kemal Ahmet Arû, and even Prost all

³⁶⁸ This commission was also known as the Board of Advisors (*Müşavirler Heyeti*). Gül, 137.

³⁶⁹ Regarding the development of the discipline of planning, two sources especially stand out: İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Kent Planlamasının Tarihsel Kökleri [The Roots of Urban Planning in Turkey]," in *Türkiye'de İmar Planlaması [(Re)Construction Planning in Turkey]*, Tamer Gök, ed. (Ankara: ODTÜ Şehir ve Bölge Planlama Bölümü [METU Department of City and Regional Planning], 1980), see especially pages 93-112; and, Ruşen Keleş, ed., *Türkiye'de Kentbilim Eğitimi [Education of Urbanism in Turkey]* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, No: 561, 1987).

³⁷⁰ Tekeli, *Türkiye'de İmar Planlaması*, 93. Tekeli notes that it is possible to suggest that Arseven had begun these courses around the time when news and publications were beginning to emerge regarding the planning of İstanbul during the early Republican period.

³⁷¹ Arseven's lectures on urban planning were later compiled and published by the Ministry of Culture under the title, *Şehircilik [Urbanisme]* in 1937. Camillo Sitte, *Der Städtebau nach seinen künstlerischen Grundsätzen [City Planning According to Artistic Principles]* (Wien, K. Graeber, 1889).

contributed to the development of planning as a discipline and discourse through their courses and contributions to *Arkitekt*, the primary architectural and planning journal of the period.³⁷² Students at both schools began to increasingly become involved in projects of urban and regional development, learning data collection methodologies and applying them to design problems in studio courses.³⁷³

Another development was the establishment of the Institute of Research and Application in Housing and Urbanism (İskan ve Şehircilik Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi) at Ankara University in 1953. Under the leadership of Mehmet Emin Erişirgil, Head of the Department of Political Science, Ernst Reuter structured the Institute in order to develop research and courses in urbanism, public administration, and regional planning. After Reuter's departure early in the 1950s, Hamit Sadi Selen, Fehmi Yavuz, Ruşen Keleş, Cevat Geray, Can Hamamcı and Ayşegül Mengi served as the director of the Institute in successive year. Even though it was also founded by a German professor, through exchange programs with the School of Public Administration and Public Services at the New York University and through TODAIE's influence, its studies were increasingly modeled after those done in New York.³⁷⁴

³⁷² For a list of the numerous essays, see Tekeli, 93.

³⁷³ Examples and/or few sources on this? Orhan Alsaç, Kemal Ahmet Arû, Turgut Cansever, and Behruz Çinici, in their memoirs, provide various anecdotes of these early projects developed with German professors in urban and regional design and development. See the bibliography for sources on these architects.

³⁷⁴ Arif Payaslıoğlu, Necat Erder, Orhan Türkay, Ruşen Keleş and Cevat Geray can be counted among those who took part in these exchange programs. Each one of these scholars would be greatly influential in the development of Public Administration and Planning departments in both universities and State departments. The work done by Keleş and Michael Danielson (from New York University) would mark the future of Turkish urban studies for decades to come. As an example of a parallel study, see, Michael N. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş. *The Politics of Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modern*

During these developments in 1954, the Permanent Commission for İstanbul's master plan invited Patrick Abercrombie, a renowned English urban designer and the author of the Greater London Plan, in order to test their progress by inviting a foreign expert. Abercrombie stayed in İstanbul for ten days and submitted a report based on his observations of the Commission's work. In his report, he expressed the importance of the collection of specific data and accurate maps and found the Commission's work to be on the right path.³⁷⁵

Abrams became aware of these developments, but generally did not feel that these efforts were coordinated with the administration's work on country programming or at least that's how he wanted to frame the context to Weissmann. Consequently, in his letter he chose not to present the recent developments, but framed the discipline as a direct and somewhat lesser derivative of German garden city traditions of a previous generation.

State Apparatus and Country Planning

In this second paragraph, Abrams' aim was to show how the current condition of architectural and planning education in Turkey was not up to the task of molding the necessary transnational and multi-disciplinary country planning machinery. Next, he sought to show how the lack of well-trained architects and planners affected the

Turkey (New York; London: Holmes and Meier, 1984); and, Michael N. Danielson and Jameson W. Doig, *New York: The Politics of Urban Regional Development* (University of California Press, 1982).

³⁷⁵ Gül, 138.

functioning of the state apparatus and administration in multiple ways.³⁷⁶ Here, he sought to show that the need for architects and planners was felt most acutely in the construction of the state's physical planning and administrative machinery. He insisted that the capital was the place where training was most needed:

Ankara itself which hums with civil servants engaged in the nation's development has no technical university in either engineering or architecture so that the city in which policy is made for the whole country and which is the seat of almost all technical work and equipment is an intellectual desert as far as architectural and planning talent is concerned. The country with a people who solved the problem of the true pendentive centuries ago and contributed originality in art and structure to a dark world is now architecturally speaking in the darkest ages itself and shows little hope of emerging unless the base of a revolution in design and structure is indigenously developed under a long-range scheme... Turkey cries for a Renaissance in architecture but it cannot come because the seedling has never been planted. The seedling now brings me to the canary.³⁷⁷

As the Dimock report had suggested through its description of country planning and as Abrams himself had argued in his writings, in line with contemporary development theory, the construction of a well-organized state apparatus was the most effective development machinery especially in developing countries.³⁷⁸ Abrams believed that architects and planners should play a central role in Turkey's process of administrative reform.

³⁷⁶ Abrams articulated these points more extensively in the report he later prepared for the UN. The report is discussed under chapter four.

³⁷⁷ Letter to Weissmann, Here, Abrams points out the absence of engineering along with architecture, while maintaining a focus on the absence of architectural and planning education in the capital city. Diker's and Sturen's influence on the idea surfaces here briefly as Abrams includes engineering in his discussion perhaps in order to provide a ground for the inclusion of the engineering fields in the project in a future discussion.

³⁷⁸ See the discussion of the Dimock Report in chapter two.

Consequently, in this paragraph, Abrams once again turned to Ankara and to the importance of establishing a well-structured state apparatus for social and economic development before making his specific proposal to Weissmann. His later report would articulate in detail the multiple ways in which a lack of architects and planners affected the country's social and economic development. His use of the word revolution is significant here, since what he was about to propose was no less than the wholesale restructuring of the architectural and planning professions in Turkey. Instead of amending one of the existing programs, such as the Institute of Housing and Planning emerging along with TODAIE at Ankara University, Abrams proposed the establishment of a totally new and multi-disciplinary program organized under the leadership of architects and planners.³⁷⁹

School of Architecture and Community Planning

He began his fourth paragraph by finally telling Weissman what he had in mind. He backed his proposal by immediately pointing out that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, whom he distinguished as “one of the most influential men in Turkey,” had already given the idea his support:

Two days ago, after realizing this, I made up my mind that Ankara must have a school of architecture and city planning. One of the most influential men in Turkey is Fatin Zorlu, Assistant Prime Minister. I managed to get an appointment with him, though he is the most difficult man to see. He was sold on the idea and after our conference asked me to incorporate it into a memorandum. He telephoned the Minister of Education and told him of our conference and his

³⁷⁹ As will be discussed in chapter five, soon after the establishment of the School of Architecture and Community Planning in 1956, departments in engineering and public administration were also established based on the conception of the project as a University by the Turkish Officials. The school's name was changed from High Institute of Technology to Middle East Technical University. Many recent graduates of TODAIE took teaching positions at METU's Department of Public Administration.

decision. I believe that if this project can be put through, my mission will not have been futile and Turkey can get started on its way of proper national physical development. The Minister wants the impetus to be given by an American university and I intend to write to Holmes Perkins asking him to accept the initiative. I must move hastily because I shall be here only until the 24th and the mere matter of communication, typing, translating and mechanics is a chore.³⁸⁰

In this paragraph, Abrams' intentions of directly linking architects and planners to the UN's mission of country programming becomes clear. While the argument he carefully presented in the previous paragraphs was geared to appeal to Weissmann's interest, by immediately following his proposal with the news of approvals from two top state officials in Turkey, Abrams was essentially presenting a project to Weissmann that he would not only be personally interested in, but also one he could not refuse. At a time when UN officials waited months to see even a lower ranking official in Turkey, Abrams had not only been able to meet directly with one of the top officials, but he had also secured his approval. Furthermore, Abrams had achieved this near impossible feat without compromising the UN's interests.

In his letter to Weissmann, Abrams chose not to mention Diker's central role in the project. Even though Abrams was well aware of the fact that he would not have been able to see Zorlu without Diker's influence, from the UN's point of view, he may have considered Diker's involvement in the project as a non-official to be a liability to the project at this critical juncture.³⁸¹ Abrams would point out Diker's importance to the project only in non-official correspondence. He, for example, mentioned Diker in his

³⁸⁰ Abrams, Letter to Weismann, 2.

³⁸¹ UN and its agencies dealt strictly with other governmental agencies and private parties could not enter negotiations with the UN directly without a governmental agency.

letter to Holmes Perkins, Dean of the School of Architecture and City Planning at the University of Pennsylvania.³⁸²

Abrams also told Weissmann about his meeting with the American Ambassador, Avra Warren, who apparently required much more convincing than Zorlu had:

This morning I telephoned the American Ambassador, Mr. Avra Warren and he asked two FAO [sic] officials to attend the meeting. Mr. Sturen of UN was with me. After an hour's talk which began with his initial resistance to the idea, the Ambassador embraced it almost completely. He suggested that Wallace Harrison would be a good man for the mission and said that he would give him every support. He also instructed the FAO [sic] men to help communicate with the regional Ford Foundation representative. He thought it would be a fine thing "in this area for UN to trigger the operation."³⁸³

It is hard to know exactly why Avra Warren would have resisted the idea at the beginning. As mentioned before, 1954 was the year US was least likely to support any projects initiated by a sub-agency of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC). Furthermore, the US would not have favored any programs that supported or contributed to the idea of country programming. It would have been interesting to know how Abrams presented the idea to Warren, since the argument he presented to Weissmann would not have worked as well on Warren. The American Ambassador would not have been as interested in the connection between architectural education and the implementation of country planning strategies. It is possible that Abrams may have focused on the aspects of the project that dealt more closely with issues of economic development, similar to the way the SOM report had approached the subject of housing and planning. This hypothesis is plausible since it would be consistent

³⁸² Abrams' letter to Perkins will be discussed shortly below as a foil to his letter to Weissmann.

³⁸³ Abrams, Letter to Weissmann, 2. Abrams was actually referring to FOA, or Foreign Operations Administration, and not FAO.

with the Ambassador's response to bring a well-known American architect, such as Wallace Harrison (1895-1981), into the project.³⁸⁴

At the same time, one still senses a certain degree of hesitancy in the Ambassador's final suggestion that the UN spearheaded the project. Two conclusions can be drawn from this cautionary remark. First, keeping in mind the competitive relationship among nations in the Middle East, Warren may not have wanted to openly publicize US support of a UN project in Turkey at that particular point in time. Second, he may have wanted to see how the project would actually pan out. If it proved to be a success, then the US could join in and provide support, but there was no point in putting the US, or himself for that matter, at risk at this early point. After all, Warren had recently arrived in Turkey following the breakdown of relations between the DP administration and his predecessors. However, as we have seen, US attitudes weighed heavily on the minds and opinions of Turkish officials and any hesitancy or suspicion on the part of US officials could influence Turkish attitudes as well. Consequently, continued US support for the project was essential.

Abrams also wanted to make sure that Holmes Perkins would be given the primary responsibility of the next mission. In the letter, he expressed his position on Harrison and noted that Harrison would make an excellent Chairman of the Turkish-American Committee; however, since an American University must accept the ultimate responsibility, it would be good to position "Holmes Perkins and another U of P man

³⁸⁴ Abrams' other correspondence indicates that, from the very beginning, he felt very strongly about Holmes Perkins' involvement in the project. He did not share the enthusiasm that the Ambassador had for Wallace Harrison's involvement except for the possibility that Harrison's involvement could make it easier to solicit US grants to the project.

(such as Martin Meyerson or Bill [William] Wheaton who teaches City Planning at U of P) to accompany him.”³⁸⁵ Abrams also stressed that Warren suggested Easter as a good time for the arrival of this next team of UN experts who would focus on the establishment of the school.

Here it once again becomes clear that planning was of central concern for Abrams, and he wanted to offer Perkins the opportunity of a clear slate to establish an architecture school based on the model he had proposed for the University of Pennsylvania. Even though Perkins had been trying to transform the curriculum at Penn from a Beaux Arts model to resemble the new program at GSD since his arrival there as the Dean of the School of Fine Arts in 1950, the school had not fully embraced a multi-disciplinary curriculum. Disciplinary boundaries between architecture, planning, landscape architecture, and art, prevented collaboration across these divisions as well as with other branches of social sciences and technical fields.

Abrams ended the letter by emphasizing the importance of the project for UN-TAA’s prestige in Turkey, “I am convinced, as is Ambassador Warren, that if this project goes through, it will be of immense importance to UN’s prestige here. Will you and Nasr get together on this and call in any others who might expedite it.”³⁸⁶ Also, in a post-script, Abrams added,

Since writing the above, Sturen and I saw Fatin Zorlu again and had another conference with the Minister of Education tonight. The 1955 Turkish budget will be amended to include a preliminary appropriation for the Turkish Committee, and the Government will ask top priority for a grant from UN for the experts.

³⁸⁵ Abrams, “Letter to Weissmann”, 2.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

They all want “American speed” to put the project through and I would like to have the experts here much sooner than April – January if possible.³⁸⁷

With this post-script, one is reminded again how different the second half of Abrams’ letter was from the first half. In the first half, Abrams introduced the situation as if he were asking Weissmann’s opinion regarding his proposal. In the second half, beginning with the meeting with Zorlu, the letter took a different turn. Abrams began to use the Turkish approval of the idea as a way to support his proposal and to push Weissmann into action. He then added the US approval into the mix for a slam-dunk. After that point, Abrams began to assume UN approval of the project as he began to discuss the next phase of the project. However, one has to take a minute to question: Was the Turkish and the US support really so strong? Or, is it possible that Abrams was exaggerating Turkish and/or US support in order to pressure the UN—after all Turkey was interested in a University? Could it be that each party’s decision or position regarding the project was in fact reliant upon what the others might do? In this scenario, how Abrams presented the opinion of each party, even more so than the specific reasons he presented for the establishment of the schools, may have made the biggest impact toward the realization of the project. Abrams’ post-script suggests that it was the Turkish officials who sought to speed up the project, however Abrams’ and Sturen’s correspondence with Turkish officials suggest that the Turkish side was being coached to some extent by Abrams’, Sturen’s, and Diker’s bureaucratic experience and shared enthusiasm for the project.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

3.2 Letters to Holmes Perkins and other UN and Turkish Officials

Even before sending the letter to Weissmann, on October 1, 1954, both Abrams and Sturen went to work writing to the Turkish officials letting them know how the project should proceed. The day before writing to Weissmann (on October 1, 1954), Abrams drafted a Memorandum documenting the tenets of his meeting with Vecdi Diker and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. Following his letter to Weissmann, on October 5, 1954, he sent the Memorandum to Zorlu along with a letter (dated: October 5, 1954) where he itemized what he thought to be key issues for the successful continuation of the project. Securing a high degree of autonomy for the School emerged as paramount for Abrams as he discussed the aims and make-up of the Turkish committee as well as the sources for the School's funding.³⁸⁸ The US position and funding of the project emerged as the second most important topic in Abrams' letter. In addition, Abrams took the opportunity to thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his support of the project and sought to reassure him that the project was on the right track.

Abrams' concerns reflected his experiences and observations at the Ministry during the first few days of his arrival in Ankara. Consequently, for Abrams, issues of

³⁸⁸ Abrams sent copies of this Memorandum to the UN office in New York and to Holmes Perkins, Dean of the School of Architecture and Planning. He titled the document as, "MEMORANDUM on the Establishment of a School of Architecture and Community Planning in Ankara, Turkey." Abrams also included this Memorandum as Appendix D in a bound volume he later compiled under the title, "U.N. Report on a University in Turkey: The Need for Training and Education for Housing and Planning." The only surviving copy of this volume is available in the Avery Library at Columbia University. The draft budget was included as Appendix E of the bound volume. Abrams and Sturen left a copy of this Memo with Avra Warren, US Ambassador to Turkey, following their meeting with him.

language, communication, and professional background became central to the make-up of the Turkish committee:

It would be desirable that the membership, as far as possible, be Turkish citizens who speak English, who have studied in America or are familiar with its educational techniques. I mention this because it will help both to overcome the difficulties of communication [sic] between the American and the Turkish groups as well as minimize the conflicts of opinion on curricule [sic], techniques and requirements of study. If an American University is to help set up the institution, there should, as far as practicable, be a common understanding, sympathy and viewpoint on approaches. This, of course, is not intended to preclude the essential guidance the Americans require from the Turkish members toward an understanding of the needs of Turkish students and their educational qualifications and requirements for practice in the Turkish scene.³⁸⁹

By including only those professionals and bureaucrats who had been exposed to recent methodologies in the US, Abrams hoped to keep out, as much as possible, the bureaucratic class that had been educated under German and Austrian masters. Second, Abrams discussed briefly his and Sturen's meeting with the US Ambassador and FOA officials and told Zorlu that the Ambassador generally responded positively to the project. At the same time, in a letter Abrams wrote as a cover to the memorandum, he explained the Ambassador's position regarding the funding of the school:

He [the Ambassador] felt that while it [the school] should have the active support of the Turkish Government, its primary support should come from private individuals in Turkey. Any support it might obtain from an American foundation should be contributory, not exclusive, and for a fixed period so that, thereafter, the school's support will come entirely from Turkish sources. He suggested Turkish bankers as possible contributors.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁹ Abrams, "Appendix D: Memorandum..." 2.

³⁹⁰ Abrams did not include this cover letter in the bound volume. In fact, there is an appendix C missing from the bound volume that Abrams had prepared. This letter may have been the original appendix C. Abrams may have later decided to not include the letter in the volume he compiled. Charles Abrams to Fatih Rüstü Zorlu, October 5, 1954 (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University, Reel 51), 2.

Abrams defended the Ambassador's position by explaining that he felt the school needed to maintain a degree of autonomy from the Government if it was to function as a truly reformative force. Abrams tied this issue to his position regarding how the school of architecture and planning should be established as a distinct and separate unit. Abrams must have made this point in response to Diker's and Zorlu's requests to found the school as a technical university which would include departments in Engineering. In the following passage, Abrams also equated the Ambassador's suggestion to solicit funding from private Turkish sources to mean that some of the outstanding Turkish entrepreneurs would be part of the Turkish committee. Abrams wrote,

I agree with Mr. Warren's emphasis upon an independent committee particularly since one of the main purposes of the school will be to influence the improvement of current techniques in design rather than be influence [sic] and subordinated to the very techniques it seeks to rectify. Its teaching of architecture as a discipline independent of engineering is crucial. The location of the school in that national capital underscores the need for a committee sympathetic with this view.³⁹¹

Abrams did not further explain why it was important for the School of Architecture to be independent of Engineering.

The rest of the letter comprised explanations and assurances. Abrams informed Zorlu that the Ambassador had recommended Wallace Harrison's involvement in the project perhaps as the head of the next group of UN experts who would be involved in the establishment of the school. Abrams introduced Harrison as, "an eminent American architect," who is "known to the United Nations having designed its buildings in New York," and continued, "with your permission I will suggest that United Nations communicate with him." Abrams also noted that if the University of Pennsylvania did not

³⁹¹ Ibid.

accept the assignment, “encompassed by the memorandum, I suggest that the interests of the following institutions be solicited in the order following, i.e., the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University and the University of California.” He added, “These, in my opinion, represent the outstanding American universities in the architectural and city planning fields.” He assured Zorlu that he was familiar with all three of these programs and knew their deans personally and that “he would be happy to communicate with them in the event Dean Holmes Perkins’ reaction is unfavorable.”³⁹²

Abrams also noted that he would have to travel to another mission in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) on October 24th. However, he told Zorlu, as he had Weissmann, that he would like to “see a definite invitation dispatched by the United Nations to a mission which will include a group from the University of Pennsylvania and to accelerate the appointment of the committee as planned here and in America.” He urged Zorlu by saying, “this requires your Government to request such a mission from the United Nations.” He also noted, “The United Nations Resident Representative can continue to help after I have left Turkey,” and made sure to leave both his and Weissmann’s contact information in Ghana, in New York, and at the United Nations Headquarters.

In the last paragraph of the letter, Abrams thanked Zorlu, as well as Vecdi Diker and Celal Uzer, neither of whom he had mentioned to Weissmann. As he closed, he interestingly chose to emphasize the architectural aims of the project only perhaps as a way to maintain it as the primary focus during Zorlu’s correspondence with other officials and agencies:

³⁹² Ibid., 3.

It has been a particular honor to work with you toward the great purpose to which you have lent your aid. I cannot help but feel that the leadership you have given to this dramatic undertaking will set your country on its way toward recapturing the architectural genius of the past which still shows its monuments to the world in splendid [sic] eloquence, that will help revitalize it toward a progressive future and help inspire the renaissance of a new architectural tradition worthy of the Turkish nation and its people.³⁹³

Abrams also noted that he would send copies of the attached Memorandum to both the United Nations Headquarters in New York and to Holmes Perkins, Dean of the School of Architecture and City Planning of the University of Pennsylvania.

In the Memorandum, Abrams first listed the reasons discussed for, “The need for such an Institution.” In this portion, he carefully defined the role foreign experts would play in the establishment of the institution in accordance with the law of 1954. Also, in this section, Abrams pointed out something that he left out of the letter to Weissmann. Perhaps in accordance with Diker’s wishes, Zorlu and Abrams had discussed that after the school of architecture and planning was established and under operation, the school could be expanded to include engineering departments. The tenets in this section included:

1. There was a shortage of architects and planners (city, village, and regional) qualified to help in developing the country as it should be developed.
2. With the country in the process of rapid growth, building was proceeding at a rapid pace and physical patterns are being created which will have a lasting influence and effect upon the future patterns of the country, its cities, villages, and regions.
3. The proper development of the country cannot be assured through the aid of foreign experts alone, but assistance from such experts is needed to advise on the creation of the institution, to staff it with competent teachers during the early

³⁹³ Ibid., 4.

years and to train Turkish architects and planners in both teaching and in the practice of the professions over the long term.

4. Though there were more trained engineers than architects in the country, there was a shortage of engineers as well, and after the school of architecture and community planning was organized and in operation, it would be desirable that the scope of the school be expanded so as to embrace the engineering professions. It was recognized, however, that the teaching of architecture should be directed toward a specialized profession, not coupled with engineering as a unit either in training or in the conferment of degrees; the same principle should apply to the engineering profession.

5. The need and desirability for such an institution in Ankara is emphasized by the fact that Ankara has no such institution, either within its boundaries or within the immediate region; that architectural, engineering, and planning policies vitally affecting Turkish development are being made in Ankara; that there are many students as well as civil servants who can benefit from study or association with experts and teachers from abroad, and who will apply for entry; that their training and association with a university and with such experts will have an important impact on improving the quality of design and on the physical development of national improvements as well as on the quality of private improvements.³⁹⁴

Abrams also listed the following points that were discussed in detail regarding the fulfillment of the project:

6. Quarters for the establishment of the institution can be made available by the Government during its initial stages at one of the schools in Ankara or at some other suitable place to be selected. During the first stages this should present no difficulty.

7. The proposal can best be served by securing the aid of an established university abroad which can assume the primary task of advising on the budgeting of the program, programming the courses, aiding in the staffing of the professional and administrative personnel, prescribing the requirements for entry, and for conferment of degrees. It was suggested that the University of Pennsylvania through its school of Architecture and City Planning be requested to advise on these phases of the program.

8. The further aid of the United Nations toward helping to implement the program will be solicited where its help is available, i.e. the granting of scholarships and

³⁹⁴ Abrams, "Appendix D: Memorandum...", 2.

fellowships and the aid of experts to cooperate with Turkish Government and with others concerned in the undertaking.

9. A committee is to be designated by the Turkish Government which will be responsible for furthering the proposal, study its financing requirements, confer with groups or persons concerned with the proposal's development, and make recommendations looking toward its fulfillment. As soon as possible the committee will be broadened to include foreign experts, particularly from the United States, who can cooperate with and establish desirable liaisons with foundations, the University of Pennsylvania, the United Nations, or other groups whose technical or financial aid may be necessary. Steps will be taken to have such a committee designated and have it confer with the Minister of Education, the Minister of Public Works or others who might be concerned with the program.

10. At the appropriate time the Government will announce the appointment of the committee, the purpose of its formation, and the preliminary plans being taken toward initializing the undertaking.³⁹⁵

On the same day that Abrams was writing to Perkins, Sturen drafted four separate letters to: Celal Yardımcı, Turkish Minister of Education; Taghi Nasr, Chief of the Office for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East at UN-TAA; Robert W. Culbertson, Deputy Near East Representative of the Ford Foundation in Beirut; and, Julia Henderson, Director of the Division of Social Welfare of the United Nations.³⁹⁶ In his letter to Yardımcı, similar to the way Abrams had advised Zorlu regarding the future of the project, Sturen advised Yardımcı, in a more detailed manner.³⁹⁷ First, Sturen expressed to the Minister that the project had received approval at the top level in order to make ensure the Minister's immediate cooperation,

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Sturen's letters to Yardımcı and to Nasr were included as appendices F and G respectively in the bound volume that contains the Abrams report in the Avery Library at Columbia University. Sturen's letters can also be found in Abrams' papers. See, Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, Rl. 51.

³⁹⁷ Sturen to Yardımcı, 6 October 1954.

Mr. Abrams and I are very pleased with the way our recommendation has been taken care of by you and the Deputy Prime Minister. We feel that the establishment of a school of architecture and city planning can really contribute to the development of Turkey and that your very keen interest in the project will guarantee a good solution.³⁹⁸

Sturen then spelled out the manner in which the Minister should proceed in order to ensure that the project advanced in a timely manner.³⁹⁹ As was described in the Dimock report and based on the agreement between Turkey and the UN, Sturen advised that the Minister should take the following steps as soon as possible,

The Ministry of Education shall request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to submit a formal request for technical assistance to the United Nations through the Permanent Turkish Delegation to the United Nations in New York. The request shall be for a team of three American experts to come to Turkey for a two-months' mission in the beginning of 1955. The objective of the mission shall be to discuss with a Turkish counterpart the curriculum, organization, financing, etc., for the intended school.⁴⁰⁰

Sturen also reminded Yardımcı to proceed with a letter of request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sturen wrote,

In your letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is desirable if you include that this new request for technical assistance from the United Nations has to be given the highest priority and that, if necessary, some other project included in the 1955 technical assistance program for Turkey should be omitted.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁸ Ibid., 1.

³⁹⁹ In a post-script Abrams added to the end of his letter to Weissmann, he told Weissmann, "Since writing the above, Sturen and I saw Fatin Zorlu again and had another conference with the Minister of Education tonight. The 1955 Turkish budget will be amended to include a preliminary appropriation for the Turkish Committee, and the Government will ask top priority for a grant from UN for the experts. They all want, "American speed" to put the project through and I would like to have the experts here much sooner than April – January if possible." Abrams to Weissmann, October 2, 1954, 3.

⁴⁰⁰ Sturen to Yardımcı, 6 October 1954, 1.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., 1.

Here, one finds that it was Sturen who recommended to the Minister to note, “this new request... has to be given top priority, and ..., if necessary, some other project included in the 1955 technical assistance program for Turkey should be omitted.” As discussed above, Abrams had, in the post-script of his letter to Weissmann, noted that the Turkish Government was planning to ask top priority for a grant from UN for the experts. Instead, we find that it was Sturen who was advising the Turkish Government to designate the project as top-priority.

While both Abrams and Sturen were doing their best to bring financial support to the project from UN and US agencies, it is nevertheless interesting how Abrams and Sturen, on the one hand, and perhaps Diker, on the other, used their bureaucratic know-how in order to give the project a chance. In the next paragraph of his letter, Sturen did not shy away from specifying the names of the Turkish committee members that the Minister was to form. This committee would go on to form the basis of the Board of Visitors of the school once the project came closer to fruition:

As Turkish counterpart for the team of experts to be provided by the United Nations, a committee should be appointed with preferably five members. Based on the discussion in your office yesterday, I was taking the liberty of suggesting the committee to have the following members: Your Excellency as chairman of the committee, one representative from the Ministry of Public Works (perhaps the Under-Secretary, Mr. Daniş Koper), one representative of the High Educational Board, and two non-governmental representatives (Mr. Vecdi Diker and one contractor). Until the arrival of the UN team, our Resident Representative here in Turkey will act as liaison officer between the committee and the United Nations.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰² Sturen to Yardımcı, 1-2.

Lastly, Sturen confirmed the date of a key meeting that was set up by the Minister to be held at 11:00 o'clock, on Wednesday, October 20th in the Minister's office. Sturen pointed out that, at that meeting, UN-TAA would be represented by Charles Weitz, the new full-time resident representative, Charles Abrams, and Sturen, himself. Sturen also informed the Minister that Miss Julia Henderson, Director of the United Nations Division of Social Welfare, would be in Ankara on that day and asked if the Minister would mind Miss Henderson's attending the meeting.

Sturen also wrote to Taghi Nasr, Chief of the Office for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East at UN-TAA, four days after Abrams wrote his letter to Weissmann, Sturen provided a positive interpretation to the Ambassador's remark suggesting that the UN should trigger the project. It is possible that Sturen sought to clarify for the UN the particular statement that Abrams had chosen to quote in his letter to Weissmann from their meeting with the Ambassador. Sturen wrote,

He (Avra Warren) indicated that the American support for the undertaking might be possible to get from an American university with the help of the Ford Foundation or some similar institution. He emphasized, however, very strongly, the importance of giving the credit of the operation to the United Nations and I certainly agree with him in that respect as we need more credit and better understanding for our technical assistance programme in Turkey. The Ambassador proposed the United Nations to send a mission to Turkey including representatives from the University of Pennsylvania (or any other suitable university in the event the University of Pennsylvania is not interested). He suggested that the Chairman of the committee be an American and that foundation solicitation from the United States could best be secured on a temporary basis for about 5 years as was done in another Ford project and that while Government sponsorship of the School is essential, the operation of the school as well as financing should not be completely dependent upon government but should be sought also from private Turkish sources such as the banks.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰³ Sturen to Nasr, (Appendix G in Abrams' bound volume), 6 October 1954, 2.

Sturen discussed, in detail, subsequent meetings held separately with Zorlu and Yardımcı regarding the details of the project and assured Nasr of Turkish interest and support. At the same time, both Sturen and Abrams recognized the importance of US support for this project and in order not to preclude the possibility of US aid, there were certain things that they needed to communicate with the UN Headquarters. In his letter, Sturen recognized that the establishment of a school may seem too large of a commitment and tried to address any concerns that Nasr might have in that regard. He noted,

In the case, as I believe, UN cannot undertake the running of such a large programme in Turkey (we already have the Public Administration as you know), the best approach seems to me is to get an American University interested in the project and to ask for American financial support from Ford foundation or some other American institution. *The UN mission should therefore preferably consist of Americans.*⁴⁰⁴

Sturen candidly expressed that he was not sure if the suggested UN mission could be financed under the regular technical assistance programme or through available funds of the United Nations, but he concluded these remarks by saying that this project certainly must be given the highest priority. He also tried to make the project more feasible by limiting the scope of UN's financial commitment to the salaries of three experts for two months and to later on support the school by granting scholarships and fellowships for the training of Turkish staff and students through study grants. He estimated the cost of the three-person team to be between \$8,000 to \$10,000 and added, "If necessary, therefore,

⁴⁰⁴ My emphasis. To my knowledge, this is the only place where the specific importance of soliciting an American University and staff to take on the job becomes clarified. As Sturen suggests here, the involvement of American nationals was important if US funds were to be solicited for the project. Sturen's letter to the Ford Foundation, which is discussed below, also hints at this issue. In that letter, Sturen begins by introducing Abrams as a US national. Ibid.

some of the projects already included in the proposals for 1955 programme for Turkey should be omitted to secure funds for this project.” In addition, Sturen tried to address another potential problem that might arise from UN’s perspective. Educational matters fell under UNESCO’s and not UN-TAA’s area of expertise. Consequently, he wrote,

As Mr. Abrams is a UN-TAA expert, I believe that at least the proposed mission should be a UN-TAA undertaking. The fellowships and scholarships in the future, however, should perhaps be granted by the UNESCO. I would appreciate your opinion in this respect.⁴⁰⁵

Sturen then reiterated the importance of this project to UN-TAA with enthusiasm,

The reason why this project to me seems so important is that as far as I understand, it is the first time since we started our technical assistance programme in Turkey that our recommendations have been so rapidly accepted and not only that but have been discussed, considered and accepted on the absolutely highest governmental level. I am certain you agree with me that if we achieve success in this project it will reflect on the future of the whole UN technical assistance here in Turkey.

From the correspondence about the Economic Research teams, you are aware of the fact that it is difficult even to arrange for a meeting with Mr. Zorlu and the mere fact that we have succeeded in getting two meeting with him and that we have enrolled his enthusiasm justifies the big importance I personally attach to this new project.⁴⁰⁶

Years later, Abrams also commented on the failure of the celebrated project by the Economic Research team. Just at the time when Turkey’s country programming project was getting underway and the UN-TAA was about to get its first full-time resident

⁴⁰⁵ This was a sensitive matter in terms of the territorial relationship among UN agencies. In this instance, Sturen did not mention anything regarding Turkish perceptions of UNESCO. Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid. Abrams also noted, “In 1954, he (a UN-expert) would rarely get to see anyone with the rank of a cabinet minister and was more often assigned to a minor functionary who would spend an occasional hour with him lamenting the predicaments of officialdom. A U.N. economics mission with three prominent experts, after struggling to make an impact on the government, had packed its belongings and left in despair.” See, Abrams, *Men’s Struggle ...*, 202.

representative in Turkey, the successful implementation of such a project was perhaps a bigger triumph for Sturen than Abrams, as he had been in Turkey for some time and struggling to make certain things happen.

Next, Sturen wrote to Robert W. Culbertson, the Deputy Near East Representative of the Ford Foundation in Beirut, in order to invite him to Ankara during Abrams' presence and to solicit support for the project. He enclosed a copy of Abrams' Memorandum to Zorlu and a copy of his own letter to Yardımcı, the Turkish Minister of Education, along with the letter. Sturen began by introducing Abrams as a U.S. national who had, "just spent six weeks in Turkey on a United Nations assignment, investigating the possibilities of assisting the Turkish Government in the development of housing and city planning."⁴⁰⁷ He then introduced Abrams' recommendation to establish a school of architecture and community planning adding that the Turkish officials became, "immediately very much enthusiastic about this suggested school..., and they have already accepted the project in principle."⁴⁰⁸ He then told Culbertson, "Mr. Avra Warren, ..., suggested that I write to you as there might be possibilities that the Ford Foundation be interested in supporting the proposed school. I would appreciate it very much if you would let me know whether you would be able to come to Ankara some time this month to discuss this project." He closed by apologizing for the short notice and with the hope that Culbertson would be able to meet Abrams before his departure to the Ghana.

⁴⁰⁷ Sturen to Robert W. Culbertson, Ford Foundation, Deputy Near East Representative, Beirut, Lebanon, 6 October 1954, (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University, Reel 51), 1.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

Sturen then wrote a relatively short note to Julia Henderson regarding the project and copied her with his letters to Nasr and Yardımcı as well as with Abrams' Memorandum. He also informed her that Abrams had written a personal note to Ernest Weissmann, "from whom you will get any further information which you may need." He expressed her hopes that she would be able to attend the meeting on October 20th during her visit in Ankara.

In their correspondence, Abrams, Sturen, and Warren all pointed out that the success of this project was central to UN-TAA's continued operation in Turkey, putting the UN officials in New York in a bind. In order to build this pressure, they solicited support from both Turkish and US agents and presented it to the UN as if both parties supported the project even though the respective support of each agent was somewhat contingent upon the participation of the other. It was exactly the kind of pressure experts could hope to build on their agencies if they sought to implement a project that had not necessarily originated from the UN.

Based on Sturen's recommendations, the Turkish Government prepared a request for technical assistance toward the implementation of the establishment of a School of Architecture and Community Planning as recommended by Charles Abrams, the United Nations housing expert who visited Turkey.⁴⁰⁹ Interestingly, the document defined the project and the nature of the mission considerably differently than the way Abrams and Sturen had described it to their counterparts at the UN,

⁴⁰⁹ Abrams kept a draft of this letter from the Turkish Government to the UN. No dates or signatures were given. The document must have been prepared either by Minister of Education's or the Foreign Minister's office. Draft letter from the Turkish Government to the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University, Reel 51).

The technical assistance shall be in form of at least three experts who will come to Turkey for a period of not more than three months as soon in 1955 as can be arranged. The objective of the mission shall be to discuss with representatives of the Turkish Government the Organization, policy curriculum and other details of the proposed school. While initially it is intended that the school concentrate upon the teaching of architecture and community planning, the Government of Turkey looks forward, in the future and as experience and opportunity afford, to a [sic] expansion of the project to embrace engineering and such other technical disciplines as may be found feasible.⁴¹⁰

As recommended by Sturen, the document then informed the UN that as counterpart to the team of experts to be provided by the United Nations, a committee would be appointed by the Turkish authorities. The document listed the committee members as they were suggested by Sturen. It also reiterated the UN's and the Turkish Governments respective responsibilities:

The Government of Turkey notes that the aim of the mission will be to secure the cooperation of an established university in the United States to employ its experience toward guiding the project in its initial years and accepts with gratitude the news that the University of Pennsylvania has agreed in principle with the aim of the project and has expressed its willingness to cooperate with the counterpart committee.

The Government of Turkey agrees to make available to the forthcoming mission such clerical, translation, and other assistance as shall be necessary and will pay the necessary subsistence for the experts in accordance with appropriate resolution of the Economic and Social Council. The Government of Turkey will make available, for the project, such space as may be required for teaching, administration, cloakrooms, library, and other essential facilities. These matters are to be the subject of an agreement between the Government of Turkey and the United Nations.⁴¹¹

In accordance with Sturen's recommendations, the document then expressed that the Turkish Government was anxious to see the project commence as soon as possible and

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., 1.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

asked that this request for technical assistance should receive high priority among UNTAA projects for 1955.

After receiving this request from the Turkish Government and based on the information provided in Abrams' Memorandum and in both Abrams' and Sturen's correspondence, the UN-TAA Headquarters in New York put together a fact-sheet entitled, "Notes on the Proposed Establishment of a School of Architecture and Community Planning in Turkey," in towards the preparation of the next mission to establish the School in Turkey.⁴¹² The document defined the objective of the next UN mission as well as the scope of the school very much along the lines described by the experts and in exactly the same words as they were described in the document prepared by the Turkish Government. Consequently, the UN found the project agreeable and resolved to support it to the extent described in these documents as long as all involved parties would also hold their commitments. In addition, the UN document recognized, without additional comment, Turkey's interest in the expansion of the school into a university embracing engineering and other technical disciplines. The document then spelled out the responsibilities of each party. It acknowledged the Turkish Government's commitment to provide all necessary, financial and otherwise, equipment for the project as well as their request that this project receive high priority among UN-TAA projects for 1955. The document then listed in a five-step process how the project would proceed on both the Turkish and UN sides.⁴¹³ In addition, the document recommended that in order

⁴¹² "Notes on the Proposed Establishment of a School of Architecture and Community Planning in Turkey," (File SOA 173/57/018) (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University, Reel 51).

⁴¹³ Ibid., 2.

to assist the national committee in this phase of development, one member of the UN mission remain in Turkey until the opening of the school.

Based on Abrams' and Sturen's rough estimates and the Turkish Government's pledge, the document acknowledged,

The initiators' (meaning the Turkish Government) expect to secure the \$87,000 in foreign currency recurring on a 12 month basis required for the school (in addition to the TL 519,000 in national currency) from sources other than UN, namely from the Ford Foundation or the US-FOA (United States-Foreign Operations Administration). The United Nations or UNESCO would be asked to assist in providing teaching staff only if the efforts to secure assistance from the above two sources failed.⁴¹⁴

In summary, the document established the UN contribution to the project as follows:

a) a team composed of at least 3 experts, one them to be concerned with higher policy rather than with other details, and the two others concerned with such matter as detailed organization of space, library, enrollment procedures, personnel policy, curriculum, etc. One member of the team should be also competent to explore the possibility of the future expansion of the school to include engineering. The mission would stay 2 to 3 months in Turkey with the exception of one member who should be prepared to remain at least until the opening of the school; b) three to five fellowships and scholarships every year for observation abroad of the teaching staff and for specialization of students of the Ankara school who will become members of the faculty.⁴¹⁵

The document also expressed that the Turkish government had already announced the project in the press and expressed that they were anxious "that the project commence as soon as possible." The UN was therefore very receptive to the project describing its every component in detail and assuring its incorporation to the project.

Letter to Perkins

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

While Abrams and Sturen were both writing to UN and Turkish officials, Abrams also sent a preliminary letter to Holmes Perkins, Dean of the School of Architecture and City Planning at the University of Pennsylvania, on October 6th, even before he had heard back from the UN.⁴¹⁶ Abrams' aim was to notify Perkins as early as possible regarding the burgeoning project and to have the chance to provide his own description of the project to Perkins as a way to solicit his interest as well.

During the initial talks among Charles Abrams, Olle Sturen, the acting interim Resident Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, and Avra Warren, the US Ambassador to Turkey, Warren had proposed that, in terms of obtaining US financial aid for the establishment of a School of Architecture and Community Planning in Turkey, it might be helpful if a prominent American Architect, such as Wallace Harrison, were involved. Even though Abrams had supported the Ambassador's suggestion for those very same reasons and had asked Ernest Weissmann to look into the possibility of soliciting Harrison's involvement and support, he had also maintained that the involvement of Holmes Perkins and the University of Pennsylvania was central to the long-term success of this particular project. Aside from the fact that the Turkish officials had requested the involvement of an American University in order to provide assistance with the eventual expansion of the School to a University, Abrams had

⁴¹⁶ Charles Abrams, Ankara, Turkey, to G. Holmes Perkins, Dean of the School of Fine Arts at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 6 October 1954, microfilm, Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25.

two primary reasons for his strong preference for Perkins and the University of Pennsylvania among other administrators and universities.⁴¹⁷

The first reason was professional. By the time Abrams began to work as a consultant to the UN, he had held appointments as a lecturer at a number of colleges and universities following his initial appointment at the New School of Social Research during the mid- to late-1930s.⁴¹⁸ As a result, he had become familiar with the curricula of a number of outstanding architecture and planning programs across the nation. Between 1952 to 1957, while teaching as a lecturer in the Department of City Planning at Penn, he had become particularly impressed with the relationships that Perkins had been able to establish between the School and the City Government through the multiple positions he held in Philadelphia as the President of the Housing Association, Chairperson of the Zoning Advisory Committee and City Planning Commission and the Dean of the School of Fine Arts.⁴¹⁹ Through these multiple engagements and within the particular political

⁴¹⁷ As discussed in chapter three, Abrams wrote to Weissmann, “I think Harrison would be a good choice, but since an American university must accept the ultimate responsibility, it would be a good idea to have Holmes Perkins and another U of P man (such as Martin Meyerson or Bill [William] Wheaton who teaches City Planning at U of P) to accompany him. Harrison should ultimately emerge as Chairman of the Turkish-American Committee... After talking to Nasr, will you contact Harrison, Perkins and Meyerson and arrange for a discussion.” Abrams to Weissmann, 2 Oct., 1954. Abrams expressed the same position to Perkins, “I suggested Harrison [referring to his earlier statement in the letter] because the American Ambassador suggested him. It is not a *sine qua non*, though his name would help with grants, I think, and prestige. The government doesn’t know him but knows of the U. of Pa. If you approve of the project, call up Weissmann right away and arrange an appointment so that you can work out the details. The “U of Pa.’s the thing” as I see it. As for the other members and the number, that should be up to you.” See, Abrams to Perkins, 6 Oct. 1954.

⁴¹⁸ Throughout his career, Abrams lectured at the New School, Columbia University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Pennsylvania and the New York City College.

⁴¹⁹ Abrams was associated with Penn throughout his career. A survey of University Directories between 1950-1970 reveals his position as a Lecturer from 1952 to 1957. Another source also shows that he was a Visiting Professor there in 1965.

context of the period that supported housing and urban renewal projects, Perkins had been able to create a unique laboratory of urban planning and development in Philadelphia in a very short period of time following his arrival at Penn in 1950.⁴²⁰

In 1961, Jan Rowan, the managing editor of *Progressive Architecture*, wrote an influential essay regarding the developments in Philadelphia under Perkins' leadership.⁴²¹ He claimed that a new movement, "stemming from Philadelphia, heralds a new renaissance that might prove to be at least as important... as the Chicago School." Rowan argued that Perkins acting as the creative link between the City Planning Commission and the Dean of the School of Fine Arts had made it possible for Philadelphia to become a "laboratory and an important subject matter of the school," encouraging multiple departments in both the city and the University to work together collaboratively. It was this model in particular that positioned the Department of Architecture, Landscape Architecture, and Planning in direct relationship to the planning departments of the city that Abrams was interested in implementing in Turkey. Except in Turkey, the idea was that the school would have a direct relationship to the planning departments of the State.

⁴²⁰ Regarding the political context, the Housing Act that promised every American family "a decent home and a suitable living environment" was passed in 1949, creating the Slum Clearance and Community Development and Redevelopment Program. That was followed by the Housing Act of 1954, which brought in urban renewal and created further employment opportunities for architects and planners both as administrators and practitioners. In 1951, Philadelphia elected reformist Joseph S. Clark as Mayor and Richardson Dilworth as the District Attorney unseating the conservative Republicans. Both politicians positioned Philadelphia in the lead for Federal Funds for urban renewal and housing which in turn positioned Philadelphia as a center for gifted architects and planners turning the City's Planning Commission into one of the best in the nation. Four years later, Clark was elected to the US Senate and Dilworth became the Mayor continuing the programs with even greater support from the Congress. See, Strong, 131.

⁴²¹ Jan C. Rowan, "Wanting to be: The Philadelphia School," *Progressive Architecture* 42 (Apr. '61): 130-63. Also see, Strong, *Book of the School...*, 132. Also see the unpublished book manuscript by, Mimi Lobell and John Lobell, "Philadelphia School: 1955-1965: A Synergy of City, Profession, & Education," <http://johnlobell.com/Books/PhilSchShrt.htm>; internet; accessed 16 December 2011.

Consequently, Perkins was the right person for the job. Abrams envisioned him to establish the same type of relationship between the School in Turkey and the Ministries of the Turkish Government. With this project, Perkins was to take the ideas in housing reform and urban renewal that the School was exploring in conjunction with the City to the next level and to begin to address issues of country and regional planning at the grandest scale.

Abrams' second reason was political and it had to do with Perkins' unique ability to do equally well in both academic and political circles. Because of his dual role as the Dean of the School of Fine Arts and the Chair of the Philadelphia Planning Commission, Perkins had established important political connections to a number of politicians active both in Philadelphia and in the US Congress. Among these, Abrams felt that Perkins' connection to Harold Stassen could prove especially helpful in bringing US aid to the project.⁴²² Stassen was the Penn President (1948-1953) who had convinced Perkins to come to Penn from Harvard to transform the School of Fine Arts from a traditional Beaux Arts program into one of the leading interdisciplinary programs in the country. Following his Presidency at Penn, Stassen had become the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA; after May 1955, International Cooperation Administration or

⁴²² Strong, *Book of the School...*, 131, 133-134. In a letter Perkins wrote to Abrams on October 14, 1954, after being in touch with Weissmann, he noted, "I talked to Weissmann yesterday and he will be in touch with the FOA and is now arranging a meeting in New York to be held in about a week." Abrams had noted the importance of FOA funding in his initial letter to Weissmann (see Ch. 3) and subsequently, Weissmann invited Perkins to the meeting with FOA, understanding the connection between Perkins and Stassen. G. Holmes Perkins, Univ. of Pennsylvania, to Charles Abrams, Ankara, Turkey, October 14, 1954, Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, RI. 25. During the initial meetings at the UN regarding the School, Perkins was perceived as the person who would negotiate contacts with the FOA. For example, see Minutes of the meeting held on December 22, 1954, "It was also decided to ask Professor Perkins whether an approach to the Ford Foundation would in any way jeopardize the interest already shown in the project by the FOA," TAA 173/57/018. Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, 1.

ICA), between 1953 and 1955, under Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration, which was the very agency that Weissmann and Abrams were trying to solicit support from for the School project.⁴²³ During Abrams' initial meeting with Avra Warren, the US Ambassador to Turkey, the initial response of the FOA agents in Turkey towards the project was somewhat neutral at best. Similarly, Weissmann, during his conversation with Robert McCabe, an FOA agent in Washington, DC, had not been able to obtain a definitive interest in the project. Within this context, Perkins' personal connection to Stassen was one of the primary reasons why he and the University of Pennsylvania were the right candidates for the job. Abrams felt that if the funding issue were to fall along the differences between the liberal and conservative sanctions of the Republican Party regarding foreign policy and aid, one could not get closer than Stassen to the liberal side of the Republicans.⁴²⁴ Stassen was connected to that line of influential politicians that could be traced all the way back to Wendell Willkie who supported a more liberal foreign aid policy that went beyond military and diplomatic alliances.⁴²⁵ Later, even after Stassen

⁴²³ In 1953, Stassen was appointed by Eisenhower to administer United States foreign aid programs, first as director of the Mutual Security Administration; then, after a reorganization, as director of the Foreign Operations Administration. Alec Kirby, "Harold Stassen: Biographical Memoirs," in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* (vol. 147, no. 3 September 2003), 321.

⁴²⁴ In a letter to Julia Henderson, Weissmann noted, "I have also talked with Mr. Robert McCabe of FOA, in the absence of Mr. George Reed, who is in charge of U.S. assistance in the field of housing and community development... In principle, according to Mr. McCabe, 'the project is of the type in which FOA has taken interest in the past', and he sees no reason why they should not be interested in this particular project." Although FOA would later hold off support and Stassen became key to Weissmann to Henderson, Oct. 14, 1954, Charles Abrams papers, Cornell, RI. 25.

⁴²⁵ During the 1940 Republican National Convention, Stassen helped secure the Republican Party nomination for Wendell Willkie (1892-1944). Willkie, a corporate lawyer by profession, was a critic of Tennessee Valley Authority and some (not all) of the other New Deal programs that he felt to be inefficiently and unfairly competing with corporate investments. At the same time, he was an internationalist and a supporter of US involvement in world affairs toward the end of WWII, becoming Roosevelt's ambassador-at-large and developing the vision for the United Nations and bringing home a

had to step down from his directorship position at FOA, the partnership between Perkins and Stassen would prove to be central to the success and identity of the project.

During the second half of the 1950s, because of a decline in Turkish agricultural production, exports had declined reducing the DP Administration's foreign currency reserves.⁴²⁶ When coupled by inflation that reduced the Turkish lira from 2.80 to 9.00 to the dollar, the foreign currency problem had reached a crisis level. It was this economic situation that allowed the debate regarding the scope and content of the School to reach the point where it stalled the opening of the School. The DP Administration needed a foreign sponsor to provide the foreign currency to pay the salaries of foreign faculty in dollars.

Abrams' letter to Perkins contained summarized portions of the descriptions and information Abrams had presented to Weissmann. At the same time, one finds that Abrams' letter to Perkins provides an interesting foil to his letter to Weissmann since it clarifies some of the points that are, as we saw, not so openly explained in the letter to Weissmann. As candid as his tone appeared to be towards Weissmann, one finds that Abrams was able to be much more open about the actual situation in Turkey toward Perkins perhaps because Perkins was not a UN official, and therefore, his letter would not be filed among official UN correspondence. It is also possible to suggest that Abrams

vision of "One World" freed from imperialism and colonialism. See, Wendell L. Willkie, *One World* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1943). Also see interview with Stassen in, "Harold E. Stassen (1952)" in *Chronoscope* (Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), 14:35 min. available through *American History in Video*, <http://ahiv.alexanderstreet.com/View/529267>, accessed on 11.17.2011. Also see, Harold E. Stassen, *Where I Stand* (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1947); and, H. W. Brands, *Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

⁴²⁶ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 108.

may have felt that, if the project were to indeed go forward, Perkins would face the same issues that he himself had faced. Consequently, Abrams may have felt that it would be best to explain the situation as clearly and openly as possible to Perkins so as to help him set up the right team and build accurate expectations toward the establishment of the school. In addition, Abrams didn't hesitate to mention some of the things he had kept out of his letter to Weissmann. For example, he did not mind pointing out Vecdi Diker's contributions to the project, perhaps as a way of letting Perkins know that Diker would be one his most reliable counterparts in Turkey (to link Perkins with Diker toward the future development of the project).

In the letter, Abrams (emphasized Turkey's staffing problems in terms of country planning based on the reports he had reviewed at TODAIE) immediately established the crux of the problem as he saw it. He wrote that Turkey was, "making enormous strides developmentally," but added, "in the absence of trained personnel, its physical patterns are doomed to chaos." As a way of explaining what he meant by this and to give Perkins a point-by-point list of things he needs to consider, Abrams itemized a list of six important issues as a second letter that he attached to the end of the first.⁴²⁷ At the top of this list came, "The Problem of Language." He wrote,

The younger generation is taught English, so a fair number of students will be able to communicate with the American staff. I think the staff should be both Turkish and English-speaking with the Turks recruited for the school in the roles of assistant professors, instructors, etc.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁷ These were, "1. The problem of language; 2. Enrollment, etc.; 3. The problem of the team; 4. Foundation support; 5. (Continuity between the members of the next mission and who would be left behind to teach); 6. Scholarships and fellow-exchanges. Abrams to Perkins, 7 October 1954, 1.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

Here, as mentioned above, he talked about Ernst Egli as a useful candidate because of his extensive experience in Turkey. However, in the rest of the paragraph, it becomes clear that Abrams' concerns went beyond language and were in fact concerned with the conceptualization of architecture and planning disciplines within the Turkish context. Here he also distinguished the two disciplines of architecture and planning as he expressed that perhaps the planning discipline would require more attention. He wrote that aside from Egli, there are also a few good Turkish architects around, probably referring to Ekmel Derya in particular, "with a Weltschmerz." He wrote, "The problem of architecture should afford less communication problem than planning, on which you might go easier as you feel your way." He added the following as a way to explain how the absence of trained personnel affected the organization of development projects.

All problems in the field here bog down because of a curious central-city relationship which is an administrative monstrosity, so planning problems at least from the problem of policy require a very thorough grounding in the problems before an American planner can undertake any comprehensive teaching.⁴²⁹

In this way, Abrams pointed out that the problem of language manifested itself as a professional divide between American architects and planners and their Turkish counterparts and this divide was even greater in the area of planning. Consequently, he cautioned Perkins to take his time in configuring the planning component of the program.

In the letter, he also pointed out the US Ambassador's request to include Wallace Harrison on the team, but Abrams left it to Perkins to make the final decision regarding the members of the team. He also informed Perkins of the problem of language; the

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

budget allocated for the team's visit; and discussed the extent and likelihood of future funding for the project from UN and US sources. He did not neglect to point out the Turkish enthusiasm for the project and expressed his confidence that the project would continue even if foreign aid were slow to materialize. Regarding the team, he noted:

This should be primarily up to you. I suggested Harrison [referring to his earlier statement in the letter] because the American Ambassador suggested him. It is not a *sine qua non*, though his name would help with grants, I think, and prestige. The government doesn't know him but knows of the U. of Pa. If you approve of the project, call up Weissmann right away and arrange an appointment so that you can work out the details. The "U of Pa.'s the thing" as I see it. As for the other members and the number, that should be up to you. The UN budget for the project is \$10,000 and can be raised, I think, with insistence, if required... One of the other things that might be good is to take along at least one man who might remain. I don't like the gaps these missions create. Somebody should be prepared to stay on. The Turks want the school started right away – at least for the 1955 fall enrollment.

I think the people you have in mind to teach should be recruited *before* the mission begins so that the continuity can be establish at once. The Turks are sick of "expert reports" and I was embraced when I promised not to do one. Your team should emphasize architecture and one city planner.⁴³⁰

Weissmann to Julia Henderson

Following these series of letters that Abrams and Sturen sent out from Turkey, in a letter dated October 14 that Weissmann sent to Julia Henderson, the Director of the

⁴³⁰ Ibid., 3. Here, Abrams quoted the upper end of the salary totals (\$10,000) that Sturen had estimated in his letter to Nasr (\$8,000-\$10,000)—see Sturen's letter to Nasr below. Abrams must have felt slightly uncomfortable about the salaries that could be offered. He must have felt that the salaries needed to be more in order to ensure, or at least not discourage, U.Penn.'s involvement. As discussed in chapter two, Abrams felt that UN salaries were not worth the trouble of doing work outside of the US especially when it was coupled with extensive background checks that the US government required of US nationals working as experts for the United Nations. Abrams felt that this considerably reduced the number and quality of US professionals involved in UN projects. Consequently, in his letter to Perkins, he listed in detail all the various daily allowances that the U.Penn. team would receive in order to render the project more attractive. For the letter, see, Charles Abrams, Ankara, to Holmes G. Perkins, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 6 October, 1954 (Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, microfilm, reel 25).

United Nations Division of Social Welfare, he briefed her on four primary issues regarding the state of the School project in Ankara, Turkey prior to her arrival in Ankara on October 20: First, he asked her to review and comment on the letters and the memoranda that the UN office in New York had received regarding the project following her discussions with various parties in Turkey.⁴³¹ Second, he informed her that Wallace Harrison had kindly declined to accept the assignment to head the mission to Turkey or the proposed Turkish-American sponsoring committee since, “he is extremely busy and just could not devote the necessary time to this project. He will be glad to help as much as possible.”⁴³² Third, he let her know that he had talked with Mr. Robert McCabe of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) about the project.⁴³³ Even though the US Ambassador or the Department of the State had not yet contacted McCabe about this new project in Turkey, Weissmann reported to Henderson that McCabe said, “the project is of the type in which FOA has taken interest in the past”, and that he sees no reason why they should not be interested in this particular project. He informed that McCabe thought that the question should be further investigated and believed that either him or Mr. Reed could come to New York to discuss the project in detail. Fourth, Weissmann confirmed that Holmes Perkins, the Dean of the School of Fine Arts at Penn, had expressed his great interest in the project and would be happy to participate in it. Here, Weissmann noted that

⁴³¹ Ernest Weissmann, New York, to Julia Henderson, New York, 14 October 1954 (Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, microfilm, reel 25), 1.

⁴³² Ibid. Weissmann also told Henderson, “I will be lunching with Mr. Harrison on Saturday or Sunday. If anything new transpires, I will send you a cable to Ankara.”

⁴³³ Ibid. Weissmann notes, “I have also talked about the project with Mr. Robert McCabe of FOA, in the absence of Mr. George Reed, who is in charge of U.S. assistance in the field of housing and community development.”

Perkins believed that the UPenn would endorse the project provided that there are no financial implications for the University. Weissmann told Henderson that he had assured Perkins that they were working on FOA or other foundation funding to cover the salaries and expenses of foreign faculty who would help establish the school and teach during the first few years.

Weissmann's last point revealed how much the project still relied on US funding to succeed. While practically all parties had agreed to support the project in principle, the availability of FOA or Ford Foundation funding was still the primary issue that could make or break the project. Where this foreign currency, that was repeatedly said to be needed for the salaries and expenses of the UN staff and the scholarships for students, would eventually originate from would also largely determine the identity of the School at least during the first few years. Abrams had become aware of the central importance of these funds for the realization of the project. While Olle Sturen and later, Charles Weitz, Sturen's full-time successor at the Ankara UN-TAA offices, would make it a priority to contact the regional center of the Ford Foundation in Beirut, Weissmann would try to solicit the funds from the FOA officials in Washington, DC. However, Abrams also realized that the issue of initial funding could fall along the fundamental fault lines of American politics regarding foreign policy. It could become the litmus test that would reveal the small, but fundamental differences in foreign policy among UN and US agencies. It also revealed the well-entrenched differences among the liberal and conservative factions of both the Republican and Democratic parties within the US. However, in case these differences proved too great to be bridged with the idea of the

School, Abrams had constructed a back-up plan, so to speak, into this network of alliances that essentially hinged around the idea of bringing Perkins and the University of Pennsylvania into the project. Perkins' political connections would prove to be essential to the development of the project during several critical stages. Nevertheless, the debates and relationships the funding issue created and the differences it revealed among all factions was a fabulous theatre of Cold War politics that Abrams watched and observed with great fascination. He continued to follow the developments closely and recorded the events as meticulously as he could by saving all of his correspondence and documents in his own records so that it could be understood in detail by future generations.

While Diker, and to some extent others from among the ranks of the Turkish professionals that Abrams had contact with, had advised Abrams regarding the appropriateness of an educational institution as an area of technical assistance within the professional and political contexts of the 1950s, Abrams and Sturen configured a way to present the idea to US and UN officials. Through this teamwork, these experts would succeed in obtaining support at least in principle while the foreign currency and funding issue would continue to reveal differences and cause delays in the implementation of the project.

Conclusion

Marshall Dimock, the Acting Resident Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UN-TAA) in Turkey, described the role of the resident representative within the newly adopted French Plan as, “the servant of all interested parties – the recipient government, the experts assigned to the country, the regional and headquarters staffs of the specialized agencies, and the TAB Secretariat.”⁴³⁴ However, within the context of deteriorating relations among the UN, the US, and the Turkish Government, it had become difficult for Olle Sturen to maintain Turkish interest in UN advisory reports such as the one that Abrams had come to prepare. Furthermore, soon after his arrival, Abrams found out that the Turkish Government had not yet begun to regard issues in housing and planning with the same political and social urgency as UN-HTCP agency did in developing countries. At the same time, the Turkish interest in technical education, voiced primarily through Sturen and Diker, caught Abrams’ attention as a possible way to reorient the focus of his mission from policy to training and to gain Turkish support for his mission.

There were several reasons why Abrams felt that the idea held considerable currency. First, if this idea were to be presented initially as a school of architecture and planning, it could also draw Weissmann’s interest as well. After all, the idea of public administration was already being discussed as one of the primary concerns of the

⁴³⁴ Report of Mr. Marshall E. Dimock, Acting Resident Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board to David Owen, Executive Chairman of the U.N. Technical Assistance Board, for the period 1 June -31 August 1954, “United Nations Technical Assistance Activities in Turkey,” 31 August 1954 (Charles Abrams Papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 51).

planning professions in the US.⁴³⁵ In addition, the issue of re-training of architects and planners to become more attuned to links among the issues of housing, regional planning, and economic development had already been a part of the discussion at the Housing and Planning Seminar in New Delhi. Second, the criticism of Turkish professionals of Turkish Governments practice of hiring foreign experts had finally been heard through the passing of the Law of 1954, which largely limited the involvement of foreign experts to higher education. Third, and perhaps most importantly, from the very beginning of his mission in Turkey, Abrams had observed a significant professional divide between foreign experts like Abrams and their Turkish counterparts. On the one hand, this divide was caused by language, which limited the Turkish professionals' access to the most recent ideas on housing and planning issues. On the other hand, it was caused by differences in educational backgrounds. For example, while many of the foreign expert reports that Abrams was able to review at TODAIE focused on the blaring contrasts between Turkish cities and provinces, the Turkish professionals were not attuned to the imminent problems that such contrasts would cause in terms of rapid urbanization and depopulation of the countryside.

Based on these observations, Abrams began to develop his own reasons for reform in training in the administrative and technical disciplines. However, in order to appeal directly to Weissmann's interests and to keep the initial scope of the project to a

⁴³⁵ For example, a University of North Carolina class handout announced, "city planning is practiced only incidentally as an art; it is principally a process of public administration." As quoted in, Greg Castillo, "Design Pedagogy Enters the Cold War: The Reeducation of Eleven West German Architects." *JAE* 57 (May 2004): 14. Also see, Hugh R. Pomeroy, "Basic Concepts of Planning," mimeograph: class handout for American Planning Seminar (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, March 25, 1950), 1.

reasonable scale, Abrams brought the idea to Weissmann as a school of architecture and planning. Later, he would admit, “Architects and planners was the wedge, but engineering and training in other disciplines were also essential to build the country.”⁴³⁶

While Diker was instrumental in securing the Turkish support through Zorlu, Sturen and Abrams worked to draw UN and US support while also making sure that the Turkish support did not wane. Sturen and Abrams used the initial support they managed to obtain from Turkey and the US to leverage UN interest. They also had to gauge the scope and content of the project carefully so as not to overwhelm the interest they had gained.

Consequently, one finds that Abrams had not only to change the scope and content of his mission based on Turkish demands and conditions, but he also had to configure it in such a way to maintain the interests of all the key players in the technical assistance machinery. During this process, the official and non-official letters Abrams and Sturen wrote to UN and US agents were the key to successful fruition of the project. However, since the main function of these letters were to convince their audiences of the validity of the project, the information these letters contain have to be weighed against other accounts of Abrams’ experiences and encounters during his mission.

The way Abrams operated among many interests and agents in order to devise a successful project was not unusual to his career both as a New York lawyer and a UN expert. Bernard Taper describing Abrams once wrote,

⁴³⁶ Abrams, *Men’s Struggle for Shelter...*, 202-203.

He (Abrams) says that on many occasions, both on missions abroad and here in the United States, his achievement has consisted of being able to come up with some ‘gimmick’ – by which he means some legal formula, perhaps, or some administrative or financial mechanism – that generates significant social action. ‘When you come right down to it, what I am really is a kind of finagler,’ he once said. “In real estate I learned how to finagle for myself. After that, I just began finagling for society.”⁴³⁷

Policy adjustments may have indeed seemed like finagling for social action to Abrams at times, a task clearly not equal to the welfare revolution that he wanted to achieve. The Turkish criticism of the postwar technical assistance machinery challenged Abrams to find overlaps between the aims of his welfare revolution and the Turkish national revolutionary ideology.

The shift in Abrams’ mission from policy to training and his subsequent proposition, brought about by the Turkish position on UN reports, presented a significant challenge to the way the UN was operating until that time. It was revolutionary in the way that it challenged UN’s attitudes toward development. It was also revolutionary in the way that it proposed to re-order the way the Turkish state was organized. Following the series of letters Abrams and Sturen wrote to the UN and US officials, Abrams formulated the justification for this new strategy in the report he later submitted to the UN.

⁴³⁷ Bernard Taper, “A Profile of Charles Abrams,” in *The Work of Charles Abrams: Housing and Urban Renewal in the USA and the Third World: A Collection of Papers*, eds. Koenigsberger, O. H., S. Groak, and B. Bernstein (New York: Bergamon, 1980), 10.

Chapter Four:

From Policy to Training:

Formulating a New Strategy of Development, 1954-56

Charles Abrams, a New York labor lawyer and a housing policy expert, formulated a new strategy for international technical assistance and development in the report he filed following his first overseas mission as a UN agent in 1954. Even though the report was prepared in response to the conditions Abrams had encountered in Turkey, it was a critique and a proposed revision of UN's continued commitment to the idea of policy development as the primary component of programs to achieve political stability and to provide economic opportunities in developing nations. In this way, it was also a revision of the earlier report Abrams had prepared for the United Nations Housing and Town and Country Planning (UN-HTCP) division entitled, "Urban Land Problems and Policies."⁴³⁸ This report had served as a prelude to his numerous overseas missions as a UN expert. In this earlier report, Abrams had, in line with other UN programs, advocated policy development as a way of resolving housing and urbanization problems across the world. Even at that early stage in his career as an expert, he was careful to qualify his support of policy by pointing out that a policy or a program developed for one country could not be applied to another without a thorough examination of that country's administrative practices. As a UN housing and planning expert, he perceived his role to be the development of responsive policies based on a thorough understanding not only of

⁴³⁸ Charles Abrams, "Urban Land Problems and Policies," *Bulletin on Housing and Town and Country Planning* (New York: United Nations, 1953): 3.

international economic systems, but also of local land tenure practices, laws, and regulations.

In spite of these convictions, upon his arrival in Turkey, Abrams' commitment to policy as well as his role as an expert encountered significant challenges from Turkish officials who questioned the validity of UN policy proposals. Even though Turkey was one of the few countries that had begun to implement the country programming schemes recommended by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), it was doing so with the hopes of attracting US funds and investments to UN-endorsed programs.⁴³⁹ At that particular point in time, during the mid-1950s, US-Turkish relations had suffered a temporary breakdown due to continuing reductions in US postwar aid to Turkey. Furthermore, US and its aid organizations had grown skeptical of the aims of ECOSOC, and a contentious relationship prevailed between the US and the UN. Therefore, without US support and aid, Turkish officials did not find value in UN policy recommendations. Turkey felt that the US postwar commitment to build Turkey as a strong military and economic ally in the region was diminishing and, by refusing to work with the UN, Turkish officials expressed their discontent with the way the postwar international economic development machinery was slowly shifting from economic aid to policy recommendations.

Four weeks into his two-month mission in Turkey, Abrams had developed two separate policy recommendations for both the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of

⁴³⁹ During the early 1950s, ECOSOC programs and the UN-TAA technical assistance programs were recommended by US agents and agencies, however, by the mid-1950s, US began not to support these programs, only to resume supporting them again after realizing that it was a mistake to leave this playing field to the Soviets.

Public Works. However, he realized that these would most likely receive little attention. At the same time, through meetings and conversations with a number of officials and professionals—above all, Olle Sturen, the acting interim Resident Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UN-TAA) office in Ankara, and Vecdi Diker, a civil engineer trained in the US and the former founding Director of the National Highway Department of the Ministry of Public Works--Abrams became aware of a long-standing and bi-partisan Turkish interest in the establishment a UN-sponsored technical university in the capital city. Abrams' own observations had also revealed a perceptible shortage of qualified personnel in ministerial and municipal offices, especially in the provinces, where professionals who were usually educated in Istanbul universities did not want to work and live.⁴⁴⁰

Within this context, and especially, within the context of the country programming schemes that Turkey was adopting, Abrams saw an opening for a new type of development strategy. Instead of policy recommendations, he resolved to prioritize the training and education of local professionals, whom he described as, “inperfs,” in order to strengthen the administrative network throughout the country and develop policy from within. This idea of training was in fact consistent with Abrams' formulation of policy development in his earlier report from 1953: A set of legal and technical

⁴⁴⁰ During the 1950s, a two-year compulsory service became a requirement in order to bring recent graduates to serve in ministerial offices in Ankara. To convince them to take positions in the provinces was usually out of the question unless the graduate happened to be from that particular region. This compulsory service was added onto the existing two-year compulsory military service required of male citizens.

recommendations based on a careful examination of existing conditions.⁴⁴¹ Abrams resolved that this task needed to be carried out not by experts who came and stayed in a country for only a short period of time, but by inperfs who understood the international system and who could examine conditions and develop policies based on a deep understanding of local variations and transformations.

This idea was more revolutionary than it might at first seem since it envisioned a completely different structure for the State. As a result of his experience in Turkey, Abrams became aware of a fundamental flaw in the way the UN as well as his earlier report had prioritized policy without any attention to training, an approach that Abrams himself had earlier endorsed. As an agency of international governance, one of UN's primary aims was to ensure political stability and economic development throughout the postwar world by reducing social and economic inequality between the developed and the developing countries and regions. ECOSOC sought to achieve this goal through programs and policy proposals that would organize and fortify the administrative structure of developing governments. However, policy development privileged the authority of international agencies as well as that of a centralizing state, which further increased the disparity between developed and developing nations as well as between urban centers and rural peripheries. Consequently, policy development increased contrasts instead of decreasing them and relied largely on the maintenance of the authority of a central state to maintain political order and solidarity across the nation.

⁴⁴¹ Abrams dedicated two chapters to the idea of "inperfs," and training. See, "Aid-Experts and 'Inperfs'," and "Education and Research: A University is Born in the Middle East," in *Men's Struggle...*, 89-104 & 195-212.

By shifting the focus of his recommendations from policy development to the training and education of administrative and technical personnel, Abrams proposed to restructure the central authority into a regional network that could be more responsive to the needs of the entire nation. Within the Turkish context, the idea was consistent with the studies and recommendations of the United Nations Institute of Public Administration in Turkey, which had found significant social and economic disparities between Turkish cities and provinces. The Institute's studies had already focused on ameliorating the effects of these differences, however the institute approached the issue only from the standpoint of public administration and did not seek to provide a multi-disciplinary network across the nation.⁴⁴²

Through comparisons between Abrams' initial report for HTCP and his report on his mission to Turkey, this chapter examines how Abrams reformulated his approach to development by re-orienting his arguments toward training and education instead of policy development. Here the chapter shows how Abrams relied on some of the same arguments he had developed in his earlier report. However, instead of simply prioritizing policy, he proposed training and education as fundamental components of policy development and implementation. By maintaining the framework of his earlier argument the same, Abrams was able to keep his proposal within the conceptual parameters already accepted by the UN.

At the same time, the chapter shows how Abrams' proposal completely reimagined the structure of the postwar state by reconfiguring, and to some extent,

⁴⁴² As discussed in chapter three, Abrams read these reports which were prepared by UN-experts teaching and doing research at TODAIE.

challenging its centralizing structures by creating an administrative and technical network throughout the nation. The chapter also discusses how Abrams envisioned the role and position of architects and planners in relation to this new structure. Abrams' new formulation did not dictate a specific formal language or a program for postwar architecture. Instead, Abrams envisioned the architecture and planning professions as a combined discipline that could act as a leader for other disciplines such as public administration and the arts and sciences including engineering in order to consider simultaneously both the social and economic concerns of development.

Furthermore, Abrams also proposed the expansion of the concerns of architecture and planning to include the examination of the needs of regions beyond urban centers and to look beyond the way the design professions had been traditionally conceptualized. In particular, Abrams called for the study and design of squatter housing, village and community centers, indigenous materials and construction methods. These inquiries required collaboration with engineers, industrial designers, financiers, and entrepreneurs as well as social scientists. Abrams' proposals were in line with the ideas that were emerging in architecture and planning schools in the United States. Within the Turkish context, Abrams had found the opportunity to begin a new school and to implement a new vision of architecture and planning as a means of reorganizing the centralizing and authoritative State.

As a revision of the ideas developed in his 1953 report, the 1955 report was once again addressed largely to the UN-HTCP as the leading clearinghouse of experts working on similar issues across the world. Interestingly, the report did not discuss why his

experience in Turkey had led him to fundamentally rethink his approach to development. In other words, the report did not articulate the ways in which the Turkish position had been central to the inception and realization of the project. Instead, Abrams continued to explain the highly-charged national revolutionary sentiment in Turkey through the social and economic concepts already accepted by the UN while he tried unsuccessfully to implement the idea of training elsewhere during successive missions.⁴⁴³

Furthermore, the analysis shows that even though Abrams prioritized training and education within the Turkish political context, he could not completely abandon his commitment to policy development. Here the chapter examines the policy recommendations Abrams had developed for the Turkish Ministry of Labor. Abrams included these as an addendum to his report. As Abrams may have sensed, political climate would once again shift in Turkey soon after Abrams' departure putting the ministries once again in need of housing policies that they could implement more immediately. This shift threatened the priority of Abrams' proposal for training. Within the slightly different political climate that emerged following Abrams' departure, Vecdi Diker and Charles Weitz, the new and the first full-time Resident Representative of UN-TAA in Turkey, emerged as the new champions of the project. Both Diker and Weitz, working in their respective capacities, were central to maintaining the project as a priority among other new projects and ideas competing for UN-TAA funds. Thanks to their clever diplomacy and persistence, the school opened its doors and began providing courses in Architectural Design in November, 1956.

⁴⁴³ For example, Abrams tried to implement the idea of training in Ghana during his mission immediately following his work in Turkey. Weissmann once again provided support for the idea. There will be more discussion on subsequent projects towards the end of this chapter.

4.1 The Abrams Report

As the previous chapter established, by the time Abrams officially submitted his report to the UN on August 23, 1955, the idea of establishing a School of Architecture and Community Planning in Turkey had already received initial support from UN, US, and Turkish agencies. Consequently, the purpose of the report was not to encourage support for it from various. Instead, the report targeted the UN with two primary purposes in mind. First, it sought to establish the parameters of the project and map out any potential roadblocks for future UN experts who would be involved in its implementation. Second, it sought to introduce training and education as a new development strategy in broader terms that would supplement policy recommendations in UN-HTCP missions across the world.

In his initial report for the UN-HTCP, Abrams had articulated the importance of policy development in resolving housing and planning issues within capitalist systems. Following his mission to Turkey, he repeated these arguments, but this time, used them to substantiate his call for training and education as a new development strategy. His earlier report was largely based on his lectures at the New School, which he had compiled in his book, *Revolution in Land* (1939) prior to any overseas experience as a UN expert.⁴⁴⁴ Following his experiences in Turkey, Abrams found that training and education should accompany policy recommendations since an absence of an administrative framework staffed by well-trained professionals made it impossible to revise and implement policies according to specific regional, physical, social, and economic conditions. Consequently,

⁴⁴⁴ Charles Abrams, *Revolution in Land* (New York; London: Harper and brothers, 1939).

the new report could be seen as a revision of his earlier report, as he found training and education to be intrinsic components of policy recommendations.

In his 1953 report, Abrams explained how housing and land tenure practices were two of the most important issues effecting social and economic development throughout the world. One of the purposes of this earlier report was to reveal the often-overlooked links between housing and land tenure policies and to show how sound policies regulating land tenure practices could reduce mounting pressures on urban land as well as the cost of workers' housing. Abrams explained the shortage of low-income housing as a product of the Industrial Revolution which he argued affected all countries but in slightly different ways:

Despite vast differences in background, development, wealth and climate, there appears to be a remarkable similarity in the housing problems faced by most countries. This is not surprising, for industrialization is an increasingly common trend.⁴⁴⁵

Abrams explained that modern housing problems across the world, which he described as “One world-one housing problem,” had emerged as a result of two primary issues. First, while standardization were implemented in other areas of production, housing had suffered from a technological lag. He argued that even in the United States where the home-building industry was one of the most advanced in the world, home construction had remained essentially a handicraft operation with most of the work done directly at the

⁴⁴⁵ Abrams, “Urban Land Problems and Policies,” 9. Here, with the sub-sub-title, “One world-one housing problem,” Abrams was undoubtedly making a reference to Wendell Willkie’s (1892-1944) widely-read and influential book regarding the shape of the postwar world order, *One World* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1943). Here, Willkie theorized the philosophical basis of the United Nations arguing that people across the world all wanted one thing, “political freedom and economic opportunity.” Characterizing the Second World War as a, “Revolutionary War,” he argued that the postwar world is “one world,” freed from imperialism and colonialism.

site.⁴⁴⁶ He argued, “In manufacturing, specialization has as a rule served the interests of efficiency. In construction, however, instead of increasing efficiency of production, specialization has split the home-building operation into hundreds of segments whose myriad sub-segments still have to be put together in a multitude of distinct and usually sequential operations.”⁴⁴⁷ In this way, Abrams identified labor costs and specialization as one of the factors that was driving housing costs beyond the means of the average worker.⁴⁴⁸

Abrams’ main focus was on the rise of urban land values, a topic that he felt to be even more central in determining the cost of housing.⁴⁴⁹ He argued that industrialization, which was affecting every part of the world, was the main cause of rising land costs, especially in urban areas. Abrams explained that numerous factors resulting from industrialization, such as monopolization, concentration of wealth, increase in profit margins as well as rural migration to urban centers, had put increased pressure on land, raising its value so that it was no longer affordable for housing construction, especially in urban areas.

Much of Abrams’ formulation of land economics was inspired by his reading of Henry George who, in his book entitled, *Progress and Poverty* (1879), argued that

⁴⁴⁶ Abrams, “Urban Land Problems...,” 9.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid. Abrams wrote, “It has been estimated that if an American automobile costing \$1,714 were built in 1949 with 1910 tools, as houses in the United States are being built today, its cost would be \$60,000.

⁴⁴⁹ Abrams developed his arguments regarding the relationship between the Industrial Revolution and rising land values in his, *Revolution in Land* (New York; London: Harper and brothers, 1939).

increasing land values forced a decrease in wages.⁴⁵⁰ George argued that this inverse relationship between land values and wages led to an increase in poverty in industrialized cities and nations. The increase in poverty in turn led to social and political unrest and periodic worldwide economic depressions. As a New York labor lawyer with extensive experience in land transactions and tenure practices, Abrams felt that policies could help to regulate the increased pressure on urban land. Policies that were geared to control urban migration, land tenure practices, and housing finance schemes could largely regulate increasing land prices and reduce housing costs.

At the same time, Abrams found that while the effects of the Industrial Revolution was ubiquitous across the world, what was commonly referred to as the Industrial Revolution was actually a series of continuing revolutions which acted upon different nations at different times with varying effects. Through this differentiation, based on the varying processes and effects of the Industrial Revolution, Abrams developed his critique of development theory. He argued that policy could not be based on a general formula or an ideology of development. It needed to consider the specific social and economic practices of a country or a region. This differentiation also allowed Abrams to formulate the differences between developed and developing countries.

In the earlier report Abrams had prepared for UN-HTCP, he classified the continuing series of revolutions that made up the Industrial Revolution under four primary processes. He wrote,

⁴⁵⁰ Henry George, *Progress and Poverty; an Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions, and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth; the Remedy* (New York: Henry George and Co., 1879).

- (1) The maturing of the individual's rights against the state, the grant of privacy in his property and security against search, seizure or expropriation without due process.
- (2) The deconcentration of land ownership and the break-up of holdings (in a number of countries, laws which perpetuated or concentrated holdings have been abolished or more widespread distribution of holdings has been encouraged).
- (3) The decline of land as the dominant form of wealth, giving rise to new forms of intangible property, and the simultaneous development of new uses for land.
- (4) The rise of a welfare concept in which the desire to advance housing and urban living standards, rationalize the disordered urban land structure and improve city patterns, all played a part.⁴⁵¹

Abrams argued that policy should be developed considering each country's national background and patterns of land tenure in relation to these four primary processes of transformation.

Abrams argued that developed and developing countries were going through these processes in a significantly different manner. He held that while the developed countries had gone through the processes of Industrial Revolution over a span of a couple of centuries, developing countries were experiencing these transformations simultaneously and in a much shorter period of time. The construction of this difference was essential for Abrams's argument in two specific ways. First, the increased pressure applied to land because of the multiple and simultaneous transformations that developing countries were going through allowed Abrams to argue that there was even a more urgent need for policy development in developing countries. Similar to W. Arthur Lewis's arguments in his pioneering essay on planning, Abrams' insistence on a fundamental difference

⁴⁵¹ Abrams, "Urban Land Policies...", 6.

between developed and developing countries allowed him to argue that policy was much more critical to establish in developing countries.⁴⁵² Lewis wrote,

Planning is at the same time much more necessary and much more difficult to execute in backward than in advanced countries.

In the first place, planning requires a strong, competent and incorrupt administration. It must be strong enough to be able to enforce its measures, such as to collect taxes from the peasantry, or to enforce a rationing system without black markets, measures which even so ancient a government as that of France has not found itself fully able to enforce. It must have a competent administrative service, with trained personnel, able to understand the large issues that are at stake, and to act reasonably and rapidly. And it must be free of all charge of corruption, since, whereas men will bear many restrictions from a government which they believe to be acting fairly and solely in public interest (however mistakenly) without respect of persons, they will sooner or later resist violently measures which are corruptly administered, however acceptable the measures themselves may be.⁴⁵³

Second, the difference between developing and developed countries allowed Abrams to posit that the policies of developed countries could not be applied to developing countries. New policies had to be formulated for the developing world based on a close examination of national conditions and practices.

In the report Abrams submitted following his mission to Turkey, he constructed the difference between Turkey and the developed world in a very similar way he had done in his initial report for UN-HTCP. Except this time, he began to refer to the four transformations as four revolutions. Abrams noted,

⁴⁵² W. Arthur Lewis, *Principles in Economic Planning: A Study Prepared for the Fabian Society* (London: Unwin University Books, 1949). See especially Appendix 2, "On Planning in Backward Countries." See also chapter two for a discussion of Lewis work in relation to the adoption of planning policies by ECOSOC.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

A number of dramatic events have now supervened upon the Turkish scene. In my study of urban land problems and policies, I noted the impact of four revolutions upon nations in the last 200 years:

1. A political revolution which matured the individual's rights against the state, the grant of greater privacy, and greater security against search, seizure or exploitation.
2. A land revolutions which witnessed the deconcentration of land ownership and the break-up of concentrated holdings.
3. An industrial revolution which saw the rise of cities, the decline of land as the dominant form of wealth, simultaneously giving rise to the factory and the city and the development of new uses of land.
4. A "welfare revolution" emphasizing a new welfare concept marked by a desire to advance living standards and effect a greater distribution of benefits to the people at the base of the social and economic pyramids. An effort to rationalize urban land patterns and housing problems formed a part of this development.⁴⁵⁴

In the next few paragraphs, Abrams explained how Turkey was going through all four of these revolutions simultaneously within a very short time in contrast to the way similar processes had taken place in countries that had gone through the industrial revolution over a period of two hundred years. For example, he briefly noted the Turkish national revolution and its adoption of a new constitution and a new legal system patterned after western models. Accordingly, he pointed out that lands were redistributed and a state-sponsored industrialization was begun. He also discussed the recent emphasis on private enterprise as well as subsidies provided by international and Turkish agencies for agriculture, aid to squatters, housing assistance of various forms, educational advancement and other measures. He noted that these changes were accompanied by,

⁴⁵⁴ Abrams, "The Need for Training and Education..." 3.

...what was virtually a social mutation in dress and customs, and in more recent years a road programme of major proportions began to open up the hinterlands, bringing influences of an incipient mechanization and a market economy to the rural areas; it speeded a migration to the cities, sometimes causing their populations to double in a short time.⁴⁵⁵

It is not clear why Abrams chose to use the word, *revolution*, to refer to these processes in the later report. One important point is that most of the transformations that Abrams was pointing to in Turkey were not products of an industrial revolution. Instead, they were products of a national revolution and a revolutionary ideology that embodied modernization and development as its central doctrines.⁴⁵⁶ Consequently, these changes in Turkey had not come about through a social and economic process. Rather, they were the result of a major movement organized by the Ottoman/Turkish elite to overcome and resist Western technical and economic hegemony and colonization. Despite this significant difference between the two revolutions, Abrams continued to describe the transformations in Turkey in terms of social and economic processes, putting aside the political framework and discussing the issues in the terms already established by the UN.

Abrams portrayed Turkey as a country of contrasts, pointing to the gaps in development between commercial centers and rural peripheries. Abrams had begun to express this position in Turkey in his letter to Holmes Perkins as he was explaining that planning might in fact prove to be the biggest challenge in Turkey.⁴⁵⁷ Both the expert reports he had examined at the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ Abrams to Perkins, 6 October 1954.

Middle East (TODAIE) and the observations he had made during the extensive trip he had taken identified these contrasts as one of the primary potential problems of urbanization and social unrest in Turkey:

Turkey is a country of striking contrasts in terrains, customs, occupations, backgrounds, and social and economic conditions. Not only villages contrast between one region and another but cities do as well. The visitor who has seen Istanbul, Bursa, Yalova, and Izmir will know little of Tarsus, Amasya, Sivas, or Konya. Much of the country had been cut off from communication with the rest of the country – and with the world in general. This has been particularly true of the interior and of the smaller towns and provinces.⁴⁵⁸

The contrasts that Abrams established in Turkey worked in a very similar way to the differences he had identified between developed and developing worlds to explain the importance of policy development. Here, however, Abrams used this disparity to build a case for the establishment of an administrative framework that would be implemented equally throughout the country, founded on the training and education of architects and planners:

Confronted with these changes, there has been little time to plan in advance for the reception of the new population, for their housing, for the layout of new areas, for the enactment of appropriate building or zoning laws, and for the rationalization of urban-provincial-central relationships, for the development of a mortgage financing system, or for a workable local tax system. There has been no regional planning to control suburban blight, rationalize the relationships between village, city and region, nor has there been any village planning aimed at improving the patterns of the villages themselves.

In these problems, architects and town planners would normally play an important part; the former in influencing housing design, sub-division layouts, and the rationalization of building laws; the latter in relating the physical structures to the new cities or to the expanding areas of the old ones, simultaneously bringing into

⁴⁵⁸ Abrams report, 3. By the time Abrams wrote the report, it is conceivable that he had had more time to examine the reports he had collected from TODAIE. In the report, he emphasizes the idea of contrasts. Abrams had brought the extensive reports by A.H. Hanson and Ernst Egli to the United States and kept them in his records of his mission to Turkey.

operation those policies and programmes which can generally improve land utilization in town and village.⁴⁵⁹

He then continued to focus his argument, on the training of architects and planners. First, Abrams argued that the existing schools were limited in the number of architects and planners they were able to produce. Second, the existing architecture and planning curricula did not adequately prepare students to deal with the problems that Abrams described:

It is hard to assess cause, effect and responsibility in a country experiencing such volatile changes, but one deficiency stands out: there are today few architects in Turkey to do work that is either good or bad. There are architects in İstanbul, İzmir, and the larger cities, but in most places I found none in sufficient number. In Tarsus, for example, the city has long advertised for an architect, with no applicants seeking the job. The nearest architect is in Mersin, a resort city a good distance away...

Because of the dearth of architects, cities are unable to hire civil servants who can interpret plans. In Adana, for example, I came across a new building – one of many throughout Turkey – which violated the existing building code by omitting the prescribed lateral areaway and covering one hundred per cent of the lot besides. Were the adjoining buildings also to follow suit, as indeed they probably will in time, there would be no light, no yard space, no ventilation for any of the buildings except on the street side. I talked to the contractor and to my surprise he exhibited the city approval stamped on the plan. On inquiring I learned that such approvals of illegal plans by city officials were common and perfunctory. This was due partly to the inability of officials to read plans and partly to the vagueness of the building code which is so general and confused that it supplies no accurate yardsticks. Every point in the code seems arguable. Once the illegal house is erected and occupied, it thereafter becomes impossible – the housing shortage what it is – to tear it down. This is true even in the cities with alert and able officials. In its effort to ease the shortage, Turkey granted a ten-year tax exemption on new buildings. Thus the country is not only permitting the erection of illegal structures but subsidizing them as well.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., 3-4.

⁴⁶⁰ Abrams, “The Need for Training...,” 4-5.

For Abrams the problems Turkey faced were two-fold. First, the codes and policies regulating building construction and life safety requirements needed to be revised and made applicable to the specific needs of each region. Second, both cities and other municipalities needed the personnel to develop these codes and execute them in a knowledgeable and responsible manner. Abrams focused his argument on the latter as he argued that sound codes and policies could not be developed without local knowledge. He made a similar argument for need of planners as well,

Absence of city planning know-how exerts an equally serious impact upon the Turkish environment. City planning in central Europe is mainly a function of architecture. The intricate and interwoven problems of finance and economics, housing and planning policy, social and environmental relationships, legislations and public administration, are all virtually ignored. Yet Turkey has no experts qualified even for the limited European approach.⁴⁶¹

Following these examples that showed how Turkey's zoning, construction, and housing finance laws were a mixture of borrowed policies, none of which addressed the specific conditions in Turkey, Abrams launched a more systematic argument about how both the shortage and the inadequate training and education of architects and planners affected the economic and physical organization of Turkey in eight specific points. These eight points that Abrams was able to identify in the Turkish context again had their origins in the earlier report Abrams had prepared for the UN-HTCP. Consequently, in his analysis of the conditions in Turkey, Abrams continued to use the frameworks he had developed in the earlier report.

Under the heading, "Speculation and Blight," Abrams discussed how speculative development practices were shaping the future of many Turkish cities. In the absence of

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., 5.

regional plans that regulated development outside of the city limits, Abrams observed that private speculators had developed a wide-spread practice to buy large aggregations of land from farmers or from the state or city and to divide it into as many lots as possible. In one instance, he observed that these lots did not even have the room

... for a house of the most acceptable standard; no space for play, recreation or laundry, no yard or garden space, no allocation for commercial facilities; no privacy; no room for expansion of the house; no safety from traffic; no relief from the drab monotone of house upon house upon house, built on lot upon lot upon lot. Worse still, the subdivision was completely free of any regulation by the city in its materials and specifications.⁴⁶²

He added that the tools used in the United State and Europe to prevent blight, such as “zoning, subdivision controls, regional planning, extension of planning controls over peripheral areas, workable building regulations and other devices are as yet unknown in Turkey, and if they were known could probably not be administered, planning knowledge being what it is.”⁴⁶³

It is significant that Abrams first discussed, “speculation and blight.” As Aydın Germen, a well-known Turkish planner who was working for the UN roughly around the time of Abrams’ visit, has pointed out, because of slow industrial development, speculative building and development has been and, until recently, remained the primary means of investment in the Turkish context, putting added pressure on land values and zoning and construction regulations.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶² Ibid., 6.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Aydın Germen, interview with author, Istanbul, Turkey, June 25, 2008, digital recording, author’s archives. Germen later became influential in the development of reconstruction regulations and plans throughout Turkey.

In his 1953 report, Abrams had discussed the topic of “Speculation and Blight” under a lengthy discourse regarding the balance between private enterprise and the development of public restrictions on land use and tenure. In this earlier report, Abrams pointed out the importance of public restrictions on land use through a number of historical and contemporary examples. His goal was to show that as a result of increased demand on land following the Industrial Revolution, it had become all the more important to develop sound policies that regulated the rights of private ownership over public lands. Most of the examples Abrams provided on public regulation of land holdings and construction practices were based on European models.⁴⁶⁵

In his second point, “Frustration of City Plans,” Abrams began to shift his argument toward the importance of well-trained personnel in government offices in order to develop and to execute sound building codes and policies. Even though each city was required to file a plan of improvements (Imar Planı), which included public amenities such as new squares, new streets, or new public buildings, Abrams observed that these plans were rarely, if ever, implemented as projected due to a variety of reasons. However, Abrams insisted that the absence of know-how at the local municipal governmental level necessary to execute such plans as the primary reason for their ineffectiveness.

As the third, fourth, and fifth points of his argument, Abrams discussed the effects of the shortage of architects and planners had on the planning of publicly-built, co-operative, and the pension fund housing schemes. On the planning of publicly-built housing, he observed that stock plans for housing developments were used often without

⁴⁶⁵ Abrams also discussed the limits of such policies in obtaining results.

any consideration for the climate or topography of the land or the cultural and regional preferences of their inhabitants. He found that this was also the case in co-operative housing initiatives. He felt that Turkish co-operatives could, for example, learn much from the experiences of earlier Swedish or Danish co-operatives. However Turkish architects and developers were not knowledgeable of these case-studies of co-operative developments.

In the body of the report, even though Abrams briefly addressed the question of the Pension Fund Housing in Turkey, he addressed this question in more detail in an Appendix he attached at the end of his report.⁴⁶⁶ Abrams recognized that this scheme represented the largest single effort to build housing for workers in Turkey and wanted to provide specific recommendations to the Ministry of Labor in response to this issue. However, in the body of the report, he did not want to detract from his focus on the training and education of architects and planners. Consequently, in the body of the report, he briefly pointed out,

My study of the co-operative programme (referring in this case to the Pension Fund Housing scheme) confirms that absence of financing knowledge and experience is enabling the building of only LT 27,000,000 in housing, when under a proper mechanism, ten or twenty times that much could be financed with the same fund. Using the fund as a base, a major mechanism could be devised for channeling savings into long-term mortgage-financing along the lines of the Hyresgasternas Sparkasse och Byggnadsförening Co-operative in Sweden. But this would require good housing experts and housing administrators, and these are not to be found.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶⁶ Appendix I. The report Abrams submitted to the Ministry of Labour as an Appendix to his report will be discussed later in this chapter.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., 8.

Abrams' point about the importance of financing experience and knowledge in the success of housing schemes reflected the way he understood the study of architecture and planning as multi-disciplinary fields. This is an important point since, Abrams was thus identifying the types of knowledge and skills the new architects and planners should be taught in this new school.

His sixth point also expanded on this issue as it discussed the idea of individual resourcefulness and initiative in the cities. Here, Abrams wrote,

Anyone who has seen the mushroom houses in Ankara and İstanbul must concede that there exists in Turkey a pool of workers with a natural aptitude for building houses. Considering that many of the houses were built of mud brick, rocks gathered nearby or scrap wood and tin, and that they had to be put up in as little as 24 hours to avoid public interdiction, one cannot fail to have a healthy respect for these folk. In questioning the squatters, I found that some of the better houses cost about TL 300. Only a few of them would be considered acceptable by city standards, and indeed some were located near landslide areas and wherever space could be secured. But given some initial planning of streets and utilities for the site, some use of better materials, given more time within which to build, some supervision, and assured of security of tenure at the very beginning, a very good workers' development indeed might have emerged.⁴⁶⁸

Through these points, Abrams sought to again expand the realm of architects' and planners' inquiry to encompass the design and planning of squatter settlements. Jacob Crane, one of Abrams' close associates and the former Assistant Director of US Housing and Home Finance Agency, was then the primary proponent for self-help housing schemes.⁴⁶⁹ Like Abrams, Crane had chaired the second major session entitled, "Housing and Community Improvement Programmes," at the New Delhi seminar and had traveled

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., 8.

⁴⁶⁹ Jacob Crane had just retired from his position as the Assistant Director of US Housing and Home Finance Agency prior to his engagement in Athens.

to Greece as a housing expert around the same time that Abrams was in Turkey. While Abrams devised his own versions of self-help housing schemes in other countries after Turkey, this was not a strategy he proposed within the Turkish context.⁴⁷⁰ Instead, he raised the issue as an area of inquiry that the new school in Turkey should undertake in order to capitalize on indigenous construction techniques and materials that were already being utilized in innovative ways in squatter housing.⁴⁷¹

Abrams' seventh point sought to bring the attention of architectural and planning education to the development of villages, again an area of research and inquiry that was largely ignored by current programs in architecture. Abrams argued that the Turkish village could be a wonderful area of exploration for Turkish architects and planners. Until that time, Sedat Hakkı Eldem's well-known National Architecture Seminar at the Academy in İstanbul had focused on examples of high-style villas of İstanbul, Bursa, and surrounding territories. Studies that focused on indigenous building and settlement traditions of villages had not yet been a part of the curriculum in the schools of architecture in İstanbul. Abrams wrote,

In the villages, the problem is not shortage of materials, for Turkey is rich in local materials that can be used for village housing – sun-dried brick, baked brick, and

⁴⁷⁰ Abrams may have begun to formulate the partial loan schemes, such as the roof loan scheme he had proposed in Ghana, in Turkey. Ernst Egli's reports, which Abrams had reviewed and retained for his records at the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East, contained such suggestions while also praising the resourcefulness of the Turkish rural population. See, Cevat Geray, "The Application of the Aided Self-help Housing Method in Turkey," in the Proceedings of the RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development) Symposium on Rural Housing in Ankara (7-10 July 1973).

⁴⁷¹ Ironically, shortly after Abrams' departure, when the United States International Cooperation Administration (US-ICA) announced an interest in introducing aided self-help schemes in Turkey, the Ministry of Public Administration became very interested in the idea. This turn of events will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. For a brief history of aided self-help housing in Turkey, see, Cevat Geray, "The Application of the Aided Self-help Housing Method in Turkey," in the Proceedings of the RCD Symposium on Rural Housing in Ankara (7-10 July 1973).

clay roof-tiles (which are locally purchasable for about TL 60 per 1000) stone or lumber.

Nor is there a land problem for siting the houses. The problem is rather one of designing the village better, removing some houses and replacing them, building safer and better shelters for livestock, stabilizing the roads, improving the design of the housing, planning for the placement of fruit trees and landscaping, and generally planning the region of villages so that work can be more efficient, life more interesting, contacts less isolated, education, health, agricultural and other essential information more accessible.

Much of the life in the village is in a sense co-operative – in the work and welfare of the village, in sharing grazing lands, and often in putting the animals out to graze or even in helping to build houses. This co-operativeness can be used to greater advantage. The villages, however, are too often cut off from the life of the rest of the country and from any influence which can utilize Villagers' aptitudes for improving their environments.⁴⁷²

To Abrams, renewed attention to planning at the village scale was one way to reduce the demand on land in the cities. Abrams argued that the isolation of the village would diminish as the road system expanded to reach even the most isolated settlements. He pointed to the reports by E. Egli and Hanson that he had found at TODAIE to show that studies which brought attention to Turkish villages were already underway in Turkey, but he argued that there was much work to be done in this area by a multiplicity of disciplines spanning from social sciences and public administrators to architects and planners.

These observations and suggestions would prove to be formative in the structuring of the programs of the new school as studies into not simply of the architecture and planning of villages but also into their historic and ethnographic culture were begun as a part of the school's required summer village studies. Abrams'

⁴⁷² Abrams report, 8-9.

suggestions sought to expand the architects' and planners' focus from centers to peripheries to ensure balanced development practices in line with the concerns of the UN.

In his last point, Abrams discussed the effect that the shortage of architects and planners had on the existing landscape and architecture in Turkey, pointing to the rich architectural heritage in Turkey:

Few places in the world offer such an interesting palimpsest of Hittite, Roman, Byzantine, and Seljuk monuments. They seem to span the march of time and events through thousands of years. These dot the country from coast to coast. Despite the ravages of time they still retain their original character; despite the ravages of the unregulated speculator, they still dominate the scene in Konya, Bursa, Kayseri, and the many smaller towns and cities now being linked by the hundreds of indomitable bulldozers, tractors, and scrapers.⁴⁷³

Abrams felt that this heritage raised two important questions for Turkish architects and planners. First, how would the existing historical fabric be incorporated into the development of future cities? Second, how would this architectural heritage affect the development of Turkish architecture? Both of these questions would again contribute to the design of a multi-disciplinary program for the new school.

Abrams' eight showed how a dearth of a network of well-trained architects and planners adversely affected the development of the country. One of Abrams' important conclusions is his desire to forge close ties between the new school and the Turkish State. At least three factors contributed to the conception of the school as primarily a training ground for State ministries. First factor originated from the Turkish side and was the result of the traditional link between architectural and engineering professions and the Ottoman/Turkish State. The national revolutionary ideology supported by the

⁴⁷³ Abrams report, 9.

Ottoman/Turkish professionals was the force that supported the establishment of the school. Diker had a considerable influence from the Turkish side in this conception of the school. For Diker, the establishment of a technical school in the capital city was the fulfillment of a project that had begun with the National Revolutionary War and the establishment of the Turkish State. The new school would then largely replace the Istanbul Technical University as the official school for the training of civil servants. It would also serve as a model to reform the curricula of the schools in İstanbul and elsewhere in Turkey.

As we have seen, Democrat Party (DP) administration also supported the strong links between the Turkish government and this new institution. First, the idea would help the administration gain the support of professionals as it began to hire more Turkish professionals for important government contracts. Second, a stronger link could be established between the graduates of a UN-sponsored school and international programs of cooperation allowing Turkey to take better advantage of UN and US Aid. Third, it would allow DP to establish an administrative network throughout the country and succeed in the project of country programming. This would allow the DP officials to make good on their revolutionary promise to build not only the cities, but also the countryside, and to turn Turkey into a little America with a millionaire in every region.

Abrams further discussed the identity of the school. First, he pointed out that the DP Administration recognized the problem that he had articulated. Under the sub-heading, "The Government and its Administration," Abrams wrote,

The present government recognizes the problem. It has very competent people, but they cannot be expected to be knowledgeable in all the essential fields. The

deficiency exists in the inability to secure competent assistance for the implementation, i.e. the specialists who can draw legislation and make the plans, programme the financing, help improve the local administration. The shortage of planning skills is present in all countries everywhere, but it is critical in Turkey. One of the more fortunate aspects of the situation, however, is that government officials recognize the problem and are remarkably willing to co-operate in breaking the log-jams. This makes it possible to plan and take the necessary steps for breaking the log-jam at its most stubborn and critical points.⁴⁷⁴

After reiterating the extraordinary support provided by the DP administration to reform Turkish administrative and planning practices, Abrams clarified another important factor: Foreign specialists or experts was not the way through which to implement these reforms since the use of foreign experts did not lead to the creation of an administrative network. Under the sub-title, “Resort to Foreign Aid,” Abrams argued for the need to educate “in-perts:”

Turkey’s resort to foreign aid and example is of course inevitable when it has little to draw upon from its own, i.e. laws from abroad, standards from abroad, plans from abroad, experts from abroad. One city’s plans are made by a Frenchman; others by Germans; still other experts are invited from abroad for quick “solutions.” In each case the architect or expert stays for a month or a year and goes. A report is made and relegated to the dustbin because there is not on to give it implementation or interpretation.

What Turkey needs are not only experts but “in-perts” – people who live here or will stay to see the development through and even after completion help guard it against perversion. This brings me to the imperative need for a school of architecture and community planning in Ankara as a basic element of a programme of training and education.⁴⁷⁵

The idea of the school also worked well to create a new and more acceptable domain for experts. Under the next sub-heading, “The Importance of the School,” Abrams briefly explained the role of the school as an institution made up of experts and “in-perts”

⁴⁷⁴ Abrams report, 10. Here it seems that Abrams is again addressing the UN.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid. This was the first instance where Abrams mentioned the idea of the, “in-pert,” as a new strategy of development.

located in close proximity to the Government. Following consultations with Turkish professionals and based on the latest laws regarding the practice and involvement of foreign professionals in Turkey, Abrams had also realized that a school provided the most acceptable setting for the interaction between foreign experts, students, and government officials. By being involved in the establishment of a school and its research institutes and through teaching, experts could remain in the country for a longer period of time making a deeper impact in Turkey's administrative and professional practices.⁴⁷⁶ He wrote,

Such a school is important for reasons more vital than mere training of architects and planners, though this is indeed part of the programme. It will also produce a group of experts who can remain for an extended period and who will stay until they have helped develop a Turkish competence to succeed them. By being located in Ankara, the experts will be in the area where housing and planning policy is made. They can help guide and train people employed by government. They can also draw upon experienced government personnel in the Nation's Capital and elsewhere to help do the training. Finally, the experts can serve as a more or less continuing guide and influence to government officials in place of the temporary visiting experts who do no more than recommend and leave.⁴⁷⁷

Here it is important to point out how Abrams perceived the school both as an educational institution for new students and as a training ground for government officials. It would also be a place where experts could continue to contribute to policy development and technical research without upsetting the relationship between the Turkish government and the professional organizations.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., 11. As discussed in chapter three, this was a sentiment actually expressed by Turkish professionals. Unlike the German-Austrian expert who were exiled from Germany during the 1930s and worked in Turkish universities and government ministries for numerous years, UN or US experts during the postwar period only came for a few weeks or months and left. Turkish bureaucrats felt that the postwar experts never got a chance to really understand the country and make sound recommendations.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.\a

The next sub-title in Abrams' report, "The Problem of an Independent School *versus* a Departmental Unit of the University of Ankara," dealt with an issue that would become the focus of the most persistent debate regarding the school's location, facilities, and identity. In the report, Abrams' requests that the school be established as an independent institution instead of formed as part of the Ankara University. He also notes, "As it happens, the Government insists on an independent school."⁴⁷⁸ However, based on his consultations with both UN and Turkish officials, he must have sensed that this debate would continue for some time at least within Turkish circles. Consequently, he resolved, "the arguments for the decision (for an independent school) should be stated for the guidance of the team from the University of Pennsylvania which has agreed to come to Turkey."⁴⁷⁹

Abrams recognized that the school's establishment as a unit of the University of Ankara had certain advantages:

Becoming a unit of the University of Ankara has the advantage of enabling the school to draw upon the University's staff for teaching of related subjects. (The school has an agricultural department but no other technical department). Quarters can probably be made available and many of the administrative duties might be shared. These are the marked advantages. For the University of Ankara, there would be the advantage that it would gain a new department – though architecture, planning and engineering are disciplines unrelated to existing courses at the University.⁴⁸⁰

Here, Abrams did not point out the establishment of the Institute of Research and Application in Housing and Urbanism (İskan ve Şehircilik Araştırma ve Uygulama

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

Merkezi) at Ankara University in 1953. Even though this Institute focused on the social and economic aspects of housing and planning, instead of its technical aspects, it was a significant initiative that was begun at the University. Although German scholars and experts had initiated the Institute, it had already established connections with Universities in the US.⁴⁸¹

In the report, Abrams also addressed a particularly strong argument for establishing the school as part of Ankara University. Abrams may have felt that this argument in particular might catch the University of Pennsylvania team off-guard. The argument suggested that establishing the school as a unit within Ankara University would, “immunize it against political interference,” within the Turkish Parliament. In this particular case, Abrams’ response is actually not very convincing. He wrote,

The facts that there will be an independent Board, that an American university will have the initial authority and that funds will be made from American sources as well as from the Turkish Government, should all help guard the school against undue political interference. Schools supported by cities and states are hardly a rarity in the United States and elsewhere. They function collaterally with endowed colleges and have functioned relatively well. In Turkey, the School of Public Administration set up by the United Nations and the Turkish Government has had a free hand.⁴⁸²

It seems that Abrams’ effort to debunk the argument does not take into consideration or, at least largely undermines the strong and partially bilateral opposition a US-sponsored University might face from the Turkish Parliament, where national revolutionary sentiment was still prevalent persistent among both parties. The strong national

⁴⁸¹ The establishment of the Institute of Research and Application in Housing and Urbanism in Ankara University is discussed in more detail in chapter three. Abrams must have known about the existence of this Institute since it was connected to the Ankara University just as TODAIE was.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

revolutionary opposition to foreign schools was no doubt one of the primary reasons why the United Nations Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East (TODAIE) was established as a unit of the Ankara University.

Through discussions with Sturen and other UN-experts who were teaching at TODAIE and based on his own observations of the effectiveness of the school, Abrams knew that TODAIE had limited success in bringing reform to both Turkish educational and administrative fields because of the fact that it was established as a component of Ankara University. However, Abrams chose not to point this out in order not to step on any toes and lose any allies at both the UN and the Turkish schools and agencies. At the same time however, his reasoning here regarding how a joint sponsorship of the school by both UN and Turkish sources could immunize it from political interference does not hold water. At best, it alerted the University of Pennsylvania team to the fact that there was a debate on this issue.

In addition, Abrams listed the following reasons in support of establishing the school as a separate entity:

1. Another school is created instead of another adjunct of an existing school. There is no objection to two schools or to competition between schools, and there is much that may be said against educational concentration. Attachment to an existing school emphasizing humanities and political sciences may tend to gear horizons toward its dominant discipline. The University of Ankara should, of course, not be dissuaded from expanding into the technical field for there is room for many schools and many more courses.
2. With promised support by the Government and launched with Government aid, the new school would receive major financial support from the Government.
3. There is a need for a technical school which can grow as a technical school instead of being limited by the horizons of the existing non-technical school to which the subject matter is new.

4. Finally, the experiment is novel and important. It requires freedom for the University of Pennsylvania to feel its way and inaugurate the curricula with as few checks and limitations as possible.⁴⁸³

In closing this issue, Abrams noted that his report should not be considered final. In reaching these conclusions, he admitted that he has relied heavily on people, “whose opinions I respect both inside and outside the Government, and I have had only one conference with a representative of the University of Ankara.”⁴⁸⁴ He advised that the ultimate determination should be left open for the succeeding United Nations mission to explore.

Under the next sub-heading, “The Co-operation of the Government and its Meaning,” Abrams sought to explain the importance of the fact that the Turkish Government had received the project with enthusiasm and had pledged to provide both financial and political support for the project. As chapters two and three established, Abrams had arrived in Turkey at a time of increasing UN-Turkish collaboration. Based on the recommendations of the United Nations Social and Economic Council (ECOSOC) and the influence of the United Nations Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East, Turkey had agreed to implement country programming strategies that united and prioritized all technical assistance projects under the administration of a singular Ministry. Country programming ideas, also known as the “French Plan,” although was very successful in the reconstruction of many western European countries, had found resistance from both UN agencies and member nations, including the United

⁴⁸³ Ibid., 12.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.

States for a variety of reason. Turkey, as a country that embraced strategies of country planning, was considered to be very progressive, at least from the ECOSOC's point of view. To provide further support for increasing UN activities in Turkey, ECOSOC had agreed to appoint a full time resident representative to its Technical Assistance Board (UN-TAB), the headquarters of its operations in Turkey. That representative, Charles Weitz, was due to arrive in Ankara at the end of October, 1954, missing Abrams' mission by only a few days.

At the same time, just prior to Abrams' arrival, diminishing US aid to Turkey, which was an essential component of the technical assistance machinery, had caused a temporary breakdown of cooperation among UN, US, and Turkish agencies. Without US aid, Turkey perceived UN reports and recommendations to be useless and within the political context of the period, sought to express its dissatisfaction with changing US attitudes through explicit gestures, one of which included sending a team of well-known UN economics experts from England home without considering their recommendations.

Operating within this context, the fact that Abrams was able to bring his project to Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the Deputy Prime Minister of the DP Administration, was an unexpected and noteworthy accomplishment. Furthermore, Zorlu had supported the idea since he found the idea of a school to be compatible with DP's earlier agreements with the UN. Zorlu's support for this project meant a great deal in terms of UN's continued presence and operation in Turkey. However, in order for the project to succeed, it needed more than just Turkish support. Both Abrams and Sturen had noted the importance of continued UN and US support for the project: UN support in terms of providing experts

to teach in the school during the first few years and US support through its aid agencies in terms of foreign currency to pay for the salaries of UN experts. In this section of the report, Abrams noted,

The Minister of Education has stated that the school would receive top priority in the United Nations-Turkish budget allocations for 1955. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has agreed to this. The Government has also moved to include an initial sum in the Government budget to get the school under way.

If, however, the University of Pennsylvania is to participate, the Americans must be paid at least partly in dollars, and a library and other imported material must be available. These are possible only with foreign currency. Therefore, if the school is to be launched as planned, a grant in dollars is necessary. The Government has already announced the project in the press, and United States aid will be sought. Such aid would be needed until an adequate Turkish staff had been trained to continue the school and develop it through indigenous talent.⁴⁸⁵

Abrams had submitted a draft budget in his correspondence with the Ministry of Education. He attached the same budget as Appendix E to the report with the qualification that this budget would be revised and updated by the University of Pennsylvania team.

Abrams concluded the report with two final points. First, he noted the Turkish Government's desire to ultimately expand the school to include departments of engineering. However, he recommended that initially, "the school should start without being burdened too heavily with additional curricula and it should feel its way before expanding too rapidly." Second, regarding the issue of quarters, he pointed out that the Minister of Education had promised to provide quarters for the school and that he intended to have a new structure built to house it as soon as practical. He ended the report

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., 12.

by noting that the Government would like the school to convene by the Fall Term of 1955.

With these points, Abrams concluded the main body of his report. This report positioned training and education in housing and planning through the establishment of a UN-sponsored school as its primary recommendation. However, this was not the only recommendation Abrams had prepared during his mission to Turkey. As an appendix to the main section of the report, Abrams also included the earlier set of recommendations he had prepared prior to his meeting with Vecdi Diker.⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸⁶ “Appendix I: Memorandum to his Excellency Hayrettin Erkmen, Minister of Labour of Turkey,” 24 September 1954. During that meeting, Diker had discouraged Abrams from submitting a report with policy and finance reform recommendations and had encouraged his leanings toward the idea of training. For the encounter between Diker and Abrams, see chapters one and three.

4.2 Abrams' Policy Recommendations

The initial recommendations Abrams had prepared for the Turkish ministries had focused on housing policy and finance reform. Abrams resolved to include one of these earlier reports as an appendix (Appendix I) to his final report. The set of recommendations included in this section were addressed to Hayrettin Erkmen, Minister of Labor, and were generated in response to a series of meetings Abrams had with Ministry officials regarding the Workers' housing program in Turkey. In the first part of these recommendations, Abrams described the legal and administrative components of the existing housing finance mechanism. In the second part, he made a series of preliminary recommendations that could allow the program to run in a much more solvent manner also allowing the workers to have more stake and participation in its operation.⁴⁸⁷ Aside from minor recommendations in finance models, his central concerns were again in the area of the administration of the program. In this regard, he recommended that the program should be brought under the control of a singular Ministry (Ministry of Labor, in this case), and perhaps even under the control of a singular agency within that Ministry.⁴⁸⁸ Furthermore, he pointed out that the current funds allocated for the administration of the project was far too low for the size of the project and that the program needed to be set up in a way to support an administrative

⁴⁸⁷ In this regard, he recommended, for example, that the program should be run more as a co-operative where borrowers pay at least part of the cost of administration in addition to interest as well as a premium to be placed into a reserve fund against possible losses under the program. "Appendix I," 22.

⁴⁸⁸ Under the current model, the program was run jointly by the ministries of Labor and Finance. Abrams felt that this made the program much more difficult to administer, causing many inefficiencies and inconsistencies in the program.

budget in line with the size of the project. In addition, similar to the way he had advised in the main part of his report regarding the need for training and education, he found that the administrative apparatus of the Ministry of Labor,

... is far from adequate to cope with the problems inherent in a national construction operation of this size. It needs not only the present director but a staff including a programming department, technicians, lawyers, field men, accounting control, construction supervision and a continuing expansion of staff as the operation grows in magnitude.⁴⁸⁹

He advised that until the administrative staffing and budget of the project can be increased to an adequate competency and size, the Ministry should undertake the project only in locations where it could sufficiently oversee the realization of projects from beginning to end.

Abrams had compiled these recommendations about three weeks into his mission in Turkey. From his last remarks, one understands that he had intended to hold several more meetings with the Minister of Labor to refine and expand his recommendations had he not changed the focus of his mission altogether from policy development to training and the establishment of a school.⁴⁹⁰

Contrary to Diker's and Abrams' predictions, within the shifting political climate of the mid-1950s, the policy recommendations that Abrams included as an appendix to his report would ironically also attract the attention of Turkish officials in the Ministry of

⁴⁸⁹ "Appendix I," 18.

⁴⁹⁰ Abrams wrote, "These suggestions are not intended to be definitive. Many modifications will have to be made to the proposal as the plan is weighed and experience indicates. The original report had the following sentences and a Conference was held with the Minister of Labour. But it is suggested that a conference be arranged with the writer while he is still within the country for any further amplification of these recommendations. This conference or a series of them must be held as soon before the 24th of October (his departure date) as possible," in "Appendix I," 24.

Public Works. While the Turkish officials continued to support the idea of the school among other UN projects during the following years, the need for a comprehensive housing policy also emerged as a priority for the DP administration, which would potentially conflict with the School's establishment as a leading UN-TAB project.

Granted that the SOM report had also made similar recommendations, Abrams' conversations and his convincing arguments with a number of Turkish officials must have made an impact in shifting Turkish attitudes toward sound policy development in the area of housing and planning. However, a number of other newly emerging factors contributed to Turkey's renewed interest in pursuing programs related to housing and planning following Abrams' idea to establish a school. First, United States International Cooperation Administration (US-ICA) was showing interest in investing in Aided Self-Help housing schemes in Turkey.⁴⁹¹ Second, a report filed by a United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) expert in 1955, had recommended the development of a comprehensive housing program and the establishment of a Ministry of Housing dedicated to the administration of this program.⁴⁹² Sensing US interest, Ministry of Public Works began to pressure the Office of International Economic Relations in the Ministry

⁴⁹¹ In a letter Charles Weitz, the full-time Resident Representative of UN-TAA in Ankara, wrote to Taghi Nasr, Chief of the Office for Europe, Middle East, and Africa of UN-TAA, he noted, "The ICA is sending in an expert to Turkey for a programme in Aided-Self-Help Housing, a programme which Bernard Wagner (the US-ICA housing adviser in Turkey) feels will have to go on with ICA assistance for at least two years." See the discussion in the text below for the context within which Charles Weitz was writing this. Charles Weitz, UN-TAA Office, Ankara, Turkey, to Taghi Nasr, UN Headquarters, New York, 3 October 1956, (United Nations Archives, Queens, New York, TE 322/1 Turk), 2.

⁴⁹² In the same letter that Weitz wrote to Nasr, he also discussed the mission by a United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) housing expert to Ankara who recommended the establishment of a Ministry of Housing and a National Housing program. Weitz, during an official visit to Geneva, discussed the extent of these recommendations with Mr. Ewing (the ECE expert to Turkey) and Mr. Maurice Milhaud (Chief of UN-TAA in Europe – Geneva) who were both overseeing the ECE mission to Turkey. Weitz to Nasr, 1.

of Foreign Affairs in order to prioritize the obtaining of technical assistance for the establishment of the Housing Ministry and the construction of the National Housing Program.⁴⁹³ Correspondence among agents and agencies from this period suggest that agents working on these issues sought to push their agendas in front of the project to establish the school among UN-TAA projects.

Following Olle Sturen's two-month tenure as the UN-TAA interim acting Resident Representative in Ankara, Charles H. Weitz had begun his tenure as the first full-time resident representative of the UN-TAA in Turkey. Even though Weitz had missed Abrams' visit by a matter of a few days, he remained in touch with Abrams regarding the progress of the school project and became one of its foremost advocates within the UN. In light of the developments regarding the US-ICA, the ECE report, and Ministry of Public Works' new insistence that the Ministry of Housing project be prioritized over the establishment of the school, Weitz turned to Taghi Nasr in order to maintain the school project as the central focus of all projects regarding housing and planning in Turkey.

In a letter, Weitz pointed out to Nasr the diverging nature of current talks on the housing issue in Turkey. Instead, Weitz hoped to bring these efforts together in the

⁴⁹³ Weitz's letter to Nasr indicates that the Ministry of Public works wanted the recommendations of the ECE report and the ICA project to be prioritized. A letter from Maurice Milhaud to Taghi Nasr confirms Weitz's concerns that the Ministry of Public Works was acting to downgrade the priority of the school project. Maurice Milhaud, Geneva, to Taghi Nasr, New York, 27 September 1956. A letter from Mr. V. Kostelecky, ECE liason, brought this point to Mr. Milhaud's attention. Kostelecky wrote, "First, we (meaning the UN-TAA, referring to Weitz's letter to Nasr) note that the Turkish Government are still giving first priority in their programmes to the School of Architecture. This does not entirely square with what the Housing Committee expert mission (of ECE) were told by the Ministry of Public Works, when first priority appeared to be given to the setting up of a housing ministry." V. Kostelecky, ECE, to Mr. Milhaud, European Office of TAA, 31 August 1956 (UN Archives, Queens, New York, TAA 173/57/018 - TE 322/1 Turk).

making of the School. Weitz was concerned that limited resources of the UN-TAA would not be enough to provide technical assistance for all these projects and now, with the attention of the Ministry of Public Works shifting to another project, the School project could potentially lose its momentum as well as the technical assistance that it needed especially during its beginning years. As discussed in chapter two, Weitz, as the resident representative, was not in a position to prioritize the projects as he saw fit. Under the French Plan, the central agency of the client government would establish the priority of the projects. The ECE officials in Geneva were already getting annoyed with the way Weitz appeared to be biased toward the school project in Turkey. Consequently, Weitz chose to only point out that there was an overlap between the School's already established mission and what these new projects were trying to accomplish. By the time of Weitz's letter to Nasr, Thomas Godfrey, from the University of Pennsylvania, had already arrived in Ankara with the task of opening the school. Two other UN experts were soon to arrive to begin teaching at the new school. Referring both to the ECE requests to establish a Ministry of Housing and a National Housing Program as well as to the ICA request to begin an Aided Self-Help programme, Weitz wrote,

Finally, I have reviewed the background of the two requests, and the ICA request with Mr. Godfrey. He shares Wagner's (the ICA expert) view that if both experts can be supplied it will be beneficial. He feels that the ICA Self-Help Advisor may be of the greatest assistance to the School, and that there is every opportunity for fruitful cooperation between the needs of the School in building methods and materials and the proposed content and programme of the Ministry in Documentation and Research (the proposed Ministry of Housing).⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹⁴ Charles Weitz, Ankara, to Nasr, UN-Headquarters, New York,

As Weitz was suggesting, the ICA expert(s) on self-help housing could also teach in the school and help to establish its research institutes in building materials research. Weitz felt that this could be the US contribution to the school project. At the same time, the research institutes could function as the ECE had imagined the Housing Ministry would and provide technical assistance to the Turkish Government.

Weitz's efforts to maintain the school as a priority were well-placed. Weitz was simply reiterating Abrams' outline for the school in his report. He saw the Geneva-based ECE proposals as a significant threat to Abrams' project. Maurice Milhaud, Chief of the European Office of UN-TAA, wanted a French-speaking team of experts to be in control of the housing projects in Turkey. In the letter Milhaud wrote to Taghi Nasr, he expressed,

May I refer now to that part of my memo of 18 June 1956 to Mr. Orlic dealing with the creation of a Housing Ministry in Turkey, in relation with the proposal of the French Ministry of Reconstruction to send Mr. Bonome, Secretary-General of the Ministry, as an expert to Turkey. The French Ministry of Reconstruction maintains its proposal. Our expert on the spot and the French expert would work as a team. This means that both missions (referring here to the establishment of a National Housing Program and a Housing Ministry) should be prepared simultaneously in good time and that the UN-TAA expert should be of the same nationality as the expert put at the disposal of the Turkish Government by the French Ministry of Reconstruction.⁴⁹⁵

Instead, Weitz wanted UN-TAA and Godfrey to choose the experts for these projects. He ultimately wanted Godfrey to have control over the staffing of the school and its research institutes following the trajectory set by Abrams and later Perkins. His position was that UN-TAA could coordinate efforts among UN agencies and ensure that the experts could

⁴⁹⁵ Maurice Milhaud, Chief, European Office of TAA, Geneva, to Taghi Nasr, Chief, Area Office for Europe, Africa, and Middle East, Programme Division, TAA, New York, 27 September 1956 (UN Archives, Queens, New York, TAA 173/57/018 – TE 322/1 Turk). See also, footnote 47.

perhaps serve a dual function: teach at the school and establish the school's research institutes which would satisfy the recommendations made by ECE. As expressed in Maurice Milhaud's letter to Taghi Nasr, the ECE was likely to send a French-speaking group which would not necessarily contribute to the school in the way that Abrams and Perkins had envisioned.⁴⁹⁶

Aside from appendix I that Abrams attached to the end of his report, he had prepared two additional pieces of observations and recommendations for the Turkish authorities. First was a memorandum, prepared for the Ministry of Public Works, entitled, "Re-revision of the Turkish Building Code."⁴⁹⁷ In this memorandum, after pointing out that he had had to spend a considerable portion of his time and effort in obtaining English translations of existing building and zoning codes and other necessary documents, Abrams made two primary recommendations toward the revision of the existing codes. First, he observed that the existing code was derived from a German Code that was no longer applicable neither in Germany nor in Turkey. He recommended that, because of the vast differences between centers and peripheries and between differing climatic and geographical conditions found in Turkey, the national code should incorporate a

⁴⁹⁶ Weitz was also aware of at least two other efforts to take over the trajectory of the school project. First, he was approached by the French Ambassador to Turkey who offered to provide generous financial assistance to the school if the language of instruction was changed from English to French. Second, UNESCO made repeated protests that the establishment of a school was not among the responsibilities of UN-TAA and that UNESCO should be given the oversight of the project. Weitz felt that the school project had been very good for the prestige of UN-TAA in Turkey. At the same time, UNESCO had severed its relationship with the DP Administration through its protests of the urban renewal projects especially in Istanbul. In this way, Weitz put up a major fight on multiple fronts to keep the school as a successful and developing UN-TAA project.

⁴⁹⁷ It is not clear whether Abrams ever filed this memorandum officially. The memorandum is found in his personal records, but is not found or mentioned anywhere else. Charles Abrams, "Memorandum Re-revision of the Turkish Building Code," October 20, 1954 (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25).

significant degree of flexibility that would allow it to be tailored to the specific conditions of each municipality and region.⁴⁹⁸ He recommended that a Building Code Commission be established to begin to draft a new code based on more up-to-date standards and based on studies of differences in regional conditions. Second, in order to manage a flexible code, he pointed out that the Ministry of Public Works needed to establish an administrative network, or an “enforcement machinery” that could interpret, adjust, and amend the national code according to regional variances. Abrams felt that the school architecture and planning would be central to the successful design and implementation of a national building and zoning code in Turkey.

In addition, upon a request by the Turkish Ministry of Public Works, Abrams prepared an article summarizing his observations and recommendations for publication in the official Turkish newspaper.⁴⁹⁹ He mailed this article to Ernest Weissmann to obtain clearance from the UN. Despite repeated attempts to secure clearance for the article, Abrams was not able to obtain permission to send the article to the Turkish officials.⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁸ Abrams elaborated on the issue of flexibility under eight different bullet points.

⁴⁹⁹ Charles Abrams, “Article for Turkish Magazines,” October 24, 1954 (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25).

⁵⁰⁰ In a letter Ernest Weissmann wrote back to Abrams, he noted, “With respect to your article on housing in Turkey, I am afraid I have bad news for you. Both the Department of Public Information and the Area Chief of TAA feel that ‘publication of the article in its present form would be undesirable’. Under the circumstances, I suggest that you postpone publication of the article until you come to New York, and I am sure TAA will be just as eager as our Section to help you in completing it. It seems to me that all the comments and explanations that would need to be made about the article could not be dealt with through correspondence. I hope that this is not too great a disappointment to you and to your Turkish friends who had requested the article.” Ernest Weissmann, UN-HTCP, New York, to Charles Abrams, Accra, Ghana, 3 December 1954 (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25). In response, Abrams refused to revise the article and could not persuade the UN officials to allow him to send it to Turkey.

After completing the draft of the article in Turkey, Abrams departed from Turkey to his next mission in Accra, Ghana (then, the Gold Coast; Ghana, after 1957), then still a colony of the United Kingdom. In Ghana, Abrams (the Chairman of the UN mission) was accompanied by two other experts; namely, Otto Koenigsberger and Vladimir Bodiatsky.⁵⁰¹ Abrams faced a different set of issues in Ghana, and in response, he developed his well-known roof-loan scheme as a variation to the aided self-help housing programs.⁵⁰²

In addition to such policies that Abrams developed in response to Ghana, Abrams wrote to Weissmann from to request the establishment of a UN-sponsored school of architecture and planning there as well. Consequently, Abrams was beginning to think of training as a fundamental component of policy development in dealing with issues in housing and planning. Weissmann once again responded favorably to this request,

With respect to the proposed school in the Gold Coast, I am authorized to inform you that it is under active consideration and my feeling is that the prospects for the project are very good. You may have already heard about it officially from TAA.⁵⁰³

⁵⁰¹ For Abrams' mission in Ghana, see, Charles Abrams, Otto Koenigsberger, and Vladimir Bodiatsky, *Housing in the Gold Coast* (New York: United Nations, 1956); Bernard Taper, "Charles Abrams in Ghana," in *The Work of Charles Abrams*, O.H. Koenigsberger, S. Groak, and B. Bernstein, eds. (Oxford; New York; Toronto; Sydney; Paris; Frankfurt: Pergamon Press, 1980), 49-53; and Charles Abrams, "The Roof-Loan Scheme," in *Men's Struggle...*, 182-194.

⁵⁰² In the roof-loan program, the builders borrowed only a small amount of money in order to afford to put a safe roof on their houses which otherwise they were capable of building themselves. The partial loan scheme was an idea Abrams used in a number of other countries after his mission in Ghana.

⁵⁰³ Unfortunately, the idea of the school was never actually realized in Ghana. Ernest Weissmann, UN-HTCP, New York, to Charles Abrams, Accra, Ghana, 3 December 1954 (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25).

Otto Koenigsberger pursued the project in Ghana and was able to realize the establishment of a school of architecture there as well.⁵⁰⁴

Abrams' shift toward training during his missions in Turkey and Ghana can be compared and contrasted with the missions of two other housing and planning experts during the same period. First, Jacob Crane, who had led a session of his own at the Housing Seminar in New Delhi, went to Greece, after accepting an invitation from Constantine A. Doxiadis, who had established an internationally known planning practice in Athens.⁵⁰⁵ In 1954, Doxiadis asked Crane to prepare a report for the National Mortgage Bank of Greece in helping them to develop the financial and technical aspects of a proposed national housing policy. Immediately after his retirement from the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA), Crane went to Athens to work as a senior consultant for Doxiadis Associates on a number of projects in Greece, the US, and other locations.⁵⁰⁶ Consequently, both Crane and Abrams, at least initially, interested in policy development. However, unlike Abrams, Crane maintained his commitment to policy, presenting in May 1955 his report, "National Housing Policy in Greece," and advocating the building of a Home Loan Savings Bank type program around the existing National Mortgage Bank.⁵⁰⁷ Abrams, based on the Turkish position toward policy development as

⁵⁰⁴ The School in Ghana is beyond the scope of this dissertation, however I am currently collecting information on this school to examine the parallels between the two schools.

⁵⁰⁵ As discussed in chapter two, Doxiadis was also one of the more celebrated participants of the Housing Seminar in New Delhi.

⁵⁰⁶ Crane opened a planning office of his own in Washington, DC, providing consultant services in housing and planning and acting, in some respects, as the US branch of Doxiadis Associates.

⁵⁰⁷ "Guide to the Jacob Leslie Crane Papers," Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, 4.

well as his experiences and observations in Turkey, chose to shift the focus of his recommendations from policy development to training. The developments regarding the establishment of a National Housing Policy in Greece could have been one of the factors that caused the Turkish Ministry of Public Works to also begin initiatives to prioritize plans to implement a National Housing Policy in Turkey as well following Abrams' departure.

The second parallel development was taking place in Central America. After receiving updates from Abrams about the shift in the scope and content of his work in Turkey, Weissmann dispatched Antonio Cruz Kayanan, architect and an in-house UN-HTCP expert, to Costa Rica with the assignment to coordinate national planning programs in Central America under a centralizing agency. Kayanan was to seek help from the Advanced School of Public Administration that was established there in 1954.⁵⁰⁸ *Escuela Superior de Administración Pública América Central* (ESAPAC), very similar to the United Nations Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East in Ankara, was established to train high-level government officials of five countries in Central America; namely, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.⁵⁰⁹ Its program reflected the curricular requirement of emerging public administration programs in the US, composed of formal lectures, field trips, projects involving comparative analyses of budgetary processes and allocations, and organization of Public

⁵⁰⁸ M. Ijlal Muzaffar, "The Periphery Within: Modern Architecture and the Making of the Third World" (Ph.D. diss., MIT, 2007), 127-8.

⁵⁰⁹ ESAPAC was also maintained by the contributions that these five countries made both to ESAPAC and to the UN.

Works departments. One of its central goals was to gather statistical information deemed necessary to develop policies for Central American economies. Kayanan's assignment was another example of how Weissmann sought to position architects and planners to play a central role in the development of country planning strategies of developing countries. Observing how TODAIE had informed the trajectory of Abrams' mission in Turkey, Weissmann and Arthur Goldschmidt, the Director of the Programme Division for Central America of the UN-TAA, advised Kayanan to collaborate with ESAPAC from the very beginning of his efforts.

Even though Kayanan did not propose to establish a school, the fact that he strategized to utilize a school to coordinate the land development policies in five Central American countries shows how Abrams' work in Turkey informed UN's work in other parts of the world as well. At the same time, Kayanan's method of operation in Costa Rica clarifies what Abrams had envisioned as the aims of the school in Turkey. Although he called it a school of architecture and planning, it was essentially a school of public administration but one that would be headed by architects and planners and train a variety of professionals in a multi-disciplinary and collaborative setting. Even though there was not a fully realized example of such a curriculum in the United States, planning programs were increasingly training students in all aspects of public administration. For example, a University of North Carolina class handout announced, "city planning is practiced only incidentally as an art; it is principally a process of public administration."⁵¹⁰

⁵¹⁰ As quoted in, Greg Castillo, "Design Pedagogy Enters the Cold War: The Reeducation of Eleven West German Architects." *JAE* 57 (May 2004): 14. Also see, Hugh R. Pomeroy, "Basic Concepts of Planning," mimeograph: class handout for American Planning Seminar (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, March 25, 1950), 1.

As a culmination of these efforts, the UN-HTCP organized a major seminar in Puerto Rico in March, 1956 entitled, “Training for Town and Country Planning.”⁵¹¹ Weissmann and Kayanan jointly organized the seminar. Abrams did not participate, but almost all of the other key participants of the New Delhi seminar were there. The seminar was organized under three main headings, “The Relation of Planning Education to Physical Planning and Economic and Social Development; Training for the Planning Profession; and Research and Training Institutions for Planning in Latin America.”

Holmes Perkins was among those who took Abrams’ suggestions the most seriously. After he received Abrams’ initial letter regarding the project in Turkey (see chapter three) and as Abrams had hoped, he wrote a detailed letter to Harold Stassen, the head of the Foreign Operations Administration (1953-55) and the former President of the University of Pennsylvania (1948-53), in January, 1955, and asked for FOA support, not just for the project in Turkey, but in creating a comprehensive training program in housing and regional planning for developing countries.⁵¹² He argued that the US should, “train foreign nationals to carry on housing and city planning programs with local resources by providing: First, on the job training; second, scholarship programs to training foreign technicians in US schools; and third, US assistance in the establishment of national or regional schools of housing and city planning.” Perkins also pointed out

⁵¹¹ United Nations, “Training for Town and Country Planning,” *Proceeding of the Seminar on Training for Town and Country Planning Held in Puerto Rico March 1956 (Housing, Building, and Planning Bulletin no. 11 (1957))*.

⁵¹² Perkins to Stassen, 25 January 1955 (METU President’s archives).

that the School of Fine Arts was ready to build a team of experts to carry out such projects.⁵¹³

Abrams officially submitted his report to the UN on August 23, 1955; however, notwithstanding the relatively isolated efforts put forward by Abrams, Weissmann, and Stassen, it would take the international agencies approximately five years to begin to consider the idea of training as a legitimate strategy of instigating economic development. In 1960, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) began a pilot project called the Mediterranean Regional Project (MRP).⁵¹⁴ In this project, which included six countries; namely, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, studies were initiated that would assess the relationship between education and economic and social advancement. The report on the project explained that the starting point for the MRP was the Country Review of Portugal dealing with the problem of highly qualified scientific and technical personnel.⁵¹⁵ This review then led to the Portuguese Government to set targets for educational development with, “a view to producing the highly qualified manpower required by the long-term development objectives of the country’s economy.”⁵¹⁶ Other MRP governments expressed their willingness to participate in the same project by undertaking similar assessment projects

⁵¹³ See chapter five for the challenges Perkins faces in building a team of experts. Although Stassen will provide Perkins his full support, the Eisenhower Administration and the conservative side of the Republican party will once again interfere to curtail Stassen’s foreign policy initiatives.

⁵¹⁴ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Education and Development, *Country Reports: The Mediterranean Regional Project: An Experiment in Planning by Six Countries* (OECD, 1965).

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*

in their own countries. The project was also an experiment to quantify, “the investments in education required for achieving specified economic objectives.”⁵¹⁷

⁵¹⁷ Ibid., 5.

Conclusion

By the time Abrams had officially submitted his report on August 23, 1955, the idea to establish a School of Architecture and Community Planning had already received approval from all agencies involved. In fact, as requested by Abrams and the Turkish Government, a second UN-TAA mission, made up of the University of Pennsylvania School of Fine Arts Dean and two faculty members, had already been to Turkey in April 1955 and had since returned with its own set of recommendations. Consequently, the purpose of the report was different than the letters that Abrams and Olle Sturen had diligently sent in order to solicit support from the UN for the idea of establishing such a school in Turkey. Specifically, the purpose of the report was to lay out a new strategy of operation for the UN in developing countries where US aid was much less available than it had earlier been in Europe. The report also formulated a predominant position for the disciplines of architecture and planning within this new strategy as managers of country programming schemes that the UN was recommending in developing nations.

Consequently, the report Abrams prepared following his mission to Turkey was a revision of the initial report he had prepared for UN-HTCP as a prelude to his numerous overseas missions that he was to embark on beginning with Turkey. In the earlier report, Abrams had advocated policy development as a way of resolving housing and urbanization problems across the world. At this stage, Abrams' commitment to policy was consistent with the development theories that the UN was following. Through country programming strategies, the UN's function was to limit the growing social and economic gaps between the developed and developing nations. These perceived contrasts

between centers and peripheries and between developed and developing nations were seen to be detrimental to the maintenance of the postwar world order. Through sound policies, the UN sought to stabilize newly established states and to set priorities for projects. Abrams, even at this early stage in his career as a UN-expert, wanted to differentiate his position in relation to presiding tenets of development theories. One of the main arguments of his earlier report was that a policy or a program developed for one country could not be applied to another without a thorough examination of that country's administrative practices. He defined policy as something that needed to be developed according to a careful examination of the specific social and economic conditions of each country and region.

In this early report, Abrams defined housing and urbanization as issues that would soon be equally prevalent throughout the whole world. He perceived them as products of the multiple processes of the Industrial Revolution, which he, along with other development theorists, felt that would affect, sooner or later, all countries in slightly different ways.⁵¹⁸ He explained that the housing problem emerged when the processes of the Industrial Revolution put increased pressure on land, increasing its value and making it unavailable for working class housing. In the report, he showed that through sound policies and finance schemes, governments could mediate the processes of the market and make land available for working class housing as well as for other public functions that could not be provided for through the regular processes of capitalism.

⁵¹⁸ Similar to the way Marshall Bermann has talked about the experience of modernity as something that could unite the whole world, Abrams felt that the housing issue would be a common thread across all nations. Instead of Bermann, Abrams was probably thinking of Wendell Willkie's conception of One World, which became one of the conceptual foundations, at least in the public realm, for the UN.

However, during his first overseas mission in Turkey and following his encounters with Turkish officials and professionals, Abrams became aware of a fundamental flaw in UN's mode of operation through policy recommendations. In the context of diminishing US funds available for developing countries, policy recommendations were perceived to be useless by client governments. In the report Abrams developed in response to this situation, he prioritized training and education of an administrative and technical personnel as a central component of policy recommendations. Otherwise, he contended that policy development increased contrasts instead of decreasing them and relied heavily on the ability of a central state to implement such policies judiciously in the peripheries.

As straightforward as Abrams made this sound in his report, the idea of training and education was revolutionary as it envisioned a completely different administrative structure for the Turkish State. Policies, especially those prepared by foreign experts for client governments, by definition, privileged the concerns of international and national agencies further increasing the contrasts between developed and developing nations and between urban and political centers and rural peripheries and municipalities.

By shifting the focus of his recommendations from policy development to the training and education of an administrative and technical personnel, Abrams was proposing a restructuring of that central authority into a regional network that could be more responsive to the varying needs of a wider geography across the nation. The United Nations Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle had already

identified the contrasts between urban centers and rural peripheries as an important issue in Turkey and Abrams' proposal responded directly to this condition.⁵¹⁹

Furthermore, Abrams felt that the disciplines of architecture and planning could play a central role in the construction of this network. As many well-known contemporary authors have argued, another detrimental product of the Industrial Revolution was increasing specialization among professionals within capitalist societies.⁵²⁰ Abrams had found that specialization, although essential to industrial production processes, did not necessarily produce any significant gains in building construction processes. In addition, Abrams defined housing as both a social and an economic issue. Based on the developments Abrams had observed in the leading schools of architecture and planning in the United States, the disciplines of architecture and planning were increasingly seen as two unique disciplines that required collaboration as well as specialization in order to respond to both the social and the economic aspects of the housing question. Consequently, because of the unique collaborative nature of these two disciplines, Abrams proposed to position the disciplines of architecture and planning as the managers that would coordinate the country planning programs that Turkey would devise and implement through the construction and use of this administrative network.

In addition, similar to the way Abrams was proposing to extend the concerns and responsibilities of the centralizing state to the peripheries, he also proposed the expansion

⁵¹⁹ As discussed in chapter three, Abrams had made use of the Institute extensively during his mission.

⁵²⁰ José Ortega y Gasset, *La rebelión de las masas [The Revolt of the Masses]* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1930; New York: W.W. Norton, 1932); and, Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes [Decline of the West]* (München: Beck, 1918).

of the concerns of the architectural and planning professions to include the examination of the needs of the peripheries and to look beyond the way the design professions had been conceptualized traditionally. This proposition included the study and design of squatter housing, village and community centers, indigenous materials and construction methods. These inquiries required collaboration with engineers, industrial designers, financiers, and entrepreneurs as well as social scientists. Once again, Abrams' proposals were in line with the ideas and developments that were emerging in architecture and planning schools in the United States. Also, similar programs had been previously launched to train the ministerial staff of numerous countries.⁵²¹ However, within the Turkish context, Abrams had found the opportunity to position these new and expanded conceptions of the architecture and planning professions in direct relation to the proposed administrative reorganization of the centralizing and authoritative State.

The idea of training and education of an administrative and technical personnel proved to be agreeable to Turkish officials and professionals. The idea to bring premium western education to Turkish professionals had been at the core of the Turkish National Revolutionary ideology. The establishment of an up-to-date school could potentially curb Turkey's ongoing reliance on foreign professionals finally restoring the control of major projects and commissions back into the hands of Turkish architects and engineers.⁵²²

⁵²¹ Many of these had targeted the managerial elite only. ESAPAC in Costa Rica has already been discussed in this chapter. There are other instances. For example, Greg Castillo examines an earlier training program that was designed for German bureaucrats in his, "Design Pedagogy Enters the Cold War: The Reeducation of Eleven West German Architects." *JAE* 57 (May 2004): 10-18. Also see, Liping Bu, "Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War" *Journal of American Studies*, 33 (1999): 393-415.

⁵²² Although it should be mentioned that the professional community was divided in their perceptions of the new school. Aydın Germen argued that it would be hard to imagine any professional

Furthermore, the construction of a wider network of development was also compatible with the aims of the DP Administration, which sought to appeal to those who had been marginalized from the modernizing programs of the national revolution. Within the shifting climate of postwar aid and technical assistance, Abrams felt that the idea of training and education was even more compatible with his ideas of development than policy proposals alone.

Consequently, Abrams' report was a proposal to restructure international aid and cooperation programs. At the same time, despite this radical shift from policy to training and education, one finds that Abrams used the very same frameworks he had used in his earlier report in order to support the idea of training and education. In the report, Abrams did not discuss the political climate in Turkey that had led to the restructuring of his proposal. Instead, Abrams once again described the amplified effects the Industrial Revolution had on developing countries in order to make a case for the structuring of a network. Even though Abrams knew fully well that many of the social and economic transformations that Turkey was experiencing were results of a National, instead of an Industrial Revolution, he chose to continue to describe the conditions in Turkey through the frameworks he had set up based on the Industrial Revolution. In this way, Abrams eliminated the Turkish voice from the larger purposes of the report he was submitting to

community to unanimously support the opening of a new school as this would ultimately mean an increase in the number of practitioners and therefore increasing competition. In addition, Istanbul schools, especially ITU, would now be at a disadvantage in terms of their control of the Ministry of Public Works. Because of this, Istanbul schools observed the opening of the new school in Ankara with much skepticism and concern. The relationship between the new school and the Istanbul schools will be discussed in more detail in chapter five.

the UN.⁵²³ Accordingly, Abrams chose to base his explanations within the frameworks of the Industrial Revolution already accepted by the UN while leaving out the very forces that had led to the formation of the Turkish position, in terms of both their critique and support of Abrams' proposals. At the same time, despite the differences in the way the various parties perceived the project, there were enough overlaps in their perceptions in this case to continue to carry out the project.

Despite Abrams' attempts at implementing the idea of training and education in other countries such as Ghana, the idea never caught on as well as it did within the Turkish context.⁵²⁴ Consequently, even though Abrams did not give voice to the particular political climate he encountered in Turkey, the Turkish national revolutionary ideology was at least one of the important ingredients in getting the project realized and definitely in determining one of the prevailing identities of the school. At the same time, Abrams was right in his original report after all in arguing that a policy, or an idea in this case, developed in response to one country should not be applied to another without a careful examination of its social and economic conditions. Even though Abrams wanted to carry the idea of training with him to other missions, the particular political context in Turkey proved to be the crucial factor in the realization of the idea.

⁵²³ Despite the fact that the national revolutionary ideologies were central to the formation of many nations during the postwar period, development theories perceived them to be detrimental to the formation of a rational society and a postwar world order held together by an organic solidarity.

⁵²⁴ Weissmann had again supported the idea in Ghana.

In a letter Abrams wrote to Catherine Bauer, he told her that the idea of the school was, “probably the most important thing I’ve ever done in my life.”⁵²⁵ Abrams became more and more aware of the importance and difficulty of what he had achieved by succeeding to implement a comprehensive project in training and education. Also, in 1967, at the Delos Five symposium organized by C.A. Doxiadis, Abrams chose to present the Middle East Technical University in Ankara out of the numerous projects he had been involved in across the world. He presented it as one of, “Seven Case Studies for Development,” that were presented at the Symposium.⁵²⁶

At the same time, the other UN experts who were also operating in Turkey at the time perceived the long-term returns that an investment in education and training would bring as a bit of a luxury within the circumstances. For example, a British economist attached to another UN mission in Turkey wrote,

Abrams’ enterprise in starting a school of architecture was in a way a huge joke. It was not what he had been asked to come to do; it was not at all certain that this was what was really needed. On the other hand, there were lots of things which were more obviously needed and which the United Nations had provided experts to help get started, but which for one reason or another were just not making progress. Still it was quite a joy to all of us to see *something actually happening*.⁵²⁷

⁵²⁵ As quoted in Henderson, 181. Also see, Abrams to Catherine Bauer, July 15, 1959, Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, reel 10.

⁵²⁶ Charles Abrams, “The Middle East University of Ankara,” in *Seven Case Studies in the Strategy of Development: Proceedings of Delos Five: Strategy for Human Settlements*, *Ekistics* 24, no. 143 (October, 1967): 346.

⁵²⁷ Bernard Taper, “Charles Abrams in Turkey,” in *The Work of Charles Abrams: Housing and Urban Renewal in the USA and the Third World: A Collection of Papers*, O. H. Koenigsberger, S. Groak, and B. Bernstein, eds. (New York: Bergamon, 1980), 46. Taper does not tell if this economist in particular was a part of the British team whose policy proposals were rejected by the Turkish Government just prior to Abrams’ arrival. The Turkish Government’s refusal to listen to the recommendations of this team was one of the topics of discussion at the UN-TAA office in Ankara when Abrams arrived. He also mentions this incident in his, *Man’s Struggle...*, 202.

Abrams must have sensed that while the school was being established, the municipalities might begin to feel some political pressure to deal with imminent problems in housing and urbanization. Consequently, he attached the policy recommendation he had prepared for the Ministry of Labor as Addendum I and submitted it along with his report.⁵²⁸

As Abrams had predicted, soon after his departure from Turkey, Ministry of Public Works began to pressure the Division of International Economic Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prioritize the ECE project to establish a Ministry of Housing and the US-ICA project to begin investing in an aided self-help housing scheme in Turkey. Between Abrams' departure and the actual opening of the school, there were many attempts from Turkish, UN, as well as US agencies to postpone or shelf the school project in lieu of other upcoming shorter term investments and ideas. Charles Weitz, the full-time Resident Representative of the UN-TAA who replaced Olle Sturen, and Vecdi Diker, in their respective capacities, emerge as the two operatives who used remarkable diplomacy to maintain the School of Architecture and Community Planning project as a priority both among UN-sponsored projects and among projects that dealt with the issue of housing and planning. One finds that both Weitz and Diker did their best to channel all other initiatives and funding in these fields into the realization and justification of this promising project. The next chapter continues to tell the story of how these contentious relationships among these various agencies continued to shape the making and the identity of the school.

⁵²⁸ It is not clear if Abrams ever submitted the recommendation he had prepared for the Ministry of Public Works.

Chapter Five:
Continuing Debates: Building an Institutional Model
for Training and Education, 1955-56

Charles Abrams had succeeded in building a working consensus amongst national and international agencies, despite their diverging interests, to support the establishment of a UN-sponsored school in Ankara, Turkey. Abrams had also recommended that Holmes Perkins and the University of Pennsylvania organize the next UN mission to further define the program for the School. Approximately six months after Charles Abrams' mission to Turkey in October, 1954, a second UN mission led by Holmes Perkins, Dean of the School of Fine Arts at the University of Pennsylvania, (hereafter, the Penn team) arrived in Turkey on April 17, 1955. The Penn team's task was to build an institutional model for the idea of training and education as it was being formulated by Abrams while also maintaining the support of involved parties.⁵²⁹

Through an analysis of the report that the Penn team submitted to the UN as well as other correspondence between Perkins and UN, US, and Turkish officials, the chapter finds that the particular way in which the Penn team defined and structured the relationship between foreign experts and Turkish officials and professionals emerges as the primary factor that determined how Abrams' idea of training was ultimately received and implemented within the Turkish context. The Penn team was able to assert such

⁵²⁹ By the time of the Penn team's departure for Turkey, Abrams had not yet submitted his official report to the UN where he fully formulated the idea of training and education as a new development model. In fact, following the Penn teams' mission to Turkey, Abrams and Perkins submitted their respective reports at the same time in August, 1955. For the analysis of Abrams' report and what he meant by the idea of training and education, see chapter four.

fundamental influence through the way they defined the scope and content of the School as well as its budget, curriculum, and staffing.

The first part of the chapter examines the impact that the particular relationship between the Penn team, the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), and the Democrat Party (DP) Administration had on the configuration of the budget, curriculum, and staffing of the School. Whether the School would be established as a school of architecture and planning or a technical university emerged as the key area of contention especially between the DP Administration and US agencies, nearly undoing the consensus previously forged by Abrams. The local FOA agents understood Abrams to be proposing an institute that would initiate research and development projects and provide training in the fields of housing and planning in Turkey. FOA hoped that this would potentially create partnerships between US and Turkish finance structures, companies, industries, and professionals.⁵³⁰ The DP Administration perceived the project as a technical university that would serve Turkey and the larger Middle East while also supporting DP's bid to position Turkey as a cultural and economic center in the region. Although Abrams had initially proposed a school of architecture and planning to the UN, he knew that ultimately an interdisciplinary program with multiple departments was needed in order to carry out the administrative revolution he had in mind.⁵³¹ Consequently, there was considerable divergence in how the various agencies had come to perceive the project in terms of both scope and content.

⁵³⁰ See the discussion of the SOM Report in chapter one and Abrams' meeting with Avra Warren, US Ambassador to Turkey, in chapter three.

⁵³¹ For an in-depth analysis of the background to each of these positions, see chapter one.

The Penn team responded to this difference by proposing an institution that would be initially established as a school of architecture with two research institutes and grow incrementally based on an interdisciplinary curriculum and according to the research and teaching needs of these initial units. This structure was designed to appeal to various interested parties, including FOA. Even though FOA's perception of the project was most limited in scope, FOA support was centrally important, at least from Perkins' point of view. Perkins approached the project in Turkey as a pilot program that would provide an institutional model for his desire to embrace training as a new strategy for development. With UN's international reach and FOA funding, Perkins hoped to position Penn as the primary institution that would oversee the establishment of similar training institutes in other parts of the world.

The second part of the chapter examines the breakdown of the FOA's participation in the project despite considerable efforts on Perkins' part to keep them involved. This portion of the chapter reveals how, following FOA's departure, the UN took a keen interest in the project, providing the necessary funds. Abrams had proposed that Holmes Perkins and the University of Pennsylvania be involved in setting up the program for the School because he had been particularly impressed with not only the interdisciplinary program Perkins was building at Penn but also the partnerships that he had forged between this program and the housing and urban development programs that were being implemented in Philadelphia.⁵³² Abrams felt that similar relationships could be constructed at an international level, between the School in Turkey, the Turkish State

⁵³² See chapter three for a more detailed discussion of why Abrams had picked Perkins and the University of Pennsylvania among other prominent programs in architecture and planning.

offices and international agencies. Perkins was particularly adept at giving form to these relationships as he set up the administrative, curricular, and the spatial structure of the School.

By extending the amount of time foreign experts spent in a client country, Abrams was proposing to revolutionize the way the international technical assistance machinery was operating during the postwar period. However, the chapter finds that, as the Penn team set up the budget, curriculum, and staffing of the School, they made assumptions that valued the position of international experts more than their local counterparts, a move that adversely effected the relationship that they were trying to create between foreign experts and local professionals. For example, the Penn team structured the curriculum of the School in a very different way than what the existing bureaucrats and professionals were used to. In addition, the way they set up the School's salary structure created disparities between the UN staff and Turkish faculty, which marginalized the contributions of the Turkish faculty. Lastly, the designation of English as the primary language of instruction tilted the balance of power towards the advantage of foreign experts. The Turkish political and professional elite valued the revolutionary ideas that Abrams and Perkins touted and perceived the implementation of western educational models as a necessary component of achieving the aims of Turkish national revolutionary ideology. However, some of the assumptions through which the Penn team gave form to Abrams' administrative revolution threatened the legitimacy of the project in the eyes of Turkish observers. The Turkish ministerial staff, professionals, and faculty began to look

for ways to take control of the School while maintaining the innovative components of the project initiated by the foreign experts.

5.1 The Penn Team and the Initial Scope of the Project

As pointed out earlier, Abrams' proposal to shift from policy to training had struck a chord not only with the UN, but also with educators such as Holmes Perkins and institutions like the University of Pennsylvania. Following Abrams' recommendations, Ernest Weissmann and the UN-HTCP had entered into a contract with Holmes Perkins and the University of Pennsylvania in April 1955 to put together a team of experts to travel to Ankara in order to configure the School's curricular program. This portion of the chapter examines how the Penn team was formed and how the idea of training for development that was begun by Abrams evolved in response to the contentious climate amongst members of the technical assistance machinery

Staffing the Team

Within the political context of the mid-1950s, participating in UN missions even for a short term was not an appealing engagement for a US citizen for a variety of reasons, such as inadequate compensation and lengthy background checks by the CIA. Consequently, despite the attractiveness of the opportunity to participate in the establishment of a new School of Architecture or perhaps even a University in the Middle East, staffing Abrams' nascent School became one of the most debilitating challenges of the project.

In his letter to Weissmann, Abrams had mentioned Martin Meyerson and William Wheaton as possible candidates for the Penn team that would travel to Turkey with Perkins to set up the program for the School. Both Meyerson and Wheaton already had double duties, teaching in Penn's Department of City Planning and working on projects

in the Institute for Urban Studies.⁵³³ In a letter to Perkins, Abrams had brought up Bill (William) Holford's name. Holford (1907-1975), a British architect and town planner, was engaged in Australia and was only loosely associated with the program at Penn.⁵³⁴ As discussed in chapter three, Perkins, following his appointment as the Dean of the School of Fine Arts, had been able to attract to Penn and to Philadelphia a most outstanding group of professionals in the fields of architecture and planning. However, every one of these individuals was already engaged in projects. Perkins needed consistent funding in order to expand the team to take on more projects.

Perkins' letter to Harold Stassen, the former president of the University of Pennsylvania and the current director of the FOA, and the FOA was an attempt to obtain such funding for the Institute for Urban Studies. While both Perkins and William Wheaton continued conversations with FOA, Perkins focused his attention on securing the UN contract for the project in Turkey. Through this project, his goal was to build the beginnings of a team that would engage in similar international projects pending funding and further opportunities. Fortunately, all was proceeding as planned since Perkins had received a draft budget and contract from the UN.

⁵³³ Abrams to Weissmann, 2 October 1954.

⁵³⁴ Abrams, in his initial letter to Perkins, makes the assumption that Perkins would want to bring Holford with him and writes that that would be fine with him, "If you think Bill Holford should be on the team, its [sic] fine. He is after all a U of Pa. teacher!" See, Abrams to Perkins, Oct. 6, 1954. In response to Abrams' request, Perkins wrote, "There is certainly nothing I would like better than to take Bill Holford along and I do not think you could name a better person who could do more for them in Turkey in the light of his experience and his interest both as an architect and as a planner. I know you are aware as to how scarce these people are, and it may take some hard searching before we find a man who is good enough to stay there and who would be willing to do it as well. However, I agree with you as to the importance of the job and think we ought to give it a try." See, Perkins to Abrams, October 14, 1954.

Prior to a meeting in New York regarding the project, Perkins wrote to Taghi Nasr, Chief of the Technical Assistance Administration's Office for Europe, Middle East, and Africa, addressing both budgetary and staffing concerns and attaching a revised contract to his letter.⁵³⁵ The original UN contract provided \$12,800 to pay the "salaries, travel, and other related expenses" of three experts for a minimum of three months in Turkey. The amount and duration of the contract were generally along the lines discussed in earlier conversations. However, Perkins had two issues to be further clarified.⁵³⁶ First, the contract sum was about 20% more than the \$10,000 initially mentioned in Abrams' letter to Perkins in early October 1954. The difference was almost exactly the amount that the University of Pennsylvania would charge for overhead and indirect expenses. The UN must have foreseen that Perkins would need to request that the UN pay for the University's overhead costs in order to have enough money left to pay the experts. Consequently, Perkins wanted the contract to specify that 20% of this sum would go to pay indirect or overhead costs in order to provide a more accurate picture of the salaries the experts would actually receive.

Second, Perkins noted that, during his earlier conversations with Weissmann, they had agreed on a shorter period of time for the mission; according to his estimations, they could get the job done in six weeks. He offered, "If we could not complete the job in that time we might have to leave behind one of the members to tie up the loose ends and his

⁵³⁵ Holmes Perkins to Taghi Nasr, (copy to Ernest Weissmann), 22 March 1955 (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Library, Reel 25).

⁵³⁶ Ibid. It is beneficial to point these out here since these two issues, in a clear and isolated manner, foreshadow the challenges that the project would continuously face in terms of the interrelated issues of funding and staffing throughout its inception and development.

stay might extend to something approaching three months although I would expect it would be somewhat less.”⁵³⁷

Third, again based on the suggestions Abrams had made in his initial letter, Perkins requested that the UN should arrange for additional funds to cover various job related expenses that the Penn team may have. He asked that the following line item be added to the contract under Article II, Responsibilities of the United Nations,

c. To arrange for payment directly to members of the mission while on duty in Turkey of the per diem living allowance as established by the United Nations Technical Assistance Board and to arrange for local transportation and the provision of necessary office space, clerical and translation services for the mission while on duty in Turkey. Any payments made for such per diem allowances, local transportation, and the above services shall be in addition to and not a part of the sum \$12,800.00 set forth in Article II, a.⁵³⁸

Perkins then noted, “the University will be prepared to sign on the basis of the attached revision or on a mutually agreeable substitute. I am sure that you and I can reach that agreement on Friday,” when their meeting was scheduled. The budgetary differences between Nasr’s and Perkins’ proposals were indeed negligible. The only major difference between what Abrams had requested and what Perkins was providing had to do with the fact that Perkins had not been able to come up with a way to allow one of his team members to remain in Turkey between the end of the mission and the opening of the School.

Despite this difference, Perkins was confident about the team that he had been able to put together. At the end of his letter, he announced,

⁵³⁷ Ibid., 2.

⁵³⁸ “Draft Contract between the United Nations and the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania,” 23 March 1955 (Charles Abrams papers, Cornell University Archives), 2.

I am pleased to be able to tell you that Mr. George Howe, F.A.I.A., and the former head of the Yale School of Architecture and one of the most distinguished practitioners in the United States has agreed to join Prof. Loschetter and myself as a member of this mission. Our present plans look forward hopefully to flying April 11 or 12.⁵³⁹

Securing Howe's involvement in the project was indeed a triumph on Perkins' part, given that he was almost as influential as Wallace Harrison and also had experience as an educator.⁵⁴⁰ In this respect, the fact that Perkins had been able to recruit a well-known architect like Howe more than made up the difference between his and Nasr's budgets. It was very crafty of Perkins to save this piece of news to the end of the letter. The fact that a team had been formed and was ready to depart for Turkey left little room for Nasr to negotiate Perkins' proposed contract.

At the same time, Perkins did not neglect Abrams' request that at least one of the members of the team should remain in Turkey if at all possible in order to provide continuity between that mission and the opening of the School as well as to ensure that steps in Turkey were taken in a timely manner. Perkins was not able to accommodate this request, and the UN had not provided a budget for this service. Instead, Perkins designated Léon Loschetter, Associate Professor in Architecture, as the Penn faculty member who would come back to Turkey with the next team to establish the School and to provide continuity between the two missions. In addition to the project in Turkey, Loschetter was to lead a very similar mission in Pakistan, sponsored by the Ford

⁵³⁹ Perkins to Nasr, 22 March 1955, 2.

⁵⁴⁰ George Howe (1886-1955) was the Chair of the Department of Architecture at Yale from 1950 to 1954. Payaslıoğlu notes that Perkins announced Howe's involvement in the project at Penn on March 5, 1955. See, Payaslıoğlu, 15.

Foundation, to establish another School of Architecture and Planning during the following year, in April – May 1957.⁵⁴¹ In this way, Perkins had begun to formulate the beginnings of an international team, led by Loschetter, that would work in collaboration with other international agencies to establish schools of architecture and planning in various parts of the world.

At the last minute, however, Howe unexpectedly fell ill and could not participate in the mission. Unable to spare a second faculty member from the School, Perkins recruited Wilhelm (Willo) Viggo von Moltke (Germany, 1911 – Boston, 1987), Architect, Urban Planner, and Chief Designer at the Philadelphia City Planning Commission (1954-61), to join the team that would soon depart for Turkey.

Holding Consensus: Penn Team, FOA, and the DP Administration

Despite these last minute adjustments, the Penn team arrived in Ankara on April 17 and began a series of meetings with a number of agencies in Turkey including the UN-TAA, Turkish Ministries, and administrative officials of existing universities in Ankara and Istanbul regarding the scope and content of the new school to be established in Ankara.⁵⁴² During these meetings, the Penn team became aware of how tenuously the idea of a new school was supported among these parties. Abrams had succeeded in obtaining support for the project from top officials of various national and international

⁵⁴¹ For Loschetter's involvement in Pakistan, see, Léon Loschetter, *Report on Mission to Pakistan*, April – May 1957 (Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania).

⁵⁴² For a full list of officials and other persons with whom the Perkins team discussed the project, see appendix 5 of the Penn report. Georgia Perkins, Perkins' wife, accompanied the team in Turkey and kept notes of their daily activities in her diary. For excerpts from her diary, see Payashoğlu, 15-16.

agencies, but even among them the idea was perceived in widely contrasting ways. At the same time, their political and financial support for the project depended on whether the School would be established according to their aims for the project.

Whereas leaders of both the RPP and the DP parties wanted the School to be established as a Technical University, the Foreign Operations Administration office in Turkey (FOA; after May 1955, International Cooperation Administration, ICA; and later, US-AID), the primary US aid agency in Turkey, gradually began to assert that it would provide the necessary foreign currency if and only if the project was limited in scope to a research institute that focused on issues of housing and community planning.⁵⁴³ Turkish professionals and educators were somewhat divided in their responses. While they, in principle, supported the idea of a new educational institution, they felt ambivalent about the possibility that the new institution might outshine existing programs, introduce competition, increase the number of professionals, and form closer alliances with government offices. Others were against the idea of the establishment of a UN- or a US-sponsored institution, objecting to the idea of a foreign school altogether.

Following their arrival, the Penn team held meetings and conducted site visits to existing programs and universities in order to solicit the input of Turkish officials, politicians, educators, and professionals for the project. They also visited potential sites around Ankara considered for the campus of the proposed School or the University. The Penn team visited the Technical University of Istanbul, the Academy of Fine Arts of

⁵⁴³ Perkins had become aware of the local FOA's reluctance to support the project prior to his departure. In a later letter to Nasr, Perkins wrote, "You will remember that we [the Penn team] hesitated a long time about going [to Turkey] at all because of the local objections of the FOA to the expansion of their program." Perkins to Nasr, 28 June 1955.

Istanbul, Ankara University, the Ankara Trade Institute, and the Ankara Technical Teachers Training College.⁵⁴⁴ It held its first formal meeting on April 27 with the Minister of Education (Celal Yardımcı) and the Government Committee (Ahmet Tokuş, Vecdi Diker, Mithat Yenen, Adli Yener), which was followed, by further meetings and conferences on May 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, and 14 (**figure 5.1**). The team was also able to meet with and solicit full support from top officials including Celal Bayar, the President; and Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister; as well as Refik Koraltan, President of the National Assembly; Mükerrerrem Sarol, Minister of State; Muammer Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Transport; Kemal Zeytinoğlu, Minister of Public Works; and Osman Faruk Verimer, Acting Under-Secretary of Education.⁵⁴⁵

During these meetings, while the Penn team discussed the School's scope and content with Turkish officials, they also kept the local FOA agents abreast of new developments. They wanted to make sure that what was emerging as a result of these meetings did not jeopardize FOA support. The Penn team understood the FOA to be a key player in implementing the idea of training as a development strategy. Perkins was trying to secure a long-term partnership with FOA that might lead to the establishment of other training institutions in housing and planning. Consequently, he wanted to make sure both the local and the central FOA were involved in the program's configuration in Turkey.

⁵⁴⁴ United Nations, Technical Assistance Programme, *Report on the Establishment of a School for the Teaching of Architecture and Community Planning in Turkey*, prepared by G. Holmes Perkins, Léon Loschetter, and Wilhelm V. von Moltke, File No. TAA 173/57/018, Report No. TAA/TUR/14, 23 August 1955, UN Archives, New York. Hereafter cited as, *The Penn report*, 1955.

⁵⁴⁵ Penn report, appendix 5, 27-28.

Perkins was aware that the local FOA agents supported the project only as an institute of housing and planning, while the DP Administration maintained that it should be a University. The Turkish position seemed unrealistic to the local FOA, but it was important to the UN both in terms of experimenting with the administrative revolution proposed by Abrams and in terms of strengthening UN-Turkish relations. At the same time, Perkins was concerned that the FOA would abandon the project. Working within this context, while the team developed their general recommendations for the scope and content of the School, Perkins maintained contacts with the central FOA in Washington, DC, hoping that Stassen could provide a solution to the situation in Turkey.

The break Perkins was hoping for arrived in the form of a short note from George L. Reed, the Acting Chief of the Housing Division of the FOA in Washington, DC. Reed announced, "It now appears possible that we might be considering the proposed support of the Architecture Planning School in Ankara. I hope to discuss this on the telephone with you or Bill Wheaton this week."⁵⁴⁶ Two days later, Wheaton wrote to Perkins that the FOA was able to put aside \$300,000 for three years for the project in Ankara.⁵⁴⁷ Perkins was relieved that the central FOA had resolved to provide aid for the project regardless of its scope. The Penn team proceeded to configure the curriculum and staffing needs of the School based these figures, while remaining mindful of the local FOA's concerns.

⁵⁴⁶ George L. Reed to Perkins, 25 April 1955.

⁵⁴⁷ Wheaton to Perkins, 27 April 1955, as quoted in Payashoğlu, 26.

FOA and the Curriculum and Staffing of the School

Based on these developments, the report that the team compiled for the School began by thanking all “who contributed in a most helpful fashion to the knowledge and understanding of the Mission.”⁵⁴⁸ Understanding that the key parties differed significantly in their expectations of the School’s scope and content, the Penn team found it advisable to first re-establish and confirm the conclusions that had been reached during Abrams’ mission.⁵⁴⁹ The team maintained:

(a) that there is an imperative need for an additional School of Architecture and Community Planning (of University rank) in Turkey.

(b) that the country is in a period of rapid industrial expansion, of urbanization, and of a changing rural pattern; that the physical patterns being recreated will have a lasting influence upon the country’s future regions, cities, and villages, and that the proper development of the country cannot be assured through the aid of foreign experts alone.

(c) that foreign experts are needed to advise on the creation of the institution, to staff it with competent teachers during the early years and to prepare Turkish architects and city planners to assume leadership in the school and in the profession over the long term.⁵⁵⁰

By reiterating the conclusions that Abrams had reached, the team sought to achieve two things. First, they wanted to maintain the consensus that Abrams had forged among

⁵⁴⁸ Hereafter, I will refer to the report compiled by the Penn team as the Penn report. During the discussion of the Penn report, it is important to keep in mind that Abrams and the Penn team submitted their respective reports to the UN at the same time in August 1955. It is possible that Abrams and Perkins corresponded in order to ensure that the points and recommendations made in each report did not contradict the other.

⁵⁴⁹ Abrams and Perkins must have collaborated in drafting these portions of the Penn report.

⁵⁵⁰ The Penn report, 4.

diverging agents.⁵⁵¹ Second, the team was aware that the limited initial scope of the project, as Abrams had established, appealed to the investments of the local FOA agents. At the same time, in order to appeal to Turkish interests, they proposed that the School, “in the future and as experience and opportunity afford, would be expanded to embrace engineering and other technical disciplines.”⁵⁵²

While negotiating the differences between Turkish and US agencies, the team found an opportunity to establish a University first as a School of Architecture and Planning and then to develop it based on the teaching and research needs of this central program. They wrote that this conceptualization should have a, “decisive influence upon the form, organization and curricula of the institution, and upon the choice of its location and site.”⁵⁵³ However, before discussing how the team configured the key details of this relationship, it is helpful to first understand how they shaped the interdisciplinary curriculum of the School of Architecture in relation to the diverging conceptions of the project.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵¹ In his letter to Nasr, Perkins repeatedly pointed out the amazing feat that Abrams had achieved prior to the Penn team’s arrival. He also emphasized that Weitz had worked hard to maintain that consensus until the Penn team’s arrival. Perkins wrote, “I have come away convinced that had it not been for the firm foundation laid by Abrams and Weitz we would never have succeeded in having the thing run as smoothly and in as friendly a fashion as it did.” Perkins to Nasr, 28 June 1955, 2-3.

⁵⁵² The Penn report, 4.

⁵⁵³ The Penn report, 4.

⁵⁵⁴ How the interdisciplinary structure of the School of Architecture was reflected in the administrative and spatial organization of the University will be discussed in chapter six.

An Interdisciplinary Curriculum for a University

The Penn team described the basic structure and content of the School under, “Part C: General Recommendations,” portion of their report. With these recommendations, the team constructed a dual identity for the School that would be realized in two stages. These two identities corresponded to the two different ways the FOA and the DP perceived the School. At the very beginning of these points, the team defined the project to be the founding of a University. They then described the process through which the project would begin as a school of architecture and planning with two research institutions and grow into a university. After establishing that a Board of Trustees would make up the governing body of the University, they confirmed its stature as a regional university, in response to DP’s concerns, as the Middle East Technical University. The team recommended:

(a) that the new institution be of University rank but independent of any existing University.

(b) that the institution be conceived as a training center for a future integrated building industry and as a medium for modernization of building techniques and materials, building codes, zoning and subdivision regulations, city and regional planning legislation; such a concept will have a decisive influence upon the form, organization and curricula of the institution, and upon the choice of its location and site; only through close integration in the teaching of skilled mechanics, technicians, contractors, producers of building materials, industrial designers, engineers, architects, and city and regional planners, can a better understanding of common problems be achieved and a more modern and practical attitude towards building be efficiently promoted.

(c) that the first step towards this goal should be the creation of a Faculty of Architecture, a Faculty of City and Regional Planning, a Research Institute for the Modernization of Construction Methods and Materials, and a Research Institute for Housing, Regional, City and Village Planning looking to the addition of faculties of engineering in the near future.

(d) that the institution be governed by an independent Board of Trustees appointed by the Government; that each Trustee hold office for ten years with staggered terms; that two Trustees be appointed to represent the Government, one appointed from a list of three nominated by the Chamber of Industry, one from a list of three nominated by the University of Pennsylvania (for the first four years the University of Pennsylvania will nominate the Alumni Trustee); that Advisory Committees be appointed by the Trustees upon nomination by the President of the institution for each Faculty or Research Institute from the relevant profession or related fields which shall make annual inspections and public reports.

(e) that the name of the institution be the Middle East Technical University.⁵⁵⁵

The establishment of the School as “independent of any existing University” was an especially heavily debated issue. The local FOA held that the School should be established as an Institute and as component of an existing university or a program. They argued that Turkey did not have the resources to establish a new comprehensive university and that the available resources should be spent to build and update existing programs.⁵⁵⁶ Turkish academicians, educators, and the professional community agreed with the local FOA officials on this particular issue. The administrators of existing schools felt that a new technical school in Ankara could threaten the importance and the resources allocated to their schools. The professional community, most of whom worked in ministerial offices, were threatened by the establishment of a new school that could potentially produce better qualified staff for state offices.

At the same time, the DP Administration was decisive in conceiving the institution as a separate and new Technical University in Ankara so that it might function as a symbol of the changes they had brought to Turkey. Abrams and the Penn team

⁵⁵⁵ Penn report, 4.

⁵⁵⁶ The FOA position will be discussed in more detail in the second portion of this chapter.

supported the idea of an independent institution. Abrams, based on his observations of the United Nations Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East, had arrived at the conclusion that the School needed to be established as an independent institution. In their view, it was critical that it be established in Ankara and in a close relationship with the State, if it were to bring needed reforms to the Turkish administrative, architectural and planning cultures. Otherwise, the established system in existing schools could nullify the new School's innovations.⁵⁵⁷ An independent institution would also give the Penn team the freedom and the opportunity to create a model implementing Abrams' idea of training for development. Consequently, despite the position of the local FOA, educators, and professionals, the Penn team insisted that the new institution would be "of University rank but independent of any existing University." The team further elaborated on this point to justify their position. The team held that the School should be established as a separate unit, in Ankara, and in direct relationship to the State:

(i) that there are decisive advantages to the creation of a new school rather than the expansion of existing ones because:

1. experience indicates that there is an upper limit to the optimum size of architecture and city planning schools;
2. of the obvious advantages accruing to both old and new schools through friendly competition in the development of the best possible training;
3. greater independence to develop a newer, more practical and modern approach to architecture and planning.

⁵⁵⁷ Abrams also addressed this point in his report under the sub-section, "The Problem of an Independent School versus a Departmental Unit of the University of Ankara." See, Abrams Report, 11; and, chapter four.

Therefore it is recommended that the new school not be in Istanbul where two already exist and that there appear to be advantages to locating in Ankara because it is contemplated that extensive aid can be given the Government more effectively in this city by the Research Institute as outlined in the description of their objectives.⁵⁵⁸

The conception of the new School as a university independent of existing institutions and located in close proximity to the State were perhaps two of the most contentious claims that the team made. Its establishment as an independent unit was, as mentioned above, problematic to the FOA. In addition, by positioning the School as the central advisory institution to the State, the Penn team was altering the traditional role of the Istanbul Technical University (ITU) and therefore threatening the role of many ITU students and alumni within the State ministries, especially the Ministry of Public Works.⁵⁵⁹ ITU alumni could certainly act as a political force to be reckoned with especially since many of the ministries were under their control. If they were to perceive the School as a threat to their professional legitimacy, they could potentially hurt the relationships that the School sought to establish with the State. The Penn team tried to address both of these concerns in the way they configured the curriculum and staffing of the School and its research institutes.

In their report, the Penn team presented the basic organization of the School of Architecture and Community Planning in three interdependent charts (**appendices 5.1, 5.2a, & 5.3a**). During this first phase of development, the team did not project the

⁵⁵⁸ Penn report, 4-5. The items between (e) and (i), which I did not include here, deal primarily with the University campus and will be discussed under chapters six and seven.

⁵⁵⁹ Abrams, in his letter to Weissmann, had recognized the dominant role of the engineers from ITU in the Turkish bureaucracy.

establishment of any new major departments beyond the School of Architecture and Planning. The School was to begin instruction by providing a core curriculum during the first three years. Similar to the curriculum at Penn, the first three years were to form the basis of an interdisciplinary program. The idea of implementing a singular program appealed to FOA's perception of the project while also establishing the foundations of an interdisciplinary program.

At Penn, Perkins had transformed the existing Beaux Arts curriculum into an interdisciplinary program only a few years prior to his engagement with the establishment of the School in Turkey. Perkins explained the reasons behind the shift at Penn in the 1952-1953 *Bulletin* as follows:

Today the School of Fine Arts is composed of the departments of Architecture, City Planning, Design, Landscape Architecture, History of Art, Music and the Institute of Urban Studies.... Each of the triumvirate of mutually dependent professional courses in architecture, city planning and landscape architecture is five years in length.... The work of the first three years of the professional courses in architecture, city planning and landscape architecture is, except in rare cases, identical in content, reflecting the fact that all are parts of a common field whose processes and objectives are the same. Each gains added vitality and usefulness by the growth of understanding of their common goals and from habits of collaborative work. The understanding between the professions thus developed during the first three years is nurtured through collaborative problems in the later years...⁵⁶⁰

Immediately after his arrival from Harvard, Perkins had begun to transform the curriculum at Penn, with Stassen's support, much as Hudnut had done at Harvard under James Conant's leadership.⁵⁶¹ One important difference between the approach of Perkins and Hudnut was that Perkins also became increasingly involved in the Philadelphia

⁵⁶⁰ As quoted in Strong, *Book of the School*, 135.

⁵⁶¹ For Perkins' background prior to his deanship at Penn, see chapter three.

Planning Commission as a means of bridging the gap between education and practice to an extent that Hudnut and Gropius had not been able to do at Harvard.

The curriculum that the Penn team constructed for METU pushed the Penn model one step further by getting rid of the BArch program altogether (**appendix 5.5**). At METU, the Penn team condensed the five-year BArch degree that was offered at Penn into a 3 + 1 Master's degree program in Architecture. The condensed program incorporated a faculty-supervised practical training requirement during the first three summers of the curriculum.⁵⁶² During the fourth and final year of the program, the students could choose to continue with Architecture and earn an MArch degree at the end of their fourth year, or they could shift to the Master's program in Planning. Their report described the Architecture curriculum as follows:

The proposed curriculum in architecture is eleven terms in length including three required terms of practical study and field experience under the direction of the Faculty. It may be completed in four calendar years. Two options are offered in the final year.⁵⁶³

The team proposed that the School would begin offering courses in Planning during the fourth year of its establishment. Students who had completed the three-year core curriculum could choose to pursue a Master's degree in City Planning by taking courses in this department for two additional years. The team described the program as follows:

⁵⁶² The summer practical training program was probably one of the first design/build programs implemented in a school of architecture. I will discuss the nature of these summer design/build workshops under the next sub-chapter. During the first summer, the curriculum required a field practice in construction. During the second summer, an internship in an architectural office was required; and during the third summer, an internship in a planning office was required. See appendix 5.1.

⁵⁶³ The Penn team described the curricula and the admission requirements of the School under the same, "Part E," of their report. The Penn report, 8.

The proposed curriculum in City and Regional Planning is fourteen terms in length including four terms of practical study and field experience. It may be completed in five calendar years. The first three years (nine terms) are identical with the architectural curriculum; in the fourth year the student follows option 2 and receives the degree of Yuksek [sic] Mimar; and in the fifth year completes the remaining courses in City and Regional Planning and receives the degree in Yuksek Sehirci [sic].⁵⁶⁴

In addition, the team proposed that advanced work in architecture and city and regional planning should be offered by the professors in charge, for which a doctor's degree would be given upon completion of an original, published doctoral thesis.

Both the four-year (3+1) Master's degree in Architecture and the five-year (3+2) Master's degree in City Planning were innovative additions to the programs that were available to students in Turkey in the mid-1950s. Istanbul Technical University (ITU), offered a Master's in Architecture + Engineering degree which required a minimum of five years of study, in addition to a more conventional Master's in Engineering degree **(appendix 5.6)**.⁵⁶⁵ At ITU, the students were required to take four semesters of courses in City Planning, however, there was no option of an autonomous degree in Architecture or City Planning. Overall, the program at ITU, as Abrams had observed, was structured around engineering, while the new program at METU was structured around the three-year core interdisciplinary curriculum. In this way, METU's curriculum provided an interdisciplinary curriculum with opportunities to specialize in a specific discipline. After their shared coursework, students at METU could specialize in a field that interested

⁵⁶⁴ Penn report, 8.

⁵⁶⁵ Turkish Technical Information Center, *Guide of the Technical University of Istanbul, 1958-59*, translated and arranged by Chemical Engineer H. Ibrahim Özdemir (Istanbul: Turkish Technical Information Center, 1957), 111-135.

them the most while maintaining the ability to relate to their peers in other disciplines because of their shared core curriculum.

The METU program would thus provide a significant advantage to their graduates, especially in the fields of architecture and planning, in comparison to ITU graduates. In addition, METU's interdisciplinary curriculum would potentially better prepare students for public service, insofar as projects of significant scale and importance would require interaction across disciplines. In order to equalize the differences between the METU and ITU graduates, the curriculum at METU allowed graduates of other programs to apply to the final two years of the curriculum in Planning.⁵⁶⁶ This program was made available to graduates in the fields of "Civil Engineering, Public Administration, Economics, Geography, Sociology, Law, Political Science, and other relevant fields," again to encourage an interdisciplinary student body in this department.⁵⁶⁷

Role of the Institutes

In addition to these curricular innovations, the Penn team also proposed the establishment of two research institutes so that the School could immediately begin to fulfill its function as a consultant to the Turkish Government on issues concerning housing, construction, and planning. The Research Institute for Modernization of Construction Methods and Materials would be complemented by the Research Institute

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁷ METU Catalog, 1956-57.

for Housing, Regional-, City- and Village Planning.⁵⁶⁸ Both institutes were conceived as regional research centers embodying the functions of the UN-HTCP at a regional level and operating as a branch in the Middle East. The team defined the function of the first institute as follows:

The objective of this Institute is to promote through research, publication and the organization of regional seminars, the modernization of the building industry. It will not be a testing laboratory for new materials, but will rely upon co-operation with the Government sponsored bureau for information of this nature. It should promote the better utilization of local materials and resources. In addition, it should undertake studies leading to the standardization of sizes and types of building materials and the modernization of construction methods, and at the same time act as a catalyst to bring about agreement on these points between producers of materials, builders, engineers and architects. Its activities should not be confined to Turkey but it should serve as a Building Research Center for the Middle East at which experts and students from many countries should be encouraged to share experiences.⁵⁶⁹

The team also pointed out that this Institute would also function as an indispensable component of the School of Architecture as it would expose students to the “major practical problems of the profession and of the building industry.”⁵⁷⁰ At Penn, Perkins had explained that it was essential to expose the students to the actual problems of the built environment and the institutes, through the research and application projects in which they would become involved, exposed students to architecture and planning in practice. At Penn, Perkins had explained the importance of fieldwork as follows:

By personal field investigation, by visits to neighborhoods and communities, by study of the social and economic problems of the family and of the forms of

⁵⁶⁸ Penn report, 9.

⁵⁶⁹ The Penn team described the objectives of these Institutes under, “Part F,” of their report. Penn report, 9.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

social and political organization, and by first-hand contact with the city and rural landscape, the student prepares, under guidance, the programs which form the basis for his designs. Thus the student of architecture, city planning, and landscape architecture becomes aware of the social basis of his art and is prepared to serve mankind more sympathetically and effectively.⁵⁷¹

The team described the function of the Research Institute for Housing, Regional, City and Village Planning in similar terms:

The objectives of this Institute are the development and dissemination of knowledge in these fields; service to the Government in the evolution of city, regional, and village planning and housing projects; the preparation of physical planning standards for housing, health centers, schools, playgrounds, parks, commercial quarters, industrial districts, car parking, village planning, etc.; provision of leadership in these fields in the Middle East through meetings of delegates from several countries; the preparation of new literature on these subjects and the translation and distribution of the best foreign publications, and organization of planning exhibitions.⁵⁷²

The team also pointed out that problems in housing and regional planning were fast emerging throughout the larger region of the Middle East and the activities of this Institute would greatly inform and supplement the efforts of the United Nations on these topics.

At Penn, Perkins, working in collaboration with Robert B. Mitchell, had established the Institute for Urban Studies at Penn in 1951 shortly after his arrival there as the new Dean.⁵⁷³ William L.C. Wheaton and Martin Meyerson were also central to the operations of this Institute at Penn.⁵⁷⁴ The Institute was allied to the teaching department

⁵⁷¹ As quoted in Strong, *Book of the School*, 135.

⁵⁷² Penn report, 9.

⁵⁷³ Strong, *Book of the School*..., 134.

⁵⁷⁴ Abrams, in his initial correspondence with Perkins, had asked Perkins if William Wheaton could be included in the team that would come to Turkey to establish the School. Martin Meyerson, who was an Associate Professor of City Planning and Research Associate Professor of Urban Studies during

of Land and City Planning; however, it was an interdisciplinary think-tank and its aim was to stimulate and undertake a continuing, organized program of urban research through the participation of faculty and graduate students from any appropriate departments of the University.⁵⁷⁵ During the mid-1950s, an Institute of Construction Methods and Materials, such as the one the Penn team proposed to be established in Ankara, did not exist at Penn but would later be established in 1959. By contrast, ITU had not yet established the types of research institutes that could foster interdisciplinary research between architecture, planning, and construction and to forge partnerships between the school, the state, and the building industries.⁵⁷⁶

As can be seen in the proposals for the research institutes at METU, Perkins and the Penn team were not only bringing some of the programs that had been recently implemented at Penn, but they were also coming up with new innovations, as in the case of the Institute for Modernization of Construction Methods and Materials, in order to respond to the conditions in Turkey.

Funding and Staffing

The Penn team, based on Abrams' recommendations, sought to revolutionize the way the UN experts operated in Turkey. Instead of staying for only a few weeks at a

these years, later served as the President of the University of Pennsylvania between 1970-1981. Before his appointment as the President of Penn, he also served as the Vice Chancellor at the University of California in Berkeley and as President at the State University of New York at Buffalo.

⁵⁷⁵ Recent research work of the Institute for Urban Studies included: Accelerated Urban Growth in a Metropolitan University of Pennsylvania, *University of Pennsylvania Bulletin – School of Fine Arts*, 1955-56, volume LV, number 7, December 15, 1954, 24-26.

⁵⁷⁶ The Penn team described the objectives of these Institutes under, "Part F," of their report: "1. Research Institute for Modernization of Construction Methods and Materials:

time, the funding structure they created was to allow the experts to remain involved with the making of the School during the first ten years. In terms of the staffing of the School and its Research Institutes, the Penn team had three primary resources available to them. First, as established and agreed upon during Abrams' mission, key faculty and administrators of the School would initially be made up of foreign experts. They would determine the scope and content of the courses and establish the initial activities of the research institutes. During these early years, they would also prepare Turkish architects and planners to assume leadership positions in the School and in the profession over the long term.⁵⁷⁷ The foreign currency funds set aside for the project by the FOA would be used to pay the salaries of these foreign experts. Second, the team proposed that the Turkish Government earmark six United Nations fellowships for two years for the re-training of architects and planners at the University of Pennsylvania.⁵⁷⁸ These six scholarship recipients were then to return to METU to teach at the School and to assume leadership positions in the research institutes. The team advised that four such fellowships should be provided on a yearly basis following the first year of the School's operation in order to fuel on-going exchange between the two schools and to provide a steady supply of faculty for the growing needs of the School. Third, the team was to interview qualified Turkish professionals for lecturer positions in the School.

The team decided that during the first year of its operation the School would need five foreign experts, three lecturers, and twelve full and part-time assistants (**appendices 5.2a, 5.2b, 5.2c, and 5.3a**). Based on the funds promised by the FOA, the team laid out

⁵⁷⁷ Penn report, 4.

⁵⁷⁸ Penn report, 5.

an efficient structure whereby each foreign faculty member would be responsible for developing a particular aspect of the School and its two research institutes while also contributing to teaching. Consequently, during its first year, the School would need five foreign faculty members who would bring experience in administration, design, building construction, housing, and planning. Based on the ten-year plan that the team charted for the School, the number of foreign faculty needed the second year would go up to seven. However, after the fifth year of the School's operation, and as the first set of UN fellows began to return to Ankara, the number of foreign personnel would drop to four. By its eighth year, the team projected that the School would need only two foreign faculty members to maintain its operations. The team's proposed budget also set aside funds for annual visits by members of the University of Pennsylvania faculty to review the work that was being developed at the School. They also advised that, "a complete review of the programme be made by a United Nations Mission at the end of the first five years."⁵⁷⁹

Based on this projection, the foreign currency funds needed for the project during the first three years roughly equaled the \$300,000 that was promised by the FOA **(appendix 5.3a)**. The Penn team designated the FOA funds to provide additional compensation for the foreign faculty. The salaries of the Turkish faculty and staff and all other operating costs of the School were provided by the Turkish Government. None of the FOA funds were set aside to provide additional compensation or travel or research funds for the Turkish faculty. This also meant that the foreign faculty and staff would be

⁵⁷⁹ Penn report, 5.

paid in dollars as well as in Turkish Liras, while the Turkish faculty would be paid only in Turkish Liras.

The particular budgetary configuration had two primary aims. First, it aimed to render the UN-funded positions at METU attractive to well-qualified foreign professionals. Second, and more importantly, these funds were to allow the foreign experts to remain in Turkey for extended periods of time. In contrast to the short-term missions of Abrams and many other UN experts, these funds aimed to allow the foreign experts to carry out more substantial research and to develop collaborative projects with their local counterparts.

At the same time, this arrangement created a significant difference in the way the foreign and the Turkish staff were compensated. Aside from the stark difference in the amount of compensation, this plan created a difference in the types of projects on which the foreign and the Turkish faculty could work. For example, the foreign funds provided the flexibility to pay the foreign faculty for the extra work that they did on the design of the University campus and buildings, while the Turkish faculty could not be compensated for any extra work that they did on these types of projects.⁵⁸⁰

Despite the problems this pay structure would create among the foreign and Turkish faculty, it was a revolutionary configuration that effectively changed the way UN experts operated. As Abrams had found, until then, UN experts drew much criticism since they visited a country for only a few weeks, made some recommendations and left.

⁵⁸⁰ Turkish laws prevented the Turkish faculty from receiving compensation for any additional work that they might undertake within the University. No foreign funds were set aside to pay the Turkish faculty for this work. How the pay structure affected the engagement of Turkish faculty with the campus planning projects will be discussed in more detail in chapter six.

With this new structure, UN experts were expected to stay in a single country one to three years or more doing substantial research and learning more about local social and economic structures and traditions.

Language of Instruction:

In their report, under the sub-section entitled, “Fees, Fellowships, and Student Employment,” the Penn team wrote, “In order that the Technical University and the Research Institutes may most effectively contribute to the spread of technical knowledge in housing and planning throughout the Middle East, and because of the availability of texts and the presence in the early years of many foreign professors it would be best to offer the courses in English.”⁵⁸¹ The team also addressed the language issue under the sub-section entitled, “Curricula and Admission Requirements.” Here, they designated that, “... a working knowledge of a foreign language (preferably English)..., for students without a command of English there should be offered an intensive course in English in the summer prior to admission.”⁵⁸² As Abrams had recounted on many occasions, he had had considerable difficulty in communicating with ministerial staff, officials, and professionals in Turkey. He observed that foreign experts were lecturing through an interpreter at the United Nations Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East. It had even become customary for foreign professors, most of whom were German-speaking, to provide desk crits and studio courses with an interpreter in Istanbul

⁵⁸¹ This particular sub-section was an unexpected place to include this topic. Perkins report, 13.

⁵⁸² Perkins report, 8.

schools. Consequently, if the students learned a foreign language, it was usually German. Abrams and the Perkins team felt that if the University was to become an institution that could create relationships among national and international agents and agencies, the requirement of a common language was essential. However, as with the salary structure, the designation of English as the primary language of instruction privileged the foreign faculty. Furthermore, the foreign faculty would not have to learn any Turkish, which reduced their ability to communicate and to learn about local cultures in Turkey. Ultimately, the particular way the Perkins team addressed the language issue became yet another factor that began to drive a wedge between UN and Turkish professionals. Even though this arrangement provided for a more direct communication amongst UN staff and faculty and Turkish faculty and students, it also became the source of tension between the two groups, particularly when UN administrators of the School found themselves in a position to pressure the Turkish faculty to lecture and communicate with the students in English.

The Penn team advised that the UN set aside scholarships for six Turkish professionals to attend graduate school at Penn as a way to begin to ameliorate the professional divide the new school would bring through its new interdisciplinary curriculum and language between Turkish ministerial staff and professionals and METU faculty and students. The returning fellows were to take positions teaching and contributing to the work of the research institutes at METU. The fellowships were to continue for a number of years to provide Turkish faculty that would eventually replace

the foreign staff and to foster the continuation of the exchange of knowledge between the two schools.

Although the pay structure and the language issue would become pressing concerns, neither raised immediate problems for the Penn team during their mission. Towards the end of the six weeks that the Penn team spent in Turkey, they were able to structure a general plan for the School that more or less met the expectations of all parties. Finding the faculty with the proper qualifications for these positions was the next major challenge that the team faced in getting the School started.

At the end of their six week mission, as the Penn team was beginning to make preparations to return to the US, Perkins sent a series of letters to Celal Yardımcı, the Minister of Education, summarizing the team's findings and recommendations prior to the submission of their official UN report.⁵⁸³ In these letters, Perkins confirmed that the School was scheduled to open in September, reviewed its budget, and discussed issues regarding temporary quarters and apartment houses for faculty and students as well as the five possible sites considered for the future campus of the School. He also advised that, until the new law for the establishment of the University could be prepared, the School be called, the Middle East Technical Academy in publications and announcements regarding the School's opening. In addition, he noted that in case the funds would not become available in time for the opening of the School, the fallback plan should be to proceed with the opening of the research institutes.

⁵⁸³ Perkins to Yardımcı, 20 May 1955.

Perkins' last note was related to his concern regarding the contentious relationship between the Turkish Government and the local FOA agents. Prior to his departure from Turkey, Perkins wrote to M.L. Dayton, Director of the FOA Operations in Turkey, updating him on the scope and content of the project and confirming FOA's involvement and cooperation in the project.⁵⁸⁴ He also assured Dayton that the Turkish Government had promised to make available all the financial resources necessary to realize the project and that a provisional law to charter the University would be prepared and become effective as soon as possible. He hoped that the local FOA would begin to shift its position and support the project as directed by the central FOA in DC.

Meanwhile, between May and September 1955, immediately after the Penn team's departure from Turkey, FOA had undergone major reconstruction and was renamed the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) under the Eisenhower Administration. Perkins had lost any influence he might have had on ICA decisions since Stassen had stepped down and was no longer the Director. Dayton, with whom Stassen had corresponded in Turkey was also replaced with Lieutenant General William E. Riley, as the Director of Operations in Turkey. As Loschetter and Harris began to organize the opening of the School, they found that local ICA officials had once again taken an uncompromising position regarding the scope and content of the project.⁵⁸⁵ They held

⁵⁸⁴ Perkins to Dayton, 25 May 1955.

⁵⁸⁵ Riley pointed to the economic troubles that Turkey was facing during the second half of the 1950s to make the point that Turkey was in no condition to establish a new University. At the same time, ICA may have found the establishment of an Institute to be a better investment of American dollars abroad. Some of the ideas Perkins had given them in his original letter to solicit funds (see chapter four) may have emerged as competing ideas to the School. For example, the Aided Self-help Project that the ICA was now beginning to support could be easily implemented through the establishment of an Institute. From ICA's stand-point, there was no justifiable need for a new School or a University.

that the ICA would provide funds for the project only if it was realized as a single research institute and not as a University. The Turkish officials, on the other hand, insisted that the School should be established as a University.

5.2 The Contingency Plan and the Opening of the School

Thomas A. Godfrey, a graduate of the Graduate School of Design at Harvard University and now a Professor of Design at Georgia Tech University, was surprised when he received a call from Holmes Perkins to see if he would oversee the establishment of a School of Architecture and Planning in Ankara, Turkey. After all he had not been one of Perkins' favorite students at Harvard.⁵⁸⁶ Furthermore, he suspected that there would be numerous candidates waiting to jump at the opportunity in Perkins' closer circle around Philadelphia. It was not yet clear to him why Perkins was calling all the way to Georgia to recruit someone for this job. He resolved to cautiously accept the offer since it promised a prestigious position at an international level and an adventure for his family.⁵⁸⁷

During his meetings with UN officials and based on the rumors he began to hear around Philadelphia regarding the School, Godfrey began to understand why it may have been necessary for Perkins to contact his students in places away from the reach of these rumors. Disagreements regarding the scope and content of the School had led to funding problems and the project was no longer attractive to anyone who was familiar with its history. Staffing the project with qualified professionals had once again become one of the central challenges for Perkins.

⁵⁸⁶ Godfrey noted that he didn't think of himself as a good student and he was not one of Perkins' best students. In fact, he felt that he actually did not like Harvard or Walter Gropius very much. He had originally wanted to go to Taliesin West to work with Frank Lloyd Wright. However, during those years, one could not obtain a military draft waiver as a student or an apprentice at Taliesin. Thomas Godfrey, interview with author, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, April 15, 2006.

⁵⁸⁷ Godfrey, interview with author, Bryn Mawr, PA, April 15, 2006.

Background to Thomas Godfrey's Arrival

Godfrey, who was to serve as the acting dean of the School during the first three years of its operation (1956-59), recalled that he had two separate meetings at the UN offices in New York in September 1956, prior to his departure for Turkey as a UN expert to establish the School.⁵⁸⁸ His first meeting was with Taghi Nasr, Chief of the Office for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East of the Technical Assistance Administration.⁵⁸⁹ Nasr warned Godfrey that the Turkish officials would pressure him to structure the School as a University. He advised him that he should not be distracted by these demands and that he should focus his energies on the establishment of a School of Architecture. Godfrey's second meeting was with David Owen, Chief of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. Owen told Godfrey that the Turkish officials perceived the project as a University and that the UN was in a position to support the priorities set by client governments. At the same time, he advised Godfrey to use his judgment in determining how quickly the School needed to grow from a School of Architecture into a University.

Godfrey realized that there was more to the project than establishing a School of Architecture and Community Planning in Turkey. As he was trying to decide whether he should still take the position, he also heard additional rumors about the events that had taken place in Ankara during the previous fall, in 1955, which was when the School was originally scheduled to begin instruction.

⁵⁸⁸ Regarding the title, "acting dean," in his correspondence, Godfrey and all other UN-sponsored administrators of the School used the prefix, "acting," in their titles to indicate that their positions were temporary and that a Turkish administrator would take over their position as the School's operations were established.

⁵⁸⁹ Thomas Godfrey, interview with author, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, 15 April 2007.

Léon Loschetter, as the designated Penn faculty for international training projects, and Walter D. Harris, Jr. had arrived in Ankara that fall to open the School of Architecture for instruction. According to the agreements negotiated by the Penn team at the end of their mission, Loschetter was to return to establish the School with the funds provided jointly by the FOA and the DP Administration. However, FOA demanded that a US citizen be in charge of the project. Consequently, Perkins recruited Walter Harris, a recent Yale graduate, to take the position of the acting dean under FOA funds for the first three years.⁵⁹⁰ Since Loschetter had been a part of the Penn team during the earlier mission, the UN agreed to provide the funds to bring him back to Turkey to offer some continuity during the first year of the School's establishment.

In order to negotiate a compromise between the two parties, Loschetter arranged a secret meeting (following Perkins's advice) with Celal Yardımcı, the Minister of Education, half an hour before another meeting to be held with the ICA and the School's Board of Visitors.⁵⁹¹ During this meeting, Loschetter informed the Minister that Perkins had obtained "full-accord" from the ICA officials in Washington and it would be only a matter of time before the ICA officials in Turkey would take a more favorable position towards the project. Loschetter then asked the Minister to, "take in the meeting an amiable attitude towards the local ICA position as to be certainly expressed again during

⁵⁹⁰ Walter D. Harris, Jr. received a B.Arch. (1948) and an M.Arch. (1950) from Yale and, during the sixties and seventies, published a number of studies on South American urbanism while working for the Department of Social Affairs: *Housing in Peru: A Research Study Conducted in the Department of Social Affairs, Pan American Union* (Washington, DC: 1963); *Housing in Honduras A Research Study Conducted in the Department of Social Affairs, Pan American Union* (Washington, DC: 1964); *The Growth of Latin American Cities* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1971).

⁵⁹¹ Weitz was aware of the meeting and approved it. Loschetter to Perkins, 25 October 1955.

the meeting, knowing that it would be curbed, in time by new instructions.”⁵⁹² In response to this request, Loschetter reported that the Minister “expressed his obligation for this valuable piece of information and stated right away, quite emphatically, that he had decided to openly conform to the original “Perkins” report, with or without ICA.”⁵⁹³

Loschetter was not aware that the Minister was responding exactly the way he was instructed to do towards the ICA. Perkins, following his trip to Turkey during the previous spring, had met with Stassen in Washington in order to definitively ensure that the ICA was committed to providing support for the University project in Turkey. Following this meeting, he had met with Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the Deputy Prime Minister, and Abrams, both of whom also happened to be in Washington at that time. Perkins communicated to Zorlu that his Government was to take a definitive position regarding the project towards the local ICA officials. Zorlu wired those instructions to his ministers telling them to think of the project only as a University and nothing else.⁵⁹⁴

As a result, no agreement or compromise could be reached between the ICA and Turkish officials regarding the scope and content of the project. ICA walked out of the project, leaving the School with no foreign exchange funds. Trying to shed some light on

⁵⁹² Loschetter to Perkins, 25 October 1955.

⁵⁹³ Loschetter continued, “He (the Minister) said he was irritated enough by the constant change of mind of the ICA and by the fact of their attaching all kinds of strings to their ridiculous contribution; that rather to accept such a humiliating deal, he would finance the whole affair himself. I did not dare telling him at that point that no American teacher would trust his dollars and left. I called Weitz immediately. He was quite upset, like myself, but 5 minutes later the meeting started and we could do nothing but assist with long faces to the great patriotic declarations of the Minister. You see what a good selling job you have done this spring..! The “Perkins” program and nothing else! The ICA people were delighted, of course, and Delp [the other ICA official in Turkey] jubilated.” In this letter, Loschetter also informed Perkins that there was now competing support for the University project from German and French governments, but that meant that they would take full control of the project. Loschetter to Perkins, 25 October 1955, 2-3.

⁵⁹⁴ Perkins to Nasr, 28 June 1955, 2.

what had happened, Loschetter reported that Harris, who was practically being kept under house arrest at the ICA offices in Ankara, had come across a telegram from Washington giving the local ICA full authority to “carry on, curtail, or withdraw entirely.”⁵⁹⁵

Loschetter asked Perkins, “Could it mean that there is double-talk on ICA W’s part?”⁵⁹⁶

Perkins had become aware of the local ICA’s position regarding the project prior to his departure to Turkey in April, 1955.⁵⁹⁷ He knew that despite his connection to Stassen, the ICA could falter. Perkins had turned to Nasr to see how they could proceed without ICA funding. Perkins explained the ICA departure as follows:

After having talked with them [FOA agents in Turkey] through the efforts of Mr. Weitz I came to understand their very difficult position rather better than before I left. It was very obvious that they were on the horns of a dilemma since there were a number of [ICA] projects which had already started that needed additional financing and for which the Turks were continuing to press them. Unless the total amount of money was increased for Turkey or expanded funds became available at the end of the fiscal year it would have been impossible to support the new university. It, therefore, became necessary for us to talk with FOA in Washington.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹⁵ Loschetter to Perkins, 25 October 1955, 2. Harris, as an ICA employee, was put through quite a bit of humiliation during his assignment. Loschetter wrote, “Harris has to report every morning at 9 to Mr. Delp (the other ICA official in Ankara) and has got an office right next to his, wherein he is requested to spend most of his time. He is not discouraged, but his moral is greatly affected by the fact that he has to go through this instead of doing what he came for: namely organizing a school and teaching...” Godfrey recounts that he heard about Harris’s situation from Weitz only after arriving in Turkey, otherwise he may not have taken the job. Thomas Godfrey, interview with the author, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, April 15, 2006.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁷ Trying to put the new situation in perspective during talks with the UN, Perkins wrote to Nasr, “You will remember that we [the Penn team] hesitated a long time about going [to Turkey] at all because of the local objections of the FOA to the expansion of their program.” Perkins to Nasr, 28 June 1955.

⁵⁹⁸ Perkins to Nasr, 28 June 1955. Perkins was referring to some of the other educational exchange programs that were already under way between Turkey and the US. For an analysis and background to these programs, see, Richard P. Garlitz, “Academic Ambassadors in the Middle East: The University Contract Program in Turkey and Iran, 1950-1970,” (Ph.D. Diss., Ohio University, 2008).

However, with the difference of opinion between Stassen and the Eisenhower administration regarding foreign aid, it was possible that the local ICA would act independently as the US government restructured the central ICA.

Both Perkins and Nasr knew that the loss of ICA support and funding was a major blow to the project and the hopes of restructuring the components of the technical assistance machinery around training missions. Perkins had willingly picked up where Abrams had left off and had carefully woven the components of the project together. Orchestrating Loschetter's continuous involvement and return to Turkey during fall 1955, arranging Harris's involvement, as well as ensuring Stassen's support through ICA, all had been carefully coordinated. However, ICA's uncompromising position had suddenly undone all that had been established to that point. Based on the new situation, the Turkish officials, the UN, and Perkins now had to completely reconfigure the funding, the nature of the initial team, as well as the scope and identity of the entire project. Furthermore, with ICA's restructuring, Perkins' ambition to build the Institute for Urban Studies as an international think-tank had to be put on hold at least for the time being. Despite Perkins' continued involvement in the project, there was no question that some of the enthusiasm and the momentum that had emerged in the wake of Abrams' original mission had now been lost.

Following Loschetter and Harris's unsuccessful attempt at opening the School and during the course of the year from fall 1955 and fall 1956, all involved parties worked to find an alternative path to establish the School. The Turkish Administration submitted a Contingency Fund Request and asked the UN-TAA to provide the dollar amounts for the

salaries of six foreign experts for the first three years of the School.⁵⁹⁹ UN-TAA agreed to provide approximately \$90,000, primarily for three experts for three years plus the six scholarships that were originally planned for Turkish students to spend one to two years at the University of Pennsylvania.⁶⁰⁰ By this time, Abrams had submitted his report outlining the idea of training and education as a strategy for development. Ernest Weissmann and the UN-HTCP began the initiative to implement the idea of training for development in other parts of the world as well.⁶⁰¹ At the same time, the project begun by Abrams and Perkins in Turkey had become very important for the UN to let go because of FOA's failure to support the project. Aside from being central to the growing relationship between UN-TAA and Turkey, the project had now become the first of its kind, possibly marking the beginning of a new era in UN-TAA projects across the world. Consequently, the UN resolved to provide the funds to restart the School project. At the same time, because of the dramatic events during Loschetter and Harris's mission, it had now become nearly impossible to convince anyone to go to Turkey to continue work on this project.

⁵⁹⁹ Charles Weitz to Taghi Nasr, 11 October 1956. UN Archives. Penn team's chart had designated five foreign experts for the first year of the School. Judging by Weitz's tone, contingency fund requests from client governments were quite common and this was Turkey's first request for such funds. Weitz addressed Nasr in the following manner, "The Turkish Government has never understood why its one [Weitz's emphasis] Contingency Fund request for 1956 was so battered. They asked for what they wanted. Without consultation with the Government somewhere in the UNTAA-UNTAB machinery the request was about halved. The Government was understandably put out and this started them on the trail of suspicion that someone in the UN was trying to stop this project."

⁶⁰⁰ Reed, 222.

⁶⁰¹ See chapter four.

Even though the UN came to the conclusion that they needed to support the project regardless of the presence of outside funding, one cannot underestimate the influence Charles Weitz had in encouraging UN efforts to back the project. Weitz's letters to Nasr indicate that he kept the central UN-TAA office abreast of the latest developments and demanded UN-TAA's utmost attention to the project. It was also Weitz who had the foresight to ask Loschetter, while he was still in Turkey, to interview candidates for the six UN fellowships for training at the University of Pennsylvania as had been planned during the Penn team's visit. Loschetter did not have much time for this task, but he did put together a preliminary list of possible candidates. Among the candidates he interviewed, Loschetter noted,

The ones submitted by the Ministry of Public Works look like good drafts and craftsmen, but without any stature. The best ones which got to me were those sent directly or indirectly by Bozkurt Güvenç, who became finally interested himself in the proposition. They are all neat, intelligent people, obviously from excellent families, well educated and not without means (having private cars, for example). Their professional capacity is rather hard to judge from the pictures and drawings I saw.⁶⁰²

In his letter to Perkins, Loschetter indicated that an idea to interview candidates with backgrounds in international relations and law was put forward and he subsequently talked with candidates submitted by the law faculty. However, he reported that all of the candidates he interviewed seemed, "extremely immature." In the final analysis, Loschetter picked the following candidates for re-training at Penn in the following order. He listed their areas of current specialization next to their names:

1. Bülent Onaran, architect

⁶⁰² Loschetter to Perkins, 25 October 1955.

2. Adnan Taşpınar, architect, engineer
3. Haluk Taran, architect, engineer (already in the States, to be considered over there)
4. Orhan Özgüner, architect
5. Rauf Beyru, architect and planner
6. Şükrü Kaya, architect
7. İlhan Altuner, architect
8. Turgut Erkilet, lawyer⁶⁰³

The following six were finally selected to study at the University of Pennsylvania for two years. They were to specialize in a specific field that they could teach when they returned to the School of Architecture at METU: Adnan Taşpınar (design); Bülent Onaran (basic design); Dündar Elbruz (landscape architecture); Orhan Özgüner (design); Rauf Beyru (city and regional planning); Şükrü Kaya (civil engineering).⁶⁰⁴

While the UN and Turkey negotiated the details of the contingency fund, Perkins began to recruit candidates for the three UN positions essential to the School. He had to

⁶⁰³ Loschetter to Perkins, 25 October 1955. Aydın Germen, a US-trained architect and planner in the Ministry of Public Works, who was later selected to teach in the School, also sent the following names to Weitz per Loschetter's request. In the list, Germen provided a brief description of the qualifications and backgrounds of each candidate: Hüseyin Osman Baban, Vahit Erhan, Hamdi Şensoy, Orhan Özgüner, Doğan Tekeli, Sedat Gürel, Faruk Sirmarlı, Turgut Cansever, Ali Topuz, Ergün Aksel, Mehmet Tataroğlu, Murat Salahor. As drafted by Weitz from Germen's letter of 4 November 1955. It is not clear which ones of these candidates Loschetter was able to interview. Loschetter noted in his letter that the amount of time he had for the interviews was not sufficient and, in order to find the best candidates, he probably needed to go to Istanbul for which he had no time. Among these candidates, Turgut Cansever would later submit the winning proposal to the first international competition for the METU site plan. There is no indication that Loschetter was able to interview Cansever even though Germen spoke very highly of him in his recommendation. Cansever, a graduate of the Academy, remained very interested in what was happening at the new School, traveling frequently to the project reviews that were held there.

⁶⁰⁴ Ekmel Derya, who taught design and construction beginning from the very first year of the School, noted that four of these candidates, Adnan Taşpınar, Dündar Elbruz, Orhan Özgüner, Bülent Onaran, began to teach full-time upon their return to METU in 1958. Bülent Onaran left after a few years to go back to his previous position. Rauf Beyru and Şükrü Kaya returned to their positions at the Ministry, but agreed to work part-time at the School with some reservations. After the Department of City and Regional Planning was established at the School of Architecture in 1961, Beyru taught full-time. Ekmel Derya, "History of the School," unpublished notes. Rauf Beyru, interview with the author, Izmir. Also see, Sevgi Aktüre, Sevin Osmay, and Ayşen Savaş, eds. *1956'dan 2006'ya ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi'nin 50 Yılı: Anılar: Bir Sözlü Tarih Çalışması [Fifty Years of the School of Architecture at METU from 1956 to 2006: Memoirs: A Study in Oral History]* (Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 2007), 321-325.

find someone capable of establishing and running the School as well as directors for each of the research institutes who could also help teach the first year curriculum. After hearing what had happened to Loschetter and Harris, no one at Penn was willing to take on the job.

Thomas Godfrey and the First Year of the School

Godfrey arrived in Ankara with his family in September 1956 about a month before the School was scheduled to open. Perkins and the UN had not yet been able to find the two other experts who would accompany Godfrey in Turkey.⁶⁰⁵ The building that was supposed to have been made available for the School was still occupied by the General Directorate of the Retirement Fund (Sosyal Sigortalar) (**figures 5.2 and 5.3**). Furthermore, Godfrey was not able to get in touch with the Minister of Education, even though he tried desperately, since he had numerous questions to clarify in order to prepare the School for its pending opening in November.⁶⁰⁶ During this time, Charles

⁶⁰⁵ In a letter Nasr wrote to Perkins, he noted that he had met with some of the other directors at the UN-TAA (Goldschmidt, G. McKitterick, Shamsee) as well as with Abrams to discuss the problems of the project in Turkey. Staffing was one of them and he pointed out to Perkins that he had revised the job descriptions for the three experts and was sending these to Perkins to review. The three positions consisted of: (A) Expert in housing and planning; (B) Lecturer in architectural design and related fields; (C) Lecturer in building methods and materials of construction and related subjects. Godfrey's position as an administrator was clearly not one of these positions, so it is not clear whether there were two or three available positions at the School. This must have caused some confusion as well, but most references suggest there were two positions in addition to Godfrey's. However, Nasr's letter to Perkins indicates otherwise. In any event, the position of primary importance was the expert in housing and planning. Nasr to Perkins, 1 August 1956. Abrams, in response to the conversation he had with Nasr, provided a list of names by the firm, Mayer and Whitelsey who were active in recruiting Architect-Planners for overseas assignments. Abrams to Nasr, 7 August 1956.

⁶⁰⁶ Godfrey, anxious about how little time remained, tried to contact the Minister of Education immediately and with some insistence. He was told that the Minister was in Istanbul and that he would call for Godfrey upon his return. Unable to wait, Godfrey went to Istanbul in search of the Minister. However, the Minister's aides found him first. Godfrey humorously recalls that he was then graciously "removed" from the scene by Adli Yener, from the Ministry of Public Works, and taken for a tour of the western coast

Weitz and Vecdi Diker, who had been active as a key member of the Board of Trustees and overlooking the work at the campus planning office, became Godfrey's closest allies, providing him with whatever information they could about the history of the project.

Both Weitz and Diker used their respective roles to put Godfrey in touch with both local and international officials in Ankara to help him get the project going.⁶⁰⁷

Following his arrival, Godfrey reported to Nasr frequently. In his first letter to Nasr, Godfrey wrote that he had resumed the interviews for faculty and staff positions that were begun by Loschetter during the previous fall.⁶⁰⁸ He had thus far selected two teachers and one assistant. He had also found an interpreter, a typist, and possibly a secretary. The first staff meeting was set for October 3, however, Marvin Sevely, who had recently been appointed for the second UN position to "lecture in Architectural Design and related subjects," had not yet arrived.⁶⁰⁹

of Turkey. As Yener drove Godfrey out of Istanbul, he told him that the Minister of Public Works was interested in Godfrey's opinions on the development potential that the Turkish Aegean and Mediterranean coasts held for tourism. The Ministry of Public Works may have been genuinely interested in this question at this time (see the section on Jaakko Kaikkonen and the OECD later in this chapter). Godfrey recalls visiting Ephesus and Selçuk for the first time during this trip. When he was brought back to Ankara, the Minister of Education was ready to meet with him and the top floor of the Retirement Fund building had been made available for Godfrey and his family.

⁶⁰⁷ Weitz pressured the UN to find the two additional experts who were scheduled to arrive with Godfrey. See Weitz to Nasr, 11 October 1956. Diker pressured the Turkish officials to empty out the building that was earmarked for the School. Godfrey to Nasr, 20 October 1956. In the meanwhile, Godfrey received a note from General Riley, letting him know that he was in Turkey not as a US citizen but as a UN employee. Consequently, he or his family should not expect any assistance from the US Embassy regarding any matters that might arise during his work in Turkey. Godfrey, interview with the author, 15 April 2007.

⁶⁰⁸ Godfrey to Nasr, 26 September 1956.

⁶⁰⁹ This would have been the lecturer position in architectural design as defined by Nasr. See attachments in letter from Nasr to Perkins, 1 August 1956. Ernest Weissmann had highly recommended Marvin Sevely for the position and the United Nations appointed Sevely to the job. McKitterick to Perkins, 22 September 1956. However, it is important to note that Sevely had only recently received his Master's degree in Architecture from Harvard Graduate School of Design in 1950 after completing a collaborative thesis on the redevelopment of downtown Providence, Rhode Island with three other students: R.I. William

Godfrey also informed Nasr that he had completed the drawings necessary to begin the renovations for the top floor of the building, but considerable work still needed to be done to get the whole building ready for the School year. The top floor of the building was going to be altered to serve as a residence for the acting Dean and his family.⁶¹⁰ The bottom two floors would need to be configured as classrooms, offices, a library, and studio spaces.⁶¹¹ Overall, the building was barely large enough for the School's first year of operation. Based on the general square footage requirements that the Penn team had estimated for the School, another building or an entirely different solution would be needed to meet the School's future needs (**appendix 5.4**).

In his next letter, Godfrey informed Nasr that, even though much remained to be done, he was determined to begin classes on November 1, the day all other schools of university rank began classes in Turkey.⁶¹² Over the course of a month, Godfrey had managed to resolve several issues of primary importance. He reported on the progress of the work on the building. He also noted that the preliminary law for the School had been

Conklin, Robert Geddes, and Ian McHarg. He was at a much earlier stage in his career than the experts who were previously involved in this project. For a brief description of Sevely's project at Harvard, see, Anthony Alofsin, *The Struggle for Modernism: Architecture, Landscape Architecture, and City Planning at Harvard* (New York; London: W.W. Norton, 2002), 206, 208-209.

⁶¹⁰ At one point, it was considered that a part of the top floor could be made available for Sevely, however, Godfrey insisted that the Ministry should secure other apartments in anticipation of incoming UN experts to teach at the School.

⁶¹¹ The building also had a basement. The School's janitor, Veli Dönmez, occupied the basement with his wife and children. Payashoğlu, 188.

⁶¹² Godfrey wrote, "I felt it would be better to start classes on time, and plan the official opening at any convenient later date, depending on actual passage of the law. We therefore intend to start teaching next Thursday, although our quarters will not be finished. I think it is necessary to establish a tradition of meeting commitments in the school – too few are being met here now – and so we will begin on time." Godfrey to Nasr, 29 October 1956.

finalized and submitted to the Turkish Government. The official opening ceremonies for the School were scheduled for November 15. In terms of the students and the selection process, he reported:

... we had 290 applicants, of whom 256 showed up for examination last Monday. After personal interviews to check their English ability and their intentions, we selected fifty – the Minister of Education flatly refused to allow the limit set any lower – and on Saturday I published the list at the school... Our examination system was far from perfect, but was, I think, the best that we could do this fall. Next year a much more effective system should be possible. We have a few students I think will be very good, although the general level is not as high as I should like. We lost some prospects to other schools by getting in so late with our announcement and examinations.⁶¹³

With Weitz and Diker's help, Godfrey managed to pull things together to begin classes, which had seemed an impossible task at the time of his arrival. He began to feel more confident that, with time, the fledgling school could become a university.

When Godfrey was first informed of the plans for a university, he was not sure if he was qualified to do the job. After several weeks in Turkey, he realized that, within the Turkish context, if the idea of a school of architecture and planning was to politically survive, it was necessary for the project to become a technical university. Consequently, he began to think of the project in broader terms and to consider its financial future more closely. In his letters to Nasr, he asked him to look for ways to attract outside support to the project.⁶¹⁴

⁶¹³ Godfrey to Nasr, 29 October 1956.

⁶¹⁴ Godfrey brought up the Ford Foundation as a possible resource. Godfrey to Nasr, 29 October 1956. The Ford Foundation had been considered originally, however, when the ICA had agreed to provide funds, Nasr had advised against talking with the former. Now that ICA was out of the picture, Godfrey felt that other options both within and outside of the UN needed to be explored immediately to provide consistent and reliable resources for the School. Even UNESCO's name (Turkish officials had initially expressed that they would not accept UNESCO's involvement in the project) came up in later correspondence. Perkins had pointed out (Perkins to Nasr, 28 June 1955) that the relationship between this

At the same time, Godfrey initiated one of his most significant and lasting contributions to the School. He began to pressure Nasr to provide funding for a librarian who could lay the foundations of a university library. Godfrey understood the reasons why Abrams and Perkins had designated English as the primary language of instruction. However, he felt that without a proper library, students and the faculty did not have the connection to international sources that the school was meant to provide. He also found that an open shelf library system, where the students could browse through the books on their own, did not exist in Turkish institutions. He resolved that obtaining an American-trained librarian and establishing a library needed be top priorities. He asked Perkins and Abrams to solicit book and journal donations. He also addressed this issue in detail in his correspondence with Nasr:

We have as yet no librarian. Mrs. Dean, of the American Library, informs me that there is not a librarian in Turkey trained to run a library of the kind we need, ... that there is an urgent need for the American type of university library, as we contemplate it. When other departments are added to the university, this need will become even more pronounced... I wish to renew the request I made verbally to you for the services of a librarian, on a short contract at least, to get the system set up and train local personnel in architectural library work, which is far beyond my capacities to handle in addition to my other duties. Is it possible to use the funds presumably allocated to this project, but not spent, for the services of the two experts for the periods during which they have not actually been employed, to send a librarian over here for six months, or more if possible? I am convinced it would be a thoroughly worthwhile service, and would involve no delay in recruiting, as the Georgia Tech Architecture Librarian of whom I spoke to you has already expressed her interest in the opportunity.⁶¹⁵

project and UNESCO needed to be clarified; however, again that avenue was initially put aside due to ICA's involvement.

⁶¹⁵ Godfrey to Nasr, 29 October 1956.

Nasr agreed to provide the funds for a librarian. Natale Isley, from Georgia Tech, arrived to set up the METU library, which became the first open shelf library of its kind in Turkey (**figure 5.4**). It was a tremendous contribution that set the identity of the School apart from other universities. The idea of the library, paired in this case with the mission to create a common language among national and international agencies, emerged as one of the most important components of the project in Turkey. Godfrey was the person to bring the idea of the library to the forefront of the project. As the School grew into a University and talks began regarding the design of the University campus, the symbolic and physical position of library to the rest of the campus would become a topic of utmost significance.

Three days after Godfrey sent his letter to Nasr, the School did indeed begin instruction on November 1 as the Middle East High Institute of Technology (**figure 5.5**). The official opening ceremonies were held on November 15, with the Minister of Education as the principle speaker. Charles Weitz and one of the students also spoke, and Godfrey reported that around two to three hundred people attended the opening ceremony. In the same letter to Nasr, Godfrey also expressed his, “delight in Sevely’s long-awaited arrival on November 21st.”⁶¹⁶

By the end of the 1956-57 academic year, Godfrey had been able to hire four full-time and eleven part-time instructors to teach the curriculum prepared by the Penn team in April-May 1955 (**appendix 5.1**). Godfrey and Marvin Sevely remained the only two UN-funded faculty that could be recruited for the program. Ekmel Derya and Gönül

⁶¹⁶ Godfrey to Nasr, 22 November 1956.

Tankut became the first two full-time Turkish design faculty hired by the School. In addition, Gündüz Güngen (National Railways Association; DDY), Dündar Saim Örer (Ministry of Public Works), and Aydın Germen (Ministry of Public Works) were hired to teach in the studios on a half-time basis. Haki Özbek (full-time) and Fazıl Erdoğan (part-time) taught Mathematics; Major Ekrem Üstünol (part-time) taught Physics; Major Tevfik Ateş (part-time) taught Surveying; and, A.D. Gammon (part-time; Ankara Lycee, TED) taught English.⁶¹⁷ On a last-minute basis, a Mechanical Engineering department was also opened and twenty-five students were admitted. Eight additional Turkish faculty members were hired to teach courses in the Mechanical Engineering Department. A number of the students who were originally admitted into the Department of Architecture transferred to the Civil Engineering Department that was established during the second year of the School.

Godfrey understood that the School needed to incorporate departments in engineering and to grow into a University to gain legitimacy. He also knew that if the School grew too quickly, the interdisciplinary focus that the School was meant to have on Planning would be lost. Consequently, while he did his best to maintain the identity of the School as established by the Penn team, Perkins, Nasr, and Abrams, in their respective ways, looked for an architect with experience and background in housing and planning to join the team in Turkey as the third UN-funded expert.⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁷ Payashoğlu, 126.

⁶¹⁸ Nasr to Perkins, 1 August 1956; and, Perkins to Nasr, 7 November 1956.

Perkins felt that finding an experienced expert in housing and planning to fill the third available position was key to the success of the project at this point in its development. Godfrey had settled into his position as the acting dean. In addition to his administrative duties, Godfrey was capable of overseeing and coordinating the general instruction at the School with Sevely's help in the studios. According to the job description that Nasr had prepared, this person would,

1. Undertake in cooperation with the faculty of the School of Architecture instructional and other functions as may be deemed necessary, particularly in drawing up a curriculum of instruction in the field of housing and planning (city, village and regional).
2. Participate in the activities of the Research Institute for Housing, Regional, City, and Village Planning (School of Architecture) which will, inter alia, give service to the Government in the evolution of city, regional and village planning, and housing policies.
3. To advise the Government (through the Ministry of Public Works) in the establishment of a National Housing Agency and the formulation of a programme of activity. Advice in drafting legislation and developing the organizational pattern of the proposed agency will be important aspects of the expert's work.⁶¹⁹

As can be deduced from this description, the duties of this expert were extensive and the job required a highly qualified and experienced planner. Even among Perkins' staff at Penn, only one or two professors, such as William Wheaton, would have qualified for the position as advertised. Around the time of Sevely's appointment, Alvaro Ortega, again a Harvard-trained architect from Bogota, Columbia, applied for the position.⁶²⁰ Anatole

⁶¹⁹ Draft job description (A), attachment in letter from Nasr to Perkins, 1 August 1956.

⁶²⁰ Ortega had received his Master's from Harvard in 1945. He then worked at the Ministry of Public Works in Bogota (1947-48), taught at the Universidad de los Andes (1949-51), practiced as a architect, and served as a consultant and teacher in Housing and Building Methods, Inter-American Housing Centre, in Bogota.

Solow, Director of the Division of Housing and Planning of the Pan American Union in Washington, in conversation with Weissmann, greatly supported Ortega's application and expertise in the fields of housing construction.⁶²¹ Perkins agreed with Solow in Ortega's qualifications in these fields; however, he urged that Ortega's application be rejected, because, he wrote,

When we originally made our report we suggested that two institutes be set up in connection with the proposed university. The first was in construction and the second in housing and planning. Mr. Ortega would be an excellent man to head up the first of these two institutes but that is not the one which is needed first. I do not believe that he qualifies from the point of view of either training or experience to fill the post in planning or in advising on housing policy. We need instead a planner who understands thoroughly the economics, the administration of the legal aspects of planning. We already have the architects and it would be a decidedly one-sided operation were we to add Mr. Ortega to the present staff.⁶²²

Perkins clearly wanted to cement the School's connection with the State through the Institute of Housing and Planning, and therefore, the establishment of this Institute was an urgent task, even aside from the basic operation of the School. Perkins' continuing influence on the identity of the School also becomes perceptible through this letter. However, by March 1957, Perkins had decided to shift his position regarding the importance of the Institute for Housing and Planning.

The next candidate for the position was Jacobus P. Thijsse, a Dutch planner who had previously been involved in UN-HTCP projects.⁶²³ He appeared to be the right

⁶²¹ Anatole Solow was also well-known among housing and planning circles. See, Anatole A. Solow, "Housing in Tropical Areas," *Bulletin on Housing and Town and Country Planning* 2 (April 1949): 11-17.

⁶²² Perkins to Nasr, 7 November 1956.

⁶²³ See, Jac. P. Thijsse, "Low Cost Housing in Tropical Areas: New Materials and Methods of Construction," *Bulletin on Housing and Town and Country Planning* 3 (February 1950): 31-37. One runs

candidate for the planning position that the School had prioritized to fill. However, around the same time, Godfrey reported that what the School really needed was not a planner, whom they would not need until the fourth year of the curriculum, but someone who could start the building research institute and teach the construction materials and methods classes.⁶²⁴ In his monthly report to Taghi Nasr, Godfrey also expressed that research into materials and methods would soon be central to the design of the University Campus:

The need of a good man to effectuate plans for building research is becoming more acute, particularly since campus development is affected. Lack of dollars for building will make it necessary to stress substitution of materials and ingenuity and efficiency of structural design, as well as originality and efficiency of planning, if the very best of quarters for the school are to be obtained with available materials and within the limits of the budget. As the students are now beginning their study of building structure, this man's services would be doubly valuable at this moment.⁶²⁵

Godfrey communicated his latest position to Perkins and Weitz as well, and they each wrote to Nasr separately updating him on the evolving question of the School's institutes and their staffing.⁶²⁶ At the same time, putting off the establishment of the Institute for Housing, Regional, City, and Village Planning immediately complicated the School's burgeoning relationship with the Ministry of Public Works. As discussed earlier, the

into a number of different spellings of Thijsee's name, even in his own correspondence. I will use the spelling used in his article in the UN Bulletin.

⁶²⁴ Thomas Godfrey "Faculty of Architecture, Middle East Technical University, Report for March, 1957 (Monthly Report to Taghi Nasr at UN-TAA in New York)," 10 April 1957, (United Nations Archives, TE 322/1 Turk (23)), 1.

⁶²⁵ Godfrey, "Report for March," 1.

⁶²⁶ See, Perkins to Nasr, 27 March 1957 (University of Pennsylvania Archives); and, Weitz to Nasr, 14 March 1957 (United Nations Archives).

Ministry had begun to press for the establishment of a National Housing Agency through UN-TAA assistance.⁶²⁷ Weitz had been able to keep the Ministry's requests at bay arguing that the School's institute was to serve that exact purpose and more by engaging in both research and policy development.

As a result of this shift in the School's priorities, Weitz had to abandon this earlier strategy. In his letter to Nasr, he simply explained the new situation and requested that a separate expert should be provided to establish a National Housing Agency within the Ministry of Public Works. He informed Nasr that he had proposed Thijsse for this position. However, the Ministry did not want a Dutch planner and requested that UNTAA find an American, a British, or a Swedish expert for this job.⁶²⁸ At the same time, Ortega's name came up again for the School's materials and methods institute,. However, Perkins, perhaps in anticipation of his first annual visit to the School in June, did not press Nasr to come to a decision regarding the materials and methods position. Perkins was looking forward to seeing the Campus site and reviewing the preliminary plans that Godfrey and Sevely had developed for it. Perkins had begun to contemplate whether the institutes at Penn could operate as substitutes for these positions. He wanted to wait until his annual visit in Turkey to see if he could bring such a proposal to the Board of

⁶²⁷ The Ministry wanted to establish a National Housing Agency in order to make use of ICA funds available for establishing Aided Self-help Housing finance schemes. ECE in Europe had supported this initiative arguing that the establishment of a National Housing Agency should have priority over the establishment of a School of Architecture and Planning. Weitz had masterfully maintained the idea of the School as a priority in talks among all parties, but now the School was established, it was okay to allow the Ministry do what they needed to do.

⁶²⁸ Weitz to Nasr, 14 March 1957 (United Nations Archives), 2-3. Perkins seconded Weitz observations and definitively stopped any further consideration on UN's part to hire Thijsse as an expert. See, Perkins to Nasr, 27 March 1957 (University of Pennsylvania Archives).

Trustees. As a result, neither the housing and planning nor the materials and methods faculty positions were filled for the 1957-58 Academic year.

The Penn Report had designated the School's interdisciplinary curriculum and research institutes as the initial components that would enable the lines of communication amongst the School, the State, and the Industry. However, staffing these components of the School and finding the foreign currency with which to recruit qualified candidates emerged as some of the first major challenges for the School. Furthermore, the pressure to add new departments and to grow into a University threatened the interdisciplinary organization that the School was meant to have around the idea of planning.

As it became clear that the School would grow into a University faster than what the Penn team had originally envisioned, the University's administrative and spatial organization gained as much importance as the components of the School of Architecture and Planning in configuring and nurturing ties with the Turkish State and Industry. Consequently, as the School grew, continuing debates and challenges regarding staffing would shift from the importance of the Institutes and center, as the next chapter explores, around the School's administrative organization as a University and the planning of its Campus.

Conclusion

Working within the same contentious political context as Abrams had, the Penn team structured an institutional model to revolutionize the way international technical assistance operated based on Abrams' proposal following his mission to Turkey. Abrams and the Penn team submitted their respective reports to the UN at the same time in August 1955. As suggested by this overlap in the dates of their submissions, Abrams and Perkins coordinated their efforts as they articulated and began to institutionalize a shift from policy to training as the key to international development and planning. Each of the two reports concentrated on a specific task and built on the other's conclusions. While the Abrams report focused on articulating the idea of training and education as a new strategy for development, the Perkins report provided the curricular, budgetary, and the staffing structure for an institution that would bring about a radical change in the way international technical assistance projects were organized. In addition, Abrams also argued that the focus on training would bring about an administrative revolution within Turkey as well. This revolution would make the policies and operations of the Turkish State responsive to the significant social and economic transformations that were taking place throughout Turkey and beyond.

In formulating the structure of the new institution, the Perkins team built on the foundations that were established during Abrams' mission. Abrams' idea of training had emerged in response to the breakdown of the international technical assistance machinery he had observed in the Turkish context. This breakdown was result of a shift in US foreign policy towards Turkey as well as other developing nations, which reduced aid and

support for development projects and stalled the social and economic revolution that the DP Administration had begun largely based on foreign aid in the early 1950s. Working within this context of reduced foreign aid, Abrams suggested a shift from policy to training in order to curb Turkey's reliance on foreign aid and develop expertise and policies that were more in line with the country's needs and resources. Abrams' idea to focus on research and training proposed to revolutionize the existing structure of technical assistance while it also appealed to the interests of involved parties.

Similar to the way Abrams had resolved opposing demands, the Penn team developed the structure of the institution in order to continue to appeal to the interests of the multiple agents and agencies involved in the project. Accordingly, the team proposed that a School of Architecture and Planning would be established as the initial department of a University. The smaller initial scope of the project aimed to appeal especially to FOA interests, while its long-term mission as a technical university would satisfy both UN and Turkish agencies. This arrangement appealed to Perkins' own interests as well since it gave him the opportunity to implement the interdisciplinary curriculum he had begun to develop at the School of Fine Arts at Penn at a larger scale. Through the idea of training for administrative reform, Abrams had formulated a way to align the disciplines of architecture and planning with projects of postwar reconstruction and economic development. Perkins was in charge of giving form to one of its first examples with the hopes of engaging Penn in the establishment of similar training institutes around the world.

For Abrams, an interdisciplinary program and the relationships that the School would forge between local and international agents and agencies were key ingredients to the success of an administrative revolution and the idea of training for development. He had recommended Perkins for the job not only because of the innovative and interdisciplinary program he was building in the School of Fine Arts at Penn, but also because of the relationships he had been able to build between his School and the various local and federal agencies. Abrams had envisioned that Perkins would establish in Turkey the international version of what he was building at Penn. METU's interdisciplinary curriculum and its research institutes were all parts of the program to establish these relationships between the School and the national and international agencies.

At the same time, there was a certain duality, if not a contradiction, in the way the Penn team structured some of the components of the School. How the various parties perceived these components would play a significant role in determining how these relationships would actually be formed. Many of these key decisions that the Penn team incorporated into the structure of the School had been largely established based on Abrams' experience and observations as a UN expert during his six-week mission.

In order to fulfill its function as a reform institution, the Penn team felt that the School needed to have a certain degree of autonomy from existing institutions of higher learning in Turkey. This was an issue that Abrams addressed in detail in his report as well. Therefore, the Penn team advised and maintained that the School should be established as an independent institution and not as part of an existing program or a university. This arrangement allowed the Penn team to implement a unique

interdisciplinary curricular structure organized around the School of Architecture and Planning and two research institutions. This arrangement afforded the School two distinct advantages. First, it could begin as a School of Architecture and grow incrementally and in an interdisciplinary manner based on its own research and teaching needs. Through this structure of incremental growth, the Penn team hoped to appeal to the differing perceptions of the School's scope and content among its supporters. Second, the interdisciplinary structure was to foster multiple levels of interaction between the various departments, institutes, and State, non-governmental, and international agencies. At the same time, however, the School's unique structure and connection to agencies of development became a threatening challenge to the legitimacy of existing programs in Turkey and governmental staff who had been educated under more orthodox systems. Consequently, the Penn team's innovations ran the risk of alienating the ministerial staff and severing relationships instead of building them. The six UN fellowships to retrain ministerial staff was aimed to bring the benefits of the school to the ministerial staff as well. The success of this program as well as other relationships the School could foster between its staff and programs and the state offices would prove to be central to the School's ability to foster relationships.

In addition, the way the Penn team structured the budget and the staffing of the School was meant to revolutionize the way UN experts operated during the postwar period. As Abrams had observed, UN experts usually spent only a few weeks in a country, wrote a report and left. The UN budget for the School allowed the UN staff to remain in Turkey for one to three years at a time allowing time for the UN staff to

conduct in-depth research and carry out substantial projects in collaboration with local staff and professionals. At the same time, the UN staff earmarked almost all of the foreign funding to pay for the salaries of UN faculty and staff only. The funds provided by the Turkish Government paid for the salaries of the Turkish faculty and staff. The resulting structure created a significant difference in the amount of compensation the foreign and Turkish faculty received. It also provided less flexibility in the type of projects that the Turkish faculty could get involved in. For example, it precluded the Turkish faculty from taking part in the design of the University campus, which led to the perception that the UN staff held that project under their control.

Lastly, the establishment of English as the School's primary language of instruction, although again a key component of its function as a reform institution, could drive a wedge between the School and the numerous ministerial staff who did not know English and were not educated in the professional traditions of the English-speaking countries. In addition, the introduction of English as the primary language of instruction was, at least symbolically, threatening to the national revolutionary ideology of Turkey, which had emerged in response to the mounting influence of foreign powers and non-Muslim groups within the Ottoman Empire. Although implemented in order to make the communication between foreign experts and their local counterparts more productive and to make the most recent research and publications available to Turkish bureaucrats and professionals, the idea could be perceived as a threat to the existing schools and faculty, professional legitimacy of the ministerial staff, and Turkish sovereignty, ultimately preventing the development of sound relationships among local and international agents.

By the late-1950s, although still popular, the DP Administration's social and economic policies were beginning to see perceptible opposition due to growing inflation and worsening economy. Within this shifting political context, DP officials pressured the newly established School to grow into a University faster than the UN experts had envisioned, causing them to lose control of the structure and make-up of the new departments. At this pace, it became difficult to implement the interdisciplinary curriculum at a University-wide scale. As the UN-experts lost control of especially the addition of the engineering departments, the design of the administrative and spatial make-up of the University comprised the central concern of the UN-staff.

The UN-staff continued to have the full support of the political elite and the now well-in-place Board of Trustees. However, the Turkish professionals and the ministerial staff who had been very curious about the rise of this new School were not so keen on the way the UN-staff had full control of the projects in the School. Within this context, the design of the spatial configuration of the METU campus emerged as a battleground of contentious relationships, this time, between foreign experts and Turkish bureaucrats and professionals.

Chapter Six:
Rule of Experts: Designing the University
and its Campus, 1956-59

Working within the contentious political climate that prevailed between Turkish and US agencies during the mid- to late-1950s, the UN-sponsored Penn team had devised an interdisciplinary curricular structure organized around the disciplines of architecture and planning to guide the School's growth and transition into a technical university. Based on this program, all entering students were to follow the same core curriculum during the first three years of their studies. They would then specialize in one of the areas that would be established at the School. Architecture and City and Regional Planning were initially formulated as the two main areas of specialization. Two research institutes in housing construction and planning were also planned in order to initiate the School's engagement with national and international agencies. Based on the teaching and research needs of these initial departments and institutes, new departments would be added and the School would grow into a technical university.

At the same time, the School of Architecture and Planning as well as its research institutes were to continue to serve as the central organizing body of the School, planning and organizing the School's function and future growth while also serving as the beginnings of a planning agency for the State. The Penn team maintained that "the institution be conceived as a training center for a future integrated building industry and as a medium for modernization of building techniques and materials, building codes,

zoning and subdivision regulations, city and regional planning legislation.”⁶²⁹ At the same time, they argued that, “...only through close integration in the teaching of skilled mechanics, technicians, contractors, producers of building materials, industrial designers, engineers, architects and city and regional planners, can a better understanding of common problems be achieved and a more modern and practical attitude towards building be effectively promoted.”⁶³⁰ They held that the relationship among these fields as well as the School’s relationship to State and international agencies was central to the School’s configuration and that, “such a concept will have a decisive influence upon the form, organization and curricula of the institution, and upon the choice of its location and site.”⁶³¹ However, as we saw in previous chapters, the UN experts’ ideas were once again mediated by the positions of other agents and agencies, altering the way the original curriculum was actually implemented as the School grew into a University. Soon after the opening of the School, the DP Administration and the University’s Board of Trustees began to pressure the School to add new departments in engineering much earlier than had been planned.

This chapter examines the way the Penn team and the Turkish administration negotiated the administrative and spatial organization of the School as a technical university. In the process, the design of the university campus emerged as a project of central importance, where multiple perceptions of the School competed for representation

⁶²⁹ The Perkins Report, 4.

⁶³⁰ Ibid.

⁶³¹ Ibid.

in the spatial configuration of the School. The chapter first analyzes how outside experts, working with Turkish officials, differentiated METU's administrative structure from the structure of existing institutions of higher learning in Turkey in order to create an institution that was responsive to the development needs and potentials of the region within the evolving postwar world order. Combined with the curricular structure devised by the Penn team, this administrative structure was to form the basis of an institution that would bring about the revolution that Abrams had proposed in his report. Sustained and responsive relationships between the School and national and international agencies around the idea of training, research, and education formed the core of this administrative revolution.

The Penn team introduced a new model for higher education in Turkey by setting up a Board of Trustees as the main administrative body of the University.⁶³² In addition, Perkins asked Harold Stassen, the former President of the University of Pennsylvania and the former head of the FOA, to travel to Turkey to draft the law that outlined the administrative structure of the University. Perkins knew that this would bring international recognition and help recruit an internationally known administrator to the University, elevating the status the new institution would have within the larger region and the world.

⁶³² Abrams, speaking through Sturen, had initially recommended the idea to form Turkish advisory committee made up of five members to act as the counterpart to the UN experts towards the end of his mission in Turkey. See chapter three. Sturen had specified the make-up of this initial committee: Minister of Education; Minister of Public Works; one representative of the Board of Higher Education; and two non-governmental representatives from related industries. The resident representative of the UN-TAA would act as a liaison officer attending the meetings at the absence of a university president. Godfrey (and Perkins, when in Ankara) attended the meetings of the committee as the acting dean of the School following his arrival.

The chapter then examines how the experts sought to implement this unique curricular and administrative structure through innovative studio projects as well as through the spatial organization and the design of its campus as a model self-sustaining community with physical and symbolic ties to both national and international agents and agencies.⁶³³ Through an examination of monthly reports, interviews with initial faculty and students, and other primary sources, the chapter analyzes the interdisciplinary and community-based projects that the School engaged shortly after its establishment and in collaboration with other universities and international agencies that were at the time conducting social and economic studies in various parts of Turkey. While discussing these projects, the chapter also explores the nature of the interactions amongst the UN-experts, the Turkish faculty, bureaucrats and professionals who frequented the School during project reviews and juries.

The chapter also examines the successive proposals that the UN experts prepared for the campus plan. From the very beginning of the School, every UN expert who came to teach at the School took part in the production of a proposal for the layout of the campus. In addition to revealing the process through which the ideas for the campus developed, these projects also show how various experts attempted to reflect the ideals of the School in the spatial arrangement of its components in relation to each other and the campus site. The differences in these experts' approaches led to considerable disagreement and to territorial battles between the experts and their Turkish counterparts,

⁶³³ The studio projects were a part of the core curriculum.

which significantly influenced the outcome of the project and the final configuration of the university campus.

Decisions regarding the curriculum, budget, and the language of instruction of the School largely determined the hierarchy among the UN and Turkish faculty and staff and controlled how each player could contribute to the project. The UN experts assumed that they would play a leading role in the design and outcome of the campus project. Holmes Perkins, as the Dean of the School of Fine Arts at Penn and through his now long-standing relationship with METU's Board of Trustees, held a significant influence over the decisions regarding the way the campus design would be carried out. Instead of bringing efficiency to the way the project was carried out, Perkins' nearly singular authority began to drive a wedge not only between the UN-sponsored experts of different backgrounds but also between foreign experts and the Turkish faculty and the professional community. Turkish professionals perceived Perkins' authority over the METU project as a new challenge to their sovereignty and legitimacy, especially in relationship to the authority of foreign experts. In an effort to regain control of the project, professionals and bureaucrats at the Ministry of Public Works began to join hands with the Turkish METU faculty to look for ways of taking control of the School. Significantly, returning UN fellows joined their Turkish compatriots in this battle. At the same time, it was through these successive proposals, public debates, and territorial battles among the foreign experts and between the foreign experts and their Turkish counterparts that METU began to have a significant impact on the architectural and planning discourses of the period.

6.1 Differentiating METU's Administrative Structure

METU's interdisciplinary curriculum, organized around the central departments of Architecture and City and Regional Planning, was the first way through which the School's structure differed from existing technical schools of higher learning in Turkey. Existing programs did not provide an interdisciplinary curriculum or setting, were organized around an engineering emphasis, which did not allow specialization in the fields of architecture and planning. As the School began to be structured as a University, positioning a Board of Trustees as its main governing body was the second major way in which METU's administrative structure differed from other existing and newly established universities. METU's initial organizing committee and later its Board of Trustees were made up of competent professionals who had worked mainly in public service and private enterprise.⁶³⁴ The goal of positioning this group instead of an academic governing body at the head of METU was to ensure ties between the University, the Turkish state and industry as well as to instigate teaching and research programs that would support Turkey's administrative and industrial development.

Existing Turkish universities were organized as a federation of substantially autonomous departments such as law, medicine, letters, science or engineering.⁶³⁵

⁶³⁴ Howard A. Reed, "Hacettepe and Middle East Technical University: New Universities in Turkey" (*Minerva* XIII, no. 2 (Summer 1975)), 202-203.

⁶³⁵ Throughout the dissertation, I will use the term, "department," instead of "faculty," as the translation of the Turkish term, "fakülte," which means department, but is sometimes translated as faculty, such as Faculty of Administrative Sciences. Reed, "Hacettepe and Middle East Technical University..." 202-203. Also see the following two sources on METU's administrative structure and how it differs from other Turkish and world institutions: Clement Henry Dodd, ed., *Studies in University Government and Administration* (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 1962); and, Metin Heper, *Decision-making in the Middle East Technical University: Responsiveness of the University to the Socio-Economic*

Faculties were traditionally made up of several chairs (*kürsü*) in special subjects, each directed by a senior professor assisted by one or more professors, associate professors (*doçents*) and auxiliary academic staff such as assistants, who were prospective or probationary members of the teaching staff, lecturers, specialists, research workers, and translators. The chair of each department directed his/her teaching and research projects and subordinate staff with considerable independence and with almost no concern for interdisciplinary collaboration among faculties or for the decision-making process of a central organizing body.

In addition, the law of 1946 had granted substantial autonomy to the universities and their constituent departments.⁶³⁶ This law granted broad powers for internal administration to the senate of each university. Unlike METU's Board of Trustees, the typical university senate was composed of two professors elected by their peers in each department, one professor chosen by his colleagues in each affiliated higher school, the dean of each faculty, former rector, and rector; all were elected for two-year terms. The rector was a professor selected by the majority of all the professors and two *doçents* from each faculty for a two-year term on a rotating basis with each faculty supplying the rector in turn.

Development Efforts in Turkey, assisted by Orhan Yılmaz Silier, sponsored by International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 1973).

⁶³⁶ Prior to the passage of the Universities Law No. 4936 on 13 June, 1946, universities were under the direct control of the Ministry of Education. The Minister designated the university rector to serve as his representative for an indefinite term and all academic appointments to the regular teaching ranks were made by the Minister on the rector's recommendation. Reed, 203-204.

Istanbul University (1933), Istanbul Technical University (1944), and Ankara University (1946) operated under this basic structure from their very beginnings **(appendix 6.1)**. During the 1950s, Ege (Aegean) University in Izmir and Karadeniz Teknik (Black Sea Technical) University were established largely following this same format. Atatürk University in Erzurum was established in 1957 following the American land-grant college model in collaboration with the University of Nebraska and therefore represented a second type. With its Board of Trustees as the governing body and its interdisciplinary curriculum, METU represented a third type.⁶³⁷ Even though its by-laws which controlled the make-up and tenure of its Board of Trustees were modified after the Coup of May 27, 1960, METU's basic structure remained considerably different from other Turkish universities until the 1980s.⁶³⁸

METU's first organizing committee was established during Abrams' mission in September-October 1954 by the Minister of Education based on the recommendations provided by Abrams and Sturen.⁶³⁹ Regarding the role and the make-up of the Board of Trustees, the Penn report prescribed:

⁶³⁷ Hacettepe (1967) and Boğaziçi (Bosporus) universities which were established later in 1967 and 1971 respectively were to founded as a hybrid of the first and third types. Reed, 204.

⁶³⁸ Reed argues that despite changes in laws that were passed in 1960 and in 1973 to homogenize the differences among Turkish universities, certain radical departures in METU's structure were interestingly preserved. He writes, "the reconfirmation of this METU legislation and its substantial exemption from the Universities Law of 1973 suggests that this new institution has demonstrated to some significant sectors of Turkish society that productive diversity in university charters and development is worth-while." Reed, 225. It is important to point out here that Reed wrote his essay on Hacettepe and METU in 1975 in response to the Turkish Government's attempt at chartering nine new universities in Turkey during the 1973-74 fiscal year. Reed's aim was to point out the significant gains that had been achieved through the innovative structures of these two institutions.

⁶³⁹ Olle Sturen had advised Celal Yardımcı to include the following five persons in the initial Turkish organizing committee, "Your Excellency as chairman of the committee, one representative from the Ministry of Public Works (perhaps the Under-Secretary, Mr. Daniş Koper), one representative of the

(a) The Trustees are the corporate body of the University, they shall hold and exercise all powers in respect thereto that are not explicitly reserved to the Minister of Education or to the Faculty of the University, and may at their discretion delegate their powers, in whole or in part, to the President, Deans, Directors, and/or the Faculty.

(b) The Trustees shall be appointed by the Minister of Education for ten-year terms (staggered so that one appointment shall be made every two years)... Two Trustees shall represent the Government, one shall be appointed from the list of three nominated by the Chamber of Industry; one from a list of three nominated by the Alumni and one from a list of three nominated by the University of Pennsylvania (For the first four years the University of Pennsylvania shall nominate the Alumni Trustee).⁶⁴⁰

In addition, the Penn team recommended that the Trustees should have a deep interest in education and in the technical fields represented at the University; however, they should not be members of the Faculty, the National Assembly, nor civil servants directly responsible to the Minister of Education, “in order to avoid undue political pressures and conflicts of loyalty.”⁶⁴¹

Instead of a Rector chosen from among the senior academic staff, as was the case in traditional universities, the Penn Report also established that METU would have a President appointed by the two-thirds vote of the full Board of Trustees. The President, as the chief executive officer, could serve indefinitely, at the board’s discretion, until

High Educational Board, and two non-governmental representatives (Mr. Vecdi Diker and one contractor). Until the arrival of the UN team, our Resident Representative here in Turkey will act as liaison officer between the committee and the United Nations.” See, Sturen to Yardımcı, 6 October 1954, 1-2.

⁶⁴⁰ Penn Report, 16.

⁶⁴¹ The Penn Report specified that the Board meet regularly and not less than four times a year. Ibid. Based on these recommendations, Celal Yardımcı, Minister of Education; Vecdi Diker, former Chief of the National Highway Commission and the Chief Executive of the Minneapolis Moline Tractor Co. (Turkish Branch); Ahmet Tokuş, Representative (Milletvekili) from Antalya; Mithat Yenen, Secretary General of the Cities Bank (İller Bankası Genel Müdür Yardımcısı); and, Adli Yener (Architect) comprised the members of the Board of Visitors during the School’s first two years of operation from 1956 to 1958. In 1958, Zafer Pamir, Secretary General of the National Highway Commission, was added as the sixth member of the Board. Payaşlıoğlu, 88-89. Also see, METU catalogs, 1956-59.

retirement age of 65.⁶⁴² Unlike the Rector who was appointed for two-year terms, the indefinite appointment of the President was to provide continuous leadership of the University. Furthermore, this system did not bring the academic staff or students into the process of the President's selection providing a break between the loyalties of the President and the academic staff. At the same time, the President was designated as the chairman of the combined faculties, and the principal administrative and budgetary officer of the University under the general direction of the Trustees. The President was also responsible for the co-ordination of policies between the various faculties and, in co-operation with the faculties, the development of a University educational policy.⁶⁴³ In this way, the Board of Trustees and the President were established as the links between the University, on the one hand, and the Government and the Industry, on the other.

Deans of faculties and directors of institutes, faculty, and advisory committees made up the rest of the School's administration. The Trustees appointed both the deans and the faculty based on the advice and consent of the President. The Trustees also appointed Advisory Committees annually for each Department and Institute, again based on the recommendations of the President. The members of the Committees were chosen from relevant professions or related fields and not necessarily from among the University faculty.⁶⁴⁴

⁶⁴² Penn Report, 17-18; and, Reed, 225.

⁶⁴³ The Penn Report, 18.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid.

The Advisory Committees were central to the operation of the University from its very beginnings. By 1957, eight committees were already established and active in the decision-making processes of the School.⁶⁴⁵ Thomas Godfrey, as the Acting Dean of the School of Architecture, attended the meetings of almost all committees except those that pertained to establishment and development of specific departments. In this way, he was essentially serving as the Acting President of the School. During his third year as the acting Dean of the School of Architecture, the Board of Trustees petitioned the United Nations to approve Godfrey's appointment as President.⁶⁴⁶ However, Godfrey was not entirely willing to extend his stay in Turkey beyond three years.⁶⁴⁷ In addition, there were also plans and hopes to appoint a well-known public figure in the US to be the President of METU.

Based on this administrative structure established by the Penn Report, Perkins continued to work on a detailed statute for the University. Around the time of the Penn team's visit and during the lengthy negotiations between the Turkish officials and the ICA resident representatives, the parameters of this statute were dependent on the details of the agreement between these two main bodies in terms of the scope and content of the School. By 1956, as ICA temporarily dropped out of the picture, the items of the statute were discussed and refined through discussions primarily between Perkins and the Board

⁶⁴⁵ The 1957 Catalog of the School listed the following committees: Land Acquisition Committee; Foreign Aid Committee; Architecture and City Planning Faculty Advisory Committee; Mechanical Engineering Advisory Committee; Agriculture and Forestry Faculty Advisory Committee; Education Department Advisory Committee; Civil Engineering Advisory Committee; and, Administrative Faculty Advisory Committee.

⁶⁴⁶ Reed, 224.

⁶⁴⁷ Godfrey, interview with author, .

of Trustees.⁶⁴⁸ A preliminary law at the very least needed to be passed for the University in order for the Ministry of Education to allocate funds for its operations. Even though Perkins had developed a detailed statute for the University based on the structure prescribed in the Penn Report, the Trustees decided to present only a preliminary law at that time and to draft the detailed statute at a later date.

The preliminary law was made up of only six items (**appendix 6.2**).⁶⁴⁹ It authorized the Ministry of Education to take the necessary steps to establish the Middle East Technical University with all of its necessary facilities, pay its employees, accept donations, and make available any resources required for the School's operation.⁶⁵⁰ In his next report, Godfrey informed Nasr that the law had passed and a budget of one million Turkish Liras (TL) had been set aside for the School's operation during its first year and three million TL were earmarked as initial funds for site purchase and the construction of facilities for the University. Godfrey also noted that a bill was in preparation to provide sixty million TL over three years for the construction of the University Campus.⁶⁵¹

The strategy to present only a preliminary law to the Grand National Assembly as the initial step towards the establishment of the University was a critical juncture in

⁶⁴⁸ Perkins was working on a draft statute in Philadelphia. Godfrey acted as the middleman communicating developments between the Trustees and Perkins. See, Thomas Godfrey, "School of Architecture Report (Monthly Report to Taghi Nasr at UN-TAA in New York)," 31 December 1956, (United Nations Archives, TE 322/1 Turk (23)), 3.

⁶⁴⁹ *Official Newspaper of the Turkish Parliament (Resmi Gazete)*, 29 January 1957, Law No: 6887; 23 January 1957.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵¹ Thomas Godfrey, "Middle East Technical University, School of Architecture Report for February," 4 March 1957, (United Nations Archives, TE 322/1 Turk (23)), 1.

METU's development.⁶⁵² The relatively swift passing of the law and the allocation of a substantial budget for the School evidenced the Turkish Government's commitment to the project. From that point on, Godfrey, Perkins, Weitz, and the Trustees used that evidence to solicit further support from international agencies for the expanding program of the School.

Diker, as a representative of the Board of Trustees, visited Nasr in New York to inform him of the Turkish Government's definite plans to expand the School into a University.⁶⁵³ Second, Godfrey began discussing the needs of the School with the Ford Foundation, which was interested in supporting departments in Business Administration and Education.⁶⁵⁴ Third, in a letter Weitz wrote to Nasr, he urged that it was now time for UNESCO to be invited into the project. Weitz wrote,

During the recent visit of Dr. Malcolm Adiseshiah (Assistant Director General, UNESCO), it became apparent that there has been insufficient consultation between the UNTAA and UNESCO regarding UN assistance in general for the development of the new Technical University of the Middle East.

⁶⁵² Members of the Board of Trustees sensed that a detailed statute could generate too much debate on the floor of the Assembly jeopardizing and postponing the approval of the basic law and, more importantly, the budget for the School. Even with the preliminary law, points were raised on the floor regarding the cost of establishing a whole new University and the construction of a new Campus; the level of influence of foreign experts; and, the designation of English as the language of instruction.

⁶⁵³ Both Godfrey and Weitz, in their correspondence with Nasr, mention Diker's visit to New York. See below.

⁶⁵⁴ In a cover letter to his February, 1957 report, Godfrey wrote, "I have discussed with Mr. Iverson the possibility of Ford Foundation interest in the project. The reaction was guarded, but Mr. Iverson suggested a possibility of their becoming interested in programs in Business Administration and Education, which I believe you discussed with Mr. Diker in New York. Mr. Iverson has agreed to study the entire project more closely in the coming months, before making any final decisions." Godfrey to Nasr, 4 March 1957, (UN Archives, TE 322/1 Turk (23)), 1. Perkins also indicates that Godfrey was also talking with the Rockefeller Foundation who appeared to be more enthusiastic about getting involved. Perkins to Nasr, 27 March 1957 (University of Pennsylvania Archives, School of Design, Office of the Dean Records, 1931-1965 (UPB 8.4), Box 93), 2.

Dr. Adiseshiah took the position that UNTAA was exceeding its authority in its work with the Government and that UNESCO's role in assistance to the development of universities and technological institutes had been neglected.⁶⁵⁵

Weitz admitted that the relationship between the Turkish Administration and UNESCO had been contentious at best; however, now that the School project was well-established and had moved beyond its initial phase of the School of Architecture to that of a University with evidence of government support, it was time to bring a wider range of UN support to the project beyond what the UNTAA could offer. Weitz told Nasr that he had already written to UNESCO letting them know that,

The [Turkish] Government's present plans call for an expansion to approximately 6000 students in 10-12 years with some 20 departments. You [UNESCO] can well imagine how much help the Government wants. If things move along well in the next 90 days, I will ask you to send a higher education specialist out here to see what UNESCO can do to help for the UN[TAA] certainly does not want to get involved in the scheme beyond its initial commitment to Architecture.⁶⁵⁶

Weitz pointed out that the Turkish Government would soon make as wide an appeal as possible to various groups for help and he urged Nasr to, "take a broad view of the Government's plans to see how, where and when UN aid (no matter which agency) can fit into the Government's annual plans."⁶⁵⁷

In response to these requests, Norman G. Luker, who had replaced Taghi Nasr during the summer of 1957 as the chief of the office for Europe, Middle East, and Africa at UN-TAA, requested Perkins to visit UNESCO in Paris on his way back from Turkey at

⁶⁵⁵ Weitz to Nasr, 11 March 1957, (UN Archives, TE 322/1 Turk (23)), 1.

⁶⁵⁶ Weitz to Nasr, 11 March 1957, (UN Archives, TE 322/1 Turk (23)), 2.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid. Both Godfrey's and Weitz's letters were in response to Vecdi Diker's recent visit to the UN offices in New York. Consequently, neither of the letters were news to Nasr who had already been informed by Diker about the plans of the Turkish Government.

the end of July. Perkins reported that he had a series of meetings with individuals and with groups at UNESCO and came away with the feeling that UNESCO would be able to provide assistance to the School in a number of ways. Based on his observations in Turkey and his talks with UNESCO staff, he identified the recruitment of a president for the university as the most pressing area with which UNESCO could help right away.

Soon after Perkins' visit to UNESCO, Arthur E. Goldschmidt of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations arrived in Turkey to discuss the development of the project with the involved agents and agencies. He met with Vecdi Diker, Necmettin Tanyolaç, by then, the Secretary General for the project, Charles Weitz and Godfrey. After having witnessed the Government's commitments to the University, Goldschmidt wrote directly to Malcolm Adiseshiah urging him that the project in Turkey warranted the full attention of UN and UNESCO.⁶⁵⁸ Goldschmidt seconded Perkins' recommendation in that he expressed that what the University now needed was a President of international influence and experience. He pointed out that the Board of Trustees had made some efforts to recruit James B. Conant, the former President of Harvard, but he was unwilling.⁶⁵⁹ Goldschmidt suggested Dr. Frank Graham, the former President of the University of North Carolina who was now working for the United Nations.

As a result of these conversation, UNESCO was finally able to convince Harold Stassen to get involved as a temporary consultant to METU and to finalize the

⁶⁵⁸ In this letter, Goldschmidt also mentioned the L25,000 that the United Kingdom had pledged for the Electrical Engineering Faculty. Arthur E. Goldschmidt to Malcolm Adiseshiah, UNESCO, Paris, 5 September 1957 (United Nations Archives, ...).

⁶⁵⁹ The Trustees also asked John S. D. Eisenhower, to assume the Presidency, but he declined as well. Reed, 224.

administrative structure of the University in a draft statute that could be pushed through the Turkish Parliament. Stassen agreed on the condition that Dr. Willis Raymond Woolrich (1889-1977), then the retiring Dean of the College of Engineering at the University of Texas in Austin, assist him and remain for a year as “interim president.”⁶⁶⁰ As a result, Stassen made two trips to Ankara in November 1958 and March 1959. Between these trips, he essentially revised and resubmitted the basic statute that Perkins and Godfrey had prepared in consultation with the Trustees.⁶⁶¹ However, Stassen’s major contribution came in the form of a major grant he earned for METU, making the School one of the first beneficiaries of the United Nations Special Fund. On 28 May, 1959, it received \$1.5 million for a four-year program, which was later extended, to strengthen its faculties of architecture and engineering by providing experts, fellowships, and equipment through UNESCO.⁶⁶²

This was the largest sum of foreign currency funds that METU had so far received. It helped to further legitimize METU’s status as a new University. While the acceptance of the preliminary law had encouraged foreign support, this grant, in turn, served to convince its local skeptics that the project could attract support from

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid. Willis R. Woolrich was the Dean of the College of Engineering at UT-Austin between 1936 and 1958. Prior to that he had served as the Director of the Agriculture Industry Division of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1933-36. For Woolrich’s papers, see Briscoe Center for American History at UT-Austin. For METU’s administration under Willis R. Woolrich (1959-60), see, Uğur Ersoy, *Bozkırı Yeşirtenler: ODTÜ Kuruluş Yılları Anıları, 1959-1963 [Cultivators of the Steppe: Memoirs of METU’s Founding Years, 1959-1963]* (Kadıköy, İstanbul: Evrim Yayınevi, 2002).

⁶⁶¹ Perkins and Godfrey kept sending each other revised drafts of the statute back and forth. Perkins had a near complete draft with him when he visited UNESCO in July, 1958. See copies of the statute dated 21 July 1957; and, 5 August 1957, addressed between Godfrey and Perkins (UN Archives, TE 322/1 Turk (23)).

⁶⁶² Ibid., 226.

international agencies. Subsequently, following a brief re-examination by an advisory committee to the Turkish Government, the draft statute that Stassen submitted during his second visit, was finally adopted without major changes as Law No. 7,307 on 27 May 1959 (**appendix 6.3**).⁶⁶³ Instead of the six items of the preliminary law, this second law contained twenty items with detailed explanations and breakdowns of each item. Stassen took what Perkins had prepared and rescaled its scope to apply to an institution that was now definitively becoming a University.⁶⁶⁴ In addition to the law, Stassen prepared a report entitled, “Initial Policies and Program of the Middle East Technical University,” in consultation with the Board of Trustees and Godfrey, which served as a guide to the administration of the School regarding priorities, rules, and best practices. Stassen’s involvement in drafting the statute for the School had certainly influenced the UN’s decision to provide the generous grant to METU through its Special Fund. At the same time, the approval of its statute by the Turkish Parliament also brought further legitimacy to the School in both Turkish and foreign perceptions. All the basic essential components of the School were now complete: It was chartered into law; it had a budget; a Board of Trustees; and a President, all in accordance with its by-laws. It now needed a Campus to embody and reflect this unique structure through its spatial organization.

⁶⁶³ *Official Newspaper of the Turkish Parliament (Resmi Gazete)*, 4 June 1959, Law No: 7307; 27 May 1959.

⁶⁶⁴ For example, the number of members on the Board of Trustees was increased from five to nine. See, Item 3, in appendix 6.3.

6.2 METU's Educational Structure: People, Projects, and the Campus

While the writing of the innovative administrative structure of the School into law in 1959 was a great triumph in terms of bringing lasting legitimacy to the School's founding aims, the location, scale, and layout of its Campus would remain a subject of continued debate for another two years. The Penn Report had advised that the School's administrative and interdisciplinary curricular structure be reflected in the location and configuration of its Campus. However, since its beginnings in fall 1956, the School was housed in rather makeshift quarters. It first began instruction in the former offices of the Retirement Fund (**figures 5.2 & 5.3**). During its second year, some of its components, including the School of Architecture, were moved into the utility wings of the new Grand National Assembly Building (**figures 6.2 & 6.3**).⁶⁶⁵ By the third and fourth years of the School's operation, even these quarters had become too inadequate for the School's operation. Consequently, some of the classes were being held in pre-fabricated metal buildings or barracks positioned temporarily in the south gardens of the National Assembly complex.⁶⁶⁶ While this location ironically gave the University the proximity

⁶⁶⁵ Parts of the National Assembly building were still under construction. Godfrey mentions, "As the present building (Retirement Fund building) is too small, arrangements have been made to exchange building with a section of the Ministry of Public Works, which is occupying a building in the compound of the new Grand National Assembly. Although this move will more than triple the available space, it has the disadvantages shared by all temporary, borrowed quarters. Rooms are the wrong size, and not so arranged as best to suit teaching needs, and the limited time of occupancy planned does not justify too extensive alterations." Godfrey, "Monthly Report, 15 August 1957, 2.

⁶⁶⁶ Godfrey reported, "During the fall Architecture has been taught in two prefabricated metal barracks buildings which are inadequately heated, though otherwise reasonably satisfactory." By January 1958, Godfrey reports that efforts were being spent in order to make alterations to the Grand Assembly buildings to make them work better as classrooms. Godfrey, "Monthly Report, 1 January 1958, 6. These barrack were then moved to the Campus site comprising some of the first structures of the University there. The barracks had won METU the name, "Baraka Universitesi," or "The University of Barracks," a derogatory title used by its rivals to connote the first years of METU's existence.

and the relationship it sought to maintain with the State, the quarters that were meant to function as the laundry facilities and other utilitarian spaces of the Assembly did not reflect the image and atmosphere of the interdisciplinary and independent community that the University had aimed to embody.

The Penn team, during their initial visit to Turkey in April-May 1955, had visited potential sites for the School's future location while they organized the School's initial program. The team did not include their observations regarding these sites in their official report. However, in a letter he wrote to Celal Yardımcı, the Minister of Education, Perkins discussed five of the sites that they had visited in terms of their potential in serving the aims of the School (**figure 6.1**).⁶⁶⁷ He also attached a map to his letter showing the location of the five sites in relation to Ankara and identified sites 1 and 5 as having the most potential in terms of the School's mission, projected growth, identity, and location in relation to the capital city and the ministerial offices of the State. Perkins' discussion of these sites is significant as it reveals his assessment of these sites in relation to his perceptions of the aims of the School:

In the opinion of the Mission Sites [sic] 1 and 5 are greatly to be preferred to the others. Site 2 is too limited in size; Site 3 is remote, lacks distinction, and is difficult to protect against encroachment; Site 4 is remote and is not topographically good for a campus.⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶⁷ Perkins wrote, "From among the sites visited by the Mission five were considered as worthy of further examination." Perkins to Yardımcı, 20 May 1955.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid.

Site 1 was located within the boundaries of the Atatürk Farm (Atatürk Orman Çiftliği).⁶⁶⁹

Perkins expressed that the Penn team found this site suitable for the following reasons:

- a. Site 1. That portion of Atatürk farm between the swimming pool and the Technical Colleges is eminently suitable since it is close to town, to the existing educational institutions, to recreational areas, is topographically good with water available, has a good outlook [*sic*] it is the ridge to the east is protected, is capable of expansion, and is protected against intrusion by future development.⁶⁷⁰

Site 5 was the one that afforded the most potential for the establishment of a new University. At the same time, this was also the site that would require the most investment in terms of infrastructure and housing for both students and faculty. Perkins wrote,

- e. Site 5. Site west of Junction of Present and Projected Roads to Konya. Ample land on an acropolislike hilltop with complete natural protection against encroachment; dramatic views of city and mountains; most distant of any site from the city (on completion of new Konya Road about 10-12km from the city center); good building land and especially good if University were to grow to several Faculties and to more than 2000-3000 students; too large for a permanently small University; availability of water unknown; this site requires dormitories for most students and housing for faculty.⁶⁷¹

Even though debates regarding which one of these sites would provide the best setting for the future campus would continue for the following five years, site number five was designated as the location for which ideas began to be developed shortly after Godfrey's

⁶⁶⁹ The Atatürk Farm was initiated by Atatürk in 1925. It was a model farm established near the capital in order to develop and promote modern farming methods and technologies. Atatürk chose a site that was not necessarily suitable for farming. By transforming this site, he sought to showcase what modern methods could achieve even in an unsuitable site. The establishment and development of the Atatürk Farm can also be seen as part of an effort to beautify the surroundings of Ankara, which was made up of arid, deforested, and underutilized farmlands. See, Ensar Kılıç and S. Göksin Seylam, *Atatürk Orman Çiftliği* (Ankara: T.M.M.O.B. Harita ve Kadastro Mühendisliği Odası, 2000); and, İzzet Öztoprak, *Atatürk Orman Çiftliği'nin Tarihi* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2006).

⁶⁷⁰ Perkins to Yardımcı, 3.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

arrival in Turkey. As Perkins mentioned, despite the fact that this site would require the largest initial investment, it was the site that provided the most potential for a project that could continue to develop over time much like a model community independent but also both visually and physically located in close proximity to the municipalities of the capital city.

Thomas Godfrey and Marvin Sevely

Following the passing of the preliminary law for the School (23 January 1957) and the allocation of an initial budget for the School's operation (one million TL) and site purchase and construction of buildings (three million TL), Diker and Godfrey set up a Campus Planning Office on the ground floor of a building located a few blocks from the School building on Müdafaa Street.⁶⁷² Diker was able to recruit several experienced draftsmen, including Batur Ardiç, Bülent Sülüner, and Mehmet Toprak, most of whom had previously worked with the National Highway Department.⁶⁷³

On December 31, 1956, just prior to the official passage of the preliminary law and the approval of the budget for the School, Godfrey informed Nasr that the government had approved the site that had been selected by Perkins during the Penn

⁶⁷² When most of the classrooms moved from the Retirement Fund building to the utility areas of the Grand National Assembly, the Campus Planning Office was moved into the Retirement Fund building. Batur Ardiç, draftsman in the Campus Planning Office, interview with author, 1 October 2009, digital recording, author's archive.

⁶⁷³ In his monthly reports to UN-TAA, Godfrey repeatedly pointed out the difficulties they faced in figuring out how to compensate the staff on the Campus planning work. Godfrey felt that this was keeping them from making real strides on the planning of the Campus and the design of buildings. Turkish law did not allow the School to pay for these services out of the School's budget. Diker must have worked something out with the National Highway Department so that the staff in the Campus Planning Office could be compensated.

teams' visit the previous spring (**figures 6.1 & 6.4**). Godfrey noted that the extent of the site had been increased to 10,500 acres. Godfrey expressed his first impressions about this site as follows,

In many ways a unique opportunity for university development is here presented: Physically, the tract is magnificent, and capable of great variety in development. It is admirably serviced by main highways, and may be easily connected by a spur to the railway. The area selected tentatively for teaching, residential, and public uses has a dramatic view over the city on one side, or a large valley and lake on the other. The site includes a village, which it was suggested may become a living laboratory for students of architecture and planning, and which when considered with its fields, and with the industrial laboratory area serviced by the railway, may provide an unparalleled opportunity for study of all the elements of industrial – agricultural civilization in Turkey.⁶⁷⁴

The Turkish Government had moved unusually fast in approving this extensive site for the Campus of the University.⁶⁷⁵ Ardiç points to the political context in the Middle East as the reason for the DP Administration's swift actions to make the University an actual entity. A rivalry had emerged between Turkey and Egypt in terms of their leadership within the Middle East. Menderes, the Turkish Prime Minister, wanted to bring international attention to Turkey through this project to project Turkey as a cultural and educational leader in the region.

Ardiç argues that the location and the size of the terrain was not a total accident or a generous gesture on the part of the DP administration, but was most likely the result of negotiations and dealings that were taking place at the highest level among Turkish and

⁶⁷⁴ Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 31 December 1956, 3.

⁶⁷⁵ Part of the land was government property and a large portion of it had to be expropriated from farmers. Ardiç recalls that some two to three thousand individual pieces of land had to be bought from farmers through eminent domain. His colleague Mehmet Toprak worked on this task with a committee. The process was arduous and not without its critics. However, the Government was decisive in making this land available as quickly as possible.

NATO officials. Ardiç recalls that the hill on which Perkins and Godfrey had wanted to position the academic center of the Campus was actually the place of one of the central relay or transmitter stations that transmitted decoded signals received from radio towers near the Black Sea region and the Soviet Union directly to the Pentagon receivers. There was actually an extensive off-the-grid US military settlement on the site.⁶⁷⁶ There were also plans to later establish a liquid oxygen manufacturing plant on this site.⁶⁷⁷ During those years, Ardiç also did surveying work for the US companies that provided services for the US Air Force, consequently he was familiar with the extent of the NATO operations on this site. However, to the unsuspecting eye, the site appeared as underutilized and barren farmland even though it had central strategic and political significance at top-level negotiations (**figures 6.5 - 6.7**). By providing the land for the University, Menderes had possibly achieved two things at once. He could add to his political currency with his NATO allies by ensuring that this area would not be encroached upon with development for a long time to come, and consequently advance his position, even so slightly, among his rivals in the Middle East. Second, by also appearing to provide substantial and long-term support through this generous land-grant for the establishment of a regional University, he gained both national and international recognition as a leader who invested in high-quality education as the elections drew near in Turkey.

⁶⁷⁶ This NATO radio tower complex was later incorporated into the master plan developed by the Penn team. See figure 6.29. The radio tower site also appears on the initial plans developed by Godfrey and the Campus Planning Office in Ankara. See figure 6.11.

⁶⁷⁷ Liquid oxygen, aside from its numerous medical uses in hospitals, is also a substance still in wide use in the loading operations of missiles. Batur Ardiç, interview with author, digital recording, author's archive.

Benefiting from these high-level political and diplomatic negotiations, the School kept receiving good news regarding the acquisition of land and the appropriation of funds for the construction of the Campus.⁶⁷⁸ Consequently, Diker, Godfrey and Sevely began to develop some of the first plans for the University with the help of the staff in the Campus Planning Office. Ardiç reports that Gönül Tankut and Ekmel Derya were among the members of the Turkish faculty who contributed to the design of the Campus layout and its buildings.

On May 15, 1957, prior to Perkins' arrival, Godfrey reported that the Board of Trustees had approved sketches on the first campus unit and work on designs was proceeding at top speed.⁶⁷⁹ During the spring 1957 semester, Godfrey and Sevely collaborated on the development of a preliminary site plan for the Campus. In terms of the individual buildings on this plan, Godfrey focused on the design of the School of Architecture building, while Sevely worked primarily on the design of dormitory buildings.⁶⁸⁰ Kemal Aran, a student in the first class of the School, and later, a well-known and -regarded professor in design at METU, recalls the activities of both Godfrey and Sevely quite clearly.⁶⁸¹ He paints a first hand picture of Godfrey:

⁶⁷⁸ Godfrey reported, "A bill is in preparation, with the government's approval to provide 60,000,000 TL over a three year period beginning March, 1958, for construction of the University facilities." Godfrey, "Monthly Reports," 4 March 1957.

⁶⁷⁹ Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 15 May 1957.

⁶⁸⁰ Godfrey, during interviews, does not acknowledge much involvement with the design of the initial site plan or the architecture building. However, all other accounts by students and the staff of the Campus Planning Office reveal that he was involved in the design of the campus site plan and its buildings at this early stage.

⁶⁸¹ Kemal Aran was one of the best students of that period. He received one of the UN scholarships offered to graduates of the undergraduate program and received a Master of Architecture

Godfrey worked on the site plans for the University. He had built a model, he had all the tools (for sculpting the model). Godfrey was actually trained as an architect, but he was also trained as an artist and he was interested in sculpture. He was also a very good administrator; he had good people skills. He would also get involved in studio instruction and providing desk crits... Even though the site plan for the University was still in progress, he had also begun to work on the design of the School of Architecture building. I remember very clearly, it was an international style building; it had a very clear and clean form, very similar to some of the structures that Walter Gropius was designing in the United States.⁶⁸²

Aran also recalls Sevely's designs and a meeting to discuss his proposals for the dormitory buildings:

Sevely's buildings were approximately 12 meters wide and 40-50 meters long; the stone veneer walls began thick at the bottom and tapered inwards as they went up; they were *mastaba* type, four buildings all together that formed a geometric pattern, and the buildings had thin and tall windows. Again, I remember very clearly: there was a meeting where Diker, Batur, Bülent (and Godfrey) were all present. There were also people who had come from the Ministries, primarily from the Ministry of Public Works. They discussed these buildings. Some of them felt quite shocked by Sevely's proposals and reacted [perhaps in Turkish that Aran could understand], "Wow! What does this man think we are?! Is this Africa?! Uganda?! Do we not have windows, glass, why should we have such small windows, and (so much) stone?!" The buildings were actually made up not load-bearing stone walls, just veneer. They had a reinforced concrete frame within; however, in order to make them fit Ankara, he (Sevely) had veneered them with stone; it was a building where tradition and modern stood together; however, I don't think that was understood during that meeting.⁶⁸³

degree from Penn after studying there for two years from 1960 to 1962. He was among a number of METU students who had a chance to take studios with Louis I. Kahn. Aran returned to METU to coordinate second year studios. He was also the main editor of, *Studyolar*, an annual publication of the work produced in the design studios at METU intermittently between 1987-1996. METU faculty published a *festschrift* for Aran, Gönül Evyapan, ed., *Mimarlık, Eğitim, Gelenek ve Yenilik: Kemal Aran'a Armağan* (ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi Yayınları, 2001). Also see, Kemal Aran, *Beyond Shelter: Anatolian Indigenous Buildings*. Ankara: Tepe Architectural Culture Centre, 2000.

⁶⁸² Kemal Aran, in, *Anılar: Bir Sözlü Tarih Çalışması [Fifty Years of the School of Architecture at METU from 1956 to 2006: Memoirs: A Study in Oral History]* Sevgi Aktüre, Sevin Osmay, and Ayşen Savaş, eds. (Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 2007), 11.

⁶⁸³ Aran, *Anılar*, 13.

In retrospect, Aran adds that this was not a reaction to Sevely's design in particular. He recalls that the response came primarily from the Istanbul Technical University alumni who were working in the Ministry of Public Works at the time. Despite the strong reaction Sevely's project received, it was through these public project reviews where the ministerial staff, representatives of the professional community, and professors from other schools of architecture gathered at the School in order to review student projects or the proposals for the campus site plan and building that the School began to have an impact on the architectural and planning discourse of the period.⁶⁸⁴ As Abrams had observed, the Istanbul Technical University graduates who dominated the professional field as well as the administration at the Ministry of Public Works viewed the new School as well as the DP Administration for being responsible for developing it with skepticism and contempt. At the same time, they were curious about its unique curriculum, pedagogical process, projects, and even the unique student/teacher interactions and collaboration that were exhibited in these reviews. Although their input was limited, Godfrey and Sevely continued to revise and develop the campus and building designs for the University based on these reviews and discussions. By mid-May, the Board of Trustees approved the site plans and the designs of the first set of buildings as presented by Godfrey and Sevely.⁶⁸⁵

While the work on the campus and the building designs continued, Sevely and Gönül Tankut introduced a project to first-year, second-semester students that

⁶⁸⁴ Unfortunately, none of the drawings and models that Godfrey and Sevely had prepared during this period has survived.

⁶⁸⁵ Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 15 May 1957.

particularly drew attention.⁶⁸⁶ Following a semester in basic design where Sevely largely relied on typical basic design problems that he was familiar with as a student at Harvard, they decided to begin the second semester with field trips to Ağsak, a small village near Kızılcahamam.⁶⁸⁷ Aran recalls,

The purpose of the Ağsak project was to take the students out of the city and introduce them to one of the poorest communities in Turkey; to show them how these people managed to survive in these conditions on a day-to-day basis, and then, to come up with innovative ways to provide them with new avenues of economic development (based on their own methods and skills), in what kind of a community they might organize, what they might build as dwellings, etc. We were asked to develop site plans (for a village center) and designs for model dwellings... We were also told that we would do our summer field construction practice in Ağsak.⁶⁸⁸

It was quite radical to introduce the students to this type of community design project so early in the curriculum after only one semester of dealing with issues of formal composition in basic design. The students were immediately introduced to the social aspects of architecture and to exploring spatial ideas in relation to the everyday life of a community. Aran also recalls that they were both excited and anxious about how their studio work would be continued, revised, and constructed during their field practice in construction course that was to be held in Ağsak during the summer.

Even though Holmes Perkins' arrival that summer would disrupt the continuation of the Ağsak Project as planned during that summer, similar and more extensive

⁶⁸⁶ Aran recalls that they, as the students, had spotted Sevely and Tankut discussing this project for some time and that they had become quite curious about what they had been preparing. At the same time, the project would bring considerable attention to the activities of the School.

⁶⁸⁷ On the basic design projects, I am relying on Kemal Aran's notes to author, 29 June 2008, author's archives.

⁶⁸⁸ Aran, *Anılar*, 8.

community-based projects would form the core of the design curriculum at METU during at least the first three years. Especially with Jaakko Kaikkonen's arrival in January 1958 to establish the Institute of Housing, Village, City, and Regional Planning, these projects would be coordinated and implemented at multiple levels in connection with projects being carried out by international organizations.⁶⁸⁹

Sevely, aside from his involvement in the design of the Campus site and buildings as well as his contributions to the Ağsak Project, also designed the emblem for the University, which is still in use today (**figure 6.8**). Aran recalls that Sevely had originally introduced the University emblem as a short studio assignment. Aran recounts the events related to the design of the School's insignia:

Sevely asked us to design the emblem for the Middle East High Institute of Technology, which was the name of the School at that point. Everyone brought in a few proposals: spider, bug, ant... , but he didn't like what we had, so he had prepared something himself, so he brought it in to show it to us. It was on a small card stock paper, red intersecting circles, forming red and white two crescents. Well, he had drawn today's METU's emblem. He explained, "This institution will be the place that will bring the Middle East together, the first crescent is METU, and the second crescent is the one that brings together the cultures of these nations, this is the abstraction of this idea. I made this and it has been approved."⁶⁹⁰

Although a small anecdote in the larger scheme of things, the way Sevely engaged the students, but then resolved to design the School's emblem himself was an interesting example that foreshadowed how the UN experts would, despite better intentions, interact with their Turkish colleagues. As will be discussed below, similar modes of interaction

⁶⁸⁹ See the upcoming sub-section under, c. William E. Cox and Jaakko Kaikkonen.

⁶⁹⁰ Aran, *Anılar*, 13.

between UN experts and Turkish faculty and professionals took place in the design of the campus plan and buildings as well.

Holmes Perkins and METU's Board of Trustees

Based on the recommendations of the Penn Report, the UN Budget allowed for Holmes Perkins, or another leading faculty from Penn, to visit and provide annual reports on the state and development of the School's programs during the first five years.⁶⁹¹ In anticipation of his upcoming visit to the School, Perkins, working with members of his faculty and staff at the Institute for Urban Research, had prepared drawings to contribute to the ideas developed by Godfrey and Sevely at the Campus Planning Office. Similarly, in Ankara, Perkins' arrival at the end of that semester was a long awaited event by both the students and the faculty. While the Perkins' visit propelled the School into its next phase of development as a University and a Campus, it also disrupted the progress of some of the projects that were already begun successfully by the faculty.

The students and the majority of the Turkish faculty had never met Perkins, but had heard of him and about Penn through Godfrey and Sevely. Perkins' name must have come up on numerous occasions in relation to the books and the drafting supplies that were sent from the University of Pennsylvania. Many of the aspiring students thought of Penn as the home of the great Louis Kahn and the place where they might one day have

⁶⁹¹ The Report stated, "an annual visit and review be made by the University of Pennsylvania and that a complete review of the programme be made by a United Nations Mission at the end of five years." Penn Report, 5. Even though Perkins was to visit annually, he was not able to come to Ankara at the end of the 1957-58 academic year. He visited again one last time in June-July 1959, shortly after which Penn's direct involvement with the School ended. UNESCO took over the advisory position for the whole University and the School of Architecture lost its close connection with Penn even though a small number of students continued to go to Penn for graduate work on scholarships provided by the UN, UNESCO, and the Turkish Government.

the opportunity to study if they were to qualify for one of the UN scholarships. Also, the fact that METU, as an institution, had a connection to this prominent University in the United States gave the students a sense of privilege and prestige. Consequently, Perkins and his visit had a powerful aura especially over the students, since Perkins' visit and interest in the School confirmed the School's connection to this other place.

Perkins planned to spend the majority of his time during the first days of his arrival with the students, reviewing the Ağsak village projects (June 19-21) (**figure 6.9**).⁶⁹² Aran recounts that project review process that METU had introduced to Turkey had already become a central part of the School's culture and attracted many professionals and officials from around Ankara and beyond. Aran recalls that most of the reviews took place in the central entrance hall of the building on Müdafaa Street. This space, which measured about 8 meters by 8 meters, was level with the entrance to the School. Anyone who happened to walk into the building had to go by this space and if there was a review in process, they couldn't help but witness the spectacle. Aran recalls:

Sevely (and Godfrey, presumably) had figured out a way to get pin-up boards made for that space; gun-metal grey, and one was yellow. That space was essentially an exhibition space where all the projects were exhibited and "enacted" in front of the public. We wouldn't discuss why somebody had gotten an A or a C. Those grades would be up there by the boards. But we would discuss all the projects in terms of their approaches... Sometimes friendly jokes would be made... somebody had written their name wrong, for example... This was also the place where we figured out the aims of the project, through this discussion (especially in basic design).⁶⁹³

⁶⁹² During this period, Perkins also met with the Board of Trustees (June 18); visited the future site of the University (June 19); and had lunch with Refik Koraltan, the President of the Grand National Assembly (June 20). See, Perkins' itinerary in his, "Annual Report," 9 September 1957.

⁶⁹³ Aran, *Anılar*, 8.

As Aran points out, this review space made all the projects and the review process completely public. Whoever walked into the building could see the latest projects exhibited or witness a review in progress. Aran also reports that, perhaps because of this new spectacle, it was not unusual for groups of people to visit the School from the ministries, other architecture programs, and universities, and that everyone was very curious and at times skeptical about what was happening in this new School.⁶⁹⁴ Consequently, it was through the events that took place in the central hall of this building that the School began to have an influence on the architecture and planning cultures in Turkey.⁶⁹⁵

Following the reviews with Perkins, a reception was held at Godfrey's apartment in the School building where Perkins, the faculty, and the students gathered to celebrate the end of the first year of the School (**figure 6.10**). In his report to Luker, Perkins noted that, all things considered, he was, "encouraged by the quality of the work done by this particular group."⁶⁹⁶ He added,

The most important observation was the very fine and friendly relationship which had developed between the students and the architectural design staff composed of the two UN experts. This kind of relationship is one which is far from being

⁶⁹⁴ Aran, *Anılar*, 8-9.

⁶⁹⁵ It is unfortunate that the significance of this central hall and the building on Mūdafa Street has never been recognized properly in relation to the School's identity, influence, and history. The building itself was not as odd as it is usually made out to be. Its symmetrical Beaux Arts layout with its central entrance was very similar to the buildings of many architecture schools in the United States. Cornell University's original School of Architecture building; Avery Hall at Columbia; or, the one in University of Kansas are only some of the examples that I am personally familiar with. Many other examples can be provided. Unfortunately, the drawings Godfrey had made for the renovation of the building did not survive. It would have been important to keep at least a record of this building.

⁶⁹⁶ Perkins, "Annual Report," 9 September 1957 (United Nations Archives), 2.

usual in Turkey or in many of the other European architectural schools but which can do a great deal to develop better workmanship and understanding.⁶⁹⁷

The atmosphere at the School had provided a unique and in some ways life-changing experience for many of the student even during that first year.

Aran recalls the events of that year and tells that he personally found the community that the School provided particularly helpful and liberating. Aran was from Sivas and not from Ankara. He was among the students who had been admitted into the School from the provinces. Consequently, he lived in a 500-student dormitory of the Law School in Cebeci, Ankara, which was one of the few places available to out-of-town students at that time. “It was an eerie place,” he recalls, “but the School became a place he could call his own.”⁶⁹⁸ He spent many nights at the School working with other students. Members of faculty would drop in at nights from time to time to look over and discuss the work. Conversations would continue late into the night. When deadlines approached, Veli Bey (Veli Dönmez), the School’s building manager who lived in the basement of the Müdafaa Street building with his family, cooked fried eggs (*sahanda yumurta*) for those who were still working in the building at dawn.

As Perkins had observed, from its very beginning, the School introduced a very different kind of experience to university students in Turkey. The open shelf library system that Godfrey had helped to introduce and the collegial relationship that the School encouraged between students and faculty all contributed to the development of a new type of community in higher education. Perkins was right in suggesting that these details

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Aran, *Anılar*, 9.

would make an impact in creating a lasting educational and professional culture. It was not long before the students began to institutionalize some of the rituals and practices that had emerged early in the *Müdafaa* Street building. For example, during the School's residence in the Grand National Assembly complex, the students organized a student-run cafeteria that served breakfast and lunch to the students and faculty.⁶⁹⁹ Another interesting manifestation of the student/faculty collegiality was in the way everyone at the School began to refer to each other as, "*hocam*," or as "(my) teacher," or "(my) master" in Turkish, during the early to mid-1960s. Everyone from the highest administrator to the lowest ranked staff-member working in the tearoom adopted this ritual sooner or later.⁷⁰⁰ This widespread use of the title, "*hoca*" certainly carried a degree of irony and was used somewhat mockingly as well, especially during the student movements of the sixties. But it could also be used to express respect and camaraderie for one's peers and seniors. Consequently, as it caught on, it gained multiple meanings, and served to erase all titles within a University community, leveling everyone's rank, at least symbolically. This practice, which still continues today, was an interesting manifestation that evidenced the emergence of a new type of community of higher learning in Turkey. However, the configuration of the campus for this new type of community was Perkins' primary concern and purpose for his visit.

⁶⁹⁹ Students had created a system where each day a group of students would be responsible to gather the necessary food items for the kitchen from the wholesale markets of the city early in the morning. This practice also exposed the students to a whole another aspect and infrastructure of the city, how the cities markets worked and relied on the supply chains that reached out to the country.

⁷⁰⁰ It would not be unusual to hear a senior faculty member address a student or a member of the staff as, "*hocam*," at METU. For example, they might say, "*Hocam*, could you please run 50 copies of this syllabus for me?," or, "*Hocam*, I will take this one *çokomel*, one tea, one *ayran*, and two toasts (*cheesetoasts*)," at the architecture school cafeteria.

Following his engagements with the students, Perkins held several meetings with the Board of Trustees; the Minister of Education and the Minister of Public Works; members of the Land Appropriation Committee; Ankara Rotary Club; and Charles Weitz. In each one of these meetings, key issues regarding the School's facilities, campus, students, curriculum, and development were discussed.⁷⁰¹ Perkins and Godfrey attended almost all of these meetings together and during the time they had outside of these meetings, they discussed the development of the work on the design of the site plan and the buildings of the Campus. During these meetings, it became apparent that Godfrey and Sevely's designs, which had just recently been approved by the Trustees needed to be revisited. In his monthly report to Luker, Godfrey gave two reasons for this setback. First, the property lines of the campus site had to be redefined because of a change in the terms through which properties could be acquired for the campus. This change affected where the academic center could be located within the larger site. Second, Perkins, Godfrey, and Sevely all became aware that Godfrey and Sevely's approach to the design of the site was quite different than what Perkins had prepared in Philadelphia.⁷⁰² Consequently, they decided to set aside the time between July 8-11 (during Bayram, or religious holidays) to develop a new plan.

Based on Godfrey's reports and the dates of Perkins' visit, it is possible to suggest that the campus plan that was published in the 1957-58 METU catalog was the plan that was developed as a result of this collaborative work during Perkins' visit (**figures 6.11 &**

⁷⁰¹ Perkins, "Annual Report," 9 September 1957.

⁷⁰² Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 15 July 1957.

6.12).⁷⁰³ On this plan, the main body of the campus was located to the north-east of the Kocamunt Hill, the peak of the hills to the West of the Konya highway where the NATO transmitting stations were located. The buildings were located along a perimeter road that primarily followed the contour lines of the site. Along this route, the School of Architecture was located at the very north-east corner of the site, facing the capital city and the Grand National Assembly, expressing the connection between the University and the State in the configuration of the site plan. At the other end of the loop, Engineering buildings were located next to the Kocamunt Hill. Both of these main faculties were scheduled to be built during the first phase of construction (indicated by letter E on the site plan), therefore functioning as book ends or anchors for the Campus. The remaining buildings were to be built over time in the areas between these two focal structures.⁷⁰⁴

During Perkins' visit and as a result of the series of meetings he had with both the Trustees and government officials, the decision was made to begin work on the new School buildings sooner than later. Consequently, Perkins and Godfrey decided to change

⁷⁰³ This drawing is dated, 15 July 1957, and corresponds to the date of Godfrey's July report to Luker where he noted, "Dean Perkins arrived in Ankara with preliminary sketches made in Philadelphia on a rather radically different approach. The development of the campus was stopped while a new plan, acceptable to all, was worked out, and it is on the basis of this that progress is again beginning now." The resulting site plan was dated 15 July 1957 and was drawn by Batur Ardiç. All work that was done by Godfrey, Sevely, or Perkins, prior to this drawing has not survived and there is no record of them except Godfrey's descriptions in his monthly reports and Aran's descriptions of Godfrey's and Sevely's designs as discussed above. As Godfrey indicates in his reports, there were numerous documents and drawings related to site acquisition and development that was done in the Ankara Campus Planning office. In addition, Godfrey mentions that they had worked on the design of buildings as well.

⁷⁰⁴ This site plan is unfortunately the only drawing that survives from the extensive work that was done on the Campus layout and buildings in Ankara throughout 1957. Practically everything that was done prior to Perkins' arrival has been lost, except what Godfrey recorded in his reports. As Godfrey notes, there were numerous documents and drawings related to site acquisition and development that were created in the Ankara Campus Planning office. In addition, Godfrey mentions that they had worked on the design of buildings as well.

the location of the first field practice course in construction from Ağsak to the Campus site. As Aran recalled,

We were told that our field practice would be in Ahlatlıbel (where the Campus was to be built). On that site, there was a flat hill that could be seen from the city. That area is still quite empty, PTT (Turkish Telecommunications Company) later built a few structures there. Prefabricated barracks were brought to the site; foundations needed to be prepared for the barracks. We were taken there during the summer in a bus; the ground was mostly stone. We only had picks and shovels to work with, but got into it anyway. However, it was not long before we were all exhausted. The next day, we did the same thing again, but of course we weren't accomplishing anything. We tried this for fifteen days. Aydın Germen tried to motivate us as best he could, however the whole thing failed. It was not something that could be achieved with picks and shovels...⁷⁰⁵

Godfrey also reported that the summer field practice course that year ended on September 21st and he wrote, "it can be described at best as unsuccessful."⁷⁰⁶ He also noted that, "it was, however, also educational and as a result of these lessons, I hope better results can be achieved next year."⁷⁰⁷ Godfrey listed several reasons for the course's failure, which included inadequate supervision, and the unreasonable schedule that the students were given to do the work. The last reason that Godfrey put forward was, "probably the most significant reason."⁷⁰⁸ He noted,

...the idea of students' working in this fashion on the construction job was never really accepted by the staff and other people concerned..., but specifically it demonstrates the need for a more positively oriented and sympathetically minded staff, assuming the program to be sound, as I believe it to be.⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁵ Kemal Aran, in, *Anılar: Bir Sözlü Tarih Çalışması [Fifty Years of the School of Architecture at METU from 1956 to 2006: Memoirs: A Study in Oral History]* Sevgi Aktüre, Sevin Osmay, and Ayşen Savaş, eds. (Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 2007), 8-9.

⁷⁰⁶ Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 30 September 1957, 1.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid.

One unexpected outcome of the summer work was that the DP Administration, perhaps seeing that some work had begun on the site, decided, somewhat abruptly, to stage a groundbreaking ceremony. The DP Administration was also trying to publicize the project both nationally and internationally because of the upcoming national elections.⁷¹⁰ Also, again as Batur Ardiç had noted in relation to the significance of the Campus site, the project held international significance for the DP Administration. They made sure that they invited all international delegates that they could from both Europe and the Middle East in order to make sure that everyone understood that the Middle East Technical University was being built in Ankara and nowhere else. Godfrey was caught off-guard. Because of the changes that were made to the building designs during Perkins' visit, they did not have any of construction drawings ready for any of the buildings. In his report to Luker, he explained,

Since an agreement had been made between Perkins and the Board concerning his approval of all building designs, and since such approval has been received on no building as of this date, it has been necessary to proceed on the basis of modification of a building which was started by and with him. This will be a dormitory unit for 360 students, including a dining hall which may be used temporarily for lecture and assembly, and public rooms which may serve as class and meeting rooms during the first year.⁷¹¹

⁷¹⁰ Also, again as Batur Ardiç had noted in relation to the significance of the site, the project held international significance for the DP Administration. They wanted to make sure that

⁷¹¹ Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 4 October 1957. In the Memorandum that Perkins had submitted to the Board of Trustees on July 21, 1957, he noted, "Plans for the dormitories are far enough advanced so that working drawings should be ready for bidding by early September. The plans for the architectural school are moderately well along in the preliminary design phase and have been begun for the arts and sciences classrooms and laboratories." Perkins, "Memorandum to: Board of the Middle East Technical University, 21 July 1957 (United Nations Archives), 3.

Consequently, Godfrey figured out a solution and the groundbreaking was staged at the site of one of the dormitory buildings as indicated on the July 15 Campus plan. He projected that the Architecture Building, Mechanical Engineering Building, and a classroom building would follow as quickly as possible. He informed Luker that many dignitaries including the Prime Minister, other ministers of the State, many foreign representatives including the US Ambassador, and the UN-TAA resident representative were all present at the site (**figures 6.13 - 6.16**).⁷¹²

Despite the groundbreaking ceremony, Godfrey knew that the work on the planning of the Campus had not progressed after Perkins' departure during the 1957-58 school year.⁷¹³ Here again, Godfrey felt that the growing divide between the Turkish faculty and the UN-staff was keeping them from building a collaborative working environment among the faculty within the Campus Design Office. He pointed out that the current system of compensation for Turkish faculty did not allow them to be compensated for any work that they did on the Campus project. Consequently, they were refusing to participate. Godfrey expressed the need for a different system of

⁷¹² For the ceremony which took place on October 2, 1957, see Akif Tunçel, "İstikbale Işık Saçacak Bir Eser: Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesinin Temeli Büyük Bir Merasimle Atıldı" *Mesleki ve Teknik Öğretim* 57 (Kasım, 1957), 18-23. Batur Ardıç, who played a key role in putting together the event, expressed, "When the Government came up with the groundbreaking idea, we worked tooth and nail to put the whole thing together. We put up temporary seating, borrowed a power-shovel from the Highway Department, even brought in dirt to the site, so that the delegates shovel it around. Otherwise, there was no dirt to dig on the site, even with a power-shovel, which was a whole another issue in terms of the difficulties that we would face later in building on this site. In any event, Menderes wanted publicity and he got it. But the whole thing was really a hoax. In reality, we were nowhere near where we needed to be (in terms of the design of the buildings), in order to begin construction." Ardıç, interview with the author, October 1, 2009.

⁷¹³ Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 4 January 1958, 9.

compensation so that everyone in the faculty could participate in the design of the Campus. He wrote,

When other members of the United Nations team arrive, it would be possible to go ahead on most of this work, but it seems quite undesirable to do it except as a team operation, with full participation of the Turkish staff. One of the immediate needs, therefore, is a more flexible system for compensation of staff, to permit the University to attract and hold good people and pay them adequately for any service they perform in addition to their regular teaching duties.⁷¹⁴

Perkins was aware that the campus planning office needed a budget of its own in order to hire sufficient staff and to compensate all those who participated in the design of buildings. He reported this situation to be of primary importance in the memorandum he prepared for the Trustees following his visit.⁷¹⁵ However, the issue of being able to properly compensate the Turkish faculty for the Campus design work continued to be a problem.

Consequently, the divide that Godfrey had first noticed between the Turkish and the UN faculty in relation to the summer field practice course continued to grow as the Turkish faculty felt that they were excluded from the decision-making process regarding the curriculum as well as the layout of the campus. While Godfrey looked for solutions, the arrival of two new UN-funded faculty in Ankara promised to bring new momentum to the development of the School's initiatives.

⁷¹⁴ Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 4 January 1958, 9.

⁷¹⁵ Perkins, "Memorandum to the Board of the Middle East Technical University," 10 July 1957 (UN Archives), 11.

William J. Cox and Jaakko Kaikkonen

William J. Cox and Jaakko Kaikkonen both arrived in Ankara in January 1958. Perkins had recommended Cox for the yet-to-be-filled UN-sponsored position for an expert to establish the Institute of Building Construction and Research.⁷¹⁶ Cox had received a Bachelor of Architecture degree from North Carolina State college and had completed a one-year post-graduate study at the Architectural Association in London. At the time of Perkins' recommendation, Cox was working as a registered architect for the Park Service in Philadelphia. He had also taught at Penn and had worked in a number of well-recognized offices while in Philadelphia including the offices of Louis Kahn and Vincent Kling. Perkins informed Weissmann that Cox would be an excellent assistant to Godfrey and, at the end of a year, he would be "... able to take over some of the administrative work."⁷¹⁷

Upon his arrival, Cox was given the dual responsibilities of teaching second year design studios and establishing the Institute of Building Construction Research, along with Ekmel Derya, who had been at METU since the beginning of the School.⁷¹⁸ In addition, Cox became involved in organizing the program and activities of the Institute of Housing and Town and Village Planning, probably with Kaikkonen. He also worked on gathering programming data for the new campus facilities. Following Godfrey's

⁷¹⁶ Perkins to Weissmann, May 27, 1957 (University of Pennsylvania archives).

⁷¹⁷ Cox was the youngest of three candidates that Perkins suggested for the job; however, he recommended him highly. Perkins to Weissmann, May 27, 1957 (University of Pennsylvania archives).

⁷¹⁸ William E. Cox, "Semi-annual Report," 23 June 1958 (United Nations archives), 1.

resignation in July 1959, Cox also served as the temporary acting Dean of the School of Architecture until a new Dean could be found in July 1960.⁷¹⁹

Jaakko Kaikkonen also arrived in Ankara in January shortly after Cox. Prior to his arrival, Kaikkonen had been practicing as an architect and town planner in Sweden and had worked on several regional planning projects with Alvar Aalto, most notably the regional plan for Lapland, Finland, finalized in 1950. Weissmann hired Kaikkonen because of his extensive planning experience and perceived him as the person who would finally be able to establish the Institute for Housing, Regional, City, and Village Planning.⁷²⁰ Kaikkonen was also to implement the Regional Planning curriculum, as planned by the Penn team, during the School's fourth year of operation (1959-60). In addition, he was to coordinate studios and summer workshops in both design and planning as well as to develop a new proposal for the University campus.

Kaikkonen's extensive planning background and experience with Aalto made him an outstanding candidate for the job. At the same time, it soon became evident that, as someone who had been trained and practiced in Sweden, his approach to planning and education was quite different than Godfrey and Perkins. He brought a fresh approach to the School and to the planning of the campus. Turkish colleagues and students also recognized his knowledge and experience and appreciated his tangible interest in Turkish language and culture. However, when it became obvious that Kaikkonen disagreed with

⁷¹⁹ At that point, Ekmel Derya became the first Turkish Dean of the School of Architecture.

⁷²⁰ I have not been able to find the paperwork on Kaikkonen's candidacy and hiring in the archives and collections where I collected similar information for the other UN-sponsored staff. It is possible that Kaikkonen's candidacy was dealt with through UNESCO or the European Productivity Agency.

Godfrey and Perkins on certain professional and personal matters, the Turkish faculty and students found themselves agreeing with Kaikkonen's point of view. Godfrey and Perkins recognized that different approaches and multiple points of view were important for the School; however, at this critical juncture in the School's development, Kaikkonen's presence complicated matters since it revealed that the US experts were not always right and this Swedish planner was perhaps wiser and more sympathetic to the Turkish context. Kaikkonen's popularity threatened Godfrey's authority within the School and among colleagues at a time when he was also losing control of the growth of the University.

Kaikkonen had arrived at a time of increased collaboration and activity between the Turkish ministries and the European Productivity Agency (EPA) in conducting regional planning activities in Turkey.⁷²¹ In order to allow this collaboration to work more efficiently, the Turkish Government established a Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement in 1958. The mandate of the new Ministry made provisions for the incorporation of a Regional Planning Department (RPD). RPD, in collaboration with OECD, divided Turkey into five major regions of analysis: Marmara region (the area around Istanbul and the Sea of Marmara); Zonguldak region (along the Black Sea, important for its coal reserves and mining operations); Çukurova region (including Adana and Mersin, important for its agricultural and shipping potential); Aegean region (agriculture and tourism); and, Keban Dam region (southeastern Turkey, important

⁷²¹ The European Productivity Agency (EPA) was set up in 1952 under the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which had come into being in 1948 and had emerged from the Marshall Plan. EPA was largely financed by the United States. In 1961, OEEC was superseded by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a worldwide body which included the United States and Canada.

because of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, hydroelectric power and agricultural potential). The Marmara region was given priority and, during the next eight years, the Regional Planning Department and OECD consultants were to work together to develop programs for these five main regions. One of Kaikkonen's responsibilities was to align the planning activities at the School with the projects of the RPD and the OECD.⁷²²

Based on the preliminary curriculum that the Penn team had prepared, Kaikkonen formulated a two-year Master's program in City and Regional Planning. However, he was not able to put the program into operation during the 1959-1960 academic year as had been planned. Kaikkonen explained that the program could not be started because of a lack of enrollment and interest. In his final report to the United Nations, he put forward the reasons why he felt that there was not enough interest in the program:

First of all: the profession of planner is not yet known in Turkey and Middle East. Further, it seems to me that the Planning Course on graduate level at present time is possible only by providing scholarships or salary for the students. Of course the teaching language is one limited factor. Very few people in Turkey know English.⁷²³

Kaikkonen was aware of the numerous initiatives that the Turkish Government was beginning to undertake in collaboration with international agencies in regional

⁷²² OECD Report, "OEEC/OECD Technical Assistance to Regional Planning in Turkey, 1959-1967," Paris, 2 April 1968 (METU, School of Architecture archives).

⁷²³ Kaikkonen, "Final Report," 1. It will be immediately apparent to the reader that, in the several direct quotes I utilize from Kaikkonen's final report, there are numerous grammatical and typographical errors. Instead of noting each one as belonging to the original author, I resolved to leave the grammatical and usage errors as they are without noting them with a [*sic*]. I will note typographical errors for clarity. Given the errors that Kaikkonen made in his letters and reports, it is clear that he had not fully mastered the English language.

planning.⁷²⁴ He also noted that the ministries were by now aware that their staff needed retraining. In his view, City and Regional Planning was “more than civic design and requires serious research and applications of techniques developed in other countries advanced in these fields.”⁷²⁵ However, he observed that since the School could not provide salaries and scholarships for retraining and since all instruction at METU was in English, the ministerial staff was discouraged from taking part in the program. Given these circumstances, Kaikkonen proposed that, instead of a two-year Master’s degree, the department should begin by offering short-term, five-month evening courses in planning to about ten professionals at a time. He advised that if a foreign professor were to teach the course, a translator should be available to translate the lectures into Turkish.⁷²⁶

During the 1959-1960 academic year, Kaikkonen concentrated his efforts on the establishment of the Research Institute for Planning and Housing while the establishment of the Department of Planning was put on hold. Given the regional planning projects that were beginning to take shape at the governmental level, Kaikkonen had the opportunity to conceive the Research Institute for Housing and Planning very much as the Penn team had envisioned it. Through the activities of the research institute, he was able to align the topics explored in studio courses with the interests of the Turkish ministries as well as

⁷²⁴ In his report, Kaikkonen pointed out the establishment of a new Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement which he felt was, “making great efforts to improve the practice of city planning and develop regional planning” in Turkey. He also pointed out that the Ministry had identified the Marmara region (the region around Istanbul and the Marmara Sea) as the first area of concern. Kaikkonen also mentioned the new planning activities that were initiated by *İller Bankası* (Cities Bank), but these efforts were not coordinated and had many shortcomings. *Ibid.*

⁷²⁵ Kaikkonen, “Final Report,” 1.

⁷²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

those of international agencies.⁷²⁷ In other words, he positioned inquiries like the Ağsak Village project that Sevely and Tankut had successfully begun in key areas of development identified by the European Productivity Agency and the ministries. At his urging, students and faculty conducted studies and proposals for these areas.

The Köyceğiz-Dalaman region, near the southwestern corner of the Turkish Mediterranean coast, was selected as the site for the Institute's first project.⁷²⁸ The area was chosen as one of the three pilot development regions selected by the European Productivity Agency (EPA) as part of a project for economic development in underdeveloped Mediterranean Countries.⁷²⁹ Kaikkonen reported that the Institute would first aid the project by collecting data from the region to complement the extensive economic and social research that had already been completed by an inter-ministerial Committee and published in EPA reports.⁷³⁰ The Institute would then analyze and present this information in graphical form, thus also developing methods of analysis and

⁷²⁷ In this way, Kaikkonen accepted the basic postulates that had been put forward by the Penn team regarding the function of the Institutes. Regarding the operation of the Research Institute for Planning and Housing, he wrote: "1. Research activities will enhance teaching possibilities. Therefore related program must be designed in such a way that student work and participation is possible; 2. Turkey is just starting regional planning activities. Institutes' research program must provide for pilot studies and do creative planning the result of which can be beneficial to the Government; 3. It will be more productive to concentrate research activities on projects that can be considered a part of a more comprehensive project being launched by the Government." Kaikkonen, "Final Report," 3.

⁷²⁸ Köyceğiz is a town of the Muğla municipality located on the southwestern corner of Turkey. This area was among the first areas in Turkey to be developed for tourism. One of the first regional airports in Turkey was built in Dalaman to provide easy access to the region especially for European travelers.

⁷²⁹ Kaikkonen, "Final Report," . These pilot projects were conducted even prior to the work that was begun on the five regions. The OECD Report didn't consider these pilot projects as regional planning projects, "because of their limited geographical extent (about one eighth of a province), and because of the specialized nature of the activities undertaken." OECD Report, 1968, 5.

⁷³⁰ Kaikkonen wrote, "these data would provide the basis for the planning of the area and lead to the development of a check list for the information to be compiled for regional research. Also some experience would be gained in regard to process of data collection. Kaikkonen, "Final Report," 3.

presentation. Third, the Institute would develop regional and town and village plans as well as specific housing types for the area.

In all three phases, the Institute was to work in collaboration with the teaching and research bodies of the School, the EPA, and the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement.⁷³¹ Kaikkonen reported that the School had already begun to work in the Köyceğiz area and especially in Ağla Village, which was designated as the location of the School's summer field practice program. Kaikkonen and the students spent the summer of 1959 in Ağla, studying the village and its environs, preparing plans for a village center that included in its program a new mosque, a coffee-house/shop, an open-air school/theater, a school building and three teachers' and visitors' houses, several rental summer houses and saunas (**figures 6.17 - 6.23**). The arrangement paid particular attention to the topography of the site as well as the size and orientation of the outdoor spaces that were created in between the buildings and in relation to the primary path that ran through the village. Aran, who was again one of the students engaged in that summer's field work, explained their work in the following manner:

... about 50 or so drawings were done. We staked out the position of the buildings. With the help of a local contractor, we built the village coffee house along with a little shop that was located under it.⁷³²

⁷³¹ While listing the components of the School, Kaikkonen included, "building, landscape architecture, and handcrafts." It is interesting that he included a department of handcrafts in his report, since there was not a faculty or department of handcrafts at METU. It is possible that Kaikkonen believed that one should be established. This was yet another way that Kaikkonen's approach differed from that of Perkins.

⁷³² *Anılar*, 14.

However, the rest of the buildings were unfortunately not constructed after Kaikkonen's departure at the end of the following academic year. Regarding the design of the rest of the village center, Aran provided the following:

... however there is one more issue I would like to point out (regarding the Ağla project); it is important. The village mosque was positioned across from the village coffee house; it was a single story building with a steep and pronounced gable; but not a dome. In those days, everyone was talking about Le Corbusier's Ronchamp Chapel which was a seven year long project. The only thing that was special about our building was that it had a small outdoor theater next to it, facing down the slope. Kaikkonen argued that a sacred space should have a secular space next to it. We talked about the configuration of this idea a lot...⁷³³

The students spent, not just six weeks, but almost their whole summer break at the village with enthusiasm. In this way, the Ağla project picked up where the Ağsak project had left off and became the first successful example of a fully coordinated village study at the School. Kaikkonen had been able to construct a project that finally had integrated connections to the projects of international agencies and the Turkish ministries. The project set the precedent not only for future summer field practice programs, but also for the activities of two of METU's future departments.⁷³⁴ The Department of City and Regional Planning was finally established in 1961 and began to conduct studies of the Marmara Region along the precedent established by Kaikkonen. Similarly, the

⁷³³ *Anılar*, 14-15.

⁷³⁴ For a documentation and analysis of the METU Field Practice programs, see: Kemal Aran, Yıldırım Yavuz, Suha Özkan, eds., *ODTÜ Mimarkık Fakültesi Yaz Uygulamaları, 1958-74 [METU Summer Field Practice Programs, 1958-74]* (ODTÜ: Ankara, 1974); Selahattin Önür, "ODTÜ Mimarlık Bölümü Yapı Stajı Uygulamaları [METU Department of Architecture Building Field Practice Programs]," *Tasarım Merkezi Dergisi* 4 (August, 2007): 72-75; and, "ODTÜ Mimarlık Bölümü Yaz Stajı Uygulamaları (1958-2006): Kurumsallaşmış Sosyal İçerikli Bir Program [METU Department of Architecture Summer Field Practice Programs (1958-2006): An Institutionalized Program with a Social Agenda]." Söyleşi: Selahattin Önür, Mine Özkar, Alper Alkan, F. Berin Gür [Conversation: Selahattin Önür, Mine Özkar, Alper Alkan, F. Berin Gür]. *Mimarlık* 332: 55-62.

Department of Restoration and Preservation focused its studies in the Keban Dam region following its establishment in 1964.⁷³⁵ During the fall 1959 term, Kaikkonen continued to work with the fourth year students to develop the plans for Ağla and an exhibition of their work on both Ağla and the larger region around Köyceğiz. The work was exhibited in Ankara and Köyceğiz.⁷³⁶

In addition, the enthusiasm with which Kaikkonen immersed himself and his family in the project was inspiring and exemplary for the students. He and his wife, Barbara, moved into the village prior to the students' arrival and lived in the village elder's (Muhtar's) house for the whole summer. Kaikkonen's interest and fascination with the material culture and rituals of village life also inspired the students. Most of them had grown up in urban areas and generally viewed Turkish rural life as traditional and backward. They were not used to valuing rural lifestyles, customs, culture, and architecture. Yet, getting at least some professionals out of the cities and into the countryside was one of the central aims of Abrams' administrative revolution. Kaikkonen began to achieve this partially through personal conviction and interest. He earned both the students' and the local population's respect through the resiliency and interest he showed in adapting to and learning about village life and traditions.

⁷³⁵ The establishment of the Department of Restoration and Preservation will be discussed briefly in chapter six and in the conclusion.

⁷³⁶ Kaikkonen, "Final Report," 5. Aran also reports that, during the exhibition in Köyceğiz, images of buildings and houses around the Köyceğiz area were projected on glass surfaces with slide projectors. He also reports, "a large group (from EPA) of 70-80 people made up of students, faculty, and journalists joined the METU group and stayed in Ağla during a portion of the summer for about 1.5 to 2 months. The whole village had a carnival atmosphere during that whole summer. See, *Anılar*, 14.

Godfrey, Perkins, and to some extent, Sevely and Cox had earned their Turkish colleagues' and students' respect and enthusiasm. However, Kaikkonen's approach to the structuring of the planning program, the problem of the language of instruction, as well as his interest in the local culture resonated with Turkish faculty, students, and professionals. The model that Kaikkonen was providing seemed to go further in instigating reform and establishing the relationships that the School had aimed to foster. In fact, the way Kaikkonen constructed the summer field practice program would become the precedent for numerous programs that METU would later initiate in collaboration with governmental and international agencies in community, city, and regional planning and development. Even the Department of Restoration and Preservation that was established in 1964 in the School of Architecture would operate based on the general model that was pioneered by the Köyceğiz-Ağla project.

Kaikkonen's formative influence was also felt in the planning of the University campus. Following his arrival in Ankara and while he was working on the outlines of the planning program and the Institute, Kaikkonen spent a considerable amount of time developing a new proposal for the campus plan.⁷³⁷ After reviewing the plans developed by Perkins, Godfrey, and Sevely, Kaikkonen asked the Campus Planning Office staff to build a 1:1250 scale model that accurately represented the topographical features of the site (**figure 6.24**). Ardiç recalls that this was a serious undertaking and a very large model was produced made of grey chipboard (*mukavva*). It was built in several sections in order

⁷³⁷ Kaikkonen, "Final Report to UN/UNESCO," 10 February 1960 (UN Archives), 5.

to represent a considerable portion of the entire campus site.⁷³⁸ Kaikkonen asked the staff to model the topographical features of the site as accurately as possible. Once the base model was completed according to Kaikkonen's instructions, he built a periscope-like instrument with which to view and study the model.⁷³⁹ He explained that a topographic model such as this one couldn't be studied properly without the aid of an instrument that allowed one to view it from eye level as if one were standing on the actual site. He would position pre-cut wooden massing models of the buildings on the base model and study their arrangement in relation to the site, while viewing the model through the periscope (**figure 6.25**). He would draw perspectival drawings of the arrangements as he viewed them through the instrument and then he would reposition the buildings, try different arrangements, and document them through drawings.⁷⁴⁰ Kaikkonen's process was educational and inspiring to the students. He had brought a new approach to the way the UN experts had been developing the layout of the campus on the given site.

However, after a two-year tenure at METU, Kaikkonen left Ankara at the end of the fall term of the 1959-60 academic year. Given his popularity, experience, and contributions, he could have easily stayed longer to realize the establishment of the department of city and regional planning and the conclusion of the campus plan. However, there were clear differences between him and Perkins. A degree of bitterness is

⁷³⁸ Ardiç noted that they did not build the area near Eymir Lake since the major topographical shifts in this area of the campus site would have made the construction of the model even more complicated. Ardiç, interview with the author, 1 October 2009.

⁷³⁹ Ardiç, interview with the author, 1 October 2009.

⁷⁴⁰ Unfortunately, none of these drawings have been able to be located. Only a few photographs of this significant model exist. Kaikkonen, "Final Report," 5.

clearly palpable in the final report Kaikkonen submitted to the UN. Most of his disappointment was directed to the way Perkins and Godfrey had managed to secure funds to relocate the work on the campus plan to Penn towards the end of spring 1959, despite the progress that had been made on the project in Ankara.⁷⁴¹

In this final report, Kaikkonen did not hesitate to point out that his emphasis on the importance of the features of the site and his particular approach to the design of the campus plan had generated noteworthy discussions and had significantly contributed to the later campus plans and recommendations generated by Perkins and his team of faculty at Penn. Regarding his proposal in relation to Perkins', Kaikkonen brought attention to the following differences:

In my proposal the differences concerning location between the academic area and dormitories was emphasized, In the earlier plan of Mr. Perkins working and housing were mixed. In order to give more possibilities for interesting technical and architectural solutions in the final projects I tried to point out the use of the exceptional topographical and landscaping possibilities of the campus area.⁷⁴²

Here, Kaikkonen was referring to the earlier plan that Godfrey, Sevely, and Perkins had produced (**figure 6.11**). Following this paragraph, Kaikkonen added, “The outlines of the second proposal of Mr. Perkins are almost the same as it [*sic*] my proposal.”⁷⁴³ In this case, Kaikkonen was referring to the plan Perkins subsequently prepared at Penn (**figures 6.26 – 6.28**). Regarding Perkins' later proposal, Kaikkonen wrote:

⁷⁴¹ Perkins was to secure a fund through the UN that would allow him to take the campus planning project to Penn where he completed a full set of plans and recommendations for the campus with the help of his faculty. Perkins called these set of plans, “the consultants’ plan.” This development will be discussed in more detail under the next sub-heading.

⁷⁴² Kaikkonen, “Final Report,” 5.

⁷⁴³ This plan, by Perkins et. al., will be discussed in detail under the following sub-heading.

Main entrance of the campus leading directly to the special “Center of University” (central place combined with main auditorium, university administration building and other community buildings). Secondary traffic and circulation system between the “center” and different faculties. The orientation of the campus position along the axis of the hill in direction of Ankara. Separation of dormitories from the faculties by locating them on the south slope of the hill, protected against north wind.⁷⁴⁴

Kaikkonen was correct to say that Perkins had incorporated almost all of the ideas he had put forward.

At the same time, Kaikkonen pointed out that he did not agree with the particular way Perkins had configured the academic “center.” He wrote, “the scale and the architectural form of the ‘center’ cannot be decided on,” meaning that the exact physical and symbolic form of this space needed to be discussed further.⁷⁴⁵ Perkins made note of this observation as well. In fact, resolving the “problem of the center,” would become the aim of the first competition that was to be held for the METU campus plan in late-1959 and early-1960. Kaikkonen acknowledged this in his report as well, as he wrote, “Later an international competition was opened to solve one part – problem in center according to the general-plan of Mr. Perkins.”⁷⁴⁶

Regarding the plans Perkins submitted to the Board of Trustees, Kaikkonen added,

I also cannot agree with the idea of locating the extension of dormitories in scattered rows through the large area to the south, particularly as the buildingz

⁷⁴⁴ Kaikkonen, “Final Report,” 5. Ardiç noted that Kaikkonen was the first proponent of moving the location of the central campus down the hill from where it was located on the first site plan.

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid.

[*sic*] are in close touch with the traffic roads including the main entrance road to the campus.⁷⁴⁷

In the second set of plans Perkins would produce for the Board's approval, he would address this issue as well (**figure 6.30**). In this way, Kaikkonen's final report identified the main areas of discussion and perhaps contention between him and Perkins regarding the campus plan. It seems that Perkins was open to Kaikkonen's input and addressed by and large almost all of his concerns in the plans that he would produce during and after Kaikkonen's tenure. As can be deduced from his report, Kaikkonen was also very much aware of the contributions he had made to the School's program and the development of its campus plan. However, he did not seem to approve of the way Perkins had maintained control of the project. By the time of Kaikkonen's departure, his critique and dissatisfaction regarding the School's administration were beginning to be expressed by his Turkish colleagues as well.

Holmes Perkins and the Development of the "Consultants' Plan"

Godfrey, close to the end of his three-year tenure at METU, reported that the campus planning office had, "led a confused and buffeted life."⁷⁴⁸ In this report, he provided a list of the various reasons for the planning office's less than satisfactory performance. In particular, he pointed to the numerous difficulties he had in properly staffing the office's operations:

⁷⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁸ Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 1 March 1959, 6.

As early as the fall of 1957 a competent Turkish Director was promised, but until January 1959 none was supplied. In the meantime, the office has suffered from the absence of an experienced, full time man with a sympathetic understanding of the goals of the University and with the initiative and drive to make the office an effective element in the work to reach these goals.

During this period, a succession of part time staff members has tried to keep some form of program going, in the face of lack of necessary information on the site and program needs, poor recruiting, and apathy on the part of many of the staff members who were not basically in sympathy with the program.⁷⁴⁹

In an earlier report, Godfrey had identified the problem more precisely, describing the campus plan as, “A victim of the budget.”⁷⁵⁰ The initial budget that the Penn team had configured in relation to the staffing of the School had essentially neglected to set aside UN funds to pay the Turkish faculty and professionals for any work they would do on the campus plan. Furthermore, he noted that, “(Turkish) Faculty members who because of various restrictions on payments to government workers cannot receive extra compensation for work on the campus design, are refusing to participate.”⁷⁵¹ Consequently, an oversight on the initial planning of the budget had not only slowed down the progress of the campus plan, but it also had created a significant divide between the foreign and Turkish faculty of the School.

Godfrey, in his March 1959 report, noted that a new arrangement between the UN-TAA and the University of Pennsylvania promised, “a real chance of producing a

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁰ Godfrey, “Monthly Report,” 4 January 1958, 9.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid.

campus.⁷⁵² Based on Godfrey's repeated requests for alternate sources of funding for the planning office, the UN-TAA agreed to provide a special fund to support for the planning of the campus. However, the nature of the final agreement reached between UN-TAA and the University of Pennsylvania was aimed primarily at employing Perkins and the faculty at Penn for finalizing the campus plan. It did not make any attempts to ameliorate the situation between the UN and Turkish faculty at METU. What is more, the Board of Trustees appeared to be content with the way the UN proposed to resolve the situation.

Given the conditions of the planning office that Godfrey had been describing for some time, Perkins was able to secure a special fund from UN-TAA that would allow the Penn faculty at the Institute for Urban Design to develop a final site plan for METU incorporating the ideas that had thus far been discussed and produced.⁷⁵³ In order to review the contributions that Kaikkonen had made to the design of the master plan and to collect any other programming data that was put together by the campus design office at METU, Perkins planned to travel to Ankara for the third time in March 1959.⁷⁵⁴

In his correspondence with UN-TAA, Perkins described this final master plan as a document that would bring the work of the last three years to a conclusion and serve as

⁷⁵² Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 1 March 1959, 6. After this report, Godfrey never talked about the campus site plan again. This report was next to his last report to the UN-TAA. He left his position at METU shortly after the end of the 1958-59 academic year. It is possible that he may have contributed to the development of the plan that Perkins and Loschetter was working on after his return to Philadelphia. Perkins included Godfrey's name in the drawings; however, Godfrey does not mention this in the final report he filed on 25 February 1960. In fact, Godfrey does not claim to have made any major contributions to the site plan at any point during his involvement with the School. Godfrey, interview with the author, 15 April 2007.

⁷⁵³ Perkins to Maria Huntington, 18 June 1959.

⁷⁵⁴ As discussed above, Perkins was to incorporate Kaikkonen's approach to the final plans he would develop at Penn.

the program for an international competition that would be organized to generate further proposals for the site. In his letter to Maria Huntington, the Associate Program Officer of the Office for Europe, Middle East, and Africa of UN-TAA, Perkins wrote,

For the above sum (\$10,000.00), Godfrey and I would, in accordance with our letter to you of April 20, 1959, prepare a preliminary site plan of the central portion of the campus at 1:1000 and an outline plan of the whole campus at 1:5000. In addition, for the remainder of the calendar year, advise the Board of METU on architectural plans for the buildings on the campus and, thirdly, would actively participate in the judgment of the architectural competition as well as in the preparation of the program.⁷⁵⁵

Following his visit to Turkey in March 1959 and based on this agreement, Perkins produced two sets of drawings for the METU campus that he referred to as “the consultants’ plan.”⁷⁵⁶ He prepared both sets with the aid of his faculty at Penn. Perkins submitted the first set of drawings to the Board of Trustees in November 1959 (**figures 6.26 - 6.28**). The Board approved these drawings in December 1959 and, based on these drawings, Perkins and the Board organized an international competition for the METU campus plan. The exact aim of this competition was curious and required its own discussion, since Perkins fully intended to carry out the construction of the campus based on the set of drawings he had presented to the Board. Consequently, the aims and the results of the first as well as the second competition will be considered in the next

⁷⁵⁵ Perkins to Huntington, 18 June 1959, 1-2.

⁷⁵⁶ Hereafter, I will use the term, the consultants’ plan, without quotations, to refer to the set of drawings Perkins prepared at Penn.

chapter. First, however, it will be useful to examine the configuration of the campus as proposed by Perkins and the consultants.⁷⁵⁷

As Kaikkonen had noted in his report, the design of the academic center of the campus as well as the configuration of the main drive that traced the contours of the site and led up to this center were the two of the primary features of the plan around which the idea was organized (**figure 6.26**). The configuration of these two elements in relation to each other, to the topography and other outstanding features of the site, and to Ankara and the Grand National Assembly complex also comprised the essential aims of the plan. In the second and final set of drawings that Perkins submitted to the Board following the first competition, he included two sheets of notes outlining the primary aims of the plan as well (**figures 6.32 & 6.33**). In these notes, he claimed that the aim of the consultants' plan was "to permit an orderly growth outward from a compact central core."⁷⁵⁸

An analysis of the central core reveals the complexity of the discussion that the consultants must have had regarding the organization of this space in relation to the dynamic and ever-changing quality of a University campus.⁷⁵⁹ Taking into account Kaikkonen's criticism regarding how the plan should allow a certain degree of flexibility in terms of the configuration of its center, the consultants came up with a particularly dynamic and innovative configuration organized around a shifting axial geometry that

⁷⁵⁷ In the first set of drawings Perkins submitted to the Board, he noted Loschetter and Godfrey were the two other consultants who had contributed to the plan. It is not clear who else at Penn may have been involved in the production of these drawings. The second set of drawings, which were submitted and reapproved by the Board in June 1960, did not specify the consultants' names.

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁹ The various documents refer to this central space interchangeably as, "the central core," "the academic core," and, during the first competition and thereafter, as, "the forum."

allowed the space to read as intimate and expansive at the same time. This organization held both functional and symbolic values for the University as it aimed to accommodate and reflect the School's unique curricular and administrative structure.

At first glance, the central quad of the campus does not seem that different from many other traditional American campuses, such as the lawn of the University of Virginia or the central quad of Columbia University, both of which were organized around a long rectangular space. Similar to the way Thomas Jefferson had positioned the library at one end of the Lawn at UVa, the consultants positioned the library at the southwest end of the quad at METU. Along the long sides, the School of Arts and Sciences and the School of Administrative Sciences enclosed this central space. Again, similar to the way the UVa lawn was originally configured, the second short end of this quadrangle, the northwest end in METU's case, was left open to afford views of the hills and the landscape beyond. At the same time, however, by positioning the two schools along the long sides at an oblique angle to each other, the consultants were able to create a number of other relationships that allowed the core to flow outward from this intimate center towards the larger site.

The consultants' plan positioned the Library orthogonally towards the Arts and Sciences building, creating an axis that stretched out from the Library towards the President's Office and the School of Architecture and positioned the two bodies—namely the Library and the School of Architecture—at two ends of this axis and as key components of the School. This organization reflected their importance within the organization of the interdisciplinary curriculum of the University. The proximity of the

President's office to the School of Architecture also aligned those two bodies, suggesting that the executive branch of the School would be closely associated with the functions of the School of Architecture and Planning.

Furthermore, the School of Architecture, the President's office, and a portion of the Administrative Sciences building were positioned at top edge of the hill with a direct view towards the Grand National Assembly and the capital city. The consultants provided a perspectival drawing that showed this relationship between the key departments of the School and the State (**figure 6.28**). This view embodied the vital connection between the University and the State that Abrams had initially proposed. Through this connection, the School would act as the beginnings of a planning agency and would coordinate country planning strategies and provide staffing for the State to carry out these projects across the nation.

By organizing the core around a double and shifting axis, the consultants created multiple relationships and provided views from this core towards both the landscape and the countryside beyond and to the capital city, symbolizing the School's position between the nation and its capital and providing a spatial expression of Abrams' administrative revolution. The School was to train the high-level technical and administrative staff that would bring the services of the State to the countryside. At the same time, the School was to conduct research and create knowledge about the country beyond in order to better understand the customs and needs of each region and to bring that knowledge back to the State.

The shifting axial configuration that the consultants utilized at the core allowed views and relationships towards the southwest as well. The shift in the positioning of the Administrative Sciences building provided an opening on the southwest end of the core, creating a secondary connection between the Auditorium and the School of Architecture as well. This opening also comprised the gateway to the academic core, which provided a termination point to the main drive to the campus. The secondary axis that stretched, this time, between the School of Architecture and the Auditorium provided a second and larger scale of the core allowing it to read both intimate and expansive at the same time. Along this secondary axis, the core embodied a more expansive scale and identity and included the student dormitories and dining halls along this more linear configuration.

The consultants explained this arrangement in the notes that they included with the second set of drawings that they submitted to the Board. They noted that this dynamic arrangement was to give form to the idea of an, “orderly growth outward from a compact central core.”⁷⁶⁰ In terms of the way the plan embodied the aims of the University, the consultants wrote,

A university is a society. Its purpose is to search for and to disseminate truth and knowledge. This means that it is always on the move, fluid and flexible, expanding and contracting in sometimes unpredictable directions. Further, the qualities with which university buildings should be infused seem often to be mutually conflicting—seclusion and adventurousness, humility and dignity, spaciousness and intimacy, flexibility and order.⁷⁶¹

⁷⁶⁰ Notes to the second set of drawings, “The Consultants’ Plan,” Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania.

⁷⁶¹ Ibid.

The consultants recognized that the development and the form of the actual campus might differ from the master plan that they had prepared. Consequently, they listed a set of eight principles, which, they noted, “if adhered to, provide order with variety and a continuity of growth for many decades to come” (**figure 6.32**).⁷⁶² The consultants noted that the academic core should expand from the center outward, but should remain compact so as to make it possible to walk from one end to the other within a 10-minute interval between classes. The consultants then advised the creation of a series of outdoor courts, “to give protection against the weather” and to provide centers for and between each of the Schools and Institutes that make up the University in order to provide spaces for cross-disciplinary gatherings and activities. The consultants advised that the automobile should be excluded from the academic core and from the courts of each of the Schools. In addition, the consultants advised that a system of larger open spaces was also needed for the campus’s continued readability as a coherent form in relation to the landscape and city beyond. They recommended,

The reservation for all time of a system of open spaces which will provide convenient and pleasant walks throughout the campus and which will be so located as to offer a variety of views to the panoramas of Ankara and the surrounding hills and valleys—these greenways can give coherent form to the plan and by so doing permit the greatest freedom and diversity in the development of the adjacent buildings even in places where the future needs cannot be predicted at this time.⁷⁶³

The consultants also recommended that, in addition to the work on the center, the construction of the dormitories should begin at once providing accommodations for two-

⁷⁶² Ibid.

⁷⁶³ Ibid.

thirds to three-quarters of the students at all times. In addition, the consultants recommended the use of native materials of a limited range of color, which they felt would weather well. The consultants pointed to the use of the local stone at the lime kilns in Yalincak, a village near the campus site, as an example.⁷⁶⁴ They also advised the use of passive building techniques in the design of the buildings to avoid excessive mechanical equipment and to protect the buildings from excessive sun and from prevailing winter winds.

Following the approval of the initial set of plans, Perkins organized an international competition with the Board's support, to which I will return in the following chapter. However, it should be noted here that while working on the organization and the assessment of the competition, Perkins and the consultants continued to work on the consultants' plan. They made a few revisions and added notes explaining the principles behind the campus plan as well as providing guidelines for the design of the buildings themselves under a section entitled, "General Architectural Design Conditions" (**figures 6.29 – 6.33**). This second set of drawings was re-approved by the Board of Trustees on July 20, 1960, shortly before its dissolution following the Coup of May 27, 1960.

By the time the Board approved this set of drawings, the jury of the first competition had selected Turgut Cansever as the Turkish architect who would work with the consultants in the development of the campus plan and the design of its buildings.

The conditions of the relationship between the consultants and Cansever will be

⁷⁶⁴ The consultants felt that Yalincak could be developed as a model village with its own building materials industry. The village had existing but underutilized lime kilns. The consultants made some initiatives to establish the building materials research institute in this village. Thomas Godfrey, interview with author, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, 15 April 2007.

discussed in the next chapter. However, while the consultants made efforts to designate a Turkish architect to take over the project, they also wanted to maintain their control by refining and providing a set of principles in the set of drawings that they kept describing as the official master plan for the University.

In addition to the design principles for the campus and the buildings of the University, the second set of drawings also included a broader campus plan that showed the full extents of the campus and of the facilities that would be strung along the main drive that connected the campus to the Ankara – Konya highway (**figure 6.29**). This plan provided the locations of the future residential and academic areas, parking and recreational areas, stadium, gymnasium as well as the existing facilities on the site, such as the NATO and US radar and radio stations. The consultants took care to position these functions on the higher elevations while leaving the valleys and the low-lying areas as open space between specific activity zones. The consultants felt that these open areas were essential to the understanding of the parts and the whole of the School.

The even curve of the main drive to the academic core began from the Ankara-Konya Highway and followed the contours of the land along a ridge and brought one to the plateau where the center of the campus was located. Therefore, approaching the campus from Ankara, one first got a glimpse of the School of Architecture, the student dormitories, and the Administrative Sciences building all positioned along the east and the southeast side of the hill upon which the campus was located (**figure 6.29**). As one took the long drive up the main entrance of the campus, the curvilinear path of the drive allowed one panoramic views of the central campus, as if the academic core were being

turned on a lazy Suzan and presented to the visitor on a plate. This curvilinear approach borrowed one of the key strategies of the English landscape tradition and utilized it in the approach to this postwar campus. At the same time, the generous length and radius of the curve of this path suggested a rather monumental approach and one that could be traversed comfortably only by a motorized vehicle and not on foot. Consequently, while borrowing from English landscape traditions, the main drive of the campus made its claim to modernity by unmistakably gauging its length, width, and scale to the speed and range of the car or a bus that one would have to take in order to come to the campus from the city.

As one turned into the main drive and began the ascent to the central campus, a brick factory, the stadium, and the gymnasium along the left hand side (southwest of the drive) were presented as the first structures of the campus, while the recreational fields along the right hand side of the drive provided the foreground of the view to the top of the hill. One then drove passed the mosque, the auditorium, and the dining hall to the first set of dormitories to arrive at a forecourt where the main drive was terminated (**figure 6.30**).⁷⁶⁵ At this forecourt, parking areas were provided and only public transportation and service vehicles were to drive beyond this point and onto the perimeter drive that took one around the campus. The perimeter drive circled around the academic core and

⁷⁶⁵ The inclusion of a mosque, especially along the main drive of the campus, is of course very curious and was a proposal that would certainly cause some controversy given the growing divide between the DP and the RPP during the second half of the 1950s. As the DP Administration openly supported a resurgence of Islamic practices throughout Turkey appealing to the desires of the rural population, the national revolutionary elite and the military felt that secularism, as one of the foundations of the Turkish national revolutionary ideology, was being undermined and threatened. Documents related to the campus plan at times referred to the mosque as, “the house of religion,” under a more multi-faith term, reflecting the University’s international moorings and avoiding any direct reference to Islam in particular. This topic will be discussed in more detail in chapter six.

brought people and services to the service courts of each of the departmental and administrative buildings.

The configuration of this forecourt as well as the main quad and the surrounding buildings were the primary areas where the consultants made a few changes between their first and second submissions to the Board. Comparing the two plans, one can observe how the consultants reconfigured the traffic flow and parking in the forecourt between the first and second plans. They also changed the locations of the School of Education and the Faculty Club. The building that was marked as the President's office was left unmarked in the second plan, but a note was added to a structure that had not been identified in the first plan, as President's house. In addition, a lecture hall was added as one of the buildings flanking the main quad.

In terms of the second row of buildings around the main quad, an auditorium was added on the north and the student union moved from its location on the northeast side of the quad to the northwest end of the academic core, near the administrative building, making available yet another set of views of the campus site to the students. In addition, a group of humanities buildings were placed in the middle of the engineering buildings, breaking up the monolithic character of this row and making it more interdisciplinary with connections between different disciplines.

The fact that the majority of the revisions took place around the forecourt and the main quad suggested that the aim of the first competition was to generate ideas and criticism regarding the character of the center of the University. However, the consultants continued involvement in and control over the project even after the first competition

raised many questions about the aims and role of the consultants among the university and professional community.

As Godfrey had mentioned in his reports, one of the reasons for contracting out the campus planning work to Perkins was that irreconcilable differences were growing within the School of Architecture and especially between the UN and the Turkish faculty. The return of the UN fellows who had been awarded scholarships to study and retrain at Penn contributed to this divide. These tensions ultimately led to the early appointment of one of the Turkish members of the faculty to the position of Dean.

Godfrey's Departure and the Return of the UN Fellows

In a report Godfrey submitted to Norman Luker on 1 March 1959, he requested that "recruitment begin for my replacement," since he was making plans to return to the United States to teach at Penn towards the end of his contract during the upcoming summer.⁷⁶⁶ Recognizing that it was already late in the academic year for this announcement, Godfrey provided the following explanation:

My contract expires 5 September, and it is already late in the academic year to find people prepared to make changes. I had been waiting for confirmation on my own situation before taking this action, but I do not think I should wait any longer, if you are to have a fair chance of finding a strong man. As the direction of the University is in danger of taking a very mechanistic turn at this moment, a very strong Dean of Architecture is a vital necessity.⁷⁶⁷

He then discussed some of the names that Perkins and the Board had been discussing in relation to the Dean's position at the School of Architecture. I will discuss that portion of

⁷⁶⁶ Godfrey to Luker, 1 March 1959, UN Archives.

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid.

Godfrey's report to Luker and the leadership at the School after Godfrey's departure at the beginning of chapter seven. In this sub-chapter, I would like to discuss the issues that Godfrey chose to address with the UN as he approached the end of his tenure.

Godfrey's note to Luker suggests that he had considered a longer tenure at METU and negotiations on this matter may have been continuing even at the time of his writing this report. Indeed, the Board of Trustees considered Godfrey an able administrator and had petitioned the United Nations to approve his appointment as president of the University.⁷⁶⁸ However, the UN, for various complicated reasons, reminded the Board that such an appointment would be, "beyond Mr. Godfrey's assigned role," further complicating the matters between Godfrey and the School.⁷⁶⁹ Consequently, given the circumstances of the dynamic between Perkins, Stassen, and the UN and their plans to appoint a higher profile administrator as the president of the University, Godfrey made plans to depart during the summer of 1959. However, as his note to Luker suggests, he hoped that a qualified administrator could be found for the Dean's position at the School of Architecture and Planning. As the engineering departments within METU were growing, strong leadership at the School of Architecture was important to maintain the original aims and the interdisciplinary configuration of the University. The Turkish trainees who Léon Loschetter had selected for UN fellowships had concluded their training at Penn and had begun to return to METU during fall 1958. These fellows were to ensure the continuity of the curricular and pedagogical foundations that had been established by the UN staff. In addition, Godfrey provided an extensive account of the

⁷⁶⁸ Reed, 224.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid.

state and aims of the School in the last couple of reports he submitted to the UN. Through the points he emphasized in these reports, Godfrey sought to summarize the experiences that had been gained during the first three years and emphasized the pedagogical aims of the School. These reports are especially helpful in understanding how Godfrey and Perkins perceived the School's aims and how they interpreted Abrams' idea of training and education for development.

Godfrey began to report on the returning UN fellows in November 1958.⁷⁷⁰ As discussed in chapter five, Léon Loschetter had interviewed and selected six candidates to receive UN scholarships to attend graduate courses at the University of Pennsylvania School of Fine Arts for two years beginning in fall 1956.⁷⁷¹ The candidates were to specialize in an area of their own choosing among the degrees offered within the School of Fine Arts and to return to METU to become a member of the faculty in that area. Most of the candidates were graduates of the Istanbul schools and were working as staff members in the ministries in Ankara at the time of their interviews with Loschetter. By choosing candidates from the ministries, Loschetter sought to strengthen the relationship between the School and the ministries while also acclimating the staff at the ministries to the curriculum and the methodologies at the School.

Even though the original plan was for all of the UN fellows to return to teach at METU, as they began to arrive in Ankara several issues arose complicating the realization of that plan. Godfrey explained that the UN fellows were generally reluctant

⁷⁷⁰ Godfrey to Luker, 20 November 1958, UN Archives.

⁷⁷¹ See chapter five.

to begin teaching at the School as they returned to Ankara at the beginning of that academic year.⁷⁷²

By November 1958, only three of the six fellows had gotten in touch with Godfrey regarding their returning dates and only two out of the three had shown interest to work at the School. Among the first three fellows, Godfrey reported that only one had shown actual potential to become a contributing member of the staff. In a later report, he conceded that even that fellow's contributions had been questionable.⁷⁷³

By February 1959, all six of the UN fellows had contacted Godfrey.⁷⁷⁴ Among the six, only four had shown interest in full-time teaching and among the four, only one had proven to be able to work effectively with the students and existing staff. Godfrey noted that the unpredictable schedule of the fellows' return to Turkey had made it difficult for him to place them immediately in positions. Once he became aware of their poor performance, he also was reluctant to replace well-performing members of the staff with fellows. Godfrey added that, generally speaking, the returning fellows had been reluctant to follow established school policies and often refused to teach in English. Godfrey explained that this was largely due to the fact that their English had not improved sufficiently during their studies at Penn. However, the fellows' refusal to teach in English may also have been an act of resistance and an assertion of different priorities that they held.

⁷⁷² Godfrey to Luker, 20 November 1958, 4.

⁷⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ Godfrey provided detailed information on each of the UN fellow in his report to Luker dated 15 February 1959. Godfrey, Report to Luker, 15 February 1959, UN Archives, 1.

Godfrey concluded that the fellowship program had so far been a failure.⁷⁷⁵ He suggested that a faulty selection strategy might have been at the heart of the problem. Godfrey argued that the older age and experience of the fellows recruited from among the ministry staff had not altogether worked in their favor. In addition, he pointed out that some of the fellows had lived with each other or with their families and that this had reduced their exposure to the academic and professional cultures at Penn and in Philadelphia. Godfrey noted that this point was evidenced most acutely by the returning fellows' poor command of English and by how they wanted to teach in Turkish.

Furthermore, Godfrey reported that the fellows expected higher salaries and more responsibilities than their abilities warranted. When Godfrey could not meet these expectations, the fellows became frustrated and decided either not to teach at the School or contributed to the growing divide between the UN experts and the Turkish staff, professionals, and officials.⁷⁷⁶

Based on this experience, Godfrey reported that the Board of Trustees intended to "select fellows from promising young assistants already on the School's staff."⁷⁷⁷ He added that the most valuable staff members were those, "who had recently returned after

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁶ Godfrey explained, "...there has been considerable dissatisfaction, ... that their (fellows') talent has not been put to good use. Furthermore, these men may because of their age have been less receptive to new ideas than younger, less experienced men." Ibid.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

completing their undergraduate and graduate professional work abroad.”⁷⁷⁸ Godfrey added,

It is consequently felt that for future teacher preparation, one of two sources of personnel might prove most valuable: first, selection of the most promising graduates of the course here at METU, to be sent to the USA for two year’s graduate work; and second, selection by an associate in the US (such as Dean Perkins) of the most promising graduates of American schools for one or two years’ special preparation for teaching. I have been in correspondence with a few such students, and feel there may be a rich source of material here.⁷⁷⁹

Rauf Beyru, one of the fellows who had decided not to return to the School on a full-time basis, at least initially, reported that there was more to the story regarding the UN fellows. Beyru had studied planning at Penn and he was one of the strongest candidates among the group. Beyru was also among the first group to return to Ankara and Godfrey had hoped that Beyru would take a full-time position at the School, especially since he had been trained as a planner. Instead, Beyru decided to take a position as a staff member in the newly opened Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement. Beyru reported that the reason for his choice was that at the Ministry and among the professionals, METU had the reputation of being a School run by “the Americans.” If he went to work at METU, he would lose the respect of his colleagues. Plus, the Ministry offered a better paying and a more secure position. Beyru did not want to associate himself with an institution that might not be around in the next few years. From Beyru’s point of view,

⁷⁷⁸ Generally speaking, this group belonged to an elite class who had a very different educational upbringing than the majority of the professionals who were working in the ministries in Turkey.

⁷⁷⁹ Godfrey, Report to Luker, 4.

which also reflected that of the Ministry staff, METU's objectives appeared suspect and its future seemed unsure at best.⁷⁸⁰

Orhan Özgüner was among the fellows who returned to the School on a full-time basis and became one of the most contributing members of the design faculty. Özgüner was the Academy of Fine Arts graduate who had been included among the initial UN fellows.⁷⁸¹ Aside from his focus in architectural design, Özgüner had also taken on the responsibility to develop an architectural history curriculum.⁷⁸² He helped to put together the first darkroom for the School by converting one of the janitor's bathrooms when the School was located in the buildings behind the Grand National Assembly. Özgüner also established the METU hiking club and initiated one of the first studies in Turkish vernacular architecture undertaken by one of the design faculty.⁷⁸³

Even though Özgüner chose to become a part of the faculty at the School, he confirmed many of Beyru's accounts. Özgüner reported that the presence of a divide between the UN and Turkish faculty had become clearly visible to anyone involved with the School by their return. Özgüner felt that this divide had reached even bigger

⁷⁸⁰ Only when the School's administration was transferred to Turkish staff after the *coup* of May 27, 1960, did Beyru take an active role in the establishment and development of the Department of City and Regional Planning, even as he also continued his involvement with the Ministry.

⁷⁸¹ Özgüner's *Curriculum Vitae*. Özgüner recalls that Loschetter had picked him because he spoke French. Interview with the author, 13 December 2007.

⁷⁸² Godfrey, "Monthly Report," 1 March 1959 (United Nations Archives), 3.

⁷⁸³ See, Orhan Özgüner, *Köyde Mimari: Doğu Karadeniz [Architecture in the Village: Eastern Black Sea Region]* (Ankara: METU, 1970). Cevat Erder, the founding director of the Department of Restoration and Preservation within the School of Architecture in 1964. However, Özgüner then began to take his own group to vernacular architecture studies during the summers beginning in 1968. Cevat Erder, interview with author...

proportions following the return of the UN fellows who perceived themselves to be equal to or superior to the UN staff.

At the same time, Özgüner viewed these rivalries to be perfectly normal. He pointed out that the professionals in Ankara and at the ministries as well as at the Istanbul schools had grown both very curious and skeptical about the goings on at METU. Özgüner felt that the returning fellows were to some extent still carrying the anxieties that they had adopted during their days at the Ministry prior to their departure to go to Penn. These initial perceptions were exacerbated by, on the one hand, the somewhat mediocre experiences these first set of fellows had during their time at Penn, and on the other, by their frustrated expectations upon their return. Godfrey, Sevely, and other UN faculty at the School became the target of their frustrations while they also sought the acceptance of the existing Turkish faculty at the School.

Godfrey was concerned about the way this divide between the UN experts and the Turkish faculty would affect the future of the School following his departure. Consequently, especially in his final report, he provided an extensive summary of what he felt to be the fundamental aims of the School. Interestingly, he presented these aims under a sub-title, “The Board of Trustees and the Aims of the University,” in an effort to equate these aims with the aims of the Board.⁷⁸⁴

When Middle East Technical University was first opened, there was considerable criticism and expression of doubt as to the validity of the educational intentions of its founders, particularly the Acting Board of Trustees. Experience has proved their wisdom and their vision and demonstrates that their opinions and intentions

⁷⁸⁴ Godfrey to Svetislav M. Orlic, Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations, 25 February 1960, UN Archives, 1.

for the future deserve the most attentive, thoughtful consideration and cooperation.⁷⁸⁵

However, as pointed out in this chapter, it was the Penn team who had established the curricular and administrative structure of the School. The Board of Trustees had approved and adopted them. Godfrey's effort to align these issues with the authority of the Board was an attempt to secure them with an executive body that would have lasting influence over the University. After all, Godfrey, as a key administrator with links to the beginnings of the School through the Penn team, was preparing to leave the School and turn its administration to another group of administrators. The Board could help to ensure that the aims of the School survived from one group of administrators to the next. Consequently, the aim of Godfrey's final report was less about reflecting the Board's views, but more about instructing the UN and the Board about the aims of the School. Therefore, Godfrey's report essentially tells us about how Perkins and the UN staff perceived the School at this particular point of its development.

In addition, many of the issues that Godfrey discussed in his report happened to fall along the fault lines between the UN and the Turkish faculty. By aligning these issues with the Board, Godfrey was also trying to reduce the tension that had surfaced between the UN and the Turkish faculty. The fact that, in this report, Godfrey was speaking for the Board reveals the differences in the types of relationship that had grown between the consultants and the Turkish bureaucratic elite versus the one between the consultants and the Turkish faculty and professionals. Turkish faculty and professionals coveted this

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid.

relationship and resisted the consultants' control over the School's future. Consequently, it is important to keep in mind that the dominant role of the experts instead of the particular curricular or pedagogical issues that they supported was the key dispute between these two groups. Nevertheless, in his report, aside from aligning the issues with the Board, Godfrey focused on the issues rather than the particularities of this relationship among the consultants, the Board, and the Turkish faculty in order to secure the future development of the School.

Godfrey grouped the aims he wanted to emphasize under three main points. He first focused on a pedagogical issue that was important to both him and Perkins, but had caused significant problems between him and the Turkish faculty. Godfrey felt that the idea of "learning by doing," was fundamental to the structure and aim of the School. It was also central to the third point that he discussed, which had to do with the relationship between the School and the "community." Godfrey pointed out:

First, knowing the needs of Turkey, they (the Board of Trustees) have insisted on the "learning through doing" approach to education, the integration of intellectual and practical professional effort, and with it the development of individual discipline, and regular work habits. At first blush this may seem to be a secondary school problem, and an inappropriate emphasis for a University, but it is much needed, and it in no way implies lowering academic standards. To the contrary, the highest academic standards are demanded, but they are to be achieved in the context of useful citizenship, which is the first goal for each student.⁷⁸⁶

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

Through these words, Godfrey echoed Perkins' belief in the importance of engaging students in the current problems that architecture and city planning faced.⁷⁸⁷ Godfrey's idea of "useful citizenship," also was directly related to his third point,

Thirdly, the establishment and continual growth of a close and creative relationship between the University and the community, particularly through the development of the Research Center and an active program of Research and Development for Government and private agencies, and through the future development of an extension program to expand the scope of the University's activity within the community, is as important an integral element of the University as is the teaching program.⁷⁸⁸

Godfrey's first point was in response to the criticism he had faced from the Turkish faculty regarding the hands-on building programs of the School.⁷⁸⁹ Godfrey argued that through these programs, "the traditional gulf between the working man and the educated man may be bridged, and a new tradition, of active community participation and leadership by those best qualified, may take its place."⁷⁹⁰ He pointed out that getting professionals out of cities and into the villages was one of the central aims of the

⁷⁸⁷ See chapter five. At Penn, Perkins had written, "By personal field investigation, by visits to neighborhoods and communities, by study of the social and economic problems of the family and of the forms of social and political organization, and by first-hand contact with the city and rural landscape, the student prepares, under guidance, the programs which form the basis for his designs. Thus the student of architecture, city planning, and landscape architecture becomes aware of the social basis of his art and is prepared to serve mankind more sympathetically and effectively." See, Strong, *Book of the School*, 135. See chapter three for a brief account of Perkins' educational background. For a discussion of the connections between Perkins and John Dewey's theory of education, see, Derya Yorgancıoğlu, "Reconstructing the Political and Educational Contexts of the METU Project" (Ph.D. diss., Middle East Technical University, 2010).

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁹ See Godfrey's monthly report, 30 September 1957, 1. In that report, Godfrey wrote, as the reasons why the first summer field practice program had failed, "Fourth, and probably the most significant reason, the idea of students' working in this fashion on the construction job was never really accepted by the staff and other people concerned. I should like to discuss this point later, as a symptom of more important conditions, but specifically it demonstrates the need for a more positively oriented and sympathetically minded staff, assuming the program to be sound, as I believe it to be."

⁷⁹⁰ Godfrey, Final Report, 2.

program, but this was easier said than done, since this transformation required a shift in the preconceptions of the urban elite. He wrote,

The 70% of its [Turkey's] population living in its 40,000 villages need active leadership in the field, by men and women who understand the principles and techniques of modern technical civilization, and who have the versatility and imagination to apply and adjust them to the situations particular to the villages. The country needs also, in those able through their special training or position to provide this leadership, a sense of responsibility in place of the consciousness of privilege, which so easily becomes habitual.⁷⁹¹

In this way, Godfrey's first and third points focused on the students' and the University's connection and responsibilities to its specific place. His second point discussed the School's connection to the world at large by emphasizing importance of maintaining English as the primary language of instruction. As discussed above, establishing English as the primary language of instruction was one of the primary components of the Abrams' idea of training. Godfrey had taken this idea one step further by giving primary importance to the establishment of an open shelf library in the School. In the planning of the campus, the positioning of the library had become centrally important for the consultants. Godfrey wrote,

Secondly, the Trustees insist that the University be devoted to the service of all the Middle East, not to Turkey alone, and that all teaching, and all official faculty-student contacts, be in English. Only by strict adherence to this double policy can a sense of their place in the regional, as well as the national, community be developed in the students, and a level of fluency be attained by them which will permit them to do well the advanced work needed for their degrees and in their professional lives. It also permits establishment of uniform and universal standards on the basis of which students may come to the University, as they already are, from all over the Middle East, and the development of a research and reference library which is up-to-date and available to all members of the University community.⁷⁹²

⁷⁹¹ Ibid.

⁷⁹² Ibid., 2.

Regarding the issue of language, Godfrey used the DP Administration's interest in establishing the University as a regional center in the Middle East to support the idea of maintaining English as the teaching language at the School. He argued that English provided a common language not only between experts and their local counterparts, but also between Turkey and other countries in the region. It also allowed the students to connect to a much larger world of information both through contact with colleagues and print sources. His last point legitimized the continued importance of a library at METU, something that Godfrey had spent considerable personal effort to realize.

Godfrey pointed out that repeated suggestions had been made, on the one hand, to change the University's teaching language to Turkish, and on the other, to adopt additional foreign languages for some or all of its activities. Godfrey argued that either one of these changes would be "fatal." He added somewhat agitatedly in one long sentence,

The use of Turkish would close the door to too many foreign students who can now benefit from Turkey's educational contribution, and would as well magnify to an unreasonable degree the problems of teaching many of the subjects with which the University is concerned; the introduction of other foreign languages would destroy the unity of the University community by breaking it down into cliques unable to communicate with one another, or would as an alternative increase to an unmanageable point the study problems of the already overloaded students, while limiting their opportunity to progress as far as is really necessary in a single foreign language; it would also hugely increase the problems of administration, the use of faculty in common courses, and would drastically limit expansion and usefulness of the library.⁷⁹³

⁷⁹³ Ibid., 3.

As evidenced from this sentence, Godfrey perceived the teaching language of the School to be centrally important to its aims. He felt that English, as the common language of instruction, was the vehicle through which the interdisciplinary curriculum could achieve its goals. At the same time, English was to ensure the continuation of the relationships between the University, its founding international organizations, and the State. Fully aware of the continued criticism of some of the Turkish as well as UN faculty (such as Kaikkonen), Godfrey felt that any softening of the policy to teach in English would lead to a complete breakdown of the system that had so far sustained the School's unique structure and position among other institutions of higher learning in Turkey.

Through these three primary points, Godfrey sought to summarize the key tenets of the idea training as initially conceptualized by Abrams. This new system was to radically change the way local professionals related to the varying local conditions as well as to the international technical assistance machinery. By associating these aims with the aims of the Board, Godfrey sought to reduce the increasing reactions that was building up among the Turkish professional community against the consultants' control of the School and its aims.

METU's attention to rural programs, its language of instruction, as well as its focus on collaborating with national and international agencies all threatened the legitimacy and competence of the existing ministerial staff who viewed METU and its UN staff as a threat. Consequently, the bureaucratic, professional, as well as the academic community looked for opportunities to bring METU under their own vision and control. At the same time, they were very curious about the projects and opportunities METU

offered in terms of its favorable place in the eyes of the higher ranking officials as well as in terms of its connections to opportunities abroad.

Conclusion

Following the School's establishment as a School of Architecture and Community Planning, the Penn team continued to play a significant role its growth and configuration as a University. In giving form to Abrams' idea of training and education for development, the Penn team differentiated METU's administrative and spatial structure from other institutions of higher learning in Turkey.

Abrams, during his mission to Turkey, had suggested the formation of an advisory board to act as the counterpart to the UN experts who would come to Turkey during a second mission to structure the School. The UN-sponsored Penn team institutionalized this advisory board as the Board of Trustees to act as both an advisory and an executive council made up of the Turkish bureaucratic elite. The Board's primary function was to mediate the relationship between the School and international and Turkish state and industrial agencies. While the School was to maintain close relationships with Turkish state and educational institutions, it was also to maintain its own distinct autonomy and identity acting as a reform institution, retraining ministerial staff and educating future bureaucrats, professionals, and researchers of the country and the larger region.

As initially established by Abrams, the Penn team operated in close connection with this Board and had a considerable influence over the Board's decisions especially during the first three years of the School's establishment and development. As the School grew into a University and transitioned from UN-sponsored administrators and faculty to Turkish ones, the Board was to act as the primary governing body that maintained the reformist structure and aims of the School.

However, as the School grew into a University at a faster pace than what had been anticipated through the structure of the interdisciplinary curriculum, the spatial organization of the University became just as important as the Board in maintaining and reflecting the aims of the School. The configuration of the departments and support facilities in relation to each other as well as to Ankara and the surrounding landscape became both functionally and symbolically important. The organization of the central campus around the core departments of Architecture, Planning, Public Administration, and the Arts and Sciences became the key concept that the consultants wanted to convey.

In addition, the library, which was to provide the point of connection between local and international professionals, was to hold an important position among these key departments. By placing the library in a prominent position in relation to these departments, the Penn team made references to American campus planning traditions while also incorporating several innovations to allow for a flexibility and growth of the campus. The organization of this core around a double-axis allowed the academic center to function as a center at several scales: It was simultaneously a traditional quad and a modern campus with visual and symbolic connections to the national capital and the expansive landscape beyond.

In this way, the consultants paid particular attention to the way the campus was arranged in relation to the capital city and the topographical features of the site. Through this dual connection to both the capital and the country, the campus was to reflect its purpose as a hinge and the connection point of the two contrasting realms of urban centers and the rural peripheries. Abrams, in his report, had discussed in detail about how

Turkey was a place of utter contrasts and one of the aims of the School was to reduce the social and economic differences between these two realms by making the state and state professionals more responsive to the needs of the peripheries.

In working out the campus plan, however, the consultants had acted largely without the contributions of their Turkish colleagues at the School. The fact that the Penn team had not set aside a portion of the UN budget for the work that would be done on the design of the campus prevented the Turkish faculty from participating in the design of the campus. By contrast, Jaakko Kaikonen, a UN-sponsored faculty from Sweden, treated Turkish culture and his Turkish colleagues and students with respect and collegiality, providing a critique of the model established by the Americans and putting forward a interaction between foreign and Turkish professionals that was more acceptable to the Turkish side. The returning UN-fellows added to the tensions between foreign and Turkish faculty by questioning the authority and prestige the UN-sponsored faculty held over their Turkish colleagues. They demanded better compensation and the freedom to teach in Turkish. Godfrey, on the other hand, felt that the UN fellows, for the most part, had not gained very much from their studies at Penn and therefore did not deserve the higher pay and responsibilities that they demanded. Godfrey also felt that keeping English as the primary language of instruction was central to the aims of the School.

The consultants' close relationship with the Board of Trustees as well as their control of the campus design project contributed to the continuing breakdown of the relationship between the consultants and Turkish faculty and professionals. The Turkish faculty and professionals followed the developments at the School with interest and

curiosity while also perceiving the control of the UN consultants of the project as a threat to their own professional legitimacy that they had fought hard to gain against the Turkish political elite's preference for foreign professionals and consultants throughout the history of Ottoman/Turkish modernization beginning in the second half of the 19th Century.

The next chapter examines how the rivalry between the foreign consultants and the Turkish professionals for the control of this new institution played itself out within the shifting political context of the late 1950s. While the consultants looked for ways to make their approach to the project more acceptable to the Turkish professional community, Turkish professionals had begun to look for ways to take full control of METU. The make-up of the Board of Trustees would become a focal point of this struggle. The design of the METU campus would become the other. All in all, the collaborative atmosphere that the School aimed to create between foreign and local professionals was not what emerged after the School's establishment. At the same time, it was through these fervent debates regarding the design of the campus that METU began to have a lasting impact on the Turkish architecture and planning cultures of the period.

Chapter Seven:

Rise of “In-perts”: Recasting METU, 1959-62

Holmes Perkins submitted the campus master plan that was prepared at Penn to METU’s Board of Trustees in November 1959 (**figures 6.26 - 6.28**). The Board gave their official approval to the set of drawings that Perkins called, “the Consultants’ Plan,” in December; however, this did not mean that Perkins and the UN-sponsored faculty could proceed with the design and construction of the University’s first buildings. Recent laws that the Turkish architectural community had negotiated with the DP Administration had limited the practice of foreign architects in Turkey.⁷⁹⁴ Even though working as consultants and teaching as temporary faculty were two areas of involvement for foreign experts still welcomed by the Turkish professional community, the way Perkins and the UN sponsored faculty seemed to take control of the campus project did not comply with the role assigned to them, considerably damaging the relationship between UN-experts and the Turkish professionals. Consequently, within the context of multiple rivalries that were taking place among local professional groups, state agencies, and foreign experts, Perkins and the Board resolved to open the project to a design competition in order to select a group of Turkish architects who could participate in the design and construction of the individual buildings of the University based on the master plan prepared by Perkins and the Penn team.

⁷⁹⁴ See chapter three for a more detailed discussion of this topic.

Historically, the Ottoman-Turkish political elite had preferred hiring foreign architects and planners, especially for the more significant government projects. After the Turkish Revolution and during the nation-building efforts of the new Republic, Turkish architects criticized the political elite's continuing preference for foreign architects. In their criticism, Turkish professionals acknowledged the contributions of their foreign counterparts in certain technical and professional matters while questioning their understanding of the local cultures and their ability to develop a language for a national architecture.⁷⁹⁵ In an attempt to change the Turkish government's practices in awarding state contracts to foreign nationals, Turkish professionals began to organize their efforts during the late 1920s and the early 1930s and argued for the democratization of this process through the organization of competitions.⁷⁹⁶

By the mid- to late-1950s, and especially after the establishment of the Turkish Chamber of Architects, the method of awarding of state contracts through competitions had become a well-established process despite continuing debates regarding the make-up

⁷⁹⁵ As the primary text on the construction of the new Republic, see, Sibel Bozdoğan's, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle and London, 2001). The architectural community voiced their opinions in this regard in numerous articles and discussions that appeared in the period's only trade journal, *Arkitekt*, under the heading, "Yabancı Mimarlar Sorunu [The Problem of Foreign Architects]." For references to the numerous articles that appeared on this topic during this period, see, Gürhan Tümer, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Yabancı Mimarlar Sorunu [The Problem of Foreign Architects during the Republican Period]* (Izmir: Izmir Chamber of Architects, 1998). Also see, Sayar's editorial, "Yabancı Teknik Elemanlar Meselesi [Issue of Foreign Technical Staff], *Arkitekt* no. 261-262 (1953): 119-120.

⁷⁹⁶ For a discussion of competitions in relation to the professionalization of the Turkish architect, see, Yasemin Sayar, "Türkiye'de Mimari Proje Yarışmaları, 1930-2000: Bir Değerlendirme [Project Competitions in Turkey, 1930-2000: An Analysis]," *Mimarlık* 320 (2004): 29-36; and, Selahattin Önür, "Mimarlıkta Yarışma Kültürü, Günümüz Yarışmalarında Eğilimler ve ODTÜ XXI.YY. Mimarlık Yarışmalarının Genel Bir Yorumu," in *ODTÜ: Mimari Projeler I: Yarışma Projeleri, 2000-2008*, ed. Ayşen Savaş, (ODTÜ, 2008), 30-41. TMMOB Mimarlar Odası [Turkish Chamber of Architects], *Yarışmalar Dizini, 1930-2004 [Index to Competitions]* (Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 2004).

of the competition juries and the fairness of the outcomes.⁷⁹⁷ The Chamber's continued scrutiny of the awarding process and the practice of competitions at least ensured that a contract would be awarded to an architect licensed to practice in Turkey.

Consequently, within this evolving relationship between Turkish and foreign professionals and the State, the Board's decision to organize a competition for the METU project might have at first seemed like an attempt to follow standard procedure that had been accepted by the local professional community. However, the fact that the Board had already approved Perkins' master plan suggested that, even though the Board was organizing a competition, this was a complete reversal of the roles that were to be played by Turkish and foreign architects. In this scenario, the foreign architects would be operating as the directors of the project and not as consultants. Therefore, Perkins' title for the drawings he presented to the Board, "the consultants' plan," was a misnomer. With this title, he was underplaying the fact that he and the Penn team would remain in control of the project.

This chapter examines the way the Turkish architectural and bureaucratic community became aware of the alliance between Perkins and METU's Board of Trustees. It then analyzes how the professional community, gradually and over the course of not one but two successive competitions, took control of the project by taking advantage of the power shifts that were taking place within the Turkish political context.

⁷⁹⁷ The particular make-up of the jury still largely determined which group of architects would win the competition. The Chamber of Architects demanded more representation in the make up of competition juries. The Ministry of Public Works was dominated by Istanbul Technical University graduates. Therefore many of the Ministry projects were awarded to ITU graduates. The graduates of the Academy were in control of the Chamber.

By the late 1950s, rising inflation brought Turkey under austerity measures implemented by international agencies. However, the resultant economic stability did not prevent the *coup d'état* of May 27, 1960. The Turkish military toppled the DP Administration with the premise to restore the sovereignty and the founding tenets of the Turkish Republic. The *coup* took place between the two competitions and dissolved the Board that Perkins had been communicating with. In this way, the shift of the administrative and spatial configuration of the School was tied directly to a national revolution.

The first part of the chapter examines the first competition and reveals how the Board sought to maintain the involvement of UN experts in the project through the organization of this competition within the changing social and political climate both in the School and in Turkey. This section considers how Turgut Cansever, the architect who was chosen as the winner of the first competition, responded to his role as a consultant and a collaborator to the UN experts and how his response as well as other factors gradually led to the organization of a second competition which superseded the results of the first.

The second part of the chapter analyzes the organization and the outcome of the second competition following the *coup* of May 27. Through the analysis of competition drawings as well as through new and previously conducted interviews with Altuğ and Behruz Çinici, the winners of the second competition, this portion of the chapter discusses how these two architects responded to the competition program that was largely based on the specifications set by the consultants' plan. Despite this continuity however, the chapter reveals that the Çinicis never referenced to the consultants' plans. Neither did

they refer to any developments in architecture and planning that were taking place internationally as they explained the ideas behind their project. Instead, they chose to explain their project through the narrative of their own legitimation within the Turkish architectural and planning communities.

7.1 The School, the University, and the First Competition

METU's Board of Trustees' approval of the consultants' plan prior to the first competition certainly raises a number of questions regarding the function and aims of this first competition. However, based on available sources, it is not possible to accurately access if the Board's approval of the consultants' plan was openly announced to the Turkish architectural community. It is also difficult to assess how and to what type of an audience the news of the competition was disseminated.

During the 1950s, a typical competition for a state-sponsored project would have been advertised through the Ministry of Public Works. The Chamber of Architects would disseminate this information to the professional community. *Arkitekt*, the period's only architectural journal, played an important role in this process. Zeki Sayar, the journal's sole editor, would publish the advertisement under the news (*haberler*) section, at least once, following the official announcement of a competition by the Ministry (**figure 7.1**).⁷⁹⁸ In addition, following the jury of each competition, Sayar would publish five or six of the projects that had placed or had received honorable mentions in the competition along with the available information about the competition, including the names of the participants and the jury members, as well as the comments of the jury for each project. Sayar's documentation of the competition for the Aegean (Ege) University Campus

⁷⁹⁸ How many times a particular advertisement appeared in *Arkitekt* depended on how early the announcement had been made from the Ministry and how often *Arkitekt* was being published at the time.

(1959) provides a good example of the way he normally published such competitions **(figure 7.2)**.⁷⁹⁹

Unlike the Aegean University Campus competition, however, neither the first nor the second METU competition was advertised in *Arkitekt*. The results of the METU competitions were also never published. Sayar published the results of the second competition several years after it was held and provided only brief coverage in comparison to the extensive information he provided on other competitions.⁸⁰⁰ It is unclear why Sayar did not publish the METU competitions. Based on Sayar's consistent coverage of other competitions, it is unlikely that Sayar could have overlooked a competition for a project as significant as the METU campus.

Sayar didn't publish the Erzurum Atatürk University competition either which was also issued as an international competition. Sayar published the Erzurum project only later, in 1966 when he also published the second METU competition. Consequently, it is possible to suggest that there was something similar about these two competitions, at least from Sayar's point of view and the point of view of the architectural community represented by the Chamber. The issue may have to do with their designation as, "international." Sayar may have been making a statement by not publishing the projects that were issued as "international," since this designation meant that these project would be controlled mainly by foreign consultants who may have been in an agreement either

⁷⁹⁹ The Aegean (Ege) University was announced about the same time as the METU competition in 1959. See, "Ege Üniversitesi Şehircilik Proje Müsabakası Jüri Raporu Özeti," *Arkitekt* no. 03 (1959): 101-109.

⁸⁰⁰ See, "Ankarada Orta Doğu Üniversitesi," *Arkitekt*, no. 03-04 (1965): 108-109.

with the Ministry or the School's Board of Trustees, as was the case at METU. Sayar's omission was an indication of the Turkish architectural community's ambivalent reception of a project that was organized and controlled by foreign experts. The project's absence from the pages of *Arkitekt* also points to the Turkish architectural community's stance towards such projects and the first METU competition.

Background to the First Competition

The first competition seems to have been the product of an alliance between the Board of Trustees and Holmes Perkins to ensure Holmes Perkins' continued control of the design of the METU campus. At METU, the administrative positions that were initially held by UN-experts were beginning to be transferred to Turkish faculty and administrators. According to the initial program that the Penn team had prepared for the curriculum and the staffing of the School, a UN expert was to remain as the acting Dean of the School of Architecture and Planning during the first eight years (**appendix 5.3a**). Godfrey's contract with the UN for his position as the acting dean of METU was for three years and, according to the initial plan that the Penn team had devised in consultation with the Board of Trustees, the UN was to find another foreign expert to replace Godfrey.

In a letter Godfrey wrote to Norman Luker, Chief of the Office for Europe, Middle East, and Africa Programme Division of the Technical Assistance Administration, in March 1959, he informed Luker that his contract was going to expire

on September 5 and that the UN should begin recruitment for his replacement.⁸⁰¹ On several occasions, the Board had discussed Godfrey's continued involvement with the School beyond his initial contract either as Dean or as President; however, by the time the Board began to talk with Godfrey about his continued involvement, Godfrey had made definitive plans to leave Turkey for a position at Penn.⁸⁰² In the same letter, Godfrey also noted that Perkins had been looking for people who could take his position. Perkins had mentioned Cecil Elliot, Associate Professor at North Carolina State University, as a possible dean candidate to replace Godfrey.

By September 9, the UN had been able to come up with only one candidate, Anatole Solow, Director of the Division of Housing and Planning of the Pan American Union in Washington.⁸⁰³ However, the Board of Trustees in consultation with William Cox, who was staying for another year, and Lloyd Rodwin, planning professor from Massachusetts Institute of Technology who was then visiting METU, declined Solow's application. At that point, Warren Cornwell, who had replaced Charles Weitz following his three-year tenure as the UN-TAA Resident Representative in Turkey, also contributed to the effort to find a replacement for Godfrey's position. Among the names he suggested

⁸⁰¹ Godfrey to Luker, 1 March 1959 (UN Archives), 1.

⁸⁰² During his three-year tenure, the Board had also petitioned the UN to approve Godfrey's appointment as president of the University; however, the UN would not grant that wish. Reed, "Hacettepe and Middle East..." 224.

⁸⁰³ Warren H. Cornwell to Victor Mills, Executive Officer of the Office of the Executive Assistant at the United Nations, 9 September 1959. See also chapter five, section two, where Solow's name first came up as a reference to Alvaro Ortega, who was being considered for a position at METU in 1956-57. Solow's qualifications were not found adequate for a Dean's position.

were William Wurster and Catherine Bauer who were both teaching at the University of California in Berkeley in 1959.⁸⁰⁴

In these letters to the UN, both Godfrey and Cornwell warned that METU was beginning to be dominated by engineers similar to the way the Istanbul Technical University had been. As Abrams had noted in his initial letter to Weissmann and as the Penn team had devised through the core curriculum, one of METU's initial aims was to provide an interdisciplinary education organized around the disciplines of architecture and planning. According to Godfrey, with the engineering departments growing and becoming independent of the School of Architecture, it had become centrally important for the School of Architecture to have a strong and visionary dean who would be committed to the founding aims of the School.⁸⁰⁵

Following Godfrey's departure and while the search for an acting dean was continuing, Ekmel Derya, who had been one of the first Turkish professors to begin teaching in the School of Architecture, became the acting Dean and remained in that position until 1962. Jaakko Kaikonen left in mid-year in 1960. Esat Turak, a Turkish

⁸⁰⁴ Warren H. Cornwell to Victor Mills, Executive Officer of the Office of the Executive Assistant at the United Nations, 9 September 1959. Cornwell noted that Cox, Rodwin, as well as President Woolrich had promised to supply more names. Among these names were, "Bush Brown, USC; Vernon Demars or Francis Violich of California, Mel Branch of Princeton. Cornwell asked Mills to call Professor Rodwin at MIT to get additional names from him.

⁸⁰⁵ Godfrey wrote, "As the direction of the University is in danger of taking a very mechanistic turn at this moment, a very strong Dean of Architecture is a vital necessity." He added at the end of his letter, "(William) Cox might be willing to stay on if he feels that we have a strong enough Dean to keep the School up to a good level. This continuity is very important, and I believe he should be persuaded to stay," in Godfrey to Luker, 1 March 1959. Cornwell noted, "While the Middle East Technical University unquestionably is dominated by engineers at several top levels (referring to the fact that both Woolrich, the President, and his assistant, Uğur Ersoy were engineers) still the architecture and planning influence of men like Abrahams [sic] and Godfrey remains. Of course, too much pressure on an old boy basis, like long distance phone calls sometimes backfire and have the exact opposite result from what was intended." Cornwell to Mills, 9 September 1959.

architect-planner, replaced Kaikonen as the Chairman of the Institute of City and Regional Planning. Cox stayed one more year and Joe J. Jordan joined the faculty as the new UN-staff in Architecture at the beginning of the 1959-60 academic year.⁸⁰⁶

At the University level, Dr. Willis R. Woolrich, who had been hired through Harold Stassen's involvement, served as the "interim president" from March 1959 until February 1960.⁸⁰⁷ In March 1960, Edwin Sharp Burdell (1898-1978), who had just retired from his position as the Director of the Cooper Union (1938-1960), then took the position of the "interim president," and remained in that position through the *coup d'état* of May 27, 1960 that came only two months after his arrival.⁸⁰⁸ During the 1959-60 Academic year, a seven-member Board of Trustees presided by the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, continued to oversee the operations of the University until its dissolution shortly after the *coup*. Even though the *coup* of May 27 disrupted the operations of other universities in Turkey, METU continued holding classes and graduated its first class of architects and engineers during that year.

⁸⁰⁶ Joe J. Jordan to Norman G. Luker, UN-TAA, 10 March 1959.

⁸⁰⁷ For the background to Willis R. Woolrich's involvement with METU, see chapter six. Reed, 224. Terms such as, "acting dean," (referring to Thomas Godfrey's position); and, "interim president," (referring first to Willis Woolrich and then to Edwin Burdell) were used to designate the temporary nature of the administrative staff that was appointed by the UN or UNESCO (in the case of the presidents). This designation was an important one to make within the Turkish legal system, which technically did not allow foreigners to act as the president of a University. According to Turkish law, these foreign administrators were acting as consultants to a Turkish dean or a president, even though during Godfrey's and Woolrich's tenure a Turkish dean or a president had not been appointed.

⁸⁰⁸ Burdell's title would shift from "interim president" to "consulting president" when Turhan Feyzioğlu, the former Dean of the Department of Political Science at Ankara University, was appointed as the first Turkish President by the National Unity Committee formed shortly after the *coup*. Burdell remained in that position until June 1962 when the country had returned to civilian rule. This period will be discussed in more detail under the second competition.

During this period of transformation both in the School of Architecture and at the University, the Board of Trustees continued to support the guidelines that were established by the Penn team in 1956.⁸⁰⁹ The Board also supported Perkins' continued involvement in the design and construction of the METU campus. Consequently, they approved the drawings and the specifications Perkins had finalized at Penn. In order to be able to implement the plans that were prepared by foreign architects, Perkins and the Board decided to open a competition for the design of the METU campus. However, the fact that a master plan with descriptions of the general character of buildings was already in place raises questions about the actual aims and program of this competition. In addition, at least two other factors further complicate the understanding of this particular competition. First, it was designated as an international competition; second, very little information exists on its program and outcome.

An International (Uluslararası) Competition:

During the mid- to late-1950s, very few competitions were designated as international competitions. In fact, there were only three other competitions, out of eighty-one competitions that took place from 1950 to 1960 (not including 1960) that received this designation during the 1950s, and no other competition received this designation after the first METU competition.⁸¹⁰ Since foreign architects could not

⁸⁰⁹ As discussed in chapter six, these guidelines were written into law during Harold Stassen's involvement with the School in 1958.

⁸¹⁰ The competition for the site plan of the Erzurum Atatürk University in 1955 and the competitions for the new urban reconstruction plans for Ankara (1955) and Izmir (1951) were the three other international competitions that were advertised during the 1950s. See, *Yarışmalar Dizini, 1930-2004 [Index to Competitions, 1930-2004]*, 43, 51, and 53.

practice in Turkey and could only function as educators or consultants, if a competition had an international designation, this usually meant that the organizing agency or committee aimed to form a collaboration between a Turkish architect or a team of Turkish architects and a foreign architect. The international designation could also mean that the competition jury would include foreign architects and planners. As a result, the local professional community did not view international competitions favorably and became increasingly suspect of their aims. From the point of view of the local architects, the international designation usually meant that even if they were to win the competition, they would be working alongside a foreign architect designated by state agencies, and they would not have significant control of the project. Indeed, this was exactly what happened with the first METU competition.

The Program and the Aims of the First Competition

Even though the first METU competition was planned as an international competition, an extensive survey of both Turkish and foreign architectural journals of the period has not produced any advertisements for the project. Beyond *Arkitekt*, the METU competition was not advertised in either European or American journals. Consequently, it seems that the project was advertised only officially through the Ministry of Public Works.

The unusualness of the events surrounding the advertisement and the results of the first METU competition has a number of consequences. First, not unlike the way it seemingly received no attention from the Turkish architectural community (even though quite a good number of Turkish architects submitted proposals for the project), the topic

of the first competition has almost completely escaped scrutiny or retrospect from the Turkish architectural culture. Therefore, there is almost no information available on this first competition in traditional sources. Second, even architects who participated in the competition, either as jurors or through project submittals, do not provide clear information regarding the aims and the program of the project. For example, Turgut Cansever (1920 – 2009), the winner of the first competition, provides only anecdotes regarding this significant turn in his career in his interview with the prominent Turkish architectural historian, Uğur Tanyeli.⁸¹¹ Similarly, Thomas Godfrey, whose name was included in the consultants' plans, does not provide information about this phase of his involvement with METU, reporting that the project was by and large under Perkins' control at this point. Judging from the reluctance of both sides to talk extensively about this project, one can deduce that it was an arrangement that neither side was very proud of, but wanted to pursue in order to have some involvement in one of the most significant projects that was taking place for both the Penn team and the Turkish architectural community.

Despite the lack of information about the first competition, Cansever's notes and drawings when coupled with the information provided in the two sets of consultants' plans that Perkins submitted to the Board, help to construct a reasonable picture of what

⁸¹¹ For Turgut Cansever's interview with Uğur Tanyeli on topics regarding the METU competition, see, Uğur Tanyeli and Atilla Yücel, *Turgut Cansever: Düşünce Adamı ve Mimar [Turgut Cansever: Theorist and Architect]* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi ve Garanti Galeri, 2007), 182-194. In addition, I was able to conduct an interview regarding the METU Project with Turgut Cansever in 2008; however, Cansever did not disclose any new information or documents regarding the project during this interview.

took place during and after the first competition. In his interview with Tanyeli, Cansever recounts the information that Eiler Rasmussen (1898-1990), the well-known Danish architect and urban planner who had served as one of the jurors, had given him after the competition. At the time of the first METU competition, Rasmussen was also working as a regional planning consultant at the Ministry of Public Works.⁸¹² According to Cansever, Rasmussen told him that his proposal had been eliminated from the competition on the very first day of the jury. However, Sir Hugh Casson, who joined the jury on the second day, did not find the remaining proposals to be satisfactory. So, after going through the boards that had been eliminated, he picked Cansever's proposal out of the pile and put it back with the group of projects that were still being considered. Rasmussen told Cansever that, on the third day, he himself became more outspoken and placed Cansever's drawings in front of the jurors and explained how the proposal represented by these drawings responded particularly well to the program of the competition.

Based on Cansever's drawings and his description of the competition process in his interview with Tanyeli, it is possible to suggest that the competition program did not ask the participants to propose a full master plan for METU. Instead, the program appears to have solicited proposals and drawings that explored the design and configuration of the buildings around the central forum, which was, as discussed in chapter six, the space of primary concern in the consultants' plans. Based on this assumption, it is also possible to suggest that the competition program must have included the first set of consultants'

⁸¹² At the time of the first METU competition, Rasmussen was on the regional plan of Bursa, which was designated as one of the first study areas for a regional plan in Turkey. See, Tanyeli, *Turgut Cansever*, 184.

plans that the Board had approved in November 1959 (**figures 6.26 - 6.28**).⁸¹³ Based on the consultants' plans, the competition program asked the participants to provide proposals for the design of the buildings, such as the Library, the School of Administrative Sciences, the School of Arts and Sciences, and the School of Architecture, surrounding the central forum. This explanation also clarifies why Cansever's drawings were composed only of elevations and perspectives and did not include any plans (**figures 7.3 -7.5**). At the same time, it is also interesting that Cansever or anyone else who participated in this first competition never openly talked about this unusual aspect of this competition.

Cansever explained that he was chosen as the winner of the competition with Rasmussen's help and based on the way he had portrayed the buildings of the central forum in the elevations and the perspective drawing that he had developed for the competition. However, there were a few other reasons why Cansever was a good candidate to work with Perkins. First, Cansever was a graduate of the Academy of Fine Arts (1946) and not of the Istanbul Technical University.⁸¹⁴ He had studied under Sedad Hakkı Eldem, who was one of the Turkish members of the competition jury.⁸¹⁵ As a graduate of the Academy (1946), despite the fact that Cansever had received a more dedicated architectural education than ITU graduates, he was at a disadvantage as a

⁸¹³ In his interview with Tanyeli, Cansever notes that, after the competition, Perkins went on to develop the second set of drawings that the Board reapproved in July, 1960. See the discussion below.

⁸¹⁴ For Cansever's brief biography, see, Tanyeli, *Turgut Cansever*, 415.

⁸¹⁵ The other Turkish member of the jury was Kemal Ahmet Aru, a distinguished professor of architecture and planning at the Academy's rival, Istanbul Technical University.

practitioner, since the Ministry of Public Works, and subsequently many government commissions, were under the control of ITU graduates.⁸¹⁶ During the 1950s, Cansever was a leading voice, along with Zeki Sayar, in the establishment of the Turkish Chamber of Architects and in negotiating the law against the practice of foreign architects in Turkey. Consequently, the awarding of the project to Cansever seems to have had political undertones. By awarding the project to Cansever, Perkins would be able to silence or win over one of the staunchest critics of his involvement, as a foreign architect, in the project. In addition, this arrangement would continue to keep ITU at a safe distance from the beginnings of METU. METU's development as a new and separate system of education had been very important to the Penn team from the very beginning of the project. At the same time however, awarding the project to Cansever would mean that METU would be forming an alliance with the Academy. This new alliance could then potentially mobilize the Ministry and ITU graduates against METU.

Aside from these political considerations, it is important to note that Cansever was one of the most accomplished young architects of his era. Following his graduation from the Academy with a Bachelor of Architecture degree, Cansever received his Ph.D. in Art History from Istanbul University in 1949. His dissertation examined Seljuk and Ottoman column capitals. He then traveled extensively throughout Europe returning to Turkey to found the Construction and Architecture Studio (Inşaat ve Mimarlık Atölyesi, or IMA), one of the most innovative architecture practices of the period, with Doğan Tekeli, Tekin Aydın, Aydın Boysan, and Muhiddin Güven. Along with members of the

⁸¹⁶ Abrams, when listing the reasons for the School in his initial letter to Weissmann, had pointed out how architecture as a profession was not taught in current schools in Turkey. Cansever had graduated from the School that at least taught Architecture as a distinct discipline.

IMA, he participated in numerous competitions, became an active advocate of the establishment of the Chamber of Architects, and the debates and projects related to the development of the discipline of urban and regional planning in Turkey.⁸¹⁷ By the time he had participated in the first METU competition, he had already won a number of awards for his projects and was the chief architect for the design and construction of the Turkish Historical Society building (1951-67), which was to later win an Aga Khan Award in 1980.⁸¹⁸

During his activities that required him to travel between Istanbul and Ankara, Cansever had become interested in the new School of Architecture that was being established in Ankara. He was among the initial candidates that Loschetter had interviewed for UN fellowships and for faculty positions at METU.⁸¹⁹ He had also periodically participated in reviews as a visitor at the School and had become familiar with the issues that were being discussed at the School. Consequently, Cansever's involvement with METU was imminent.

In his interview with Tanyeli, Cansever recounted the events that followed the jury's selection of his proposal as the winner of the competition. These events also

⁸¹⁷ For example, Cansever was closely involved in the regional plans that were beginning to be developed for Bursa and Istanbul around the time of the METU competition. As a part of the planning projects in Istanbul, his office had won the development plan for the Beyazıt Square in 1958. Their scheme was only partially implemented. See, Tanyeli, *Turgut Cansever*, 416.

⁸¹⁸ Cansever has the distinction to be the only architect to receive the Aga Khan Award three times: Turkish Historical Society Building, Ankara, 1951-67 (award 1980); Ahmet Ertegun House (founder of Atlantic Records), Bodrum, Turkey, 1971-73 (award, 1980); and Demir Holiday Village, Bodrum, Turkey, 1971-84 (award, 1992). See, Tanyeli, *Turgut Cansever*, 415.

⁸¹⁹ See chapter five. Loschetter found Cansever to be an excellent candidate. It is not known why Cansever did not become one of the recipients of the UN fellowships or why he didn't become one of the initial Turkish faculty. It is possible that Cansever was too busy with work both in Ankara and Istanbul to seriously consider teaching during the 1950s.

confirm the hypothesis that Perkins and the Board were not looking for a new design, but only for a Turkish architect to cooperate with Perkins in implementing the consultants' plan. Cansever recalled that he and his project team were in Bursa, working on the regional planning project, when they received several telegrams letting them know of the outcome of the competition.⁸²⁰ One of the telegrams was from Vecdi Diker who arrived the following day to have a meeting with Cansever and his team. According to Cansever, Diker, after providing a brief history of the University and the background to the consultants' plans, explained that in order for the project to continue, Cansever would need to work in close cooperation with Perkins and that he had come to Bursa to see if Cansever would agree to such a cooperation.⁸²¹

Cansever also reported that upon his agreement to these conditions, his team was given the contract to design the Public Administrations Building, which was the largest building along the south side of the central courtyard (**figure 6.26**). However, soon after they had begun to work on this building, Cansever noted that the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Reconstruction (Imar ve Iskan Bakanlığı) began to interfere with the progress of the project. In order to stop the progress of the project, the Ministry

⁸²⁰ Tanyeli, *Turgut Cansever*, 186.

⁸²¹ Cansever's account in Turkish reads as follows, "Biz Bursa'daydık, jüri kararı gazetelerde çıkınca öğrendik. İstanbul'a geldik. Üç-dört telgraf var. Bir tanesi Vecdi Diker'den... Bir telefon numarası bırakmış. Aradık. Ertesi gün geldi, üniversite kuruluşunun başkanı olarak. Bir gün boyunca oturup konuştuk. 'İşte, üniversitenin kuruluş felsefesini biliyoruz, ancak böyle olur başka şekilde olmaz. Bir işbirliği gerekiyor. Benim şimdi vazifem onu size açıkça ifade edip, ne biçim bir insansınız onu görmek ve böyle bir işbirliğine var mısınız yok musunuz onu sormak' filan diyor. See, Tanyeli, *Turgut Cansever*, 186.

began to put forward questions regarding the reliability of the geological survey of the site as well as the availability of water on the site.⁸²²

Most of these practical questions could have been addressed and resolved in time if Cansever himself hadn't also begun to raise an issue that may have run deeper among the political elite. In his interview with Tanyeli, Cansever noted that he and Perkins ran into a disagreement regarding the inclusion of a type of a municipal building on the site of the campus. Cansever perceived the campus as a small town and consequently he felt that the master plan should include a municipal building that could oversee its operations. Perkins disagreed and somewhat patronizingly argued that this was a university campus and, by definition and even though it would eventually become a model village or a town, it was an autonomous entity and had its own separate administrative structure. Cansever, not satisfied with this argument, wrote to the ministries reporting that the "Americans" were building a base or a "Vatican" overlooking Ankara.⁸²³

As a result, the Ministry of Public Works formed a committee and stopped the project with the excuse that the exact location of the academic core of the campus needed to be reconsidered based on more extensive geological surveys of the university site. Cansever admits that, at the time, he supported these questions and considerations believing that his contract and involvement with the project was secure. He was motivated to take the control of the project from the Penn team. However, he didn't

⁸²² Tanyeli, *Turgut Cansever*, 186.

⁸²³ *Ibid.*

realize that following the *coup* of May 27, the Ministry would use the help that Cansever had willingly provided to take full control of the project.

7.2 The *Coup* of May 27 and the Second Competition

When Cansever first found out that the Ministry of Public Works was reconsidering the location of the academic core within the larger campus site, he felt certain that he, as the winner of the first competition, would at least be involved in the decision-making process of this reconsideration, which would potentially give him the opportunity to be in full control of the project. This might even mean that he would redesign the layout of the campus instead of having to work with the consultants' plans. He had supported the idea not suspecting that the Ministry would move towards organizing a second competition voiding his contract in the process. When the Ministry announced a second competition, he was surprised and proceeded to contest the Ministry's decision. Despite the Ministry's invitation, he refused to enter the competition a second time and claimed that he had already won the rights to oversee the design and construction of the campus.

As discussed in chapters five and six, the staff at the Ministry of Public Works, mostly made up of the graduates of the Istanbul Technical University, had increasingly resented METU as the School that would replace ITU's long-standing link to the State. They were also skeptical of its new methodologies and approaches brought in by UN-experts. These ideas along with the introduction of English as its primary language of instruction, threatened the legitimacy of the ministerial staff most of whom had been taught by German and European professors. Cansever's allegations regarding the aims of the UN experts at METU to create an independent institution along with practical concerns regarding soil conditions and water gave the Ministry enough reasons to be able

to edge out Perkins and to take control of the project especially within the shifting political context of the period.

Background to the Second Competition

The general elections of October 1957 can be seen as the point of escalation of the conflicts that eventually led to the *coup* of May 27.⁸²⁴ The 1957 elections frustrated the efforts of the RPP to gain a popular vote and showed that, even in a worsening economy, DP would be able to gain the majority of the votes. It became conceivable that the RPP would never again hold a majority in Turkey unless they took radical steps to erode DP's popularity. The RPP stepped up the frequency of its criticism and attacks on Menderes and other DP leaders for economic blunders and corruption, and the DP administration retaliated by increasing acts of repression, which the RPP hoped would work to their advantage.⁸²⁵

By 1960, the bi-partisan battles reached a highpoint when an international consortium forced DP to accept an economic-stabilization program to reduce inflation and restore monetary order. With the help of the International Monetary Fund a new program was worked out that actually brought the crisis to an end. Frustrated once again by DP's success, the RPP mounted another major attack on DP leaders based on corruption charges, and DP retaliated by appointing an Investigation Committee that would inspect the activities of RPP leaders and the press channels that were historically

⁸²⁴ Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977), 413-420. Also see, Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977); 63-67.

⁸²⁵ Shaw, 412.

associated with the RPP. The Committee was given the right to imprison any citizens, close any newspapers, or suspend any laws that interfered with its work.⁸²⁶ DP's determination to press ahead against the tactics of the opposition led to revolts in universities in Istanbul and Ankara. Police responded with force and some of the clashes led to bloody battles between the police and the students.

While these battles took place on the streets and would most likely have subsided as DP re-adjusted its tactics, Shaw argues that the *coup* was the product of RPP's deep frustration with DP's continued ability to appeal to the Turkish middle class and rural populations. Consequently, the *coup* was led by the modernized bureaucracy and the army. The political and the military elite considered itself the defender of the reforms brought about by the Turkish Revolution against the middle classes now favored by the DP administration. In order to bring an end to DP's success and to reconfigure the RPP, the *coup* was organized and planned by students and faculty at the War College and the Faculty of Political Science, both of which had been moved to Ankara from Istanbul following the establishment of the Republic in 1923. These institutions had continued to be the principal channels through which the nation's modernizing elite was recruited, trained, and put in positions in the government and the military. They successively played their parts in staging the *coup* and restructuring the institutions of the state in its aftermath.

On May 27, a group of officers commanding the key military units in Istanbul and Ankara along with the students of the war academies arrested the members of the DP

⁸²⁶ Shaw, 413.

Administration, including Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister, and Celal Bayar, the President. Once this was accomplished, General Cemal Gürsel and 38 commanding officers representing all branches of the armed forces structured a National Unity Committee (NUC or, *Milli Birlik Komitesi*) and called in civilian intellectuals from Istanbul and Ankara universities to further organize the NUC and write a new constitution. Because the DP Administration still held the majority of the seats in the parliament at the time of the *coup*, the intellectuals advised the NUC against bringing in the members of the RPP, at least not immediately, to run the State. The NUC feared that this could lead to public resentment of the military and the *coup*. Instead, the NUC and the civilian government that followed were comprised of academics and a young workforce whose alliances had not yet crystalized, at least in the public and the political realms. The NUC was also advised to bring the members of the DP to trial and to charge them with specific counts of corruption to ensure the legitimacy of *coup*.⁸²⁷ The institutions that were formed under the DP Administration were also brought under scrutiny and, therefore, METU's Board of Trustees, despite its politically diverse membership came under attack. The NUC dismissed the standing Board of Trustees and appointed a new Board with new members. They also appointed Professor Turhan Feyzioğlu, the former Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University, as the first Turkish President of METU.⁸²⁸

As mentioned above, the Department of Political Sciences at Ankara University had served as one of the headquarters or think-tanks of the *coup*. Consequently, the

⁸²⁷ Ibid.

⁸²⁸ Reed, 226.

appointment of its dean as the president of METU showed that the NUC valued METU, but wanted to bring it under its own control. The NUC also revised the law that regulated the way the members of METU's Board of Trustees were appointed. Members of the Board were initially to be appointed for six-year terms; one third of the Board's members would be replaced every two years. They were to be nominated by the Council of Ministers and confirmed by the President of the Republic. The NUC reduced the Trustees' terms to three years, with all members designated at the same time.⁸²⁹ This change greatly reduced the independence of the Board from the political climate. Furthermore, the new Board that the NUC appointed did not have two thirds of its members from the private sector as the original METU law had required. The new board was made up of ministers, university administrators, and directors of government-owned and operated companies such as the Minerals Research Institute (Maden Tetkik Arama Enstitüsü, or MTA) or Eczacıbaşı Pharmaceuticals.⁸³⁰

Feyzioğlu kept METU running, however, he was too involved with the operations of the NUC to have a major impact at the University. On November 21, 1960, four months after being appointed the President, he was granted leave, and he resigned to become the Minister of Education on January 8, 1961.⁸³¹ His former colleague, Professor Seha Meray took over on February 23; however, Meray was overcome with illness and

⁸²⁹ This was done through an amendment embodied in Law No. 43 on August 11, 1960. Reed, 225.

⁸³⁰ During the NUC period, the membership of the Board also changed very frequently due to constant resignations and re-appointments as the NUC passed the new constitution on July 9, 1961 and returned to civilian government after the elections of October 1961. Despite these changes, Reed argues that the Board functioned efficiently and responsibly during this period. See Reed, 225.

⁸³¹ Reed, 226.

had to resign on August 5, 1961.⁸³² Dr. Burdell, who had been appointed by UNESCO just prior to the *coup* in March 1960, continued to operate as the “consulting president” until June 1962.

As “consulting president” Burdell was an important figure providing a degree of continuity from the pre- to post-*coup* structure of the University during this period of significant political and institutional transformation. Burdell succeeded in obtaining the first of a series of grants from the Ford Foundation in June 1960.⁸³³ This grant allowed the involvement of a prominent consultant, Dr. Paul Dodd, to aid in the planning and development of the general curriculum and structure of the University for a year.⁸³⁴ The Ford Foundation’s support of METU marked a new era of American support for METU, four years after its founding and, interestingly, during a time of significant power struggle between the populist DP and the elitist RPP.

Burdell’s influence continued into the beginning of the tenure of the third Turkish president of the University. Kemal Kurdaş (1920-2011), the interim Finance Minister of the NUC and a former staff-member of the International Monetary Fund, agreed to become METU’s next president on November 21, 1961. Burdell remained in his post for another six months to ensure that US support would continue into Kurdaş’s tenure (1961-

⁸³² Ibid.

⁸³³ Reed, 226.

⁸³⁴ Clement Henry Dodd, a British-born Turkish studies scholar, later compiled a number of studies on Turkish higher education and government. He wrote the Introduction as well as two other essays, including one on METU in C. H. Dodd, ed. *Studies in University Government and Administration* (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 1962). Also see, C. H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).

69), which marked the beginning of a period of outstanding growth and development for METU (**figure 7.6**).⁸³⁵

Kurdaş, who had also served briefly as the deputy head of the Treasury under the DP Administration, provided the force that would propel METU to become the leading institution of higher learning and research in Turkey, in the aftermath of the *coup* of May 27 and as the country transitioned into civilian rule on October 1961. Two primary factors contributed to Kurdaş's ability to achieve unprecedented and unexpected success for METU. First, he had a comprehensive understanding of the founding aims of the University. Burdell's continuation as the UN-sponsored administrator certainly contributed greatly to this understanding. At the same time, Kurdaş's extraordinary background allowed even a broader vision that once again brought together the multiple aims and perceptions that had come together in the inception of the idea of the School.

On the one hand, similar to Vecdi Diker, Kurdaş perceived the School as a part of the project of modernization and nation-building that was begun with the Turkish revolutionary war. He was a beneficiary of an educational scholarship that the early Turkish government had provided to the children of citizens who had contributed in some significant way to the national revolutionary effort. Kurdaş expressed from time to time how he felt indebted to the Turkish Government for his education and upbringing and how he always sought to provide in the same way for the new generations by building METU into a world-class institution of higher education and research.⁸³⁶

⁸³⁵ Kurdaş was then the sixth overall head administrator of METU, counting Thomas Godfrey as the first. Reed, 226-7.

⁸³⁶ This is at least how Kurdaş has explained his interest in and devotion to METU in his memoir. See Kemal Kurdaş, *ODTÜ Yıllarım: Bir Hizmetin Hikayesi* [My METU Years: The Story of a Service]

Kurdaş emerged as the most important Turkish economist of the DP period with extensive experience in international organizations by the end of the 1950s. Following his graduation from the Ankara University's School of Public Administration, he spent a year at the Turkish Embassy in London. During this year, in addition to his duties at the Embassy, he took classes at the London School of Economics and studied Keynesian macro economics, building upon his earlier interest in this topic and becoming perhaps the first Turkish civil servant to fully understand theories of national finance and development. As he returned to Turkey, he became the deputy head of the Treasury under the DP Administration and became a critic of DP's financial policies trying to avert the crisis that brought the breakdown of the International Technical Assistance machinery just prior to Abrams' arrival in 1954.⁸³⁷ Menderes refused to follow Kurdaş's advise for

(Ankara: METU Press, 1998). However, the most recent biography on Kurdaş reveals a more nuanced relationship between his family history and the early years of the Republic. This new biography reveals that his family had fled the Balkan wars and had moved to Bursa in 1912. His father, Şevki Kadri, had helped organize the local militia against the Greek occupation in Bursa; however, he was captured and was taken to Greece as a prisoner of war for three-and-a-half years. Kurdaş, who was named after Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the War of Independence, was an infant at the time. Kadri returned at the end of the war and, with very little means, built a business manufacturing *raki*, a Turkish national alcoholic drink, and wine, from local grapes. His business was soon thriving; however, the new Turkish state decreed a government monopoly over alcoholic drinks and appropriated his equipment. Kadri, left with no way to earn a living and suffering from ill health, asked the government to educate his children. As the son of a veteran, Kemal was admitted to a state boarding school at age seven and he lived in boarding schools through high school and college and very rarely saw his family. Kurdaş built his lasting friendships with Turkey's influential future bureaucrats during these years. According to this story, Kurdaş owed his poverty and ill fortune as well as his later success and triumph to the State. See Şengün Kılıç Hristidis, *Hayatım Mücadele İle Geçti: Kemal Kurdaş Kitabı Kitabı [My Life Spent in Struggle: The Kemal Kurdaş Book]* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2010).

⁸³⁷ Kurdaş was present at the meeting where talks between the Turkish and US representatives fell apart. See, Kurdaş, *ODTÜ Yıllarım*, 13-17. In another source, Kurdaş explained why the DP Administration's policies, despite their political success, did not make economic sense within the Turkish context. The official price of the *lira* against the dollar and European currencies was fixed at a level several times higher than the rate in the black market. Kurdaş proposed adjusting the official exchange rate to the market rate. Kurdaş's reasoning was that a lower *lira* would make Turkish exports cheaper, leading to more exports and foreign currency earnings. The proper price for the *lira* would cure the trade imbalance and foreign exchange shortage (which, as discussed earlier, would also trouble METU's initial years).

political reasons and Kurdaş resolved to leave the Ministry for a job that was offered to him by the International Monetary Fund. Menderes refused Kurdaş the permission to leave. Thanks to his wide network of influential friends he had acquired during his schooling, he obtained a passport and was able to leave the country with his family. Menderes declared Kurdaş a *persona non-grata* in Turkey.

In 1956, Kurdaş began to work with the IMF. In 1958, he was sent as an advisor to Paraguay and traveled extensively around the US and South America observing projects of economic development in numerous countries. In 1960, while preparing to go on a trip to Venezuela, he heard about the *coup* in Turkey. As he inquired about the situation, he was invited back to serve as the Finance Minister of the NUC.⁸³⁸

Although a highly qualified and able Minister during the NUC period, Kurdaş suspected that his particular approach to national finance as well as his controversial history with the Menderes government might make him an unsuitable candidate for the head of the Ministry during regular partisan politics as the country returned to civilian

However, Menderes believed that devaluing the *lira* would be a political mistake. He did not want to adjust the exchange rate. Instead, he borrowed from Europe and the United States to finance the trade imbalance. See Hristidis, *Hayatım Mücadele İle Geçti: Kemal Kurdaş...* (2010).

⁸³⁸ For a long time, Kurdaş didn't feel comfortable talking about the period he worked with the IMF. The reason for this was that his remarkable ability to continue to bring US funding and international recognition to METU had earned him the undeserved reputation as an American sympathizer or Americophile within the charged international political context of the mid- to late-1960s. Consequently, he was always concerned that the fact that he had worked with the IMF would be misinterpreted within the Turkish media and expressed this concern during my interview with him in Spring 2008. I followed up our conversation with a letter to clarify the reasons for my interest in his work during the IMF years and why his connection to that international network followed by his work at METU is so interesting. However we were never able to set up a time to speak or correspond again on the topic. I am glad to see that Kurdaş resolved to talk more about this period publicly during his later interviews with Şengün Hristidis. See Hristidis, *Hayatım...*, (2010).

rule in 1961.⁸³⁹ In September 1961, Kurdaş recalls that two of his friends who were now in the newly established National Planning Agency (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) contacted him to see if he would be interested in becoming METU's President. At the time, among other worries regarding the transition to civilian rule, Kurdaş was involved in arranging fellowships to send 12 Economics majors abroad for study. He began to imagine that METU, if reconstructed properly, could provide the same opportunities to thousands of students and decided to accept the offer immediately.⁸⁴⁰

Consequently, Kurdaş perceived the construction of METU in the aftermath of the May 27 *coup* as a re-enactment of the construction of Ankara following the National Revolutionary War in 1922. At the same time, he understood the connections between higher education and national development from the point of view of international development and international agencies as well. When Kurdaş accepted the offer to serve as METU's President, despite all the work that had already gone into developing METU, its future was still uncertain. In the wrong hands, it could have easily evolved into a mediocre college relying continuously on foreign aid to survive. Or, it could have been merged with Ankara University. However, Kurdaş had the capacity to relate to all of the multiple and diverging visions that had brought the university into existence as a separate and significant project. He worked to realize that mission and to maintain a consensus among these visions.

⁸³⁹ Kurdaş, in a remarkably short period of time, regulated the country's finances and was one of the key people that made the NUC period a success.

⁸⁴⁰ Kurdaş, *ODTÜ Yıllarım*, 25-27.

In fact the debates that were taking place, just at the time of Kurdaş's appointment, regarding the future of the University were very indicative of the divisive forces that were operating against the realization of a separate and new institution of higher learning with a new campus. By October 1961 and following the first competition, several diverging ideas had emerged regarding the new campus. During Turhan Feyzioğlu's Presidency, even a complete abandonment of the campus site were considered. Orhan Alsaç (1914-1991), an architect and the under-secretary (Müsteşar) at the Minister of Public Works, was the person to present to Kurdaş the comprehensive story of how these ideas had emerged and how they continued to delay the construction of the METU campus.⁸⁴¹

Alsaç relayed to Kurdaş that, following the first competition and during Feyzioğlu's Presidency, two primary options had emerged. First was to continue with the idea of building a campus on the site that was set aside by the DP administration. Second was to move the campus into a complex of buildings that had been constructed for a sugar factory in Etimesgut closer to Ankara.⁸⁴² Alsaç, along with several other members of the Board of Trustees, supported the former, while Feyzioğlu supported the latter based on the premise that if they were to decide to go with the sugar factory, the campus for the University would essentially be ready at a much lower cost than building a whole

⁸⁴¹ Kurdaş, *ODTÜ Yıllarım*, 45-47. Orhan Alsaç had been appointed as one of the Board of Trustees of METU following the *coup*. He was also to become the vice-president to Kurdaş at METU responsible for the Physical Plant and Development of the campus. He had already played a significant role, especially after the first competition, in the formation of the trajectory of events regarding the METU campus. It is important to mention at this point that he was a graduate of the Istanbul Technical University.

⁸⁴² Alsaç tells this story in more detail in his memoir. See Üstün Alsaç, *Bir Türk Mimarının Anıları Yaşamı ve Etkinlikleri: Orhan Alsaç* (Istanbul: Yapı Yayın, 2003), 27-30.

new campus, granted that the buildings would have to be refurbished to function as University buildings.

Alsaç expressed to Kurdaş that even though he had opposed the idea of the Sugar Factory complex, the Board felt obligated to run a feasibility study of both alternatives. The study concluded that if the academic center were to be positioned nearer one of the highways, the construction of a new campus would prove to be the better alternative in the long run.⁸⁴³ The Board agreed with the findings of the study and resolved to open a second competition in spring-summer 1961 to solicit proposals for the re-designing of the campus based on this new location. Altuğ and Behruz Çinici, a husband and wife team who were recent graduates of the Istanbul Technical University, had won this second competition and they were now waiting on the Board's decision to continue with the work. However, as Alsaç explained in frustration, some of the Board members continued to insist that Kurdaş, as the new President, should once again consider the Sugar Factory buildings as a viable alternative.⁸⁴⁴

Even though Alsaç had been involved with the project in multiple capacities during the process of the annulment of the first competition and the organization of the second, it appears that he did not tell Kurdaş about the first competition during that conversation and focused his argument around the results of the second competition. Alsaç's goal was to inform Kurdaş of the extensive work that had been done and the ground that had been covered on the planning and construction of the University campus. However, during this conversation, it is noteworthy that Alsaç mentioned neither the first

⁸⁴³ Kurdaş, *ODTÜ Yıllarım*, 45-47. Ü. Alsaç, *Bir Türk Mimarının ...*, 27-30.

⁸⁴⁴ Kurdaş, *ODTÜ Yıllarım*, 45-47.

competition nor the work that had been done by Perkins and other UN experts on the project even though he was aware of the process from the very beginning of the School. The fact that he chose to leave this information out is significant.

Alsaç's official and direct involvement with the School began shortly after the *coup* when the new Minister of Education under the NUC, Fehmi Yavuz appointed Alsaç as one of the members to the new Board of Trustees to the School. However, his indirect involvement can be traced back to its very beginnings. In 1955, when the first Board of Trustees was being put together for the School, Alsaç was working as the head of the Building and Reconstruction Department of the Ministry of Public Works.⁸⁴⁵ At that time, he was also active in the executive committee of the recently established Turkish Chamber of Architects. Alsaç recalls that the Chamber received a Memorandum from the Ministry of Education requesting someone from the Chamber to serve in the Board of Trustees of the School. He was put forward as the first candidate. However, the Chamber Committee then reasoned that the Ministry of Education would ask for a member from the Ministry of Public Works as well. They schemed that Alsaç could then join the Board of the School as the person from the Ministry of Public Works. If they nominated another person from the Chamber, they could then potentially have two allies in the Board of the School. Based on this plan, the Chamber put forward Mithat Yenen's name for METU's Board of Trustees. However, the Ministry of Education, following Abrams' and Sturen's recommendations, didn't ask for a person from the Ministry of Public Works.⁸⁴⁶

⁸⁴⁵ Alsaç, *Bir Türk Mimarının...*, 254.

⁸⁴⁶ Based on Abrams' suggestions, Olle Sturen had made the nominations to the Ministry of Education regarding who should be on the Board of Trustees. Fully aware that the Ministry of Public works

Consequently, Alsaç lost the chance to be involved in the Board of Trustees of METU at that time. However, he recalls that, as the DP Administration began the process of land appropriation in conjunction with the METU Campus Planning Office for the METU campus, Alsaç played an important role in making sure that what could have otherwise been an arduous process, was run in a timely manner for the University.⁸⁴⁷

Following the *coup*, Alsaç was brought to the position that had evaded him at the inception of the School. Alsaç's involvement in METU's Board meant that the Ministry of Public Works was now finally in a position to influence the University's Administration and the construction of its campus. As the Undersecretary of the Ministry, Alsaç would essentially be the Trustee that the Board would turn to in matters regarding the University's campus. Therefore, Alsaç's appointment to METU's Board symbolized the beginning of the Ministry's control of the University and the end of the UN experts' continuing oversight of the planning of the University's campus. It was not surprising that, soon after the *coup* and Alsaç's appointment to this position, talks began to emerge regarding the repositioning of the School's academic center and the organization of a second competition.

In this way, the balance of power had definitively shifted from UN experts to the Ministry of Public Works and subsequently to the graduates of the Istanbul Technical University. This was an outcome that Abrams and, later Perkins, had fought hard to avoid; however, the professional community dominated by İTÜ graduates had succeeded

was dominated by the graduates of the Istanbul Technical University, Abrams and Sturen did not want someone from the Ministry of Public Works to be involved in the new School's administration. See chapter three.

⁸⁴⁷ Alsaç, *Bir Türk Mimarının...*, 27.

in taking control of the new technical university in Ankara. The Ministry's takeover of the University can be seen as a *coup* that followed the national *coup* and brought an institution that had been established under the DP Administration under the control of the new regime. The events that followed this *coup* are interesting in that METU's new administrators did not proceed to restructure METU as a new İTÜ. Instead, they incorporated many of the ideas that were devised by the UN experts modifying their methodologies. At the same time, they wanted to be in full control of this transformation.

The rivalry between the Ministry and the UN experts was not the only factor that became influential in the shaping of the School's administration and campus following the *coup*. The long-standing battle for professional legitimacy and dominance in the professional scene was also operative. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, Turgut Cansever had initially supported the idea of reconsidering the location of the academic center of the campus until he realized that the Ministry, dominated by İTÜ graduates, was using this issue to organize a second competition for the project. Cansever refused to consider entering a second competition perhaps suspecting that he would not have a chance as a graduate of the Academy in a competition now organized and controlled by the Ministry. It was true that he had been awarded the project, but he had also advocated the repositioning of the site. He strongly argued with the Ministry for his rights to oversee the project. However, the new Board appeased his frustrations only by encouraging him to enter the second competition.

Despite the inclusion of a few foreign consultants in the competition jury, the second competition the Ministry organized for the METU project was not designated as

an international one. Aside from this difference however, there were a number of similarities or continuities between the organization, aims, and the program of the first and the second competitions. Zeki Sayar, for example, once again chose not to publish the advertisement for the second competition. Sayar's omission of the second METU competition from, *Arkitekt*, can this time be attributed not to the conflict between Turkish and foreign architects, but to yet another long-standing conflict, between the graduates of the two main schools of architecture. During the second competition, Sayar was protesting the Ministry's intention to edge out Cansever. Cansever and Sayar were close allies and had worked together in the establishment of the Turkish Chamber of Architects as a professional agency that would give the architects a critical voice against the Ministry's practices.

More importantly, in the organization of the second competition, the Ministry used the guidelines for the METU master plan that had been developed by the UN experts. As Cansever reported, following the first competition, Perkins prepared a second set of plans that included a set of guidelines for the planning of the campus and the design of individual buildings (**figures 6.32 – 6.33**). The Ministry translated these guidelines into Turkish and incorporated them into the program of the second competition.⁸⁴⁸

The Program and the Outcome of the Second Competition

⁸⁴⁸ I have not been able to find the actual competition program for the second competition. However, the Çinici office had kept the Jury Report for the second competition. Based on the language of the Jury Report, it is possible to suggest that the Competition Program was a near replica of the design guidelines included in the second set of consultant's plans.

Unlike the first competition, there are a number of primary source documents that provide information on the proceedings of the second competition. A full jury report, the competition boards of a number of the finalists, and a descriptive project report put together by the winning team shortly after the competition can be counted among these sources.⁸⁴⁹ Through an examination of these sources, and through a discussion of new and previously conducted interviews with Behruz Çinici, this section of the chapter analyzes the winning Çinici proposal in relation to a number of emerging and overlapping contexts such as the relationship between the new School of Architecture and Planning and the Turkish professional community; discussions and controversies surrounding the consultants' plans as well as the Turkish and international architectural and planning cultures.

Similar to the case of the first competition, extensive searches have not yielded the original program for the second competition. However, a project report put together by the Çinici team shortly after the competition suggests that it was based on the contents of the original competition program as well as the recommendations of the consultants' plans.⁸⁵⁰ This report entitled, "Middle East Technical University Campus Planning

⁸⁴⁹ For the jury report and some of the competition boards, see the archives of the Çinici office. For the remainder of the competition boards, see the School of Architecture archives at METU. The project report was prepared by the Çinici team shortly after the competition. See again the Çinici archives for these documents.

⁸⁵⁰ Here, I am suggesting that the wording in the report pertaining to the aims and the general description of the project has been borrowed from the original program of the second competition which in itself was based on the program of the first competition and the descriptions of the consultants' plans. Furthermore, the Çinicis were provided with a full bound set of the consultants' plans following the competition, one that matched the latest version available at the Architectural Archives at Penn. See the Çinici office archives. A copy of the "Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Kampüs Planlaması Raporu [Middle East Technical University Campus Planning Report]," hereafter, "METU Planning Report," is available in the Çinici office archives as well. In 1964, the Çinicis also published a booklet on the METU campus

Report,” first announced the establishment of a new University campus that would have a significant impact on, “Turkish national and social planning.” It then described the aim of the proposed project as follows:

The Middle East Technical University campus, through its spatial organization and siting, will reflect the Turkish national educational philosophy (principles) and will provide scientific, technical, and professional education to Turkey and the Middle East.⁸⁵¹

The aims of the project described in this METU planning report largely resounded the consultants’ description of METU’s mission in the University’s initial catalogs.

Furthermore, the report claimed that the “spatial organization and siting,” of the campus, “will reflect the Turkish national educational philosophy.” The report then described the siting (mevkii) and the organization of the campus to show how these goals were embodied in the project.

First, the report described the location of the campus site (mevkii) (**figure 7.7**).

Since the change in the actual location of the main campus within the larger terrain that was set aside for the University had been the Ministry’s primary reason to hold a second competition, this piece of information had a doubly significant purpose. It legitimized the second competition while also providing pertinent information for what had consistently

design in cooperation with the fledgling METU press and the wording in this publication comes from this early report. This booklet includes texts in both Turkish and English. The only copy of this publication I have been able to find was in the Çinici office, however it was published and disseminated in conjunction with an exhibition on METU in 1964. See Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi-Middle East Technical University, Altuğ-Behrüz Çinici, Mimar-Architect (ODTÜ-METU: Ankara, Mayıs-May 1964). The cover of the publication is confusing as it is not clear who the publisher was, whether it was self-published or in conjunction with METU. The booklet is not catalogued under Worldcat and does not have an ISBN number. However, the publication provides accurate site and programmatic information about the campus in both English and Turkish.

⁸⁵¹ Ibid., 1.

been one of the most important criteria for the configuration of the campus. From the very beginning of the discussions regarding the METU campus, the campus's configuration in relation to the various features of this site had been a central issue. The report described the site as follows, drawing attention to the University's connection to Ankara, the Grand National Assembly, and the countryside beyond:

Located along the exterior skirts of Ankara, approximately five kilometers West of the Grand National Assembly building, and around 10 kilometers in length, the site has varying topographical, geological, and agricultural characteristics. The larger campus site is comprised of 45 thousand square meters (11,120 acres) and the main campus is to be configured on around 8 thousand square meters (2,000 acres) of this site.⁸⁵²

The report described the views from the site as well. It pointed out that Ankara is located to the East; a calm and rolling steppe stretches to the West, and a mountainous terrain can be viewed to the south of the site.

Second, and even more importantly, the report described the principles that governed the general configuration of the campus. Here the report referred to the central core of the academic campus as a “forum,” which was the term that the consultants had used to describe this space. As discussed in chapter six, for the consultants the configuration and the identity of the *forum* was synonymous with the educational goals of the University. In describing how the *forum* was to function, the consultants wrote,

A University is a society. Its purpose is to search for and to disseminate truth and knowledge. This means that it is always on the move, fluid and flexible, expanding and contracting in sometimes unpredictable directions. Further, the qualities with which university buildings should be infused seem often to be mutually conflicting—seclusion and adventurousness, humility and dignity, speciousness and intimacy, flexibility and order.⁸⁵³

⁸⁵² “METU Planning Report,” 1.

⁸⁵³ “The Consultants’ Plan.” Also see chapter six and figure 6.32.

What is important to point out here is that the METU planning report prepared by the Çinicis had adopted the rather universalizing principles put forward by the consultants and had equated them with the spatial configuration of the Turkish national educational philosophy or principles. At the same time, this early report was the last place the Çinicis would use the term, *forum*. From this point on, they would refer to the central core of the campus as an *allée*. However, the fact that they used the term *forum* in a document prepared shortly after the competition suggests that this term was the term used in the competition program. Consequently, it is also possible to suggest that the program for the second competition was once again based on the recommendations made in the consultants' plans.⁸⁵⁴ This suggestion is further supported by the following analysis of the Jury report.

The Jury Criteria

The jury for the second competition was made up of a different group of architects, professors, and bureaucrats than those who were involved in the first competition. There were nine primary jury members and eight secondary or advisory members.⁸⁵⁵ Neither Perkins nor any of the other Penn experts who had been involved in

⁸⁵⁴ The organizing body of the second competition may have even made a set of the consultants' plans available to the competition teams for their review. A full set of the consultants' plans as well as the second and third place winners' boards were given to the Çinicis for their use in further refining and articulating their proposal following the competition.

⁸⁵⁵ The primary members were: Tulû Baytın, Gündüz Gündeş, Sedat Gürel, Adnan Kocaarslan, Bülent Berksan, Sami Anolay, J. Otto Spreckelsen, Rauf Beyru, and Muhittin Kulin. The secondary members were: Mukbil Gökdoğan, Fehmi Yavuz, Edward S. Burdell, Orhan Deniz, Fuat Zamil, M.D. Rivkin, Cüneyt Akova, and Yavuz Sey. It is important to note that none of the Turkish architects and planners who had served in the first jury were included as members of the jury in the second competition.

the consultants' plans were included in these lists of even the secondary or advisory members. The only UN consultants who were included were Otto Spreckelsen, Edward Burdell, and M.D. Rivkin. All of them except Burdell had arrived after Godfrey's departure and none of them had been involved in the previous competition or discussions regarding the project. Burdell, as the acting University President, was the only person who provided a continuity between the previous and the new administration of the University.

The jury began their report by stating the importance of this project for providing an extraordinary educational setting for Turkey and the Middle East and congratulated all participants for their interest and proposals for the project. The jury then explained that they had reviewed 21 highly competitive entries and felt that the quality of the projects should be a matter of pride for the Turkish architectural and planning professions. They added that except for one project that had to be eliminated for not complying with regulations, they reviewed all other projects based on the following criteria:

- a. The positioning of the components of the University according to the various topographic conditions and other constraints and qualities provided by the site.
- b. Vehicular and pedestrian circulation.
- c. The internal articulation of each component of the University.
- d. The relationship between each component.
- e. The adaptability of the plan to phased construction.
- f. Views to and from the various areas of the campus.
- g. Architectural language and quality of the buildings.⁸⁵⁶

“Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin Proje Müsabakası Jüri Raporu [Jury Report of the Middle East Technical University Project Competition],” the Çinici Office archives, 7.

⁸⁵⁶ “Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin Proje Müsabakası Jüri Raporu [Jury Report of the Middle East Technical University Project Competition],” hereafter, “Second Competition Jury Report,” the Çinici Office archives, 2.

In other words, the criteria that the jury listed at beginning of their report as well as the points they made regarding the Çinici project closely resembled those put forward in the consultants' plans with a few exceptions (**figures 6.32 & 6.33**).

The positioning of the academic core in relation to the site and other areas of the campus was listed as the first issue in both programs. The consultants' plans had specified a ten-minute walking radius for the academic center. The jury did not mention this specifically; however, the second point in their list dealt with vehicular and pedestrian circulation just as the consultants' plans had addressed the issue of excluding, "the automobile from the central green and from the courts of each of the Schools," as their second point. The consultants' third point regarding once again the general organization of the site was addressed in the jury's first and second points. The jury's fourth point also corresponded to consultants' fourth point, which dealt with the articulation of the outdoor spaces within each component of the campus. The jury's fifth point, which addressed the phased construction of the campus, comprised the consultants' fifth and sixth points. The jury's sixth and seventh points regarding general views and detailed views of the site as well as the general architectural quality of the submittals were also the points addressed in the rest of the consultants' program and specifications.

The primary difference between the jury's criteria and the consultants' specifications was that the wording of the consultants' program was more specific whereas the jury's list of criteria tended to be less so. For example, regarding the phased construction of the campus, the consultants' program specified that the campus should be built, "from the center outward." As discussed in chapter six, consultants had debated this

idea of moving from center out beginning with Kaikkonen's suggestions. The goal was to maintain a sense of place and community from the very beginning with key departments of the University being built around this center that the consultants called the *forum*. The jury's criteria did not include this specific terminology. Consequently, the jury's concerns and criteria largely paralleled the points listed in the consultants' plans. The competition program must have listed these same issues as the criteria for the project as well. In this way, the consultants' plans continued to influence the design and the outcome of the METU project, at least in terms of the second competition's program and the jury's criteria. After listing the criteria for the competition, the jury then provided comments for nine projects beginning with the sixth mention and moving towards the project that they chose as the first place winner.⁸⁵⁷

Because Zeki Sayar never published the METU competition in *Arkitekt*, the projects that placed second and third in the competition as well as those that won honorable mention were never discussed or published. They were only viewed by the competition jury, the winners, and the small circle of architects who were involved with the specific projects. However, the jury felt that the second and the third place projects

⁸⁵⁷ After sorting through the available competition boards both at the Çinici office and at the School of Architecture archives at METU, and after interviewing the surviving architects who participated in this competition, it has been possible to identify the projects that won the third and the second place in addition to, of course, the Çinici project that was chosen as the first place winner. However, the numbers that the jury assigned to the projects do not match the numbers that were put on the competition boards. Consequently, it has been difficult to match the jury comments to the projects. At the same time, it has been possible to definitively identify the projects by tracking down the architects who participated in the competition. I am thankful to many of these architects and their surviving spouses and children for providing me with the information that helped me navigate through the difficult task of matching the available competition drawings and boards with the competition results. I can count Güner Acar (third place award), Birsen and Teoman Doruk (first mention), Yılmaz Tuncer (third place award), and Gürol Gürkan (second place award) among those who provided critical information towards the solving of the puzzle.

were very competitive, especially insofar as they achieved the high level of connection to the site that was specified by the competition program as well as the consultants' plans. Following the competition, the organizing body gave the boards of these two projects as well as a full set of consultants' plans to the Çinicis per the competition jury's recommendations.⁸⁵⁸

The project that received the third place award was submitted by a four-person team made up of Yılmaz Sanlı, Yılmaz Tuncer, Güner Acar, and Ayhan Tayman (board number 4102) (**figures 7.7 - 7.10**). The jury commented that the project had done a relatively good job allocating the main components of the University (academic core and the residential areas) on the given site, with errors in certain areas. They noted that the project had done an especially good job in creating relationships among specific departments. The jury also felt that the architectural composition of the administration building, school of architecture, and the student dormitories were especially noteworthy. The general organization of the project also lent itself to phased construction. On the other hand, the jury pointed out that the project had not fully resolved the issue of the separation of vehicular and pedestrian circulation.

The project that received the second place award was prepared a five-person team made up of Esat Turak, Gürol Gürkan, Önder Sonad, Aktan Yörükoğlu, and Osman Armangil (board number 28955) (**figures 7.11 - 7.14**). The jury noted that this project was especially successful in positioning the academic core in relation to both the

⁸⁵⁸ During the 1950s and the early 1960s, it was not unusual for a competition jury to give the winning team the boards of some of the other projects that were felt to have strong features. Sometimes, the jury made recommendations that asked the winning team to incorporate ideas that were used in one or more of the other projects.

topographic conditions and the other components of the campus. Through the relationships it created among key departments, they felt that this proposal was successful in creating a center for the University that could be constructed over time. They added that the composition of the buildings around this core as well as the articulation of individual buildings in this area, referring especially to the school of architecture building, were competently handled by the project. At the same, the jury felt that the project had not shown the same level of articulation in the way the architects dealt with the residential areas of the campus. For this reason, they felt that the project should be awarded the second place award.

The jury commented on the Çinici project last and explained why they had chosen this particular project to be the winner (**figures 7.15 - 7.24**). The jury report praised the way the Çinici project positioned the main elements of the University; namely, the academic core, the student dormitories, the faculty/staff housing, and the athletic facilities on the given site (**figures 7.16 & 7.20 – 7.21**).⁸⁵⁹ They expressed that the plan had established meaningful working relationships between these elements making the best use of the features of the given site.

The jury commented that the academic core was appropriately positioned along the ridge with a view of Ankara while the residential quarters were sited in a secondary position along the lower slopes; and that the plan had succeeded in creating a relationship between these two zones (**figure 7.15**). The jury added that the project had shown the same competency in resolving the internal articulation of each of these zones (**figure**

⁸⁵⁹ “Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin Proje Müsabakası Jüri Raporu [Jury Report of the Middle East Technical University Project Competition],” archives of the Çinici Office.

7.18). The jury also agreed with the way the pedestrian traffic was separated from the vehicular traffic through the utilization of a perimeter road while pointing out that providing access and parking to each department from this perimeter road was an issue that needed improvement.

The jury also stated that the configuration made appropriate use of the topographic conditions along the ridge and had successfully terraced the building volumes in relation to the shifts of the terrain. They added that the given layout also lent itself especially well to a phased construction, as required by the construction brief. The jury further pointed out that the layout of the academic core allowed for a variety of architectural expressions that may manifest themselves as the campus would be constructed over time. They felt that the project evidenced a strong conception of architectural and town planning principles. The jury also expressed that the Çinici proposal had succeeded in providing a plan that would be perceived as a whole (or as a community) even though the campus would be built over time and in stages. In this way, the Çinici plan was perceived to put to rest the anxieties that revolved around this issue of creating a sense of community from the very beginning on a campus that would be built over time and on an open site. The jury then announced that, for these reasons, they found the project to be worthy of the first place award and that it could be executed in its entirety.⁸⁶⁰

⁸⁶⁰ The jury wrote, “Bu proje 1. Mükâfata lâyık görülmüştür ve bütünü ile kabili tatbik bulunmuştur.” “Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin Proje Müsabakası Jüri Raporu [Jury Report of the Middle East Technical University Project Competition],” archives of the Çinici Office, 7.

The jury then concluded their remarks by making the following recommendations to the Çinici scheme:

1. During the design and construction of the individual buildings of the academic center, the project team is to remain in close contact with the University Administration in order to work out the exact positioning of the departments in relation to the overall plan as well as the phasing of their construction.
2. The project team is to consult with the University Administration regarding the program of each building and their position within the academic center.
3. The design team is to re-visit the perimeter road's relationship to each department to provide more convenient access roads and parking for each department.⁸⁶¹

These last remarks suggest that the jury and the University Administration were not yet convinced of the exact positioning of the specific departments along the academic center. They wanted this issue to be further discussed with the architects. The Çinici proposal had positioned the main departments of the University around the east end of the *allée* in generally the same clock-wise configuration as the consultants' plans. However, there were also some significant differences in the way the Çinicis' and the consultants' respective schemes interpreted the idea of the University as the following discussion will reveal.

The Çinici Plan vs. The Consultants' Plan

Some of the key strategies of the consultants' plan (**figure 6.30**) are visible in the Çinici plan (**figures 7.18 & 7.19**). For example, the recreational facilities in the Çinici plan were positioned along the main entrance of the campus similar to the way the consultants had positioned them. At the same time, the Çinici plan was innovative in the

⁸⁶¹ "Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin Proje Müsabakası Jüri Raporu [Jury Report of the Middle East Technical University Project Competition]," archives of the Çinici Office, 7.

way that it utilized the curvilinear form of the stadium and the grade change afforded by the stepping of the bleachers to create the transition between the two functional zones and the topographic conditions of the new campus site. The jury report praised the Çinici plan for this innovation. Commenting on the Çinici scheme years later, Thomas Godfrey recalled that Perkins and other consultants had found the Çinici scheme rather objectionable on the grounds that this general layout created a distinct separation between the academic center and the residential areas of the campus.⁸⁶² Instead of this separation, the consultants' plan had proposed to position the athletic facilities and the dormitories along the main entrance, which terminated at the academic center of the campus.

There are a number of comparisons that can be made between the Çinici and the consultants' plans regarding the organization of the academic center as well. The consultants' plans recommended that the academic core of the campus should grow outward from a well-defined and compact center that they referred to as a *forum*. The Çinici plan, instead of being organized around a central court, was organized along a linear pedestrian path that the Çinicis initially referred to as a *forum*, but later called an *allée*. The shift from the idea of a central *forum* to a linear *allée* was largely necessitated by the narrower and longer dimensions that the new site afforded along a ridge. In this way, the shift from the *forum* to the *allée* was an innovative adaptation of the ideas represented in the consultants' plans: The Çinicis kept the idea of the academic core along a ridge, but had to change its configuration based on the dimensions provided by the topographic conditions of the site. Regarding the *allée*, Thomas Godfrey limited his

⁸⁶² Thomas Godfrey, acting dean of the School of Architecture and Planning at METU, 1956-59, interview with author, Philadelphia, April 2007, digital recording, author's archive.

criticism to its functional aspects and pointed out that the *allée* provided a much less efficient system of circulation ultimately reducing the interaction among the departments positioned far from each other.⁸⁶³ As discussed in chapter six, the consultants were heavily invested in the design of the *forum* and conceived it as a space that had not simply functional, but also symbolic significance for the University. The specific configuration of the *forum*, embodied the idea of the University as well as the idea of training and education as articulated by Abrams and supported by the consultants.

In the consultants' plans, the *forum* was defined by the library on the southwest, the School of Administrative Sciences on the southeast, and the School of Arts and Sciences on the northwest. The northeast side of the *forum* was left open providing views to the countryside beyond. The consultants also positioned the School of Architecture and Planning to the east of the open end of the rectangle with views to Ankara and the Grand National Assembly. These four buildings, along with the student dormitories and cafeterias that would be positioned along the main drive to the campus, formed the physical and the symbolic form of the academic core. While each of these four departments comprised the essential components of the idea of training and education as proposed by Abrams, the dual views to the countryside and the State symbolized the dual components of an administrative revolution. The rectangular configuration of the *forum* with its open end made additional references to the configuration of many American universities as well, perhaps most directly to Thomas Jefferson's Academical Village at the University of Virginia. In this way, at METU's *forum*, ideals of the American

⁸⁶³ Thomas Godfrey, interview with author, Philadelphia, April 2007.

revolution, democracy, and education were to find their parallels not only in the aims of the Turkish national revolutionary ideology, but also in DP's aims to build Turkey as a "little America."

By tilting the long sides of the rectangle at an angle to each other, the consultants provided a strategy for the expansion of this space as the campus developed from, "the center outward." In the Çinici plan, these four buildings were positioned along both side of the *allée* in generally the same clockwise configuration as in the consultants' plan. However, the relationship between these buildings as well as the visual connection between the schools of architecture and public administration and the state were less clearly defined.⁸⁶⁴ In addition, as expressed by the consultants, the length of the *allée* and the resulting distance between some of the buildings made the interdisciplinary interaction between certain departments impracticable. At the same time, the linear configuration of the *allée* dissolved the hierarchy that was achieved by the centrality of the *forum* and allowed a more democratic relationship to occur among the departments. The Çinici's *allée* emphasized movement and symbolized the freedom of the human subject. Buildings and spaces in-between became subsidiary to the experience of moving along this path. In this way, the Çinici plan could be said to have adopted a less hierarchical modernity that was also beginning to be represented in other contemporary

⁸⁶⁴ Although it should be pointed out the Çinici's attempted to maintain certain pieces of this configuration. For example, the courtyard in front of the Architecture building that was initially used for graduation ceremonies was an attempt to maintain a forum-like space within the *allée* configuration. Furthermore, the two-storey cube that marks the entrance to the School of Architecture building and houses the offices of the dean tries to maintain the visual connection to Ankara and the state. During the initial years of construction, the president of the University used the offices of the dean of the school of architecture.

projects, such as Aldo van Eyck's well-known and publicized Orphanage project in Amsterdam, which was built in 1957-60 just a few years prior to the METU competition.

Perhaps the strongest and most direct evidence of the influence of the consultants' plans on the formation of the Çinici plan was the inclusion of a "House of Religion" or a *Din Evi* in the Çinici plan (**figures 7.22 & 7.24**).⁸⁶⁵ A house of religion was included in the consultants' plan. It is not known whether the idea to include a mosque came from the DP Administration or the consultants, but a mosque was drawn on both of the consultants' submittals to the Board of Trustees (**figures 6.26 & 6.30**).⁸⁶⁶ It was not surprising for the consultants to include a mosque on the campus under the de-secularizing agendas of the DP Administration. However, one of the primary reasons for the military *coup* of May 27 was to bring an end to DP's de-secularizing policies. The Çinicis' early drawings included a religious center. One possible explanation for this continuity is that a religious center was on the original program prepared by the consultants. Since the second competition re-used the consultants' program, the religious center continued to appear in the drawings for second competition. At the same time, while the consultants positioned the mosque along the main drive, the Çinicis positioned the religious center in as remote a location as possible on their site plan.

⁸⁶⁵ It is number 11 on the index to the site plan.

⁸⁶⁶ On figure 6.26 the small square building positioned diagonally along the main drive was annotated as a mosque. On figure 6.30, the mosque remained in that same position, again along the main drive.

The Çinici Narrative

As can be seen from the above discussion, the consultants' plans as well as other international developments in architecture and planning influenced the organization and the outcome of the second competition in a number of ways. Furthermore, even though the Çinicis, in the early report they produced, initially described their project largely based on the criteria given by the competition program, using the terminology and concepts introduced originally by the consultants, in later interviews and descriptions of the project, they developed a different narrative to describe how the METU site plan had emerged. In the process, they gradually erased the references to METU's international past and to the numerous individuals, both Turkish and non-Turkish, and the ideas that had contributed to the making of its site plan. The Çinici narrative tells the story of the making of METU within a context of local rivalries and the Çinicis' own struggle for legitimacy within the Turkish architectural community while undermining the international rivalries and contexts that had contributed to METU's making. While the Çinicis' narrative is important and adds to the context of multiple rivalries, one has to keep in mind that it was only one among other multiple rivalries that were taking place among numerous agents and agencies.

The most complete form of Çinicis' account of the project is found in his interview with Uğur Tanyeli.⁸⁶⁷ In this and other interviews, Behruz Çinici tells the story

⁸⁶⁷ Uğur Tanyeli, ed. *'Improvisation: Mimarlıkta Doğaçlama ve Behruz Çinici* (İstanbul: Boyut, 1999). Tanyeli also later published the monograph on Cansever, the winner of the first competition. See, Uğur Tanyeli and Atilla Yücel, *Turgut Cansever: Düşünce Adamı ve Mimar [Turgut Cansever: Theorist and Architect]* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi ve Garanti Galeri, 2007). Another important place where this narrative is most prominent is in the recorded film interview of the conversation between Çinici and Kemal Kurdaş. See, *Kemal Kurdaş ve Behruz Çinici Görüşmesi: ODTÜ Yerleşkesi ve*

of his response to the METU competition through the experiences he had in a series of prior competitions he entered following his graduation and beginning especially with the Erzurum Atatürk University Campus competition in 1955.

Behruz Çinici (Istanbul, 1932 – Istanbul, 2011) was a graduate of the Istanbul Technical University (1954). During the last year of his studies, Kemal Ahmet Arû, one of Çinici's senior professors of architecture and town planning at ITÜ, recommended him for a staff position at the Istanbul offices of the Ministry of Public Works.⁸⁶⁸ Following his graduation, Arû also offered Çinici a position as an assistant professor in the Department of City and Regional Planning. Çinici's dual position as an assistant and as a staff member of the Ministry evidenced the traditional bond between the two institutions. At the same time, the fact that Arû had put Çinici in both of these positions revealed that Arû perceived Çinici as one of the future professor bureaucrat elites who would rise through the ranks and eventually play the role that Arû played as a professor and as a primary consultant to the State. Arû had been a member of the jury of the first competition and he participated regularly as a jury member in many competitions, especially those that had an urban or regional design component.

Çinici also had intermediary mentors both at the Ministry and at the School. Enver Tokay, an associate professor (doçent) of significant national reputation and a socialite of celebrity status, had recognized Çinici's talents and had involved him in a

Yapıları Nasıl Var Edildi? [A Conversation between Kemal Kurdaş ve Behruz Çinici: How did the METU Campus and Buildings Come to Be?]. Produced and directed by Andreas Treske. METU School of Architecture, 2001, DVD. Even though it will become clear that Altuğ Çinici was closely involved in all phases of the METU project, Behruz Çinici is almost always the main spokesperson for the project.

⁸⁶⁸ Çinici notes that this was an extraordinary favor that Kemal Ahmet Arû had done for him.

number of the competitions that he entered with other colleagues. Ayhan Tayman, an assistant professor and Çinici's supervisor at the Ministry, was one of Enver Tokay's close collaborators. Together they had designed the Emek Building in Ankara, which is considered to be Turkey's first skyscraper and the first building with a true curtain wall system of enclosure on two primary sides (**figure 7.25**). In addition to his impressive repertoire of buildings and competition entries, Tokay was a celebrated professor and personality at ITU. Çinici recalled that, even during times of great economic shortage, Tokay always dressed in exquisite layers of clothing wearing capes like Frank Lloyd Wright and dropping in and out of the School whenever he pleased like a superhero action-figure architect. Consequently, he had a formidable presence among the students. Çinici felt grateful to be one of his protégés. At the same time, Tokay and Tayman's influence was at times overbearing, as Çinici would soon realize.

Tayman frequently hired Çinici to work on several private contracts with him. They also entered competitions together sometimes asking Enver Tokay to team up with them to bring recognition and legitimacy to their relatively young team. Between 1955 and 1961, the Tokay, Tayman and Çinici team were able to place and win first and second place awards in a number of significant competitions. The following can be listed (in chronological order) among the competitions that the three won first place:

Ankara Merchants Guild Market and Office building [Ankara Esnafları Kooperatifi Çarşısı ve İşhanı (Anafartalar Çarşısı)]; 1955; with Ayhan Tayman, Ayten Seçkin.

D.S.I. (National Waterworks) Headquarters building in Ankara; 1955(?).

Erzurum Atatürk University Campus; 1955; with Enver Tokay, Hayati Tabanlıoğlu, Ayhan Tayman.

Petrol Ofis Headquarters [Petrol Ofisi Genel Müdürlüğü]; 1955; with Ayhan Tayman.

Ankara Covered Market Complex [Ankara Kapalı Çarşı Sitesi]; 1956; with Ayhan Tayman and Atilla Seçkin.

Eminönü Market, Office, and Warehouse Complex, Istanbul [Eminönü Çarşı, Büro, ve Depo Tesisleri]; 1960; with Nahit Kumbasar.⁸⁶⁹

During this period and among these numerous projects, Çinici admits to have committed three major blunders: Two master plans that he was involved in during his work at the Ministry and the Erzurum Atatürk University Campus plan.⁸⁷⁰ The latter is worth discussing here in some detail since Çinici perceived it, in retrospect, as a significant learning experience in his career leading up to the METU competition.

Kemal Ahmet Arû and Kemali Söylemezoğlu were both on the competition jury of the Erzurum Atatürk University Campus. According to competition rules put in place by the Turkish Chamber of Architects, an assistant professor could not enter a competition if his or her professor was in the jury. Kemal Ahmet Bey was Çinici's professor and Kemali Bey was Tayman's. It was not entirely unusual for architects to get around this rule by putting only the names of the members of the team on the competition ticket who had no conflicts of interest with the jury. Since both Çinici and Tayman had conflicts, they asked Enver Tokay to enter the competition with them. However, they would need someone else as well since it would raise the jury's suspicion if Tokay was the only person listed on the entry. Hayati Tabanlıoğlu, who had been Tayman's

⁸⁶⁹ *Yarışmalar Dizini*, 49-71.

⁸⁷⁰ He even goes so far as to call these blunders, murders (cinayet). Tanyeli, 34.

classmate in school, had only recently returned from Germany, so they were able to recruit him into the competition team as well.

Conflicts of interest did not bother Çinici. He felt that as long as the jurors didn't know the actual members of a team, there was no conflict of interest. The professional and the competition culture and procedures made it almost impossible to avoid these potential conflicts of interest. Everyone had to keep entering multiple competitions to get jobs and to survive as a professional. Many held multiple jobs, like Çinici, at the University and at the Ministry, while also trying to establish themselves as practitioners. Consequently, conflicts of interest were all too common within this small community of professionals. What bothered Çinici, however, was the fact that they had drawn all the drawings in the ministerial offices in Istanbul without ever setting foot on the project site in Erzurum.

In spite of this, their project somehow won the competition. Tayman and Çinici, along with the rest of the team, were initially pleased to have won; however, when the buildings began to go up, Çinici realized that they had made significant mistakes both in the conception of the master plan and in the design of the individual buildings. As he began to travel between Istanbul and Erzurum during the construction of the chemical engineering buildings, he realized how cold Erzurum got during the winter.⁸⁷¹ The team had specified metal frames for the large ribbon windows that they had designed (**figure**

⁸⁷¹ Erzurum records some of the coldest temperatures in Turkey such as overnight lows of negative 40 degrees Celsius (-40 degrees Fahrenheit—somehow Celcius and Fahrenheit readings are the same at this temperature).

7.26). He recalled that during one visit to the site, he absent-mindedly touched one of the window frames and the frames were so cold that his fingers got stuck on them.

He also realized that the site plan did not make any sense in Erzurum's climate. He asked himself with regret, "why had they designed so many separate buildings so far apart from each other?" (figures 7.27 & 7.28). He later reflected that they should have considered a more compact solution on this site and climate. As the four buildings of the Chemical Engineering department were going up, Çinici decided to get out of the project leaving his partners with the embarrassment and the task to see the project to its conclusion.⁸⁷²

What had happened to the Çinici team at the Erzurum University competition was a symptom of the competition culture that prevailed throughout the professional community during the second half of the 1950s. Similar to the phenomenon of "hiltonculuk," or the practice of designing knock-offs of the Istanbul Hilton's international style architecture, teams would form hastily and produce a campus plan for a competition that resembled Ludwig Mies van der Rohe's plan for the Illinois Institute of Technology or the Architects' Collaborative's plan for the Harvard Graduate Center without carefully considering the program or the site of the competition.⁸⁷³ Enver Tokay and Ayhan Tayman had gained a particular reputation for their ability to produce good-looking international style buildings and Çinici followed in their footsteps realizing only later that this formal and stylistic approach could lead to a major and an irreversible mistake.

⁸⁷² Tanyeli, *Improvization*, 34.

⁸⁷³ For "Hiltonculuk," see also the discussion in chapter three.

The site plans for the Erzurum Atatürk University (1955) and the Aegean University projects (1959, Perran Doğancı, Yılmaz Ergüvenç, Kadri Ilal, Zafer Koçak) were indicative of the prevailing approaches to campus design in Turkey during the second half of the 1950s. Many of the entries to both competitions, proposed thin and long bar buildings arranged in a geometrical configuration around generous exterior open spaces. The Çinici-Tayman proposal for the Erzurum Atatürk University positioned the campus layout on both sides of a boulevard that connected the campus site to downtown Erzurum. Zeki Sayar, in his documentation of the project in 1966, described its configuration in four parts:

- I. Faculty and staff housing located on the south side of the entrance boulevard.
- II. Main campus comprised of academic and administrative buildings located on the west side of the boulevard following a terminus in the road. In this area a perimeter road provided the vehicular access to each department along the outside edge of a rectangular layout. Each department had its own parking and service access areas off of this perimeter road. Inside the perimeter road, the academic and administrative buildings were arranged along a wide central pedestrian *allée* that created the “UNIVERSITY ATMOSPHERE.” To the west of the central campus area, Departments of Agriculture with research and testing fields and greenhouses were located.
- III. Student dormitories and cafeterias were located on the east side of the boulevard and south of the athletic fields.
- IV. The athletic fields were located again on the east side of the boulevard and between the faculty and staff housing and the student dormitories and cafeterias.⁸⁷⁴

As Çinici later regretted, the generous exterior spaces between the buildings dominated the plan in a climate where such spaces could only be enjoyed during a very short part of the year. The width of the central *allée* seemed especially generous dividing the academic

⁸⁷⁴ Sayar, “Erzurum Atatürk Üniversitesi,” *Arkitekt* no.4 (1966): 109-115.

core in half instead of joining them around a central court. The generosity of this *allée* worked against the idea of creating relationships between academic departments and units. In addition, the main boulevard separated the residential and the academic areas of the campus creating a considerable distance between the two areas. The students, faculty and staff had to cross a major highway, sometimes in inclement weather, in order to get to the main campus.

The winning entry to the Aegean University Campus competition exhibited a similar formulaic arrangement of buildings in the landscape without any particular connection to the specific features of the site or the climate. Narrow and long bar buildings organized geometrically around exterior spaces once again dominated the arrangement of the plan (**figures 7.29 - 7.30**). However, none of the exterior spaces emerged as particularly well defined to serve a specific activity or purpose. Even though the arrangement of the buildings around courts at the Aegean University was a more convincing application of the formula, teams usually applied formal arrangements that they borrowed from campus projects seen in architectural journals without paying attention to the particular qualities of a specific site.

Following the Erzurum Atatürk University project, Çinici won a number of first and second place awards as well as honorable mentions in numerous competitions. He was especially pleased with his proposal for the Eminönü Market Competition (1960). He entered this competition on his own and won the first place award.⁸⁷⁵ The Eminönü

⁸⁷⁵ There was once again a conflict of interest with one of the jury members. This time, Hayati Tabanlıoğlu was one of the jury members and, on paper, Çinici still appeared to be a partner on the Erzurum project with Tabanlıoğlu. The competition laws prohibited a partner to compete in a competition

competition was unusually popular among architects. Around three hundred and fifty architects teamed up to submit seventy proposals in total. Unlike the Erzurum site, this was an area that Çinici, as an Istanbul native, was very familiar with. The site was between the Rüstem Paşa Mosque and the Egyptian Market (Mısır Çarşısı) in a tight urban zone between two historical monuments. He found a way to squeeze the required square footage into the site without disturbing the silhouette of the existing fabric. He also incorporated the idea of market tents, which he felt was an essential component of any traditional market, into this modern project. The sensitive scale of his proposal was unique among the other entries and he won the competition with almost all of the jurors voting for his project.⁸⁷⁶

Altuğ and Behruz Çinici had been married for about a year when the second METU competition was advertised in spring 1961.⁸⁷⁷ They had begun to enter competitions together utilizing their house as a studio.⁸⁷⁸ At that time, Behruz Çinici was teaching as an assistant professor in the Department of City Planning at Istanbul

if one of the partners was serving in the jury, so Çinici, entered the competition under Nahit Kumbasar's name.

⁸⁷⁶ The only juror who voted against him happened to be his former partner from the Erzurum project, Hayati Tabanlıoğlu. Tabanlıoğlu was not happy about the way Çinici had left them with the project in Erzurum. Çinici had once again had to enter the competition under someone else's name in order to avoid a conflict of interest. However, Tabanlıoğlu recognized Çinici's drawings and turned him in to the Chamber of Architects for fraud. The Chamber didn't feel that Çinici's actions had affected the outcome of the competition and proceeded to award the project to Çinici. Tanyeli, *Improvisation*, 34-35.

⁸⁷⁷ Altuğ had been Behruz's student at İTÜ. They married within two months of meeting each other. Tanyeli, *Improvization*, 35.

⁸⁷⁸ They won second place with Fevzi Toroyan in the competition for the Ankara Institute for the Development of Test and Research Equipment [Ankara Test ve Araştırma Eğitsel Geliştirme Merkezleri], 1961; and, an honorable mention with Perran Doğanç and Ayhan Tayman in the Aegean University Medical Sciences and Hospital building [Ege Üniversitesi Tıp Fakültesi ve Hastanesi], 1961. See, *Yarışmalar Dizini*, 68-69.

Technical University (ITU). Altuğ oversaw the projects and the teams during the day while Çinici was at the University. They resumed work together at night with students who often spent the evenings and nights in their house.⁸⁷⁹

Behruz Çinici recalls that their bedroom looked like a paper storage warehouse and about two students also practically lived with them during this time. At the same time, the domestic set-up they had created provided an efficient and low-cost practice. This environment also gave Altuğ Çinici ready-made access into the professional world still dominated by men. As a young and newly-wed husband and wife team also competitively involved in the professional world, they challenged domestic norms and celebrated their modernity and ability to operate in this manner. The Çinicis never made any references to other internationally well-known husband and wife teams of this era, such as Ray and Charles Eames and Alison and Peter Smithson. However, it is possible to suggest that they may have felt an affinity to the liberating and avant-garde domesticities that these other couples represented in the postwar world.

When the second METU competition was announced, Altuğ and Behruz Çinici immediately went to Ankara and checked into Yüksel Palas Hotel to set up a preliminary workshop there.⁸⁸⁰ They visited the site regularly as they worked on the project even

⁸⁷⁹ Tanyeli, *Improvization*, 35.

⁸⁸⁰ Here again, and I don't want to overstate this point, but their marriage allowed them a certain degree of mobility and status as a couple and as a professional team. In those days, they would have had a hard time staying in the same hotel together if they were not married. By the same token, as a professional couple, they had the run of the place since they projected an aura of ultimate modernity as a professional couple. They were able to set up a workshop on the dining tables of the hotel.

though access to the site proved to be rather difficult due to dirt roads and the muddy terrain.

In his interview with Tanyeli, Behruz Çinici pointed out that they were taking every step to understand the site in this competition because of his experience with the Erzurum competition.⁸⁸¹ However, he makes no mention of the fact that the issue of site and topography, as discussed above, was a central concern of the consultants' plan as well as the competition program.

Çinici described that Altuğ and he resolved the *parti*, the underlying arrangement of the components of the campus, on the dining tables of Yüksel Palas. It was the positioning of the football stadium at a particular point on the site that seemed to lock the plan into place creating a perceptible relationship between the site and the layout of the campus. It was at this *eureka* moment that Behruz Çinici remembers telling his wife, "You gave me the pass, Altuğ, and I scored," putting his euphoria in football terms as he was inspired by the siting of the football stadium.⁸⁸² They then took their drawings to Istanbul to prepare the competition boards in their house with the students.

When the Çinicis found out they had won the competition, they met with Kemal Kurdaş, the new president who asked them to begin the drawings for the School of Architecture building immediately. The Çinicis moved to Ankara and established an

⁸⁸¹ Çinici recounted for Tanyeli, "When we decided to enter the METU competition together, I told Altuğ: now I will be able to take the revenge of the Erzurum competition," meaning that he would redeem himself. Tanyeli, 35.

⁸⁸² Behruz Çinici said, "Pas verdin Altuğ, ben de golü attım." Tanyeli, *Improvization*, 35. One can only deduce that Altuğ Çinici had initially suggested the idea of positioning the football field as a hinge between the academic center and the residential areas and perhaps Behruz Çinici came up with the actual location on the site.

architectural practice there and devoted all their energy to the design and construction of all the buildings of the campus for the next nine years. METU had become the project that allowed them to establish themselves as architects.

In his interview with Tanyeli and in other interviews and recordings, Çinici referred to the *küllüye* or the imperial mosque complexes of Istanbul as an inspiration or a precedent to the arrangement of buildings along METU's *allée*.⁸⁸³ Çinici likened the experience of walking along the *allée* to walking through the streets of Ottoman Istanbul as well as the neighborhoods of his childhood.⁸⁸⁴ He described the *allée* as a geometric abstraction of a *küllüye* or as an improvisation on the experience of walking along Divan Yolu, for example, which is historically the primary east-west axis that runs along the ridge of the Istanbul peninsula with buildings, courtyards, and views interspersed on both sides as one moves along the length of the city and the peninsula. At the same time, he also talked about the spaces between the buildings along the *allée* as spaces where the Turkish college students could gather and inhabit these spaces in a way they had never been able to do in the city. However, Çinici never referred to the consultants' plans or the guidelines of the competition program that had clear influences in generating these spaces.

It is possible to see that the idea of the *allée* and the configuration of the campus in three or four distinct zones (academic, residential, athletic) was an idea that Behruz

⁸⁸³ Tanyeli, 36. Also see, *Kemal Kurdaş ve Behruz Çinici Görüşmesi: ODTÜ Yerleşkesi ve Yapıları Nasıl Var Edildi? [A Conversation between Kemal Kurdaş ve Behruz Çinici: How did the METU Campus and Buildings Come to Be?]*. Produced and directed by Andreas Treske. METU School of Architecture, 2001, DVD.

⁸⁸⁴ Tanyeli, 'Improvisation,' 36-37; *Kemal Kurdaş ve Behruz Çinici Görüşmesi*, METU School of Architecture, 2001, DVD.

Çinici was exploring with his colleagues during the Erzurum project. However, the idea of the *forum*, the essentializing relationships among the library, the administrative sciences, the school of arts and sciences, and the school of architecture, as well as this core's relationship to Ankara, the Grand National Assembly and the countryside beyond were all ideas that were explored by the consultants since the very beginning of the School of Architecture and the idea of its expansion into a University with a new campus. These issues were addressed in the consultants' plans and then in the program of the second competition. The competition jury mentioned them repeated in their report and comments regarding the projects. This is also evidenced by the fact that, other projects, especially the ones that won the second and third place awards, also dealt with these issues although perhaps not as thoroughly as the Çinici Project had.

When Perkins heard of the results of the second competition, he expressed that he was pleased that a Turkish architect had gotten the job in the end. He said that that is probably what should have happened all along.⁸⁸⁵ At the same time, he saw that the campus plan had interpreted some of the ideas differently.⁸⁸⁶ The idea of the *forum* had lost its functional and symbolic purpose. The linear form of the academic core had stretched the walking distance between certain departments making the idea of interdisciplinary exchange impracticable. The plan had also separated the living and the academic quarters, which was something that the consultants' plan had sought to avoid. Lastly, Perkins pointed out that they had always hoped that a number of different

⁸⁸⁵ Joanne Patricia Scott, "Origins of Excellence: The Practical Ethos of G. Holmes Perkins and the Philadelphia School" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2004).

⁸⁸⁶ Thomas Godfrey, interview with author, 15 April 2007, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, digital recording, author's archive.

architects would be involved in carrying out a master plan. He felt that the fact that both the master plan and the buildings were commissioned to one team weakened the idea of collaboration, experimentation, and multiplicity of solutions. It also weakened the projects' influence on the Turkish architectural culture.

Behruz Çinici's accounts and explanations of the METU project has in this way dominated the understanding of the METU campus plan erasing the contributions of previous developments that were equally influential in the spatial configuration of the idea of training and education during this period. The fact that neither the first nor the second METU competition was never fully published also obscured the way other architects in Turkey were responding to and were also being influenced by the issues raised by consultants' plans discounting the important role this project had played in working out the rivalries among professional groups within the shifting political context of the period. The singular predominance of Çinici's account in the literature on METU has also obscured the project's connection to wider discussions revolving around issues of international cooperation and development.

The Çinici project was later published in a number of international journals following the beginning of the construction of its initial buildings.⁸⁸⁷ Among these, Jürgen Joedicke's coverage of METU in the *Bauen + Wohnen* magazine is worth mentioning since it contained a descriptive text along with photographs.⁸⁸⁸ Joedicke was

⁸⁸⁷ For a full list of publications on METU that appeared in architectural journals, please see the bibliography. The project's appearance in a number of European journals were a matter of pride for the Çinici's kept laminated color photocopies of these publications in the folio drawers of his office.

⁸⁸⁸ Jürgen Joedicke, "Middle East Technical University." *Bauen und Wohnen* 19 (July 1965), 275-280.

visiting Turkey as a guest of Kemal Ahmet Arû, Çinicî's former professor at ITU, when he decided to write a piece on METU. As an introduction to his article, Joedicke mentioned the long tradition of technical exchange between Turkey and Germany. He presented the achievements of METU as a culmination of this tradition of exchange between the West and Turkey. In his brief introduction to the project, he also noted that according to initial plans UN-sponsored professors were going to teach at the University, somewhat misconstruing the history of the School. He noted that instead, Turkish professors trained in US colleges now run the University. He then explained the general layout and the components of the campus commenting more specifically on the composition of the School of Architecture building.

More recently, Atilla Yücel described the Çinicîs' work at METU as an amalgam of influences including but not limited to Alvar Aalto, Jacob Bakema, Paul Rudolph, James Stirling and James Gowan.⁸⁸⁹ In response, Udo Kultermann pointed out that one could write the same thing about almost any piece of serious architecture that was being built during that period. Kultermann argued that the Çinicîs had succeeded in formulating a Turkish voice among the multiplicity of experiments that were taking place across the globe.⁸⁹⁰ However, due to the second competition and the Çinicîs' narrative, the long and complicated process that led to the emergence of METU and its campus was left out in these accounts. The rivalries that were taking place between local and international

⁸⁸⁹ Atilla Yücel, "Pluralism Takes Command: Turkey's Current Architectural Outlook," in *Modern Turkish Architecture*, Renata Holod and Ahmet Evin, eds. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 141.

⁸⁹⁰ Udo Kultermann, "Constituting a Turkish Identity: The Architecture of Behruz Çinicî." *The Journal of Architecture* 5 (Autumn, 2000): 315-326.

professional groups as well as the contributions of UN-sponsored programs and consultants were lost in these accounts of the emergence of such a significant project of international cooperation and development.

Conclusion

By revealing the influence that earlier discussions and the consultants' plans had on the organization and the outcome of the two METU competitions, this chapter denationalizes the story of the making of the METU campus. In a way, it complicates the meaning of the word "international" as it was associated with the architectural styles and responses of the period. Instead of referring to a particular style, the word, through this more complex story, refers to and brings to life the local and the international rivalries and claims to legitimacy among multiple agents and agencies and professional groups who were operating within the democratizing rhetoric and the political context of the postwar period.

Working within this complex web, the Çinicis strived to claim their own modernity through both their architecture and narrative. Their explanation of their project emphasized the story of their own rise to legitimacy among both national and international peers while obscuring the influence of a wider context of rivalries and the dynamic among the two existing schools, the Ministry, foreign agents, and the emergence of a new school of architecture and planning in Ankara.

The Çinicis alliance with the ITU group certainly helped their cause especially within the post-*coup* atmosphere of the period where the Ministry dominated by ITU elites had taken control of METU and its Board of Trustees.⁸⁹¹ At the same time, Altuğ and Behruz Çinicis partnership came at a critical time in their development as

⁸⁹¹ As mentioned before, following the *coup* the military, being unprepared to run the government, turned to the professors and administrators of the Istanbul universities for the administration of the government.

professionals. It allowed them to put space between their own practice and their mentors' in order to develop new responses to the competitions and projects they were involved in. It is interesting and noteworthy to mention that their domestic and professional partnership allowed them the space and the opportunity to do so. This dual partnership allowed Behruz Çinici to break away from his alliances while it also allowed Altuğ Çinici immediate access to the world of competitions, teams, and professional information and circles that Behruz Çinici had become familiar with.

Just as Cansever, as a graduate of the Academy of Fine Arts and a proponent of the Chamber of Architects, had been the perfect choice under the DP Administration during the first competition, the Çinicis were perfect for the second. They were young, their political and professional alliances had not crystalized and consequently their seemingly non-aligned status fit perfectly well with the rhetoric of the post-*coup* administration which sought to build a new government giving tremendous responsibilities at many key positions to a younger set of professionals and bureaucrats whose alliances had not yet been associated with one class or party. At the same time, there was no question that the Çinicis belonged to a long line of professional elite who had been active members in the making of the Turkish Republic.

One, or actually two questions still remain: Were the Çinicis fully aware of the intentions of the consultants' plans and was their response a conscious departure from some of those intentions? The Çinicis were given a full bound set of the consultants' plans, one that matches the latest version at the Architectural Archives at the University of Pennsylvania, along with several of the other competition boards of two of the other

entries that had placed in the competition. It is possible to suggest that, just as the Ministry wrote the competition program based on the recommendations made in the consultants' plans, they may have also made the consultants' drawings available to the competition participants. Even if they hadn't, by the time of the second competition, at least the general form of the consultants' plans had become well known among the professionals who were keen on getting involved with the METU project.

Evidence suggests that the Çinicis were well aware of the intentions and organization of the consultants' plans and they did their best to adapt it to the new site. If Perkins were working on the new site, it would have been much more important to him to keep the idea of the *forum* surrounded by the key components of the University. However, that idea was not central to the Çinicis. To them, the creation of a linear path articulated by courtyards and buildings was a much more appealing modernity than the re-conceptualization of an American-style campus especially within the prevailing political context of the period.

Conclusion

Two primary threads emerge out of this analysis of METU's inception and development. Both of these threads contribute to a fuller and more nuanced understanding of the political context of the Cold War and show how rivalries among professional groups as well as national and international agencies contributed to the make-up of this context much more directly than previously formulated.

The first thread has to do with the shift in the scope and content of Charles Abrams' original mission from policy recommendations to training and education as a new strategy of development. As discussed in the first half of this dissertation (chapters 1-4), this shift had come in response to the breakdown of the so-called international technical assistance machinery due to a significant reduction in US financial and political support for UN projects of social and economic development during the mid-1950s. With no funds to implement policy recommendations, UN experts such as Abrams had lost all credibility in the eyes of client governments as agents of development despite their knowledge and experience in their respective fields.

In response to the contentious context Abrams found among US, UN, and Turkish agents when he arrived in Turkey in September 1954 on his first overseas UN mission, he developed the idea of training and education as a new strategy of development and as a way to re-build consensus among the agents of international collaboration. What is significant is that the idea didn't emerge out of a singular program or agency. Abrams found the need for a new approach based on his observations and developed the idea through discussions with two other key agents; namely, Olle Sturen, the interim resident

representative of UN-TAA, and Vecdi Diker, a US-trained civil engineer and former head of the Turkish National Highway Department. He then presented the idea to Turkish and US representatives that he was able to contact through Sturen's and Diker's political connections. Once he had secured their support, and only then, he presented the idea to the UN and finally formulated the idea as a new strategy of development in the report he filed with the UN-TAA in August 1955.

The process and the convergence of multiple agendas through which the idea of the training and education emerged bring into question the traditional profile of the postwar expert. The discussion in the first part of the dissertation reveal that the role of the expert was not to come to a country, make certain observations, and provide expertise. It often involved tailoring a project according to the diverging needs of multiple national and international agencies.

However, because of the way Abrams presented the idea to the UN through the frameworks already accepted by the UN, this more nuanced political context gets lost in the report that Abrams formulated. Understanding the differences between how Abrams presented the idea in his report and how the project came about is key towards developing critical methods of reading primary documents from this period. This difference shows that these primary documents cannot be read literally and have to be carefully contextualized.

During Abrams' conversations with Sturen and Diker, the idea of training and education emerged as a common ground among the participants of the technical assistance machinery within the democratizing and decolonizing contexts of the postwar

period. Since the idea of training and education was to transfer technical expertise and knowledge from developed nations to developing ones, it promised to relocate the origin of modernity and bring an end to western hegemony. In this way, at least from the point of view of developing nations, the idea of training and education restored the missing revolutionary and emancipatory content back into the models of development proposed by the UN. Ideas of revolution and modernization overlapped within the decolonizing world, whereas the UN programs had focused exclusively on the social question, setting aside the ideals of liberty and justice, which as Hannah Arendt showed, were more central to ideology of revolution. During the conversations among Abrams, Sturen, and Diker, Diker, for example, had noted that the idea of an up-to-date technical university in Ankara was a central component of the Turkish revolutionary ideology that had not yet been realized.

Again through conversations with Sturen and Diker, Abrams also recognized that the idea of training and education was also compatible with the Turkish Democrat Party's aims to position Turkey as a cultural, political, and economic leader within the larger region paralleling allied and NATO strategies. DP had already made use of the funds obtained through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan to undertake a major spatial and economic transformation in Turkey; heavily investing in agricultural production, the building of an extensive highway network, and the reconstruction of major port cities in order to build Turkey as a "bread basket" for Europe. These large-scale projects had exposed a shortage of well-trained technical and bureaucratic staff who could manage the extensive spatial and economic transformation envisioned by DP's development policies.

The education of a well-trained professional elite also made sense to US diplomats and aid agencies that found value in the promise that Turkey could potentially make better use of the aid funds that they received. Furthermore, since the idea of training aimed to educate a managerial elite that would modernize planning and administration practices in Turkey, therefore strengthening the legitimacy of the state and bringing economic and political stability, the idea was also compatible with UN's founding aims.

Abrams also realized that the idea of training and education was compatible with his own ideas of policy development. In an earlier report that he had prepared for UN-HTCP prior to his arrival in Turkey, he had argued that policies developed for one country could not be used in another and that sound policies could only be developed through careful research of local traditions and legal codes that regulated land tenure practices. Abrams also recognized the significant social and economic transformation that the DP projects had initiated in tandem with international interests as well as the deficit in technical expertise that this transformation had exposed. Abrams saw that this deficit could not be ameliorated through international technical assistance alone. In response to both of these conditions, Abrams formulated the idea of the "in-pert" as a new strategy of development: The development of local experts equally knowledgeable in local practices as well as in international trends. Following his mission in Turkey, Abrams was to implement this idea in other missions. Similarly, Ernest Weissmann, the head of the United Nations Housing and Town and Country Planning agency, began initiatives to implement the idea of training and education in other parts of the world, most immediately in South America.

At this point, the designation of English as the primary language of instruction at METU emerge as a significant factor in defining the identity of the “in-pert” as a double-agent operating transnationally. Aside from aligning Turkey with postwar networks of international collaboration, English, as the primary language of instruction, was to also ensure that the School could operate regionally across the Middle East, as the DP Administration had imagined. While the knowledge of English was to allow “in-perts” direct access to up-to-date technical sources and open the School to other countries, it also created tensions regarding DP policies perceived to breakdown nationalist ideologies as well as between a new English-speaking elite and the older generation of bureaucrats who were used to different methods of transmission and Turkey’s long-standing connections with its prewar allies and experts from Austria, Germany and other European nations.

The second major thread has to do with the founding of the School initially as a School of Architecture and Community Planning. The positioning of architects and planners at the head of an interdisciplinary program in technical training and education was a significant decision. However, similar to the way the idea of the School had initially emerged, it did not come from a singular agent or an agency. Instead, it emerged out of the necessity to maintain consensus and to solicit funds from among the supporters of the idea of the School. While US agencies supported the idea of the School as a group of research institutes focused on housing and planning, DP Administration was clearly interested in the establishment of a technical university. The UN was interested in serving the needs of client governments, but did not have the luxury to overlook US funding. In

addition, Ernest Weissmann, the head of UN-HTCP as well as an architect and a CIAM member, was primarily interested in issues of architecture and planning. Therefore, establishing the School as a School of Architecture and Planning was a strategy through which Abrams sought to maintain US and UN interest in the project. It was at this point that Abrams contacted Holmes Perkins, dean of the School of Fine Arts at the University of Pennsylvania, to put together a team of experts and to develop the curriculum of the School. Accordingly, Perkins, utilizing his political connections to Harold Stassen, the former president of Penn and the head of the Foreign Operations Administration, formulated the initial curriculum of the School based on the funding promised by FOA.

Even though Abrams and later Perkins developed the initial structure of the School in response to the diverging agendas of the participants of the aid machinery, it is important to note that Abrams' interest in regional and national land tenure and land use practices was also operative in positioning the school of architecture and planning at the head of the idea of training. In his critically acclaimed book, *Revolution in Land* (1938), similar to the way Ebenezer Howard had done about two generations before him, Abrams had shown that land tenure and land use policies were central to determining the outcome of social and economic development programs, making him one of the most competent and sought-after UN-HTCP agents of the postwar period.

Following Abrams, Perkins became the next primary UN-agent who oversaw the construction of the administrative and spatial make-up of the School as it grew from a School of Architecture to a University near the governmental center of Ankara with its own land-grant and campus. Following the transformation Perkins had carried out in the

School of Fine Arts at Penn just a few years prior to his involvement at METU, he implemented an interdisciplinary curriculum based, during the first three years, in design and planning education. Perkins' aim was to create a school that could operate between the state and the industry, as the beginnings of a national planning agency, undertaking research and providing policy recommendations for both.

During the first three years, Perkins and the UN-experts who taught and worked as administrators at the School had considerable control over its development. The School's Board of Trustees was supportive of Perkins' ideas while they also applied considerable pressure to grow the School into a University through the establishment of programs in engineering. During these years, Perkins and the UN staff also developed successive master plans for the METU campus. The discussion regarding the School's development during these first three years reveal the importance of Penn among other leading programs of architectural and planning education during the postwar period.

At the same time, what is most significant about the discussion in the second half of the dissertation is that how the administrative and spatial programs prepared by the UN-experts were once again negotiated and altered based on the diverging interests and perceptions of involved parties. During this discussion, multiple rivalries among professional and bureaucratic agencies take center stage as the major battle that altered and determined the administrative and spatial configuration of the idea of training and education. Rivalries between national and international agents, between architects and engineers, between professional groups and the state, and between the two main existing schools of architecture in Istanbul (as well as their rivalry with METU, as new and

coming school), all contributed to the political context that determined the configuration of METU's final master plan.

Through two successive competitions, the work that Perkins and the Penn team had developed for METU's master plan was challenged and transformed by the proposals of first Turgut Cansever and second the Çinicis. Current debates within the local professional architectural culture as well as outside influences that contributed to this debate through print media and the contributions of other foreign experts also contributed to the make-up of these challenges. Perhaps because of the way the Penn team had an initial monopoly over the campus plan, the rivalry between the UN-sponsored experts and their Turkish counterparts was the most pronounced at this juncture.

At the same time, the successive competition programs as well as the entries by various participants incorporated many of the ideas that were originally developed by the Penn team. In the Çinici scheme, for example, the positioning of the main departments of the University in relation to each other and the attention to the topography of the site was largely maintained. The essential relationships between key departments and the Grand National Assembly and Ankara were also maintained as much as the different topographical conditions of the new site of the second competition would allow. In fact, one could argue that the Ministry of Public Works actually strengthened this connection when they took control of the project following the *coup* of May 27 and the subsequent dissolution of METU's Board of Trustees. By bringing the location of the central campus closer to the main road that would tie the University directly to the Grand Assembly, the

Ministry positioned METU closer to Ankara and the ministries of the State than the Penn team had originally configured, compromising METU's autonomy in the process.

One can also observe this continuity through the way the administration of the School of Architecture and the University was transferred from UN-sponsored experts to Turkish faculty and administrators, especially in the aftermath of the *coup* of May 27. Kemal Kurdaş, for example, maintained much of the original aims and the structure of the University as well as its ties to international organizations during his tenure as president from 1961 to 1969.

The interdisciplinary organization of METU's School of Architecture and its continuing commitment to the social concerns of the discipline evidences the lasting influence of the initial aims of the School. Although at times, perhaps because of the way METU's transnational origins were significantly obscured during certain periods of the School's history, there have been tendencies to frame the focus of the School in relation to the formal pedagogy of the Bauhaus, the continued investment of the planning and preservation departments in the study of urban and rural contexts of Turkey has maintained the School's founding premise.⁸⁹²

It is important to reiterate that this study shows that the aims of the School as well as the consensus that brought about the idea of training and education were products of a contentious collaborative and not the product of a singular agency. One can sense an ever-present but silent tension that has contributed to the way the School's revolutionary

⁸⁹² Although I had originally intended to include a chapter on the establishment of the Department of City and Regional Planning (1961) and the Department of Restoration and Preservation in the School of Architecture (1964), I was not able to incorporate this portion of my research into the current scope of the dissertation. I hope to discuss the making of these departments in future work.

identity has been aligned singularly with the Turkish national revolutionary ideology. This tension is also prevalent in the way the Çinicis never talked about the influence of the consultants' plans in the making and the outcome of the METU competitions. This same tension can also be felt in Thomas Godfrey's hesitancy to talk about the period of the competitions or the growing tension between the UN and the Turkish faculty during his tenure as the acting dean. The power of this tension between local and international agents is perhaps most strongly felt in the way METU's transnational history remained so obscure. As Arendt had found, the politics of revolution, modernization, and independence remains a powerful force in the making and outcome of international exchanges. By bringing this dynamic to the forefront, this study re-situates METU within the multiple agendas of its making, and positions it as an important chapter in the history of modernism in the Middle East.

Appendix 5.1 - Part 1 of 3

YEAR	TERM	ARCHITECTURE			COURSES	CHAIRS	CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING		
		CREDITS					CREDITS		
		LECTURE	STUDIO	HOME WORK			LECTURE	STUDIO	HOME WORK
I	1	2	21		BASIC DESIGN MATHEMATICS PHYSICS SURVEYING FOREIGN LANGUAGES	① ARCH. DESIGN I ② PHYSICS AND MATHEMATICS ② ③ CIVIL ENGINEERING ④ FOREIGN LANGUAGES			
		3	3						
		3	3						
		2	4						
		3		3					
		14	31	3					
				48					
	2	1	23		ARCH. DESIGN I MATHEMATICS MATERIALS AND METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION LANDSCAPE CONSTRUCT'N FOREIGN LANGUAGES	① ② ⑤ BUILDING CONSTRUCTION ③ ④			
		3	3						
3		3							
3		3							
3			3						
	13	32	3						
			48						
3		40		FIELD PRACTICE IN CONSTRUCTION	⑱ FIELD PRACTICE IN CONSTRUCTION				
		40	40						
II	4	1	20		ARCH. DESIGN II STATICS AND MECHANICS MATERIALS AND METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION DRAWING FOREIGN LANGUAGES	⑥ ARCH. DESIGN II ② ⑤ ⑦ ④			
		3	6						
		3	3						
			6						
		3		3					
		10	35	3					
				48					
	5	1	20		ARCH. DESIGN II STATICS AND MECHANICS HISTORY OF ART DRAWING FOREIGN LANGUAGES	⑥ ② ⑦ HISTORY OF ART AND ARCHITECTURE ① ④			
		3	6						
3			3						
		6							
3			3						
	10	32	6						
			48						
6		40		OFFICE PRACTICE IN ARCHITECTURE	⑲ OFFICE PRACTICE IN ARCHITECTURE				
		40	40						

Appendix 5.1: Proposal for the Architectural and City and Regional Planning Curricula, Middle East Technical University, 1955 (Source: *Perkins Report*, 1955, Appendix 1.

Appendix 5.2a - Part 1 of 2

FIRST APPENDIX, 2^a FAKULTESMI 10 YILLIK TABLOSU
FACULTY CHART FOR 10 YEARS

İSARETİ MAHSUSALAR : P = PROFESÖR / PROFESSOR
LEGEND : L = ÖĞRETMEN / LECTURER
D = DOÇENT / ASSOCIATE PROF.
A = ASİSTAN / ASSISTANT PROF.
X = EK GÖREVLİ ASİSTAN PART-TIME ASSISTANT

ECNEBİ / FOREIGNER
T = BÜKS TALEBELERİ HARCIRANI
FELLOWSHIP RECIPIENTS ABROAD

YIL / YEAR	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 REKTÖR PRESIDENT	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
1 TERSİMAT DESIGN I	P T A A A	P T A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A
2 MATEMATİK VE FİZİK MATH. + PHYS.	L A	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A
3 İNŞAAT MÜHENDİSLİĞİ SURVEYING	L X X	L X X	L X X	L X X	L X X	L X X	L X X	L X X	L X X	L X X
4 ECNEBİ LİSANSLAR FOR. LANGU.	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
5 BİNA İNŞAATI BLDG. CONSTRN.	P A X	P A X	P A X	P A X	P A X	P A X	P A X	P A X	P A X	P A X
6 MİMARİ TERSİMAT II ARCH. DESIGN II	T T	P D T A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A	P D A A A
7 SANAT VE MİMARİ TARİHİ HISTORY OF ART & ARCH.		L	L	L T	L T	L	L	L	L	L
8 MİMARİ TERSİMAT III ARCH. DESIGN III		T	P T A A	P D A A	P D A A	P D A A	P D A A	P D A A	P D A A	P D A A
9 İNŞAAT MÜHENDİSLİĞİ STRUCT. ENG		T	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A	P A A
10 ŞEHİRCİLİK TERSİMAT I PLANG. DES. I		P T A	P T A	P D T	P D T	P D	P D	P D	P D	P D

Appendix 5.2a: Faculty Chart for 10 Years. (Source: *The Perkins Report*, 1955, Appendix 2a).

Appendix 5.2b

FIRST
APPENDIX2^bİNŞAAT VE MALZEMEYİ MODERNLEŞTİRME İÇİN
KURULACAK ARAŞTIRMA ENSTİTÜSÜRESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR MODERNIZATION OF
CONSTRUCTION METHODS AND MATERIALSİSARETİ MAHSUSALAR : P = PROFESÖR / PROFESSOR
LEGEND : L = ÖĞRETMEN / LECTURER☐ = FURNES / FOREIGNER
A = EK GÖREVLİ ASİSTAN / PART TIME AT

-61-

KAHİN CHAIR N°	YIL / YEAR	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0	DEKAN DEAN	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
5	BINA İNŞAATI BLDG. CONSTRN.	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
9	İNŞAAT MÜHENDİSLİĞİ STRUCTUR. ENG.			P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
11	SİHHİ TESİSAT MECH. ENG.			L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
6	MİMARİ TERZİMAT ARCH. DESIGN II		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
	ASİSTANLAR ASSISTANTS	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
		A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A

Appendix 5.2b: Staffing for the Research Institute for Modernization of Construction Methods and materials (Source: *The Perkins Report*, 1955, Appendix 2b).

Appendix 5.2c

FIRIST
APPENDIX2^cMESKEN, BÖLGE, ŞEHİRCİLİK VE KÖY PLANLAMA
ARAŞTIRMA ENSTİTÜSÜRESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR HOUSING,
REGIONAL-, CITY- AND VILLAGE PLANNINGİŞARETİ MAHSUSALAR
LEGEND:

P = PROFESSÖR/PROFESSOR

☐ = ECNEBİ/FOREIGNER

A = EK GÖREVLİ ASİSTAN/PART-TIME A

ADAKATI CHAIR N°	YIL/YEAR →	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0	DEKAN DEAN	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
14	MESKENLEME HOUSING	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
13	ŞEHİRCİLİK ANALİZİ PLANG. ANAL.		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
17	ŞEHİRCİLİKTE TEŞKİLATLANDIRMA PLAN. ADMIN. + LAW	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
10	ŞEHİRCİLİK TERSİMAT I PLANG. DES. I		P	P	P	P					
15	ŞEHİRCİLİK TERSİMAT II PLANG. DES. II					P	P	P	P	P	P
	ASİSTANLAR ASSISTANTS	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
		A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A

Appendix 5.2c: Staffing for the Research Institute for Housing, Regional-, City-, and Village Planning (Source: *The Perkins Report*, 1955, Appendix 2c).

Appendix 5.3a - Part 1 of 2

FİRİST APPENDIX 10 YENELİK BÜTÇE BUDGET FOR 10 YEARS		YILLIK PER CAPITA *YEAR		1 İNCİ YIL ST YEAR		2 İNCİ YIL ND YEAR		3 İNCİ YIL RD YEAR				
		\$	TL	NR	\$	TL	NR	\$	TL	NR	\$	TL
TEDRİS MEYETİ MAAŞLAR TEACHING STAFF SALARIES	REKTÖRÜ PRESIDENT	12.000	12.000	1	12000	12000	1	12000	12000	1	12000	12000
	PROFESSÖR YERİNE PROF. FOREIGN	8.000	12.000	4	32.000	48.000	7	56.000	84.000	7	56.000	84.000
	" TÜRK TURK.		15.000				1	15.000		3		45.000
	DOĞENT DOCENT		11.000				1	11.000		2		22.000
	ÖĞRETMEN 3 SAAT LECTURER 3 HR.		2.000	1	2000		1/2	1000		2		4000
	" 6 SAAT 6 "		4.000	1	4000		2	8000		2		8.000
	" 9 SAAT 9 "		6.000	1	6000							
	" 12 SAAT 12 "		8.000				1	8000		1		8000
	ASİSTAN 18 SAAT ASSISTANT 18 "		4000	4	16000		4	16.000		6		24.000
	" 36 SAAT 36 "		8000	8	64000		13	104000		14		112.000
TOPLAM TOTAL				44.000	152.000		68.000	259.000		68.000	319.000	
	SEYAHAT HARCILARI TRAVEL EXP. FOR FAC.	2.500		5	12.000		6	15.000		7	17500	
	PENNSYLVANIA UNİVERSİTESİ U.O.P. ANNUAL REVIEW				8.000			5.000			5000	
	MAAŞLAR ADMIN. SALARIES		88.000		88.000			88.000			88000	
	MÜTEFERİK MASRAFLAR CURRENT EXPENSES		100.000		100.000			100000			100.000	
	KÜTÜPHANE MASRAFLARI LIBRARY ACQUISITION				5000	3.000		2000	3000		2000	3000
BURS FELLOWSHIPS	SEYAHAT HARCILARI TRAVEL EXP.	500		8	4000		10	5000		8	4000	
	DİŞ MÜLKEKİLERDE YAKALET MASRAFLARI LIVING COST ABR.	2000		6	12000		9	18000		7	14000	
	TOPLAM TOTAL	2.500			16000			23000			18000	
	UMUMİ TOPLAM GRAND TOTAL				85500	343000		113500	450000		110500	510000

* MUVAKKAT MESKEN KİRALARI, MUSDADDEM ÜCRETLERİ, İSİ, İŞİK V
EXPENSES FOR RENT OF TEMPORARY QUARTERS, SERVICE WAGES AND S

Appendix 5.3a: Budget for Ten Years (Source: *The Perkins Report*, 1955, Appendix 3a).

Appendix 5.3a - Part 2 of 2

4 İNCİ YIL TH YEAR			5 İNCİ YIL TH YEAR			6 İNCİ YIL TH YEAR			7 İNCİ YIL TH YEAR			8 İNCİ YIL TH YEAR		
NR	\$	TL	NR	\$	TL	NR	\$	TL	NR	\$	TL	NR	\$	TL
1	12.000	12.000	1	12.000	12.000	1	12000	12000	1	12000	12000	1	12000	12000
7	56.000	84.000	6	48.000	72.000	4	32000	48000	2	16000	24.000	1	8000	12000
4		60000	6		90.000	8		120000	10		150.000	11		165.000
5		55000	6		66.000	6		66000	6		66.000	6		66000
2		4000	2		4000	2		4000	2		4000	2		4000
2		8000	2		8000	2		8000	2		8000	2		8000
1		8000	1		8000	1		8000	1		8000	1		8000
6		24000	6		24000	6		24000	6		24000	6		24000
14		112.000	14		112.000	14		112.000	14		112.000	14		112.000
	68.000	367.000		60.000	396.000		44000	402.000		28000	408000		20000	411.000
8	20000		6	15000		5	12500		3	7500		2	5000	
	5000			10000			3000			3000			3000	
		88000			88000			88000			88000			88000
		100.000			100000			100000			100000			100000
	2000	3000		2000	3000		2000	3000		2000	3000		2000	3000
8	4000		8	4000		8	4000		8	4000		8	4000	
8	16000		8	16000		8	16000		8	16000		8	16000	
	20000			20000			20000			20000			20000	
	115000	558.000		107000	387000		81500	593.000		52500	599.000		50.000	602.000

V.S. MASRAFLAR DAHİL DEĞİLDİR.

SOCIAL SECURITY, HEAT, LIGHT ETC. ARE NOT INCLUDED.

Appendix 5.3b

APPENDIX 3b


BUDGET FOR ADMINISTRATION

	TL
President (see under Faculty)	
Assistant to the President	14,000
2 Translators at TL 10,000	20,000
3 Typists at TL 7,200	21,600
1 Bookkeeper	7,200
1 Assistant Bookkeeper	6,000
1 Librarian	10,000
2 Assistants to the Librarian at TL 5,000	<u>10,000</u>
Total per year	88,000

Note: Cost of maintenance and service is not included.

Appendix 5.3b: Budget for Administration (Source: *The Perkins Report*, 1955, Appendix 3b).

Appendix 5.3c



Appendix 5.3c: Graphic Presentation of Budget for Ten Years (Source: *The Perkins Report*, 1955, Appendix 3c).

Appendix 5.4 - Part 1 of 4

APPENDIX 4

MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY PHYSICAL PLANNING

1. Temporary Quarters and Equipment

a. Space requirements for First Year Square metres

Drafting Room for 50 students (6 sq.m. per student)	300
Lecture room for 50 students	50
General Office - Administration	70
President's Office	35
Assistant to the President	20
Library	70
Offices for the Faculty	
Professors of Architecture 4 at 25	100
Professors of the Institutes 4 at 25	100
Lecturer	15
Workshop - woodworking	50
Exhibition Space	100
Institute for Modernization of Construction Methods and Materials	60
Institute for Housing, Regional, City and Village Planning	60
Experimental Laboratory	100
Total square metres	1,130

b. Equipment for the first year

- 70 drafting tables 150 cm / 90 cm
- 1 wide drawer with lock
- 2 deep drawers with lock
- 70 drafting lamps
- 70 stools
- 50 cloth lockers
- 12 executive desks (double pedestal)
- 4 secretarial desks with typewriters
- 16 small desks (single pedestal)
- 12 executive desk chairs
- 4 secretarial posture chairs
- 70 office chairs
- 50 lecture room chairs with tablet arms

-23-

Appendix 5.4: Proposal for Physical Requirements, 1955 (Source: *Perkins Report*, 23).

Appendix 5.4 - Part 2 of 4

1 lecturn with light and buzzer
 7 legal size letter files - 4 drawers each
 2 map files - metal - 5 drawers each
 32 desk lamps
 15 drawer library catalogue files
 30 drawer slide files for 5 x 5 cm. slides
 100 metres of metal shelving for books
 5 library tables, 1.20 x 3.00 m
 20 library chairs
 1 magazine rack (20 magazines)
 4 upholstered chairs for library
 2 slide projectors (5 x 5 cm slides)
 6 blackboards
 32 waste baskets
 4 trash cans
 40 metres of bookshelves for President and Faculty
 1 dictaphone
 1 mimeograph machine
 1 electric calculating machine capable of dividing
 14 telephones including 1 public phone
 10 surveying instruments and equipment

The above requirements of space and equipment are for the first year only; it is unlikely that the new permanent buildings will be ready by September 1956, and therefore enlarged temporary quarters (approximately double in size) and additional equipment (also about double) will be needed for the second year, or until the new permanent quarters are occupied.

2. Permanent Classroom Building

a. Administrative	Square metres
Office of the President	35
Office of the Assistant to the President	20
Private secretary and receptionist	20
General Offices (for 2 secretaries and 2 clerks)	60
Office for the Bookkeeper	10
Office for the Editor and Assistant (translators)	25
Total square metres	<u>170</u>

Appendix 5.4 - Part 3 of 4

b. Faculty Offices	Square metres
12 offices for Professors at 30 m2	360
6 offices for docents at 15 m2	90
5 offices for lecturers at 15 m2	45
2 offices for visiting lecturers at 15 m2	30
Total square metres	525

c. Library

General area with:	
entrance and desk area	
exhibition area	
reading area	
catalogue area	
open stacks	
slide collection	
map section	
stack room	400
Office and workroom	30
Darkroom for slide librarian	20
Darkroom for students	20
Total square metres	470

d. Drafting and lecture rooms

Drafting room for first year	325
Drafting room for second to fourth year	725
Drafting room for 30 planners	180
Drafting room for Doctoral Candidates in Architecture	50
Drafting Room for Doctoral Candidates in Planning	50
Studio for Drawing and Painting	150
Large lecture room for 250 students	250
2 small lecture rooms, each for 65 students at 65 m2	130
1 medium lecture room with small drafting boards	120
2 Seminar rooms, each for 25 students at 60 m2	120
Total square metres	2,100

Appendix 5.4 - Part 4 of 4

b. Faculty Offices	Square metres
12 offices for Professors at 30 m2	360
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2 Seminar rooms, each for 25 students at 60 m2	120
Total square metres	2,100

Appendix 5.5

Plan of Study: ARCHITECTURE

Year	Course	Subject	Credits	
			1st Term	2nd Term
I	Design 100	Design Fundamentals	8	8
	Math. 17a & b	Mathematical Analysis	3	3
	Eng. 102-103	English Composition	3	3
	*	General Education	5	5
	P.E.	Physical Education	1	1
II	Arch. 200	Architecture	10	10
	Eng. 130-140	English Language & Lit.	3	3
	Arch. 230	Matls. & Methods of Const.	3	3
	F.A. 140	History of Art	3	3
III	Arch. 300	Architecture & City Planning	10	10
	L.A. 331	Landscape Construction	3	—
	Arch. 331	Mechanics	3	—
	*	General Education	3	3
	Arch. 332	Graphic Statics	—	3
IV	Arch. 334	Mechanical Equipment	—	3
	Arch. 400	Architecture	10	10
	Arch. 431-432	Steel & Reinforced Concrete	3	3
	F.A. 441 or 442	History of Arch.	3	—
	F.A. 443, 444, or 445	History of Arch., L.A. or C.P.	—	3
	*	General Education	3	3
V	Arch. 501	Architecture	12	—
	Arch. 502	Thesis	—	15
		Elective	3	3
	Arch. 531	Prof. Practice & Specifications	3	—

* General Education requirements: a total of 22 semester credits with a minimum of 6 s. c. in each of the three fields of the humanities (philosophy, history, foreign languages and literature, music, American civilization), social sciences (economics, political science, sociology, social anthropology, economic geography, social psychology), and natural sciences (chemistry, physics, botany, zoology, earth sciences). Only courses of a general educational nature in these areas will be accepted. Students in architecture are strongly advised to take Physics 5 and 6 in their freshman year.

7

Appendix 5.5: Bachelor of Architecture Curriculum at the University of Pennsylvania, School of Fine Arts, 1955-56 (Source: *University of Pennsylvania Bulletin: School of Fine Arts, 1955-56* (December 15, 1954), 7).

Appendix 5.6 - Part 1 of 3

Normal Programme									
First Year									
Winter term	S.	F.	L.	D.	Summer term	S.	F.	L.	D.
Advanced Mathematics	4	4	—	—		3	4	—	—
Descriptive Geometry	2	—	—	2		2	—	—	2
Surveying	4	—	—	—		—	3	—	—
Architectural Construction I	2	—	—	8		3	—	—	7
Architecture, Theory	1	—	—	—		1	—	—	—
Visual Fundamentals	—	—	—	2		—	—	—	3
Modelling	—	2	—	—		—	3	—	—
History of Architecture I	2	—	—	—		2	—	—	—
History of Art I	1	—	—	—		1	—	—	—
Foreign Language I	2	—	—	—		2	—	—	—
	18	6	—	12		14	10	—	12
Total hours	36					36			
Second Year									
Winter term	S.	F.	L.	D.	Summer term	S.	F.	L.	D.
Architectural Construction II	4	—	—	4		4	—	—	4
Perspective	—	—	—	—		1	—	—	1
Building Materials	5	—	—	—		—	—	2	—
Architectural Design	—	—	—	10		—	—	—	10
Visual Fundamental	—	—	—	2		1	—	—	—
Architecture, Theory II	1	—	—	—		1	—	—	—
Statics I	2	2	—	—		2	2	—	—
History of Architecture II	3	—	—	—		2	—	—	—
History of Art	1	—	—	—		1	—	—	—
Foreign Language	2	—	—	—		2	—	—	—
Measured Drawings	—	—	—	—		—	2	—	—
	18	2	—	16		14	4	2	15
Total hours	36					35			
Key									
S : Subject									
F : Field work and assigned exercises									
L : Laboratory									
D : Design work									

Appendix 5.6: Master's degree in Architecture Curriculum at Istanbul Technical University, 1956-57 (Source: *Guide of the Technical University of Istanbul, 1956-1957*, 122).

Appendix 5.6 - Part 2 of 3

		Faculty of Architecture			
		123			
		Third Year			
Winter term	S. F. L. D.	Summer term	S. F. L. D.		
Working Drawings	— — — 4	— — —	1		
Heating and Ventilating	1 — — —	— — —	1		
Sanitation	1 — — —	— — —	1		
Architectural Design	— — — 11	— — —	11		
Architecture, Theory III	1 — — —	— — —	1		
City Planning I	2 — — 4	— — —	2		
Statics II	2 2 — —	— — —	2		
Reinforced Concrete I	2 1 — —	— — —	2		
History of Architecture III	1 — — —	— — —	1		
History of Art II	1 — — —	— — —	1		
Measured Drawings II	— — — —	— — —	2		
Foreign Language III	2 — — —	— — —	2		
Electives	1 — — —	— — —	1		
	14 3 — 19		14 4 — 18		
Total hours	36		36		
		Fourth Year			
Winter term	S. F. L. D.	Summer term	S. F. L. D.		
Professional Practice and Building Cost	2 2 — —	— — —	2		
Illumination	1 — — —	— — —	1		
Architecture, Theory IV	1 — — —	— — —	1		
Architectural Design	— — — 13	— — —	13		
City Planning II	2 — — 4	— — —	2		
Reinforced Concrete II	2 — — —	— — —	3		
Higher Structures	3 — — —	— — —	3		
History of Architecture IV	1 — — —	— — —	1		
Economics	2 — — —	— — —	2		
Foreign Language	2 — — —	— — —	1		
Electives	1 — — —	— — —	1		
	17 2 — 17		8 8 — 20		
Total hours	36		36		

Appendix 5.6 - Part 3 of 3

Technical University of Istanbul					
124					
Fifth Year					
Winter term	S.	F.	L.	D.	Summer term S. F. L. D.
Architectural Design	—	—	—	24	— — — —
Administrative Law	—	—	—	—	2 — — —
History of Turkish Revolution	2	—	—	—	2 — — —
Electives	6	—	—	—	— — — —
Thesis for Diploma	—	—	—	—	— — — 34
	8	—	—	24	4 — — 34
Total hours	32			38	
Elective Courses					
Architecture, Theory					
Architectural Construction					
City Planning					
History of Architecture					
History of Art					
Higher Structures					
Visual Fundamentals					
Modelling					
Interior Design					
Architectural Acoustics					
Petrography					
Seismology and Building dynamics					
Village planning in Turkey					
Building Cost					

Appendix 6.1

Name and Place	Date of Law	Number of Faculties	Number of Teachers			Number of Students		
			Total	Male	Fem.	Total	Male	Fem.
Istanbul U.	1933	13 ^a	1,683	1,197	486	28,325	21,786	6,539
Istanbul Technical U.	1944	9	672	571	101	7,084	6,577	507
Ankara U.	1946	13 ^b	1,817	1,393	424	14,632	11,192	3,440
Ege (Aegean) U., Izmir	1955	6	732	573	159	7,004	5,432	1,572
Karadeniz (Black Sea) Technical U. in Trabzon	1955 ^c (1963)	5	219	201	18	1,996	1,895	101
Orta Doğu Teknik (Middle East Technical) U. in Ankara	1957 ^d and 1959	4	720	593	127	6,919	5,895	1,024
Atatürk U. in Erzurum	1957 ^e	8	591	514	77	3,202	3,046	256
Hacettepe U. in Ankara	1967	9	1,015	599	416	4,207	2,744	1,463
Boğaziçi (Bosporus) U. in Istanbul	1971	3	110	78	32	1,233	846	387

Appendix 6.1: Turkish Universities in 1972-73 (Source: H. Reed, "Hacettepe and Middle East Technical Universities," 202).

Appendix 6.2

Resmî Gazete tarihi: 29 OCAK 1957	
Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin kuruluş ve hazırlıkları hakkında Kanun	
Kanun No : 6887	Kabul tarihi
<u>23/1/1957</u>	
<p>Madde 1 - Ankara'da her nevi tesisleriyle bir Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin kurulması için gerekli muameleleri yapmaya Maarif Vekili salâhiyetlidir.</p> <p>Madde 2 - Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversite kuruluş hazırlıklarında çalıştırılacak üniversiteler mensuplarıyla maşlı veya ücretli Devlet memurlarına ve memur olmayan müteahhas şâhıslara bu mesailerine karşılık olarak İcra Vekilleri Heyetince (Bakanlar Kurulunca) tesbit edilecek miktarlarda ücret vermeye Maarif Vekili salâhiyetlidir. Bu ücretler Üniversiteler Kanununa göre öğretim azalarına verilen tazminata hâlel getirmez.</p> <p>Madde 3 - Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi için lüzumlu bulunduğu Maarif Vekaletince belirtilecek olan Devlete ait gayrimenkuller (taşınmaz mallar) İcra Vekilleri Heyeti kararıyla mezkûr Üniversite teşkilatının çalışmalarına tahsis olunur.</p> <p>Madde 4 - Maarif Vekâleti Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi adına her türlü bağış ve vasiyet kabulüne salâhiyetlidir. Bu çeşit bağışlar vergi, resim ve harçtan muaf tır.</p> <p>Madde 5 - Bu kanun neşri tarihinde mer'iyete (yürürlüğe) girer.</p> <p>Madde 6 - Bu kanun hükümlerini icraya İcra Vekilleri Heyeti memurdur.</p>	

Appendix 6.2: Turkish Universities in 1972-73 (Source: H. Reed, "Hacettepe and Middle East Technical Universities," 202).

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4 HAZİRAN 1959		(Resmî Gazete)				Sayfa: 21821	
Madde 5 — Bu kanunun hükümlerini İcra Vekilleri Heyeti memurdur.							
30/5/1959							
No.	Başlık	Dünya Tarih	Cilt	Sayfa	Resmî Gazete Sayı		
6237	Halk Kanunu İstanbul İnşaatı hakkında Kanun	4/2/1954	3	35	209	8025	
6163 sayılı İstanbul Opera binası inşaatının Hazinece ikmalî ve suretî idaresi hakkındaki Kanuna bir madde ilâvesine dair Kanun							
Kanun No : 7306				Kabul tarihi : 27/5/1959			
Madde 1 — 6165 sayılı İstanbul Opera binası inşaatının Hazinece ikmalî ve suretî idaresi hakkındaki Kanuna aşağıdaki madde eklenmiştir:							
Ek madde — 6165 sayılı kanun mücbirince yaptırılmakta olan İstanbul Opera binası ikmalî inşaatı ile tefris ve tezyin işlerini toplu veya kısım halinde 2490 sayılı kanunla ek ve tadillerine ve 1050 sayılı Muhasebe Umumiye Kanununun 83 üncü maddesinin (H) fıkrasına ve 135 inci maddesine tabi olmak üzere pazarlıkla yaptırmaya Nafia Vekili mezdur.							
Madde 2 — Bu kanun neşri tarihinde mer'iyete girer.							
Madde 3 — Bu kanunun hükümlerini İcra Vekilleri Heyeti memurdur.							
30/5/1959							
No.	Başlık	Dünya Tarih	Cilt	Sayfa	Resmî Gazete Sayı		
6163	Halk Kanunu İstanbul Opera Binası İnşaatının Hazinece İkmali ve suretî idaresi hakkında Kanun	27/5/1959	3	34	1615	2164	
(X)							
Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Kanunu							
Kanun No : 7307				Kabul tarihi : 27/5/1959			
I							
Kuruluş							
Madde 1 — Gençliğin eğitilmesini temin etmek, araştırmalar yapmak ve bu kanun hükümleri dâhilinde idare edilmek üzere Ankara'da Orta - Doğu - Teknik Üniversitesi adı ile hüküm şahsiyeti hâzîr bir Üniversite kurulmuştur.							
II							
Gayeler							
Madde 2 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin gayeleri şunlardır:							
A) Muayyen evsâfî hâzîr Türk öğrencilerine ilmi, teknik ve meslekî sahalarda umumiyetle İngiliz dilinde ileri bir eğitimi temin edecek geniş imkânlar sağlamak,							
B) Diğer memleketlerin mümasîl evsâfî hâzîr öğrencilerine, müraaatları ve talebe olarak kabul edilmeleri üzerine eğitim imkânları temin etmek.							
C) Türkiye ve Orta - Doğunun kaynaklarının inkişafına ve iktisadî meselelerinin haliline bilhassa ehemmiyet vermek üzere, Türk milletine ve diğer milletlere fayda sağlayacak tatbiki araştırmalar yapmak.							
D) Hakikatî aramaya ve insanlığın bilgisini arttırmaya mâtufluk temin araştırmalar yapmak ve yaymak.							
III							
Mütevelli Heyeti							
Madde 3 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi aşağıdaki şekilde seçilen 9 kişiden müteşekkîl bir Mütevelli Heyeti tarafından seçilir ve idare olunur:							
A) Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin Mütevelli Heyeti üyesi İcra Vekilleri Heyetinin kararı ve Reisicumhuru tasdik ile 6 yıllık bir müddet için tayin olunur. Ancak, ilk Mütevelli Heyeti üyelerinin tayinleri üç ilki yıllık, üçü dört yıllık ve geri kalan üçü ise altı yıllık bir devre için yapılır; böylece müteakıf her iki yılda üç üye yenilenmiş olur.							
B) Mütevelli Heyetinden her biri gençliğin yetiştirilmesine alâka gâsîrî olan, geniş kültür anlayışına sahip, iyi karakterde, seçkin Türk vatandaşları arasından seçilir.							
C) Mütevelli Heyetinden hiç birisi Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinde öğretim üyesi, idareci ve müstahdem olarak vazife alamaz.							
D) Mütevelli Heyeti üyelerinden en çok üçünün, Türkiye Devletinde seçilmiş iktisabedilen bir âmmî hizmetinde bulunanlardan veya Devlet memurlarından seçilmesi caizdir.							
Mütevelli Heyeti üyelerinden üçünün bu kabul bir hizmet bulduğunda sırada diğer üyelerden her hangi birisi böyle bir hizmet kabul ederse Mütevelli Heyeti üzelüğünden istifa etmiş sayılır.							
E) Mütevelli Heyeti üyelerinin Türkiye Devletinde seçilmiş iktisabedilen bir âmmî hizmetine aday gösterilebilmeleri için seçmelerden en az altı ay önce Mütevelli Heyeti üzelüğünden istifa etmeleri şarttır. Şu kadar ki, Mütevelli Heyeti üzelüğünde tayinlerinde seçilmiş iktisabedilen bir âmmî hizmetinde bulunuyorlar ise istifa etmekte oldukları yere telâzîm aday gösterilebilmeleri için Mütevelli Heyetinden istifa etmelerine lüzum yoktur.							
F) Mütevelli Heyeti üyesi, ölüm veya istifa ile veya her hangi bir mütevelli üyesi bu sıfatının kalkmasının ancak Üniversitesinin yüksek menfaatleri bakımından faydalı olduğunun mütevelli heyetinden en az altısının kararı ile tesbiti ve bu kararın Maarif Vekili tarafından tasvibi ile ortadan kalkar.							
G) Hizmet müddeti biten üyelerin yeniden tayinleri mümkündür. Her hangi bir sebeple ihlâl edilmiş üzelüğünde (A) bendindeki usule göre ve bu üzelüğünde ait müddeti tamamlamak üzere tayin yapılır.							
H) Mütevelli Heyeti üyesi aralarından birini iki yıl müddetle toplantılarına riyaset etmek üzere başkan seçerler. Aynı kimsenin iki defa üst üste başkan seçilmesi caiz değildir. Başkanın bulunmadığı halde heyet, üyelerinden birini o toplantıya riyaset etmek üzere başkanvekilli seçer.							
I) Mütevelli Heyeti üyelerinin mütevelli heyetinde dolayısıyla yaptıkları zarurî masraflardan başka, her ne nam ile olursa olsun hiç bir ücret verilmez.							
IV							
Rektör							
Madde 4 — Rektör, Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin başlıca İcra organıdır.							
A) Rektör, Türk vatandaşları arasından, rektör seçimi için toplanan Mütevelli Heyetinin tam sayısının üçte iki ekseriyeti ile seçilir.							
B) Rektör, bütün faaliyet ve gayretlerini Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesine hasreder.							
C) Rektör, Üniversite öğretim üyeleri ile diğer personeli üzerinde doğrudan doğruya murakabe salâhiyetine sahiptir.							
D) Rektör, vazifesel müddetince âmmî hizmetine ilgilî hiç bir vazifeye talip olamaz ve seçilmiş iktisabedilen bir âmmî hizmetine aday gösterilebilmesi için seçmelerden en az altı ay evvel rektörlükten istifa etmesi şarttır.							
E) Rektörlük bir müddetle bağız değildir. Ancak Mütevelli Heyeti bu maksatla yaptığı toplantıda rektörlük vazifesinin hitam müddetini tesbit etmenin Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin yüksek menfaatleri bakımından faydalı olduğuna tam sayının üçte iki ekseriyeti ile karar verir ve bu husus Maarif Vekili tarafından tasdik olunursa rektörlük vazifesi o tarihte sona erer.							
F) Rektör 65 yaşında vazifesinden ayrılır, Ancak, rektörlük vazifesi, her yıl, Mütevelli Heyetinin tam sayısının üçte iki ekseriyeti ile vereceği kararla 70 yaşına kadar uzatılabilir.							
V							
Müavir rektör							
Madde 5 — Mütevelli Heyeti, ilimde ve teknik öğretimde müstessna tecrübesiyle tamnmiş ve temayüz etmiş olan ve Türk vatandaşlığı olmayan bir kimsesi müavir rektör seçer.							

Appendix 6.3: Turkish Universities in 1972-73 (Source: H. Reed, "Hacettepe and Middle East Technical Universities," 202).

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Sayfa: 21822

(Resmî Gazete)

4 HAZİRAN 1959

- A) Müşavir rektör, ilmi, teknik ve mesleki araştırmalar ve öğretim hususlarında rektörün başlıca müşaviridir.
- B) Müşavir rektör, kendisine rektör veya Mütevelli Heyeti tarafından tevdi edilecek araştırma ve öğretimle ilgili vazifeleri ifa ve mesuliyetleri deruhde eder.
- C) Müşavir rektörün vazife müddeti, seçimi sırasında Mütevelli Heyeti tarafından tesbit edilir. Bu müddet bir yıldan az ve beş yıldan fazla olamaz. Hizmet müddetinin toplamı beş yılı dolduran Müşavir rektörün yeniden seçilmesi caiz değildir.
- D) Müşavir rektör, akademik mertebede Üniversite Rektöründen sonra gelir.

VI

Mütevelli Heyetinin vazife ve salâhiyetleri

Madde 6 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin hükmi şahsiyetini Mütevelli Heyeti temsil eder.

A) Mütevelli Heyeti, Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi namına ve Üniversiteyi menfaat ve istimaline arz edilme üzere, dünyanın her hangi bir yerinde hakiki ve hükmi şahıslardan, testislerden, Birleşmiş Milletler Teşkilâtından veya dünyanın her hangi bir tarafındaki milletlerarası teşekküllerden, nakit, kitap, malzeme ve teçhizat, eşya, arazi ve bina gibi menkul ve gayrimenkul mallarla her türlü hakları, bağış, temlik, terk veya vasiyet yollarıyla almaya ve bunları kiraya vermek, işletmek, mübadele etmek, satmak, devir ve temlik etmek gibi her türlü tasarruflarda bulunmaya veya bunları aynen muhafaza ederek Üniversite için en istifadeli şekillerde kullanmaya salâhiyetlidir.

Yukarıki fıkraya göre Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesince İktisadî bedden gayrimenkul mallar bu Üniversite adına tapu siciline kaydolunur.

Mütevelli Heyeti, Üniversiteye yapılacak bağış ve vasiyetlerden zamanında Maarif Vekâletine bilgi verir.

Ancak, İcra Vekilleri Heyeti, Üniversite adına yapılacak bağış veya vasiyeti veya şartlarını uygun görmediği takdirde bu bağış veya vasiyet kabul olunmaz.

B) Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesine Hükümetçe tahsis edilmiş veya yeniden tahsis oluncak gayrimenkul mallar Üniversitece lüzum görüldüğü müddetçe Üniversitenin istimal ve istifasına terk olunur.

C) Mütevelli Heyeti, münasip görüldüğü şekilde ve istediği ibareleri havi bir mühür yapılarak istimal eder ve akademik dereceler, diplomalar, vesikalar ve evrak bunlarla mühürlenerek tasdik olunur.

D) Mütevelli Heyeti, bu kanuna tevfikân Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin idaresi için lüzumlu ve uygun göreceği esas ve usulleri kabul ve tâli organları teşkil eder. Bu esas ve usulleri zaman zaman yenilemek ve tadil etmek yetkisine sahiptir.

E) Öğretim üyelerine yapılacak tayinlerde Türkiye ve diğer memleketlerdeki belibaşlı üniversitelerin seviyelerine umumiyetle eşit seviyeler gözönünde tutulur.

F) Mütevelli Heyeti, Üniversitenin ilmi, teknik ve milletlerarası mahiyetli gözönünde tutmak suretiyle müessesenin esas ve usullerine göre Türk ve diğer Devletler vatandaşlarından idareciler, öğretim üyeleri ve memurlar tayin ve bunların ücretlerini, hizmet müddet ve şartlarını ve mukavele esaslarını, mer'î mevzuat hükümlerine tabi olmak üzere tesbit eder.

Ancak, Türk vatandaşlarından olan öğretim üyelerinden bütün faaliyet ve gayretlerini Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesine hasretmekle haric olmak üzere diğer Türk vatandaşları öğretim üyelerine mukavele ile verilecek ücret miktarı birinci derece Devlet memuruna alabileceği aylık ve sair münzam istihkakları yokununu tevazü edemez.

G) Mütevelli Heyeti, uygun görüldüğü yetkileri kendi arasından seçeceği tâli komisyonlara, rektöre ve öğretim kurullarına veya Üniversitenin diğer idarecilerine verebilir ve bu yetkileri her zaman geri alabilir.

VII

Öğretim kurulları

Madde 7 — Mütevelli Heyeti uygun görüldüğü öğretim kurullarını veya öğretim bölümlerini teşkil etmeye salâhiyetlidir.

A) Öğretim kurulları müayyen zamanlarda ve ayrıca rektörün, dekanın veya bölüm başkanının daveti üzerine toplanır.

B) Öğretim kurullarında rey'e iştirak bakımından aranacak şartları bu kurul kendi tayin eder.

C) Üniversite Konseyi, öğretim kurullarının toplantısından meydana gelir. Bu Konsey, Üniversitenin bütün profesörleriyle doçent ve

asistanların her sene kendi aralarından seçecekleri mümessillerden teşekkül eder. Doçent ve asistan temsilcilerinin yekünü, profesörler yekününün yarısından fazla ve üçte birinden az olamaz.

D) Üniversite Konseyi rektöre ve mütevelli heyetine Üniversiteyi ilgilendiren öğretim meseleleri hakkında mütalâfa verir.

E) Üniversite Konseyi lüzum görüldüğü takdirde geçici olarak ve temsil mahiyette İcra Komitesi veya hususi komiteler teşkil edebilir.

VIII

Dereceler ve unvanlar

Madde 8 — Mütevelli Heyeti, aşağıdaki esaslar dâhilinde, tahsis dereceleri, fahri unvanlar, diplomalar ve sertifikalar verir.

A) Tahsil dereceleri, bu derecelere ehil kulan dersleri memnuniyet verici şekilde tamamlamış ve alacakları dereceye, ilgili öğretim kurulu tarafından, usulü gereğince tavsiye edilmiş kimselere verilir. Tahsil dereceleri Türkiye ve diğer memleketlerdeki belli başlı üniversitelerin lüzumlarına umumî olarak eşit bir esasa dayanılarak verilir. Tahsil dereceleri arasında yüksek mimarlık, çeşitli yüksek mühendislik ve diğer ihtisas dalları lisans diploması ile doktora dereceleri ve zaman zaman muvafık görülecek diğer dereceler dâhil olabilir.

B) Fahri unvanlar, Mütevelli Heyetinin tam sayısının üçte iki ekseriyeti ile alacağı kararla, Üniversitede bu maksatla yapılacak meralimde bizzat bulunacak, mümtaz şahıslara verilebilir.

C) Bütün derece ve unvanlar, Mütevelli Heyetinin vereceği salâhiyet üzerine Üniversite rektörü veya vekili tarafından tevhit edilir.

IX

Milletlerarası Müşavirler Heyetinin yıllık toplantısı

Madde 9 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Mütevelli Heyeti Türkiye'den başka üniversiteye ehemmiyetli miktarda öğrenci göndermiş olan memleketlerin her birinden seçkin bir ilim adamını veya terbiyeciyi ve Üniversitenin kaynaklarına yardım etmiş milletlerarası teşekküllere mensup birer ilim adamını veya terbiyeciyi (Milletlerarası Müşavirler Heyeti) nin öznen sıfatıyla ders yılı içerisinde bir hafta için, Üniversiteyi müşterekten ziyarete davet edebilir.

A) Milletlerarası Müşavirler Heyetinin Azası sıfatıyla yapılacak davet evveliminde Türkiye Hükümeti ile ilgili kimselerin mensup buldukları Devletlerin veya milletlerarası teşekküllerin muvafakati alındıktan sonra yapılır.

B) Milletlerarası Müşavirler Heyeti, Mütevelli Heyeti ile Rektörden ve Müşavir Rektörden malumat alır ve Üniversitenin öğretim programı ve araştırma projeleri hakkında Mütevelli Heyetine tavsiyede bulunabilir.

C) Milletlerarası Müşavirler Heyetine dahil olan kimselere her yıl (A) bendinde gösterilen esaslar dairesinde ayrı bir davet yapılır.

D) Milletlerarası Müşavirler Heyeti Azasına verilecek olan seyahat ve ikamet masrafları Mütevelli Heyeti tarafından tayin ve tesbit edilir ve kendilerine Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi tarafından ayrıca bir meblağ tediye edilmez.

X

Yıllık raporlar

Madde 10 — A) Mütevelli Heyeti hazırlayacağı bütçeyi, yazılı bir rapor ile birlikte, en geç Ağustos ayının birine kadar Maarif Vekâletine verir. Bu raporda Üniversitenin bir yıllık öğretim, araştırma ve gelişme faaliyetleri, Üniversitenin ihtiyaçları ve mali hususlar belirtilir. Ayrıca mali durumu gösteren izahî bir cetvel de bu rapora eklenir.

Maarif Vekâleti bütçeyi ve raporu o yıla ait umumî bütçenin ihzârında kabul edilen prensipler dâhilinde incelilerek tesbit ettiği miktarı kendi bütçesi ile tekdif eder.

B) Mütevelli Heyeti kesin hesaplar hakkındaki raporunu, Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Umumi Heyetine sunulmak üzere en geç mali yılı hitamın takibinden 15 Haziran tarihine kadar Maarif Vekâletine verir.

XI

Mali Hükümler

Madde 11 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin gelir kaynakları şunlardır :

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1. Her yıl Maarif Vekâleti bütçesine konulacak tahsisat,
2. Üniversiteye yapılacak her türlü yardımlar, bağışlar ve vaziyetler,
3. Öğrencilerden alınacak harçlar ve ücretler,
4. Üniversiteye yaptırılacak olan araştırma, danışma ve expertizler vesair her türlü hizmetler karşılığında alınacak olan paralar,
5. Üniversite neşriyatı gelirleri ile üniversitenin daimi faaliyeti neticesi olarak meydana gelen zirai ve diğer istihsal maddelerinin satışından, konferanslardan vesair bircümle faaliyetlerinden elde edilecek bütün gelirler.
6. Üniversiteye ait menkul ve gayrimenkul malların ve haklarının gelirleri.

Madde 12 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Muhasebe, Umumiye, Artırma, Eksiştirme ve İhale Kanunları hükümlerine, Divanı Muhasebat vize ve murakabesine tâbi değildir.

Artırma, eksiştirme ve ihale işleri ile hesap ve sarf işlerinin ne suretle yürütüleceği ve müzabit evrakın şekli ve çeşitleri Müttevelli Heyetince hazırlanacak bir talimatname ile tesbit olunur.

Madde 13 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin hesapları birli Maliye ve diğer ikisi Maarif Vekâletince her bütçe yılı başında birer yıl için tâyin edilen üç murakıptan birer kişi Murakıplar Heyeti tarafından murakabe olunur.

Murakıplar, yüksek tahsil görmüş, Devlet muhasebesi ile ticari ve sinai müesseseler muhasebesine vâkıf, İngilizce bilir ve bu kamunun konularına yüklediği vazifeleri hakkıyla başarmış kişiler arasından seçilir. Murakıplardan birisinin cenebi olması caizdir. Bunlara verilecek ücret her yıl Müttevelli Heyeti tarafından tesbit olunur.

Murakıplar Üniversitenin varidat ve sarflarını ilgilendiren her nevi muamele ve kararların tetkik ve murakabe etmekle mükelleftir. Üç ayda bir üniversite muameleleri hakkında Maliye ve Maarif Vekâletlerine bir rapor verirler. Bu raporların birer sureti Umumi Heyete tevdi olunacak yıllık rapora bağlanır.

Murakıplık vazifesi muhassas ücreti verilerek şartıyla aynı vasıfları haliz Devlet memurlarına da görürülebilir. Müddeti biten murakıplarının yeniden tayinleri caizdir.

Madde 14 — Maarif Vekâleti, Murakıplar Heyetinin yıllık raporu ile Müttevelli Heyetin yıllık raporlarını kendi mütalâması ile birlikte Umumi Heyetin tasdik ve tasvibine sunulmak üzere 15 Ağustos tarihine kadar Başvekâlete verir.

Madde 15 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin Umumi Heyeti Başvekâletten tâyin edilecek üç murahhas ile Türkiye Büyük Millet Mec-

lis Bütçe, Hariciye, Maarif, Divanı Muhasebat ve Nafia Encümenleri âzasının toplantısından vâcuda gelir. Umumi Heyet Başvekâletten gönderilip Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Reisi tarafından havale edilir: Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin bütçesine ait kesin hesapları ve Müttevelli Heyetinin ve Murakabe Heyetinin yıllık raporlarını Maarif Vekâletinin bunlar hakkındaki mütalâmasını tetkik edip Üniversite kesin hesaplarının tasdik veya reddi hakkında karar verir. Umumi Heyetin Üniversite kesin hesabını tasdik kararı Üniversite Müttevelli Heyetinin ibnâmı tazammun eder.

Madde 16 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesine yapılacak her türlü bağış ve vaziyetler vergi, resim ve harclardan muaftır.

Gelir veya Kurumlar vergisine tâbi mükellefler tarafından bu Üniversiteye mülküz mukabilinde yapılacak nakdi bağışlar, yıllık beyannâme ile bildirilecek gelirlerden ve kurum kazancından indirilir.

XII

Mütteferrik hükümler

Madde 17 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin Müttevelli Heyeti ile öğretim üyeleri, idarecileri, memur ve müstahdemleri halk ve mensup oldukları üniversite ile muamele ve münasebetlerinde hususi hukuk hükümlerine tâbi olup haklarında Memurin Mubahemeti Kanunu ile Memurin Kanunu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Emekli Sandığı Kanunu hükümleri tatbik olunmaz.

Orta - Doğu Üniversitesine ait mallar Devlet malı hükümlerindedir. Bunları çalanlar, ihtilâs edenler, zimmetine geçirenler veya her ne suretle olursa olsun sulistimal edenler hakkında Devlet mallarına karşı ilenilen bu çeşit suçlara ait cezalari tatbik yapılır.

Madde 18 — Orta - Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin kuruluş ve hazırlıkları hakkındaki 23/1/1957 tarihli ve 6537 sayılı kanun 1 Mart 1960 tarihinden itibaren meriyetten kaldırılmıştır.

Madde 19 — Bu kanunun 1, 2, 3, 4, ve 5 nci maddeleri ile (F) fıkrası hariç 6 nci maddesi ve 7, 8 ve 13 nci maddeleri negri tarilinden; diğer maddeleri ile 6 nci maddesinin (F) fıkrası 1 Mart 1960 tarihinden itibaren mer'lidir.

Madde 20 — Bu kanun hükümlerini İcra Yeri Vekilleri Heyeti memurdur.

30/5/1959

No.	Başlık	Düzenleme Tarihi	Cilt	Sayfa	Resmî Gazete Sayı
6537	Kaldırılan Kanun : Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesinin Kuruluş ve Hazırlıkları Hakkında Kanun	29/1/1957	1	38	220 9521

KARARNAME

Adliye Vekâletinden :

- 1 — 1750 lira maaşla Eskişehir Hukuk Hâkimliğine Adana Hâkimi 7514 Fahrettin Tanju,
- 1500 lira maaşla Adli Tıp Müessesesi Meclis Azalığına 1100 lira maaşla Adli Tıp Meclisi Rapörörü 13409 Mustafa Osmanoğlu,
- 1250 lira maaşla Ankara Hâkimliğine Polatlı Ceza Hâkimi 9305 Ahmet Recai Tüzel,
- 1100 lira maaşla Tosya Hukuk Hâkimliğine Ayancık Eski Hukuk Hâkimi 9094 Enver Balcıoğlu,
- 950 lira maaşla Akhisar C. Müddelimumillğine İzmir Eski C. Müddelimumumi Muavini 10186 Cengiz Erkut,
- 800 lira maaşla Yeşilyurt Sulh Hâkimliğine Siverek Ceza Hâkimi 11161 Mehmet Falk Barut,
- 800 lira maaşla Bulancak Ceza Hâkimliğine Rize Sorgu Hâkimi 10915 İzzet Buharaloğlu,
- 800 lira maaşla Karapınar Hâkimliğine Ödemiş Hazine Avukatı 10915 Kaya Öküt,
- 800 lira maaşla Serik C. Müddelimumumillğine Ankara Avukatlarından Necdet Mengüç,
- 800 lira maaşla Ünye C. Müddelimumumi Muaviniğine Rize C. Müddelimumumi Muavini 10986 Celâl İsaoglu,
- 800 lira maaşla Siverek Ceza Hâkimliğine Nizip Avukatlarından Ahmet Ögüt,

- 800 lira maaşla Temyiz Mahkemesi Raportörlüğüne Polatlı Sulh Hâkimi 10723 Şerafettin Seyhan,
- 800 lira maaşla Polatlı Sulh Hâkimliğine Ankara avukatlarından Doğan Baysal,
- 700 lira maaşla Şereflikoçhisar C. Müddelimumumillğine Viranşehir C. Müddelimumumisi 11376 Sabahattin Tekin,
- 700 lira maaşla Muş Hukuk Hâkimliğine Kırklareli avukatlarından Umrans Hekimoğlu,
- 700 lira maaşla Yalvaç Ceza Hâkimliğine Köyceğiz Sorgu Hâkimi 12042 Halim Sabit Özler,
- 700 lira maaşla Rize C. Müddelimumumi Muaviniğine Ünye Eski C. Müddelimumumi Muavini 11252 Ahmet Cemal Karadeniz,
- 700 lira maaşla Savaştepe Hâkimliğine Savaştepe Sorgu Hâkimi 14002 Kazım Özancr,
- 700 lira maaşla Balya C. Müddelimumumillğine Kaman Eski C. Müddelimumumi Muavini 12067 Cemalettin Yurtsever,
- 700 lira maaşla Kepsut Sorgu Hâkimliğine Balya C. Müddelimumumi Muavini 12211 Abdullah Vedat Altuna,
- 700 lira maaşla Susurluk Sorgu Hâkimliğine Bandırma Avukatlarından Meliha Özkar,
- 636 lira maaşla Manavgat Sorgu Hâkimliğine Köyceğiz Orman İşletmesi Avukatı 13441 Edip Tiner,
- 600 lira maaşla Dinar Hâkimi Muaviniğine Ankara Avukatlarından Hikmet Ulusoy,

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C. On the Establishment of METU

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Figures 0.1: View of the *beton-brut* bleachers of the METU stadium that spell the word, *DEV RIM*, or revolution (photo taken ca. 1978) (Source: Photo archives, School of Architecture, METU).




Figure 0.2: Photographs of the central *allee*. *Devrim* is visible on the bottom photograph to the left of the *allee* by the School of Arts and Sciences (Source: Behruz Çinici, *Altuğ-Behruz Çinici: Architectural Works, 1961-70*, 6-7).



Figure 0.3: Spaces in between the buildings along the *allée* covered by the students during breaks between classes (Photo taken ca. April, 2008) (Source: Author's archive).




Figure 0.4: The *beton-brut* poured-in-place concrete bleachers of the METU stadium as featured in publications. Altuğ and Behruz Çinici usually described the positioning of the bleachers as a hinge between the academic and the residential zones of the campus and between two topographical conditions on the site as one of the most innovative features of their site plan (Source: Behruz Çinici, *Altuğ-Behruz Çinici: Architectural Works, 1961-70*, 14-15).




Figure 0.5: The *beton-brut* poured in place concrete bleachers of the METU stadium as featured in publications. Altuğ and Behruz Çinici usually described the positioning of the bleachers as a hinge between the academic and the residential zones of the campus and between two topographical conditions on the site as one of the most innovative features of their site plan (Source: Behruz Çinici, *Altuğ-Behruz Çinici: Architectural Works, 1961-70*, 15).




Figure 1.1: Railways to the Persian Gulf as depicted in June 1913 (Source: Alan Warwick Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: M. Evans, 1992).




Figure 1.2: Ottoman Empire in 1914 (Source: William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 159).




Figure 1.3: The division of the former Ottoman territories under the Treaty of Sevres, 1920. The harsh terms of this treaty inspired a Turkish resistance movement that nullified the treaty and resulted in the establishment of an independent Turkish state embracing Thrace, the Straits, and all of Anatolia (Source: William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 165).




Figure 1.4: The Middle East between the two world wars (Source: William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 165).




Figure 5.1: University of Pennsylvania team of experts with Turkish officials. From left to right: Holmes Perkins; Georgia Perkins; Celal Bayar, the Turkish President; Celal Yarımcı, Minister of Education; Mithat Yenen, President of the Cities Bank (İller Bankası); Celalettin Uzer, Director of the Physical Works at the Ministry of Public Works; Adli Yener, Director of the National Highway Department; and, Professor Wilhelm von Moltke (Source: Arif Payashoğlu, *Barakadan Kampusa 1954-1964* (Ankara: METU Press, 1996), 14).



Figure 5.2: The initial quarters of the High Institute of Technology on 18 Müdafaa Street near the Ministerial Quarters (*Bakanlıklar*) in Ankara. The building originally housed the General Directorate of the Retirement Fund (*Sosyal Sigortalar*) which, during the 1950s funded many initiatives of economic development, including the construction of the Istanbul Hilton, Efes Hotel in Izmir, among others (Source: METU Catalog, 1957-57, 5).



Figure 5.3: Another view of the initial quarters of the High Institute of Technology (Source: Payaslıoğlu, 188).



Figure 5.4: Initial staff of the library shown in the library's first quarters in the 18 Müdafaa Street building (photo taken ca. 1958). From left to right: Fûruzan Ol-şen, Gülsevin Arün, Solmaz İzdemir, Natelle Isley (Source: Payaşlıođlu, 159).



Figure 5.5: Students in front of the entrance of the Müdafaa Street building on the opening day of the Middle East High Institute of Technology. Notice this initial name of the School on the sign by the front door (Source: Payaslıoğlu, 38).




Figure 6.1: Five sites considered for the METU campus (Source: METU President's office archives).



Figure 6.2: Southwest (support facilities) wing of the Turkish Grand National Assembly complex under continuing construction during the late 1950s pictured here on a snowy day ca. 1959--looking south. The School of Architecture as well as other departments of the School were temporarily housed in these quarters from 1958 to 1961 (Source: METU President's office archives).



Figure 6.3: Southwest wing of the Turkish Grand National Assembly complex--looking north towards the front of the complex and the Ankara citadel. To the left, one of the temporary shelters or barracks is visible. Several of these structures were constructed on the grounds to be used as supplementary classrooms (Source: Pa-yaslıoğlu, 191).




Figure 6.4: The extents of the METU campus site in relation to the Grand National Assembly and the ministries in central Ankara (Source: Burhan Tezcan, 1962-1963 *YalıncaK Köyü Çalışmaları - YalıncaK Village Excavations in 1962-1963*, Arkeoloji Yayınları - Archaeological Publications, no. 1 (Ankara: ODTÜ, 1964) plan: 1; map: 1 (no pagination provided).



Figure 6.5: View of the road leading up to Kocamunt Hill at the METU Campus site in 1956 (Source: METU President's office archives).



Figure 6.6: View of the METU Campus site in 1956 (Source: METU President's office archives).




Figure 6.7: View of Eymir Lake in the METU Campus site in 1956 (Source: METU President's office archives).




Figure 6.8: Marvin Sevely's design for the METU emblem which is still in use today (Source: Aktüre, Sevgi, Sevin Osmay, and Ayşen Savaş, eds. *1956'dan 2006'ya ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi'nin 50 Yılı: Anılar: Bir Sözlü Tarih Çalışması [Fifty Years of the School of Architecture at METU from 1956 to 2006: Memoirs: A Study in Oral History]* (Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 2007), 13).



Figure 6.9: Holmes Perkins, METU faculty, and students reviewing the Ağsak Village (near Kızılcahamam) project, June, 1957 (Source: METU President's office archives).



Figure 6.10: Holmes Perkins and the METU students at a dinner party held at Thomas Godfrey's house during the Penn team's visit to Turkey in April-May 1955 (Source: METU President's office archives).




Figure 6.11: The first known METU Campus plan developed by Thomas Godfrey, Marvin Sevely, and Holmes Perkins during Perkins' visit in June-July 1957 (Source: *METU Catalog*, 1957-58, 8).



Figure 6.12: Holmes Perkins in the METU Campus Planning Office, July 8-11, 1957. From left to right: Bülent Sülüner, draftsman; Thomas Godfrey, acting dean, Holmes Perkins, dean of School of Fine Arts at Penn; Batur Ardıç, draftsman; Necmi Tanyolaç, Secretary General of METU (Source: METU President's office archives).



Figure 6.13: Tevfik İleri, Minister of Education. METU groundbreaking ceremony, Wednesday, 2 October 1957 (Source: METU President's office archives).



Figure 6.14: Charles Weitz, Resident Representation of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UN-TAA) in Ankara, speaking during the ground-breaking ceremony for METU, Wednesday, 2 October 1957 (Source: METU President's office archives).



Figure 6.15: Celal Bayar, Turkish President, inside the power shovel with Batur Ardiç, assisting the President. METU groundbreaking ceremony, Wednesday, 2 October 1957 (Source: METU President's office archives).



Figure 6.16: Photograph of the attendants at the METU groundbreaking ceremony, Wednesday, 2 October 1957 (Source: Thomas Godfrey's personal archive).




Figure 6.17: Site plan of the Ağla village center project, summer 1958. From left clockwise: kahve/village coffee house with shop below; cami/village mosque; tiyatro/outdoor amphi-theatre; evler/two-story summer houses; saunas; okul/school; lojmanlar/teacher-visitor housing (Source: Kemal Aran, et. al. eds. *ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi Yaz Uygulamaları, 1958-1974* [METU Department of Architecture Summer Field Application Programs, 1958-74] (Ankara: ODTÜ, 1974), 9).




Figure 6.18: Site model of the Ağla village center project, summer 1958. From left clockwise: kahve/village coffee house with shop below; cami/village mosque; tiyatro/outdoor amphi-theatre; evler/two-story summer houses; saunas; okul/school; lojmanlar/teacher-visitor housing (Source: Kemal Aran's personal archive).




Figure 6.19: Site model of the Ağla village center project, summer 1958. View of the village coffee house on the left with shop below and the village mosque and the outdoor amphitheatre on the right (Source: Kemal Aran's personal archive).




Figure 6.20: Ağla village project. Plans and elevations of the coffee house building, summer 1958. (Source: Kemal Aran, et. al. eds. *ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi Yaz Uygulamaları...*, 8).





Figure 6.21: Ağla village project. Section drawings and view of the stair of the coffee house building, summer 1958. (Source: Kemal Aran, et. al. eds. *ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi Yaz Uygulamaları ...*, 7-8).





Figure 6.22: Ağla village project. Views of the coffee house building (Source: Kemal Aran, et. al. eds. *ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi Yaz Uygulamaları ...*, 8).




Figure 6.23: View of the mosque and the outdoor amphitheatre. Site model of Ağla village project, summer 1958 (Source: Kemal Aran's personal archive).



Figure 6.24: Jaakko Kaikkonen, Thomas Godfrey, and William Cox (from left to right) discussing Kaikkonen's proposal for the METU campus plan, November - June, 1959 (Source: METU President's office archives).



Figure 6.25: View of one of the METU campus plan models developed by Kaikkonen, Nov.-June, 1959 (Source: Kemal Aran's personal archive).



Figure 6.26: The site plan included in the first set of consultants' plans submitted to METU's Board of Trustees in November, 1959 (Source: Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania).




Figure 6.27: Site sections and elevations, the first set of consultants' plans, November, 1959 (Source: Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania).




Figure 6.28: Perspective drawing, showing the relationship between the campus, the governmental center, and Ankara. The first set of consultants' plans, November, 1959 (Source: Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania).




Figure 6.29: General Site Plan from the second set of consultants' plans approved in July 1960 (Source: Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania).




Figure 6.30: Site plan of the central campus, the academic center. The second set of consultants' plans, July 1960 (Source: Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania).




Figure 6.31: Perspective drawing showing the relationship between the campus, the governmental center, and Ankara. The second set of consultants' plans, July 1960 (Source: Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania).

THE CAMPUS PLAN

The Consultants' plan for the campus is so designed as to permit an orderly growth outward from a compact central core. Thus, at all stages of development, it is possible to maintain a coherent and efficient plant if the proposed flexible design is followed in principle. The plan envisages the immediate construction of the pedestrian walks, arcades, and terraces surrounding the heart of the campus which will not only unite functionally the separate schools but will, from the start, be symbolic of the new University Community of scholars and students. The aims of this plan are best expressed in the words of the jury for the International Competition:

"A university is a society. Its purpose is to search for and to disseminate truth and knowledge. This means that it is always on the move, fluid and flexible, expanding and contracting in sometimes unpredictable directions. Further, the qualities with which university buildings should be infused seem often to be mutually conflicting—seclusion and adventurousness, humility and dignity, spaciousness and intimacy, flexibility and order."

The planning principles upon which the design is based will, if adhered to, provide order with variety and a continuity of growth for many decades to come. These principles are:

1. Concentration of the academic core within an area where it is possible to walk from one end to the other in a 10-minute interval between classes.
2. Exclusion of the automobile from the central green and from the courts of each of the Schools.
3. Reservation for all time of a system of open spaces which will provide convenient and pleasant walks throughout the campus and which will be so located as to offer a variety of views to the panoramas of Ankara and the surrounding hills and valleys—these greenways can give coherent form to the plan and by so doing permit the greatest freedom and diversity in the development of the adjacent buildings even in places where the future needs cannot be predicted at this time.
4. Creation of a system of courts to give protection against the weather and to provide centers for the many Schools and Institutes which make up the University; around these should be grouped those activities that would benefit by close contact with one another.
5. Development from the center outward.
6. A start to be made on the dormitories at once, and maintenance, as nearly as possible, of accommodations for $\frac{2}{3}$ to $\frac{3}{4}$ of the students at all times.
7. Enhancement of the character of the site and preservation of the views to the Citadel, to Ankara and to the hills.
8. The use of native materials of a limited range of color which will weather well, such as the local stone for retaining walls (similar in treatment to the lime kilns), avoidance of excessive mechanical equipment, and protection of the buildings against the hot sun and cold winter winds.

Figure 6.32: Verbal descriptions and recommendations accompanying the second set of consultants' plans, July, 1960 (Source: Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania).

GENERAL ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN CONDITIONS

Certain architectural limitations and conditions apply equally to all future building on the Campus. These are:

1. All buildings shall be located as indicated on the master plan of the Campus approved by the Board of Trustees of METU in December 1959, and as revised by the Consultants and reapproved by the Board on July 20, 1960. Buildings shall conform to the grades established and shall respect the neighboring buildings both proposed and built.
2. All buildings shall be of frame construction (either reinforced concrete or steel) to resist earthquakes or other earth movement. Exceptions to this requirement may be made, but only with the approval of the Consultants or their Ankara representatives in the case of very small buildings, not more than two stories high, such as faculty houses and the smallest dormitory units.
3. Since the construction of the Campus will continue for many decades and under the guidance of many successive administrations, Boards of Trustees and architects, it is essential that each architect consider his contribution one part of an additive process, similar to the pattern of growth that takes place in any community. Although there will be a few buildings which will be freestanding and which deserve to be recognized as special monuments symbolizing the University, such as the Library, most of the remainder will take an appropriately modest place within the whole scheme of the University. Each School or faculty, and each dormitory group (House), deserves special architectural recognition, but such recognition shall be subordinated to the harmony of the whole. Furthermore, buildings which are parts of larger groups should be so designed that they may be added to in the future in such a way as to foster the development of the hierarchy of open spaces as established by the master plan.
4. To give a sense of architectural unity and harmony, the exterior materials of all buildings will be limited to pre-cast concrete, stucco, stone from the site, travertine and possibly unpolished marble provided these materials fall within a color range from white to light sand color or very light grey. Subject to the approval of the Consultants, the roofs of major auditoria, the Mosque, arcade or other elements justifying vaulted or domical roofs, may be of a different material or color. With the exception of the vaulted structures, the roofs of all others shall be flat and, where visible, covered with crushed local stone, tile or flagstone.
5. In view of the severe climatic conditions of the site, in both winter and summer, and the decision to use air-conditioning only in special rooms requiring constant temperature and humidity control, the most careful attention will be given to the size of windows and the protection of glass areas from the summer sun. Where possible, sun controls will be an integral part of the structural system rather than added as awnings or similar devices. Facades composed primarily of steel, aluminum and glass are not considered appropriate and will not be approved.
6. Retaining walls of terraces and garden walls will be of the local stone laid up in a manner similar to the towers of the lime kiln on the south side of the main Campus.
7. The natural quality of the site should be preserved to the maximum extent possible. Where intensive development or use requires a major change (particularly in the Center) the utmost effort will be exerted to create an urbane atmosphere in which nature is a primary ingredient. Though paved areas and walls may, of necessity, dominate in parts of the Campus, trees, shrubs, grass and ground cover shall be considered essential parts of the design even in these areas. Particular care will be given to the selection of plant materials which will enhance the natural qualities of the site and will give a pleasant and human quality to the spaces in all seasons.

Figure 6.33: General recommendations regarding architectural character, design and construction accompanying the second set of consultants' plans, July, 1960 (Source: Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania).

HABERLER:**GÜZEL SANATLAR
AKADEMİSİ YAPILIYOR**

Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı, yanan Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi binasının yeniden inşaatı için ilk tahsisatı göndermiştir. Bina, Akademiye yapılan yeni projelere göre inşa edilme üzere Ocak ayında ihale edilecektir.

**MİMARLAR BİRLİĞİNİN
KONGRESİ**

Türk Yüksek Mimarlar Birliği Genel Kurulu çıkan ayın 24 ünde Kızılay binasında toplanmıştır. Kongre başkanlığına İzmir delegesi Necmeddin Emre, kâtipliklere Talât Güreli, Hasan Canases seçilmiştir. Bundan sonra Kore şehitleri ve mimarlardan vefat edenler için ihtiram duruşu yapılmış, müteakiben merkez ve şubelerin faaliyet raporları okunmuştur. Raporlarda mimarların çalışma sahaları, Mimar Odaları kanununun hazırlanması, Yapı, Yollar Kanununun tadili meselesi de bulunuyordu.

Umumi heyet bu arada önümüzdeki aylarda olağanüstü bir kongre akdini de kararlaştırmış, idare kurulu seçimi yapmıştır. Asli üyeliklere; Mithat Yeneni, Recai Akçay, Emin Taşkamçıl, Rahmi Bediz, Orhan Alsac, yedeklere de; Talât Özgök, Nizameddin Doğu seçilmiştir. Birliği temsil eden bir heyet kongreyi müteakip Atatürk'ün muvakkat kabrine çelenk koymuştur.

**TÜRK MİMARLAR BİRLİĞİ
İSTANBUL ŞUBESİ YENİ
İDARE HEYETİ**

9 Aralık 1950 tarihinde toplanan Şube Kongresinde aşağıdaki zevat yeni idare heyetine seçilmiştir:

Y. Mimar Muhittin Güven, Y. Mimar Sedat Erkoğlu, Y. Mimar Ferzan Baydar, Y. Mimar Belkis Çetinor, Y. Mimar Faruk Akçer. Yeni idare heyetine başarı dileriz.

YENİ BAYINDIRLIK BAKANI

Açık olan Bayındırlık Bakanlığına Eskişehir Milletvekili Kemal Zeytin- oğlu getirilmiştir. Bu suretle, uzun senelerden beri, ilk olarak bu Bakanlığa meslekten bir vekil tayin edilmiş olmaktadır. Bu şayanı dikkat hâdiseyi kaydederken, Kemal Zeytin- oğlu'na başarı temenni ederiz.

YENİ MUSABAKALAR

Millî Savunma Bakanlığı tarafından muhtelif yerlerde, icabında Zafer âbideleri inşa edilmek üzere bir müsabaka açılmıştır.

**VAKIFLAR UMUM MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ-
NÜN, İSTANBULDA YENİ İNŞA
ETTİRECEĞİ İŞ HANI İHALE EDİLDİ**

Geren sene bir müsabaka neticesinde, projeleri tanzin ettirilen İstanbulda, İş Bankası arkasına tesadüf eden eski Haseki hamamı arsasında inşa edilecek Vakıf İş hani ihale edilmiştir. Bu ihaleyi birçok inşaat müteahhitleri haber almamışlardır. Gazetelerde kâfi ilân yapılmadığı zannını uyandıran bu ihale bazı inşaat firmalarının iştirakine mani olmuştur. Bina temelleriyle beraber ihale edilmiştir.

Hanın yapılacağı arsa çürük olduğundan ve önceden temel sistemi tayin edilmemiş bulunduğundan birbucuk milyon civarında olan ihale bedelinin, ileride çok artacağı tahmin edilmektedir.

**İSTANBULDA
YENİ BİR OTEL**

Pan Amerikan Havayolları Şirketi İstanbulda büyük bir turistik otel yapmak istediğini hükümetimize bildirmiştir.

Milton müessesesi tarafından inşaat kararlaştırılan otelden sonra bu yeni teklif büyük bir alaka ile karşılanmıştır. Pan Amerikan Şirketinin bu mürcası tetkik edilmektedir.

Öğrendiğimize göre bu yeni teklif de Hilton müessesesi tarafından inşa edilecek otel büyüklüğünde yeni bir tesis olacaktır.

Diğer taraftan Hilton müessesesi tarafından yapılacak otelin Taksim ile Harbiye arasında inşaatı kararlaştırılmış gibidir. İnşaata ilkbaharda başlanacaktır.

**BEYNELMİLEL MİMARLAR
BİRLİĞİNİN (U. İ. A.)
ÇALIŞMALARI**

— M. René Vivier başkanlığında bir U. İ. A. delegasyonu, geçen Ekimde Paris'de yapılan «Conseil International de la Documentation du Bâtiment» toplantısında, mimarları temsil etmişlerdir.

— M. Jean-Pierre VOUGA (Lausanne) ve Lionel Mirabaud (Paris) kasnında Cenova'da kurulan konferanslarda birliği temsil etmişlerdir.


— Profesör William Dunkel'in reisliği (Zürih) ve M. Joseph Moutschen'in (Liege) raportörlüğü altında, U. İ. A. Mimarlar Komisyonu, son ekimde Zürih'de toplandı.

— U. İ. A. nın inşaat endüstrileştirme komisyonu M. Marcel Lods başkanlığında Paris'de 20-21 Kasım'da toplandı. M. M. Alvar Alto, Hugo Van Kuyck, Janzen ve L. Mirabaud da toplantıda hazır bulundular.

— Aralıkta da U.İ.A. şehircilik komisyonu M. Cesare Chiodi (Milano) başkanlığında Pariste toplanacaktır. M. André Gutton, Gordon Stephenson, Alexandre Klein, Profesör A. Hoehel ve Tage William-Olsson'un da bulunmaları muhtemeldir.

— U.İ.A. tarafından intihap edilen M. André Gutton ve Jean Tschumi Adisabeba saray konkuru jürisinde bulunmak üzere, Habesistana hareket etmişlerdir.

Figure 7.1: Typical page in *Arkitekt* where general news regarding the architectural, planning, and construction professions would be listed. These would include new projects, competitions, awarded projects, or upcoming state commissions, as well as new financing available for various state funded projects. In the middle column, where it says, "Yeni Müsabakalar," is where a new competition is announced. Down at the bottom, "İstanbul'da Yeni Bir Otel," talks about a new upcoming hotel by Pan Am following the Hilton Hotel project (Source: *Arkitekt* IV, no. 227-228, (1950): 248).



Maket

EGE ÜNİVERSİTESİ ŞEHİRCİLİK PROJE MÜSABAKASI JÜRİ RAPORU ÖZETİ

ÜÇÜNCÜ MANSİYON:

(20) sıra numaralı proje :

Bu proje takdim şekli bakımından müsabaka şartnamesi ve jüri tavsiyesini çok iyi anlayan bir tekliftir, müellif diğer projelere nazaran çok değişik bir üniversite anlayışı ile ortaya çıkmaktadır. Üniversite çapında bir bütün tertiplerken karşılaşılabilecek nisbet problemleri düşünülecek fakülteler veya fakülte gruplarından meydana gelen üniteler teşkil etmek yoluna gitmiştir. Trafik, üniteleri çevreleyerek bir toplayıcı vasıtası ile karayoluna bağlanan sade ve makul bir sistemle halledilmiştir. Üniversitenin gelişmesi hem ünitelerin kendi içlerinde hem de yeni üniteler ilâvesi ile kolayca olabilecektir. Lojmanların Bornova güneyinde düşünülmesi, karayolunun diğer tarafında olmasına rağmen, sakinlerinin şehirle olan münasebetleri bakımından elverişli görülmüştür. Üniteler içinde yaya gidiş gelişin rahatça olabileceği görülmüştür, ancak bu yaya trafik sistemi projede etüd edilmemiştir.

Tedris - Araştırma, idare, spor sahaları ile talebe yurtları ve personel lojmanları birbirlerinden kesin bir şekilde ve büyük mesafeler ile ayrılmışlardır. Muhtemelen, tedris kısımları ile yaşama sahaları arasındaki gidiş gelişin umumiyetle yaya olarak yapılmıyacağı düşünülmüştür. Bu fikrin ne dereceye kadar kabule şayan olduğu üzerinde durulacak bir mevzudur. Maalesef çok kısa olan izah notu bu tip bir teklifte tabii olarak beklenen «Felsefesini izah» işini anlatmaktan çok uzak kalmıştır. Bu sebeple esasen şematik addedilecek tanzim şekilleri jüri üyelerinde bazı tereddüdün doğmasına sebep olmuştur. Ayrıca teklif birçok mesleklere hal çaresi göstermemiştir. Koleksiyon sahasının yerinin değiştirilmesi için kâfi sebep bulunamamıştır. Bu hususta projenin kompozisyonunda bir zorlama bulunmuştur. Üniteler karayoluna lüzumsuz yere yaklaştırılmıştır. Toplayıcı yolu şimalden geçirek üniteleri cenupta tertiplemek bu bakımdan daha doğru olurdu. Bu teklif üniversite plânlamasına getirdiği yenilik, basit, açık ve

kesin hal ve taksim şekli ile yukarıda bahsi geçen meziyetlerinden dolayı üçüncü mansiyon'a lâyık görülmüştür.

İKİNCİ MANSİYON:

(16) sıra numaralı proje :

Bu teklif ölçülü ve sade kitle tertipleriyle göze çarpmaktadır. Spor tesisleri ile kampüs merkezi, lojmanlar ve talebe yurtları arasındaki münasebet iyidir. Aynı şekilde yurtlar ve lojmanlar Üniversite merkezi ve tedris kısımlarına yakındır. Yaşama sahalarının rahat bir düzende tertibi, yolların binaları hizalamak yerine onlara hizmette bulunması, Üniversitenin bu iki elemanını güzel bir muhit haline getirmiştir. Üniversite esas giriş yolunun kısa tutulması uygun bulunmuştur. Kampüsü çevreleyen fakülte binaları programda istenilen sahanın ancak 1/2 sini temin edebilmektedir. Şartnamede istenilen hacimlerin temini için binalar ufki ve şakulî olarak büyütüldüğü takdirde kampüs bu hususiyetini kaybedecektir. Fa-

Figure 7.2: First page of the nine page coverage of the Aegean University Campus competition results and jury report in *Arkitekt* (Source: *Arkitekt*, no. 03, (1959): 101).



Figure 7.3: Turgut Cansever, Middle East Technical University Campus, Competition Drawings, South-west Elevation, 1960 (Source: Uğur Tanyeli and Atilla Yücel, *Turgut Cansever* (Istanbul: Garanti Galeri, 2007), 79).




Figure 7.4: Turgut Cansever, Middle East Technical University Campus, Competition Drawings, Perspective, 1960 (Source: Uğur Tanyeli and Atilla Yücel, *Turgut Cansever* (Istanbul: Garanti Galerisi, 2007), 80).




Figure 7.5: Cansever's drawings as published in, *Yarıřmalar Dizini [Competitions Index]*, compiled and published by the Turkish Chamber of Architects in . Here a third elevation was included (Source: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası [Turkish Chamber of Architects], *Yarıřmalar Dizini, 1930-2004 [Index to Competitions, 1930-2004]* (Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 2004), 66).




Figure 7.6: Kemal Kurdaş, METU's President (left), and Eugene Northrop, Representative of the Ford Foundation in Turkey (right), during a meeting between the representatives of the two institutions (Source: School of Architecture Photo Archives, METU).




Figure 7.7: Site plan; third place winner (project no. 3); Second competition; Yılmaz Sanlı, Yılmaz Tuncer, Güner Acar, Ayhan Tayman. Also see figure 7.15 for the larger site plan that shows the new site's (used in the second competition) relationship to Ankara and the environs (Source: Çinici office archives).



Figure 7.8: Site plan; third place winner (project no. 3); Second competition; Yılmaz Sanlı, Yılmaz Tuncer, Güner Acar, Ayhan Tayman (Source: Çinici office archives).




Figure 7.10: Elevations; Department of Architecture; Third place winner (project no. 3), Second Competition, Yılmaz Sanlı, Yılmaz Tuncer, Güner Acar, Ayhan Tayman (Source: Çinici office archives).




Figure 7.11: Site plan; Second Place Winner (project no. 18); Second Competition, Esat Turak, Gürol Gürkan, Önder Sonad, Aktan Yörükoğlu, Osman Armangil (Source: Çinici office archives).




Figure 7.12: First Floor Plan, part. 1; School of Architecture building; Second Place Winner (project no. 18), Second Competition, Esat Turak, Gürol Gürkan, Önder Sonad, Aktan Yörükoğlu, Osman Armangil (Source: Çinici office archives).




Figure 7.13: First Floor Plan, part. 2; School of Architecture building; Second Place Winner (project no. 18), Second Competition, Esat Turak, Gürol Gürkan, Önder Sonad, Aktan Yörükoğlu, Osman Armangil (Source: Çinici office archives).




Figure 7.14: Partial elevations; School of Architecture building; Second Place Winner (project no. 18), Second Competition, Esat Turak, Gürol Gürkan, Önder Sonad, Aktan Yörükoğlu, Osman Armangil (Source: Çinici office archives).




Figure 7.15: The larger campus site in relation to Ankara and environs. This site plan shows the site of the second competition with the Çinici proposal. The site for the first competition was located just southwest of the “Archaeological Area” (Source: *Altuğ-Behrüz Çinici, Mimar-Architect* (1964).



Figure 7.16: The original Çinici master plan (Nazım Planı; 1/5000) for the second METU competition (Source: Çinici office archives).




Figure 7.18: The original Çinici site plan (Vaziyet Planı; 1/2000) for the second METU competition (Source: Çinici office archives).



Figure 7.19: The original Çinici site plan for the second METU competition - enlarged view of the academic core (Source: Çinici office archives).



Figure 7.20: The Çinici master plan - with revisions after the competition—see the index to this plan on the following page (Source: *Altuğ-Behrüz Çinici, Mimar-Architect* (1964)).



Figure 7.21: Index to the Çinici master plan (Source: *Altuğ-Behrüz Çinici, Mimar-Architect* (1964)).




Figure 7.22: The Çinici site plan - with revisions after the competition (Source: *Altuğ- Behruz Çinici, Mimar-Architect (1964)*).




Figure 7.23: The Çinici site plan - enlarged view of the academic core (Source: *Altuğ-Behrüz Çinici, Mimar-Architect* (1964)).

VAZİYET PLÂNI

SITE PLAN

1. REKTÖRLÜK	/	ADMINISTRATION
2. KÜTÜPHANE	/	LIBRARY
3. BÜYÜK ODİTORYUM	/	MAIN AUDITORIUM
4. İDARİ İLİMLER FAK.	/	FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES
5. EĞİTİM FAKÜLTESİ	/	FACULTY OF EDUCATION
6. LİSE	/	LYCEE
7. MİMARLIK FAKÜLTESİ	/	FACULTY OF ARCHITECTURE
8. FEN - EDEBİYAT FAK.	/	FACULTY OF ART AND SCIENCE
A. Kimya bölümü	/	Department of Chemistry
B. Fizik »	/ » »	Physics
C. Matematik »	/ » »	Mathematics
D. Sos. İlimler »	/ » »	Social Sciences
9. ZİRAAT FAKÜLTESİ	/	FACULTY OF AGRICULTURE
10. MÜHENDİSLİK FAK.	/ » »	ENGINEERING
A. Dekanlık	/	Dean's office
B. Elektrik Müh.	/	Department of Electrical Eng.
C. Makina »	/ » »	Mechanical Eng.
D. Kimya »	/ » »	Chemical Eng.
E. İnşaat »	/ » »	Civil Eng.
F. Mühendislik anfileri	/	Auditorium for Engineering Dept.
11. DİN EVİ	/	RELIGIOUS CENTER
12. STADYUM	/	STADIUM
13. KAFETERYA	/	CAFETERIA
14. SPOR SALONU	/	GYMNASIUM
15. ERKEK TALEBE YURT.	/	MEN'S DORMITORIES
16. KIZ » »	/	WOMEN'S »
17. EVLİ » »	/	MARRIED STUDENT'S DORM.
18. PROF. LOJMANLARI	/	HOUSING FOR TEACHERS
19. ORTA OKUL	/	SECONDARY SCHOOL
20. ÇARŞI MERKEZİ	/	SHOPPING CENTER
21. REKTÖR EVİ	/	PRESIDENT'S HOUSE
22. KORU	/	WOOD
23. MERASİM MEYDANI	/	CEREMONIAL SQUARE
24. ALLE (FORUM)	/	PEDESTRIAN ALLEY WAY (FORUM)

Figure 7.24: Index to the Çinici site plan (Source: *Altuğ-Behrüz Çinici, Mimar-Architect* (1964).



Figure 7.25: Emek building, Enver Tokay and Ayhan Tayman, Ankara, 1959-64. The Emek building was the first international style open-frame tower in Turkey that also utilized a curtain wall system (Source: Renata Holod, ed. *Turkish Modern Architecture*, 117).




Figure 7.26: Faculty and staff housing units, Erzurum Atatürk University, Behruz Çinici, Ayhan Tayman, Enver Tokay and Hayati Tabanlıoğlu, 1955-66 (Source: *Arkitekt* no. 3 (1966), 115).




Figure 7.28: Chemical Engineering Laboratories, Erzurum Atatürk University, Behruz Çinici, Ayhan Tayman, Enver Tokay and Hayati Tabanlıoğlu, 1955-66 (Source: *Arkitekt* no. 3 (1966), 110).




Figure 7.29: Aegean University site model, Perran Dođancı, Yılmaz Ergüvenç, Kadri İlal, Zafer Kocak, 1959 (Source: *Arkitekt* no. 3 (1959), 101).




Figure 7.30: Aegean University site model, aerial view, Perran Dođancı, Yılmaz Ergüvenç, Kadri İlal, Zafer Kocak, 1959 (Source: *Arkitekt* no. 3 (1959), 102).